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Summary
Musical eutopias offers positive critiques o f the socio-cultural aspects o f popular 
musics, the medium o f radio in general, and the British Broadcasting Corporation in 
particular. Marxian critiques of what ‘is’, together with normative, socialist visions of 
what ‘ought’ to be, are reviewed with reference to radio’s listening subjects and 
broadcasting ideals. Arguably, popular musics embraced by radio only offer a 
dystopian standardisation for a mass audience. However, it is mooted here that socio­
cultural knowledges mediated by a public service broadcaster can contribute 
positively to a subject’s negotiation o f modernity and the objective world.
The humanistic potentials of music and broadcasting are considered using two 
conceits: (1) Sir Thomas More’s diagnostic benchmark o f desired alternatives and 
perfection: Utopia; and (2) Utopia’s ‘desublimation’ in More’s quasi-antonymic term, 
eutopia which is an actual rite o f resources and relative goodness. To sift for music’s 
utopia and the eutopian aspects o f Theodor Adorno’s ‘music in radio’, the writings of 
Ernst Bloch, Herbert Marcuse and Jurgen Habermas are reassessed and joined by new 
utopian theory from Caryl Flinn, Stephen Eric Bronner and allied thinkers. The 
cultural and allegorical dimensions o f music, and the institutional histories and ideals 
o f the BBC are examined through the work o f Antonio Gramsci, Raymond W illiams, 
Michel Foucault, David Levin, Christopher Norris, Simon Frith, Georgina Bom and 
others.
A near-Kantian sensibility, imagination and understanding are argued to 
develop (after Marcuse) in the musical eutopias o f public broadcasting. There, a 
dialectic o f utopian musical desires, socio-political philosophies and independent 
professional agency promotes rich aesthetic content and an equitable discursive 
framework for all. The study concludes that such in-common, public service eutopias 
o f musical and moral dimensions are still o f value for subjects becoming rational, 
empathetic species beings. Such eutopias might even counter new media solipsism 
and any instrumentally driven calls for broadcast reform.
Thesis word total: 79,929.
Excludes indented quotations, footnotes, appendices, references and bibliography.
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PART ONE | Preliminaries
91 Introduction: Art &  promise, perfection & reality
Art cannot redeem its promise, and reality offers no promises, only chances.
Herbert Marcuse, The Aesthetic Dimension (1979,48)
Imagine all the people/Living life in peace/You may say I'm a dreamer, but I'm not the 
only one.
John Lennon, lyrical extract from the song Imagine, 1971
PHILOSOPHERS, SINGERS AND DREAMERS, alienated and frustrated by the socio-political realities o f their tim es, have long imagined and articulated alternatives to present conditions; but how to picture 
something better, how and where to begin to render actual change and fulfillment? 
If  the utopian promises of art (or song) in themselves fail to render emancipation, 
is it by engaging with the chances o f a concrete reality that we might begin deliver 
better things? For instance, might an imperfect public corporation o f culture like 
the British Broadcasting Corporation, with its technological reach, musical output 
and universal remit be regarded as a good place and space, a eutopia, or should 
we, after Ernst Bloch, a key critical thinker on music and Utopia, ignore its 
possible virtues and just continue to daydream and sing endlessly to ourselves in 
an unending lone search for a knowledge and freedom?1 Where might we 
effectively fuse art’s undoubted imaginary force with the technical forces o f a 
contemporary world? Is it possible to use music and broadcasting in concert as a 
point o f eutopian departure, helping us collectively to move away from present- 
day oppressions towards freer, happier lives where commercially-conceived 
audiences are replaced by critically alert, mutually respecting publics listening to 
music and to each other in a benign public space? Is the mature, listening subject
m 2only ever a directed social construct, a ‘‘well-tempered citizen consuming 
mediated, affirmative culture, or is s/he also an agent who can, in the presence of 
publicly shared musics, begin to think and act intersubjectively and with a rational 
freedom?
The above questions and utopian conceit may today seem romantic, naive 
or at best, metaphysical. However, it is important to understand that during its 
early development in the 1920s and 1930s, the BBC, British governments and
10
listening public clearly understood the social implications o f the new public 
service broadcaster’s rem it in respect o f the formation of a nationwide ‘space’ 
with amongst other modem features, unprecedented cultural juxtapositions. From 
the outset, British public service broadcasting was Paddy Scannell’s “unique 
totality”, possessing a “communicative intention” reflecting “public service as a 
cultural, moral and educative force for the improvement o f knowledge, taste and 
manners” (Scannell and Cardiff 1991, xi, 7). The BBC was, and still is, a place, a 
space and idea. M aterial, pragmatic and quasi-philosophical contexts, then and 
now, have shaped the production and reception o f BBC programming. Not just 
critical theorists, but agents within the BBC, critics and listeners have expressed 
strong opinion on the BBC’s cultural output The m erits and otherwise o f on-air 
musical culture are therefore explored in this study with sustained reference to the 
complex ambivalences o f critical theory, BBC history and to written views o f a 
contemporary BBC audience.
The study adopts the broad-based methods and perspectives o f critical 
theory, fusing concerns for the sociological apprehension and import o f culture, 
audiences and media, with philosophically situated readings o f the more enduring 
issues o f aesthetics, public ethics, self-knowledge and hope. It is joined by a case 
study o f a nationally broadcast and politically supported BBC Music Live event in 
2000 and the results of a qualitative questionnaire undertaken by a selection o f 
individuals attending a BBC Radio Wales music event in 2003 (See Appendix A). 
It is, in effect, a combination o f sociological delineation, history and philosophical 
concepts that explore the practical potentials o f the ‘is’ o f empirical reality and the 
‘ought’ o f normative philosophical aspiration.
More specifically, this study is driven by Kantian-inspired aesthetic and 
ethical concerns; by a dialectical, subject-object imperative inspired by Hegel 
(1807a) and by careful re-readings of critical theory’s socio-cultural analyses and 
normative impulses from Adorno to Habermas. Such an articulation o f observed 
social reality and prospective philosophy is achieved via sustained deployment of 
the utopian conceit to address desire, lack and social prospect as experienced in 
music, spatially arrayed through public service radio, and articulated through 
discourse and linguistic tropes.
This study, in short, seeks to expose more distinctly the utopian 
sensibilities hidden by the prevailing pessimism o f Adorno and Marcuse; shore-up
11
dialectical thought and intersubjectivity and assemble reasons for the continuance 
o f a humanistic, non-instrumental public radio, manifested intermittently in the 
activity o f the BBC. Underscoring this aim throughout are three propositions.
1.1 Three propositions
(1) Language, discourse and discussiveness are ever-present features o f musical 
dissemination, reception and interpretation. They play a significant part in the 
‘meta-musical’ articulation o f utopian and eutopian conditions, critiques and 
potentials in music’s presence. Utopian discourse can be deployed to comprehend 
the character and value o f all musics (serious and popular) as a locale o f anterior 
recollections and anticipatory prospects. It can also be revised with reference to 
public service music radio to become an ‘inclusivist’, ‘here and now’ eutopian 
reality and spatially situated process o f intersubjectivity. Such meta-musical 
readings are played out across this study, but are given particular attention in 
PART THREE, Chapter 6.
(2) M usics per se and broadcast music constitute mediating substrates o f 
subjectificadon and intersubjectivity. Such mediation can be o f two kinds: (a) a 
negative socialization of passive audiences: one o f false promise and 
instrumentality (typified by Adorno’s conception o f the culture industry) or (b) 
one o f a more positive social potential o f Adomian “debarbarisation” and 
improved socio-cultural “navigation” for an engaged public (Adorno 2006a, 99). 
The latter is arguably identified in and informed by the intellectual history, social 
reality and agent-led practices of the likes o f the BBC. W hilst a constant theme, 
intersubjectivity is given particular attention in PART THREE, Chapter 7. 
Reference to the BBC and intersubjectivity is to be found throughout this study, 
but sustained articulation o f its role as a space of positive cultural array is offered 
in PART THREE, Chapter 8.
(3) W hilst tire negative dialectics and critiques o f Adorno et al still dominate 
much theoretical cultural analysis and discourse, this study proposes that the 
positive utopian gleams present in their work, are perhaps too often overlooked. It 
examines such tendencies, situates them in relation to Kant and Hegel, but, contra
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Adorno et al, seeks a less ambiguous position in relation to particulars and hopes 
to locate conditions for, and moments of, a “positive dialectic of enlightenment” 
(Sherratt, 2002, 16). In these positive utopian traces, we can perhaps observe a 
fragile thread running between unalloyed prewar optimism and dialectical 
utopianism (W eill 1993, Mannheim 1960) and postwar, post-Adomian critical 
utopian thought (Harvey 2000, Levitas 2001). Such positive traces are set out in 
PART TWO, Chapters 4 and 5 and in PART THREE.
1.2 C entral thesis
Peel’s radio show was [...] a place to go where every person who listened felt 
welcomed into a fairer, warmer world, one in which anybody who felt they had 
something musical to say could say it, and be heard. A community not built on 
commercialism or hierarchy. A John Peel fan, John Peel homepage: 
www.bbc.co.uk. November 1 2004
Arguably, popular musics are a social institution for individual and collective 
expression, participation and becoming. Such musics are doubly effective when 
mediated, shared, engendered and framed by public service radio. This can effect 
a wider subjectification, intersubjectivity, representation and social emancipation. 
Though neither popular musics nor public service radio constitute a utopia,
3
they can combine to figure what we might term ‘sites o f felicity’ (eutopias). 
M usical material offers the Don-linguistic surplus, which, when set within public 
service discourse and programme ‘flow’ initiates critical articulation. This can 
transcend the socio-economic ‘system’ and ideological baggage from within as 
part o f a still vital public sphere. Music and radio may not be the sole components 
o f any immanent social transcendence, but they may be reasonable points o f 
departure affording answers to Kantian questions o f knowledge, conduct and 
hope. This is no idealistic proposal but more a Fabianist one.4 Even in the 
presence o f political reality and the ideological cooption o f culture, hegemonic 
forces by their very nature, have to admit independence and reflexivity within 
their walls to preserve credibility and enjoy cultural energy from ‘counter- 
cultural’ sources.
Here, in contrast to any absolute, utopian ambition o f exclusion or 
insularity, additive, inclusivist, aspirations thrive in a place o f intersubjective
13
processes and are thus a ‘eutopia’ amplifying the imaginary through its own 
constructions o f popular musics, representation, and discursive reflection. In short, 
after the likes o f W illiam Wordsworth and G. W. F. Hegel ‘our better selves’ are 
mediated (formed) here and now by the institutional spaces of an ethical public 
body as the hopes and desires o f the subject are educated.
13  Perspectives, concepts, themes
W hilst as human beings we all desire, think, imagine and act as individual 
persons, we are, in sociological trams, subjects formed by unconscious impulses, 
material needs and the external forces o f history and society (cf. Giddens, 1993). 
Dialectical encounters with affairs as they actually are, and others through 
fam ilial, paternal and proxy institutions, introduces us to a rich socio-cultural and 
linguistic brew o f some potential. We are not discrete, essential subjects, but 
sociological subjects with urges, frustrations and intentions, conditioned by 
interactions with the family, schooling, current cultural forms and social contexts. 
Listening to the music o f others affords us perspectives on, and potentials for, 
empathy, imitation and change.
How does philosophy read this? For Hegel, state institutions o f a nation 
operated as a rational locale for the progressive development o f the self-contained 
subject. Hegel’s mature work moved from descriptive historical considerations to 
speak o f an idealist philosophy which saw the estranged mind o f a human being 
work dialectically toward a final identification with Mind, a ‘metaphysical state’ 
o f Absolute proportions and insights. Marxism preserved this general dialectic of 
interaction as a mechanism o f ‘becoming’, but instead, posited a m aterialist 
account o f a human alienation, not from an otherworldly Mind, but from nature 
and from others which might be resolved as a free, mundane identity, through a 
dialectical movement towards an ordinary, but true consciousness achieved 
through agency and historically-situated change. Moreover, the state was given 
litde or no credence in this M arxist liberation. In the hands o f critical theorists 
(Max Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse) psychoanalytic, aesthetic and cultural 
analyses joined m aterialist accounts and normative critiques o f a subject’s 
domination, highlighting the alienating effects sustained by a standardising
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‘culture industry’ and administering institutions. For these critical theorists, 
commercially produced deception in the arts and entertainment, allied to the 
distorting, phantasmagoric reach of the mass media corrupted any epistemological 
and ethical imperative which might have emancipated the individual subject. 
Moreover, in the 1930s, the possibility of a benign Hegelian state authority had 
become, in Germany at least, the reality of totalitarian power using art and 
technology to extend its control over their people, extinguishing all positive 
possibilities. All that remained for Western Marxist thinkers was a hope for 
change: the hope of a technologically resolved life; the hope invested in a body of 
avant-garde art, and a hope for a decisive withering of any state-administered, 
socio-cultural sphere.
As subjects, our sense of a ‘better se lf works with objective reality and a 
kind of psychoanalytical ‘reality principle’ to transform needs and desires 
aesthetically experienced, into reflection and comprehension on the part of us all 
as highly diverse individual beings.5
Intersubjectivity
Following Hegel and Crossley (1996), intersubjectivity is understood to be a 
dialectical process of socialisation and enculturation for those individual beings as 
they encounter the objective world which includes other subjects. It also implies a 
mutual recognition through agreement in the presence of an objective material and 
social world. An example of near Kantian, intersubjective sentiment comes from 
writer Nick Homby reflecting on the central place of music in his life:
I was sitting in a doctor’s waiting-room the other day, and four little Afro- 
Caribbean girls patiently sitting out their mother’s appointment, suddenly 
launched into Nelly Furtado’s song [I’m Like a Bird]. They were word-perfect 
and they had a couple of dance moves, and they sang with enormous appetite and 
glee, and I liked it that we had something in common temporarily; I felt as though 
we all lived in the same world, and that doesn’t happen so often. (2003,20-21)
Adomo characteristically expressed something similar in a less sentimental 
fashion several decades earlier, and found:
In its proper place, even epistemologically, the relationship of subject and object 
would lie in the realisation of peace among men as well as between men and their
15
Other. Peace is the state of distinction without domination, with the distinct 
participating in each other. (2000c, 500)
In response to first generation critical theory, Musical eutopias seeks to 
develop a defence of popular musics6 and public service radio in relation to 
intersubjectivity without entirely ignoring perennial debates such as cultural 
domination and socio-political legitimacy. The views of one individual questioned 
in a minor qualitative data questionnaire for this study (see Appendix A) provides 
some support for a positive view of popular musics, even as they veer close to a 
near-visceral antipathy to commercialised music which would have found 
sympathy with Adorno:
I am close to losing all faith in popular music. Never before have I seen freedom 
of artistic expression so choked and stifled by the opinions of cocaine-fuelled 
London muso types who are prepared to sacrifice integrity, talent and the joy of 
live performance to the safe haven and guaranteed profit margin that the market 
system provides. [...] If the BBC can stand as even a temporary bulwark against 
this cancerous growth then it is not just valid, but vital.
Questionnaire respondent number 124, attending The Big Buzz: a live music 
event staged in Cardiff Bay and broadcast by BBC Radio Wales, July 27 2003
[Hereafter: (Big Buzz respondent no. [ ], 2003)]
Yet can the modem civil polity with its imperfect bureaucracies and socio-cultural
7
institutions like that of public service radio really assist in this task? Can it 
continue to hold its own, preserve and promote the best of all cultures, and an 
abstract humanitarian ambition amid the imperfect particulars of the instrumental 
world? How might music, politics and philosophy combine to construct rational, 
cultured individuals as subject and society meet? There is always the danger of a 
banal tuning-in to other cultures, but preserving particulars and the scepticism of 
critical thought, we ourselves can avoid the pitfalls of dominating tendencies 
towards others and the Other. This last term, whilst not addressed in a sustained 
way is of value and to be understood in the context of Hegelian subject-object 
relations and works with the idea that the Other is one of a radical, prior alterity. 
The Otherness of others however can be ethically addressed via common aesthetic
g
and intellectual grounds.
Musical eutopias then seeks to evaluate popular musics and broadcast 
spaces in response to these problems of intersubjective activity. It supports the
16
view that there is a continuing need for a bulwark against pseudo-individuated 
narrowcasting and instrumentally forced deregulation whereby all music and 
associated discourses might remain fully public as significant subjectifying and 
intersubjective components.
Utopia & eutopia
Unable to effect social progress from within the polity, many socio-political 
images and critiques have appeared in the form of critical literary works like 
Plato’s dialogue, The Republic of c.380 B.C (1955), and Sir Thomas More’s
9
Utopia o f 1516 (1965). As allegorical figurations of legal, political and social 
perfection, they are now to be viewed as precursors of the normative socialist 
utopias and socio-economic and political critiques of later centuries.10
It is the sixteenth-century Latin allegory Utopia of More: lawyer, member 
of Parliament, envoy and writer, which initiated a literary genre that has informed 
much socialist thought and which initiated the conceit of eutopia at work in this 
thesis. In consulting More’s Utopia (1965) and The Second Edition o f the Oxford 
English Dictionary (1989), we see that in his original Latin text of 1516, More 
played with Latinised Greek homonyms: utopia (utopos - noplace) and eutopia 
(ewtopos] -a good or well-place. The OED defines eutopia thus: “A region of ideal 
happiness or good order”. It quotes from R. Robinson’s second English edition of 
1556: “wherfore [sic] not Utopie, but rather rightly My name is Eutopie, a place of 
felicitie.”11 In Louis Marin’s study of utopics, this is rendered as “place of 
happiness” (1984, 91). Line five of the poem in More’s Utopia from the Poet 
Laureate Anemolius, translates eutopia as not a mythic, Platonic republic, but a 
real place comprising “viris et opibus, optimisque legibus” i.e. “men, resources 
and excellent laws” (Marin 1984,92).12
The utopian trope per se emerged then with the literary Utopia of More. 
This now well-known conceit of a perfect, far off place, or an impossible reality 
became, in subsequent centuries, a socialist device in diverse quarters, connoting a 
normative vision of an attainable, ethically better place and time. More’s island 
was notionally extant as a place, albeit a distant one. It could, for the purposes of 
More’s story, be reached under sail. Subsequent interpretations have transformed 
Utopia into a regime that is nowhere other than in the future. As either far away
17
place or future temporal space, the intellectual conceit of an ideal socio-political 
situation has inspired writers and fuelled socialist utopian thinking. In ‘designing’ 
other places and other times, it is both a better past and a better future that are 
viewed inspirationally from the present Importantly, nothing can be figured, 
proposed or changed, without us setting forth from where we are now.
The semantic precision and allegorical richness o f a literary utopian 
narrative like E. Bellamy’s Looking Backward (1888) and those discussed in 
Alexander and Gill (1984) have a substantial amount o f immanent utopian 
material built on semantic, figurative detail, inviting any reader so disposed to 
decode the extended metaphors and allegories to effect social critique.
Utopian studies are now extensive and diverse (Alexander and Gill, 1984; 
Levitas 1990; Goodwin 2001), but it is within the socialist ambit of a return to 
reinvigorated, non-literary utopian thought running from the abstract and concrete 
utopias o f Ernst Bloch (1995) through the Frankfurt School to David Harvey 
(2000) that this study largely remains. What all utopias do, to a greater or lesser 
extent, be they literary, abstract or concrete is to exist as systematic figurations of 
better places; sites of Bloch’s anticipatory ‘traces’; that proffer a “experience of 
lack” (Levitas 1999), or otherwise operate as “a crucial vector of desire” 
(Williams 1980b, 199) in the absence of historical development. These are 
potentials which tap into individual and collective hopes, imaginations, discontent 
or somatic impulse and are thus socially-constructed to an extent through 
language. An awareness of changing desires is important in understanding any and 
all utopian and eutopian proposals. Sean Homer for instance observes that 
Jameson sees utopian thought today in its more provisional, (perhaps near- 
eutopian) form as a means to transformative politics (Homer 1998, 7). Here, 
eutopia is to be understood as a site of transformative aesthetics, and linguistic and 
conceptual discourse which may change consciousness and later instigate action.
Of some relevance at this point is social theorist Karl Mannheim (1960). 
He preserved the concern for the alienated, individual subject with alternative 
personal visions, but also took utopian conceit, theory and speculation a little 
further into a utopian, situated reality when he wrote Ideology and Utopia in 1936. 
In this account of utopian and ideological aspects of the sociology of knowledge, 
he was to explicate one eutopian idea now at work in the present study, namely 
the need for the active participation of agents of change amid social realities. He
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wrote “A state of mind is utopian when it is incongruous with the state of reality 
with which it occurs” (1960, 173). Here we see Mannheim’s combined interest in 
an individual’s conscious sense of dissatisfaction, and his awareness of the 
imposition of social ideologies which offer false pictures to society to legitimise 
and stabilise present regimes. Mannheim wrote however that it was not:
[His] intention [...] to establish purely abstractly and theoretically some sort of 
arbitrary relationship between existence and utopia, but rather if possible to do 
justice to the concrete fullness of the historical and social transformation of 
utopian in a given period [and that] the relation between utopia and the existing 
order turns out to be a ‘dialectical one’. (1960, 179)
So, we can usefully position a eutopia as a locale of intellectual and material 
departure driven by desire and mediated by agents.
Musical eutopias
How do we move from utopias and eutopia as a general intellectual and linguistic 
device to this study’s musical eutopias? More’s etymological play with the 
homophonic terms ou-topia (no place) and eu-topia (a good, happy place) and 
Mannnheim's thought allows us to consider the possibility of the latter being an 
extant place, a provisional site of social betterment we might discern and describe, 
not merely propose. Musical eutopias particularly identifies a locale wherein the 
processes of becoming: dialectical self-development and intersubjectivity (the 
acknowledgement of and agreement with others) occurred through the cognitive, 
pleasurable experiences afforded by culture and music per se, which was shared, 
engendered and framed by the technology and discourses of public service radio.
Public service radio has been, at times, a legitimizing site for affirmative 
culture. But as a eutopian ‘space’ of representation, pleasure and fulfillment, it is 
also one of debate and praxis, pointing us beyond our current experiences, 
descriptions and knowledges of a static, ‘here and now’ - what has been termed an 
‘is’ - to direct us all to a normative, socialist ‘ought’ of humanistic alternatives. 
Hegel in his The Conception o f Artistic Beauty tells us that there’s an antagonism 
between an earthly what is, and an ideal, what ought to be, and that art and 
philosophy have a role in expressing and exploring this antagonism which can 
only be a sublated truth in their mutual mediation:
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We see man a prisoner in common reality [...] entangled in matter, in sensuous 
aims and their enjoyments; on the other side, he exalts himself to eternal ideas, to 
a realm of thought and freedom [...] Such a discrepancy in life and consciousness 
involves for modem culture and its understanding the demand that the 
contradiction should be resolved. (Hegel 1993, LXXin 60)
Music’s ‘powers ’
Given its centrality in the manipulation of affect, social formation, and the 
constitution of identity, music is far too important a phenomenon not to talk 
about, even if the most important questions cannot be definitively settled by 
means of objective, positivistic methodologies. For music is always a political 
activity, and to inhibit criticism of its effects for any reason is likewise a political 
act. (McClaiy 2002,26)
The exposure of music’s ‘truths’: its contingent, historical formation; its tendency, 
whether radical or orthodox, to be afifirmatory and thus lacking in critical power; 
its cooption as solace and its construction of escape while devoid of actual 
transformative value are concerns found in the work of Adorno.
Music certainly cannot be regarded a field divorced from history and 
politics - yet for traditional musicologists and many genteel audiences (consider 
the BBC’s own Henry Wood Promenade Concerts) it had, in the face of modem 
social, cultural and technological developments, retreated to an autonomous, 
aesthetic realm.13 This assumed epistemological and social evacuation of music 
should, by rights render music valueless and without meaning or consequence. 
Yet it is its emotive power and accessibility (consider again the Promenade series 
and The Last Night o f The Proms) that exposes it to control and recuperation, both 
by hegemonically motivated forces and by cultural transgressors. As Adomo
14concluded, music is indeed art and social fact (Adomo 1997, 304). Music is a 
rarefied art form of disinterested creative play, but undeniably it is also a socially 
potent institution amongst Marcuse’s “established order of things” (1972, 95). It is 
not an unmediated, ‘second nature’ entity, and its socially imbricated condition 
sharpens its desirability amongst musical audiences as a force for stasis or change.
Adomo, in spite of being materialist, socialist and perforce, a dialectician, 
was, when it came to musics, a lapsed dialectician. He never overtly sought to 
dampen his predominant critiques of things popular, nor reconcile his 
observations and diagnoses in respect of serious musics and the culture industry.
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As is known, his social and aesthetic theory asserted that serious and popular 
musics were the tom halves of an integral, pre-industrial freedom; his cultural 
criticism judged popular musical forms to be bankrupt. Adorno’s ‘serious music’ 
on the other hand supposedly represented for him an autonomous, universal 
substance of Culture for people in which diverse minds could perceive and grow. 
Via the aesthetic, a social Truth might emerge allowing subjects to transcend the 
‘here and now’. The popular was for him, a corrupted music that was surely once 
o f people - a one time folk music that had been coopted by the technology and 
commerce of a capitalist modernity. This is where Adorno’s dialectical nature is 
found wanting slightly.
Adorno’s passing attention paid to the residual glimmer of utopian hope in 
the popular was but a faint echo of a more robust view developed by Bloch and 
Marcuse and later refined by Fredric Jameson (2000a) and British scholarship.
We should continue to scrutinise the popular musics of both culture 
industry and public service broadcasting to ask what is their ‘truth content’? Do 
they ‘lie’ - as Adomo would have it - and in so doing reveal the truth about an 
absent freedom? Might they invoke lost freedoms, ‘lack’ and a sense of the 
Blochian ‘not yet’? Might we, (after Roland Barthes, 1977c) hold musical works 
in language to articulate their utopian content and frame them as allegorical texts 
capable o f continual re-interpretation?
There exists an intersubjective route of personal growth ‘through music’, 
an intermittent succession of brief, particularised insights happening under the 
rubric of a publicly formulated concern for universality. This is because music is 
an art which mediates between what Norris (1989b, 317) calls “the otherwise 
insurmountable split between thought and perception, subject and object, concepts 
and sensuous intuitions.”15 We should be able to join musical and broadcast agents 
to form our own critical readings. As Marcuse said in one response during a 
question and answer session following his The End o f Utopia lecture:
The interstices within the established society are still open, and one of the most 
important tasks is to make use of them to die full. (1970c, 77)
These interstices are Marcuse’s ‘chances’, and radio arguably constitutes one of 
them.
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Radio, subjectivity & community
Radio, as the first live mass medium, coopted music as a ‘draw’ for its national 
and international ‘listeners-in’. Today we too often take radio for granted; it is a 
commonplace, ‘secondary medium’.16 In reality it offers an intimacy, a personal 
address and a local platform, but is also a public space, and a national and 
international socio-cultural arena connecting government with the governed; 
individual with wider community and society. On air a nation can speak to itself. 
We apprehend radio in this ocularcentric world of ours with the ear - the organ of 
night time alertness and wonder. Our ears reach out through the radio to an 
objective world of other subjects. This is perhaps radio at its best.
It is encouraging to note that radio and broadcast scholarship has gathered 
pace in the past four decades or so, to counter dismissive notions of radio’s minor 
status to posit a thoroughgoing historical and theoretical critique of the medium 
which constitutes a legitimising and lively academic literature (For example: 
Briggs (1961), (1965), (1995); Scannell and Cardiff (1991); Barnard (1989), 
Chapman (1992), Berland (1993), Gamham (1995), Hendy (2000) and Rayner, 
(2001).
Tuned-in we can all, at least in theory, meet and communicate with 
everyone else. Indeed the directness of today’s phone-in dialogues and incessant, 
live news updates on most radio stations may be argued to be a more irresistible 
mode of engagement with government and the public sphere than even the most 
popular o f musical programming. Nevertheless, music on air has a continuing role 
in the processes of selfhood and intersubjectivity and, most importantly remains 
the site, not only of the dissemination of contemporary popular musics but 
frequently also their constitution.
Music radio offers domesticed cultural intimacy for listeners and public 
exposure for participants. It is thus private and local, authentic and immediate, 
particularly in the broadcasting of new recordings and performances. With 
reference to Adorno’s reservations about transmissions being always “especially 
for you” (1998c, 43), it is, at the same instant - and largely because of this 
seductive form of address - a somewhat deceitful, insincere entity, acting in the 
important commercial arm of an international record industry and mass media 
organisations.
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All this and more is eloquently set out by Frith who is worth quoting at some 
length:
I think of radio as the most important twentieth-century medium. Clearly the 
record industry depended on radio for its commercial growth, but radio used 
recordings in a context that was clearly public [...] It was [...] trying to put 
together some sense of community [...] People are individuals, but always in the 
context of wanting to be part of something else. Radio to this day is a way of 
feeling part of a broader conversation, a wider community. The fact that you 
don’t know what is going to be played to you next on a good music programme, 
you literally don’t know how it’s going to fit with how you’re feeling, means that 
you are having to think about what you’re doing as a listener in the context of 
other people. Radio has done that much more significantly than any other 
medium. Frith in Oliver (ed.) (1999,263)
Musical experiences can, with associated discursive glosses, be ‘recovered’ and 
shared through broadcast practices wherein intersubjectivity at both community 
and international levels combine to effect a clear comprehension of (1) our natural 
selves (the somatic); (2) our socio-political selves (the ideological) and, with an 
understanding of Otherness, (3) our moral and ethical selves. Ideologically loaded 
meanings and beliefs in affirmative culture influence and bind us, but - as will be 
argued - they can also spur independence and contestation around which
17alternative readings, voices, and visions are raised. The exact forms, relevance 
and ideological gravity of broadcasting have already been widely debated by 
international delegates in radio study conferences around the globe, attesting to its 
humanistic potentials.1*
1.4 Evaluation, control & reproduction of public culture
Intellectual ‘worry’ about music’s power to control and weave myth, or expose 
truth and foster goodness in the hands of institutions with access to the public has 
an interesting history. Adorno’s concern for the use of culture and the loudspeaker 
in the public sphere - by state or industry - touches on some older and wider issues 
and debates. From Plato to Hegel, from Thomas More to Matthew Arnold, and 
from mid twentieth-century dictators to postwar democracies, discussion of such 
matters as music’s influence, individual fulfillment, cultural leadership, public 
education and civic enlightenment have peppered the margins and subtexts of
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19Western philosophy, the arts and mass communication discourses. In short,
culture is a social medium of significance and influence and is thus prone to
20contestation for political gain. Cooption and usage of creative agency glossed by
social and political philosophy are manifest in the state-institutions and cultural
21policies of many modem polities. The polity o f the United Kingdom has indeed
recently registered a number of keenly contested debates on the direction and
22value of public institutions and public projects.
Plato’s critique of poetry’s rhetorical and aesthetic enchantments as 
obstructions to independent reason, and his judgments of music’s moral power, 
when set before the young may be said to prefigure many of the concerns of 
Adomo. O f course, Plato was thinking about auratic, directly shared 
performances, not technologically mediated ones. But when we compare bardic 
delivery (and sometimes screened-off, acousmatic delivery in Greek theatre) and 
live radio transmissions that concerned Adomo, the distance between them is not
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so great. Adomo never accepted that ‘radio’ literally and metaphorically means a 
direct, (apparently ‘immediate’) line of live transmission from musician to listener 
which might be real rather than simply realistic, non-rhetorical and non- 
seductive.24 Adorno’s difficulty was of course with the modem fusion of art, 
commerce and politics which, for him could only result in aesthetic distortion and 
political deception; he never accepted that they too might be reconciled in a finer 
balance of independent creativity and well-meaning dissemination. Interestingly, 
what Plato and Adomo did have in common, was a concern for the presence or 
absence of legitimate authority and moral probity in those ‘philosophers’, whom 
we would term ‘cultural agents’.
It was very clearly the political cast and economic rationale of the 
broadcast media which most troubled Adomo in the twentieth century. His views 
have been extended by Stuart Hall writing of popular culture and state 
broadcasting in 1980s Britain. Hall concluded that “hegemony” was “to become 
increasingly reliant, in mass democracies, on the enlarged cultural role of the 
state” (1986b, 48). Similar concerns still trouble many today with questions about 
its narrow control and usage of media channels for cultural output.25 Certainly, 
whilst class exclusion and cultural bias may be just two of many criticisms leveled 
at the BBC, the hegemonic tendencies and imperatives of the corporation do, in
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some measure admit of the representation of groups underrepresented elsewhere, 
and thus encourages a positive critique of the extant and indeed allows this study 
to value to the monitored, subtle and relatively autonomous constitutional status 
of that particular creature of the British state and polity, the BBC. Ultimately, it is 
issues of state intervention; social legitimacy and value that determine the breadth, 
character and probity of subjectification and intersubjectivity through the ether. 
Such issues are addressed in the final part o f this study in relation to Habermas’s 
turn to legal philosophy as a means of prescribing ethical commnication.
26Music, electricity & radio as ‘a working social power ’
One important critique of music and radio to be considered is Theodor W. 
Adorno’s somewhat ambivalent and hitherto unpublished Current o f Music: 
Elements o f a radio theory (Adomo, 2006a). It was begun in the late 1930’s and 
was shaped significantly by Adorno’s concern for the aesthetic consequences, 
phenomenological reception and psychological impact of administered, 
technologically-mediated music. Published by Suhrkamp from the Adomo 
Archive, it is a posthumous, edited assembly of Adorno’s published articles on 
popular musics and radio, and his unpublished writings on the same; the whole 
generated as a methodological and theoretical response to his collaboration with 
Paul F. Lazarsfeld and others for the wartime Princeton Radio Research Project. 
Current o f Music was planned and part drafted in 1938-9 by Adomo and offered 
as an outline proposal to Oxford University Press in 1940. Current o f Music’s 
rudimentary phenomenology of radio listening for those familiar with C. Shannon 
and W. Weaver’s post-war information theory for Bell Laboratories (1949), and 
those familiar with high fidelity stereophonic reproduction or digital 
narrowcasting and podcasts will see, at best, a work driven by an individual, 
curious and fearful in the face of the increasingly mundane technological ability to 
disseminate music and voices across the ether. Adomo in his A Social Critique o f 
Radio Music (1945) reflected on his wartime radio research in the United States 
and commented on commercially-skewed investigations into radio, characterising 
it as no more than an “administrative technique” geared to assessing (for 
exploitative purposes) the manipulating influence of music radio on the masses. 
He contrasted this instrumental perspective with what his colleague Lazarsfeld,
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(according to Adorno) “calls benevolent administrative research, putting questions 
such as, ‘how can we bring good music to as large a number of listeners as 
possible?’ ” (Adorno 1945,272), an encouraging instance of Adorno’s willingness 
never to cease probing music and radio technology for latent qualities and 
opportunities.
It was not only Adomo who was fascinated by music and electricity fused 
together by the new techniques of electrical recording, amplification and 
transmission in the late-1920s and 1930s. In Britain, the first Director General of 
the BBC, John Charles Walsham Reith, Baron (1889-1971), also saw electricity 
and music as the essence of the new public service for which he had prime 
responsibility. Anthony Smith recalls the occasion of “Reith interviewing a 
nervous undergraduate who says he is not proficient in music or electricity ‘then 
you are applying for the wrong job’ said Reith ‘for those are the two things with
27which the BBC is principally concerned. Music and Electricity’ ” (1986,1).
Adorno’s radio theory is condemnatory of its technocratic control and 
impoverished content, the latter being Adorno’s “what” of radio (2006a, 77), but 
he is not necessarily dismissive of its potentials and technology per se - his ‘how’ 
of radio still held out, in true Marxist fashion, a means of transforming the quality 
of people’s lives (2006a, 77). Adomo wrote: “Radio was not invented ‘for the 
sake’ of monopolistic society” (2006a, n. 1, 148). He also wrote that “The 
stubborn condemnation of mechanically reproduced music would deprive it of 
possibilities which, no matter how it may be criticised, should be developed and 
improved with the help of criticism”, and added that he was not trying “to save an 
island of genuine and live music against the threatening seas of mechanisation and 
reification” [but was wanting to confront this development, rather than flee to any 
remote] “cultural islands [and wanted to remain in order to effect] better 
navigation” (2006a, 102). This is realism and ambition given further impetus in 
the pages that follow.
In Current o f Music, Adomo had laid down a critique of what, in a letter to
<28
Benjamin he had termed the question of “music in radio It is Adorno’s 
theoretical insights and critical readings of broadcast music as “musical 
reproduction” (2006a, 97) which this study seeks to address and try to (re)invest
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popular musics (commercial and autonomous), radio and service practices of the 
postwar period with an optimistic gloss he himself would never fully articulate.
What then of a more positive reading of broadcast music? In the 1920s, the 
transmission via electromagnetic radio waves of culture, news, commerce and 
politics to large numbers of mass-manufactured radio sets became a common 
place, not least in the homes of Europe and North America.29 Acting as a 
mediating locale between domestic privacy and public intercourse, radio, as a 
instrument of ‘direct’ engagement, cultural exposure and socio-political influence, 
soon became a communicative tool of veneration for several radical artists and 
thinkers, and it is these responses that serve as one point of historical reference for
30this study of music and radio.
Musical places & the spaces o f British public service broadcasting
What place for public service radio today? As new digital broadcast technologies 
are being set in place and new commercial paradigms begin to dominate, radio 
listening figures in the United Kingdom have increased.31 Meanwhile, long- 
running debates about the funding and content of public service broadcasting have 
recently assumed the character of a serious economic and socio-philosophical end 
game.32 Witness the scrutiny in 2004-05 of the BBC’s 2006 Royal Charter 
renewal, intensified for many by the bitter Gilligan-Kelly affair between
33Government and the BBC. Residual respect and an awareness of public 
sentiment toward the corporation have meant that commercial and governmental 
pressures on the corporation have been less than might have been anticipated. 
However, recent debate about matters of truthful representation and of trust has 
surfaced together with the announcement in July 2007, that the radio consortium 4 
Digital - led by Channel 4 - Britain’s other public service broadcaster has won the 
second national Digital Audio Broadcasting (DAB) radio licence and will run 
some ten entertainment and news stations. These latest incidents and 
developments will again invite external and internal scrutiny of the BBC’s 
policies and raison d ’etre.
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1.5 Summary
This study seeks to draw upon both Frankfurt School and postwar Anglophone 
cultural theory and criticism to contend that music and its accompanying 
discourse can, on air, effect a praxis and a linguistically based intersubjectivity. 
Such communicative action educates subjects through cultural diversity and an 
ethical response to the Other. Using Kantian and Hegelian notions; Blochian and 
other utopian tropes; Adorno’s late reappraisal o f radio; Marcuse’s aesthetic 
theory and Habermas’s accounts of the public sphere34 (as part of an ethically 
maintained life-world), this thesis will argue that a process of imagining, 
reflecting and ‘becoming’ for self and society can offer Stephen Eric Bronner’s 
Mannheimian “immanent transcendence” for society and individual (Bronner, 
1994, 350), whereby the utopian assumes a role as a conceptual ‘yardstick’ of 
goodness against which the present can be ‘measured’ and where necessary 
modified using existing eutopian resources and people.
There are, of course, strong arguments dismissing the possibility of 
experiencing or even articulating conceptions of human Identity, ‘authenticity’, 
knowledge and freedom, particularly in the channels of any constitutionally- 
framed and regulated system of public broadcasting. Arguments suggesting that 
these spaces can be dismissed as class-excluding and class-inflected conceptions 
are certainly acknowledged, however, in exploring the possibility of ‘good 
places’, with Amoldian examples of ‘the best’ in play for all to witness (Arnold, 
1993), this thesis gives equal consideration to socio-philosophical perspectives 
that might propose the existence of, or at the very least a need for a creative, 
critical sphere effected through the ether. Moreover, public service broadcasting is 
a spatial locale where, at the point of reception, capitalist exchange values have 
been historically at some distance from the activity of broadcasting and listening 
per se. Far from there being a dead hand of centralisation doing the bidding of 
capitalism and a global record industry, public service radio can still foster an 
arena for positive cultural developments - genuine experimentation and risk - 
which commercial organisations have yet to match. It is for us all to judge the 
continuing value of the BBCs and the public service model as new media hasten 
to undermine the qualities of broadcasting.
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Notes
1. Bloch wrote of a primitive, pre-socialised condition whereby we ignore the outside world 
hearing only ourselves “As endless singing-to-oneself’ (1985,1).
2. Cf. Miller (1993).
3. As some might argue, the distant, ideal ‘best’ has long been the enemy of that which is currently 
‘good’.
4. The Fabian Society was founded in London in 1884. It argues for gradualist socialism and 
change from within die establishment A Fabian maxim: “Remould it nearer to the heart’s desire” 
appears in a stained glass window in Beatrice Webb House depicting Sidney Webb and G. B Shaw 
hammering a globe on an anvil. See www.modjoum.brown.edu/Essays/Fabianism/htm.
5. The notion of ‘better selves’ occurs in several places in this study and in relation to the ‘I’ is 
touched on by Inwood (1992, 121) with a passing reference to “his better self (besseres Ich)n 
which whilst Hegelian, almost invokes a Freudian notion of a directing super-ego.
6. Hie term popular musks is adopted and used whenever diverse musical practices, traditions and 
functions need be taken into consideration that are demotically produced and consumed, either 
within or beyond the standard catalogues of contemporary commercial sounds. For further 
definition see Appendix B. Cf. also Dalhaus (1998).
7. Public service broadcasting is cogently defined by O’Sullivan as the “provision of radio and 
television channels as public goods rather than private commodities [...] as national cultural 
institutions dedicated to extending public resources of information, representation and 
entertainment In the UK context, the ‘core’ components of public service broadcasting have 
tended to include the following principles. First as a public service, broadcasting should be 
universally available to all citizens and attempt to cater for diversity as well as unity within the 
national culture and its communities. Second, the service should be financed and accountable [...] 
which allows for the [...] insulation of broadcasters from die vested interests of governments, 
political parties, commercial or corporate power. Finally, the services provided should be of good 
‘quality’ and responsive to the needs of all groups in modem culture regardless of their power, 
status or influence. The erosion of this facility is understood as a political weakening of an 
important historical right of citizenship as well as an index of modem social and cultural 
fragmentation” O’Sullivan et al (1994,251-2).
8. For a fuller discussion of Otherness, see Levinas (2003).
9. More wrote and published Utopia whilst in The Low Countries. Its printing was overseen by 
Erasmus. It was first translated into English by Ralph Robinson in 1551.
10. For example: Frederick Engels’ Pamphlet entitled Socialism: Utopian and Sckntifc of 1876 
(1995), and William Morris’s News from Nowhere of 1890 (1986). For a general discussion of the 
utopian see Alexander (1984).
11. F elkity  is defined thus by The Oxford English Dktionary: “1. The state of being happy; 2. 
That which causes or promotes happiness; a sources of happiness, a blessing; prosperity, good 
fortune, success. 4; A happy faculty in art or speech”.
12. See the passage from the verse penned by More which prefixes Utopia (1516) and entitled: 
Hexastkhon Anemolii Poete Laureati. It reads, in part “ Vtopia proscis dkta  ob infrequentiam, 
nunc ciuitatis aemula Platonicae [...] Eutopia merito sum vocanda nomine.” The Poet Laureate’s 
lines are translated by Turner (More, 1965, 27) as: “NOPLACIA [utopia] was one my name/That 
is, a place where no one goes/Plato’s republic now I claim/To match, or beat at its own game/For 
that was just a myth in prose/But what he wrote of, I became/Of men, wealth, laws a solid frame/A 
place where every wise man goes:/GOPLACIA [eutopia] is now my name” More (1965,27).
13. See generally Leppert and McClary (1987) for challenges to this assumed autonomy.
14. In respect of social fact: Paddison tells us that “Adomo uses the term ‘social fact’ (fait social) 
in the sense given to it by Durkheim and other ‘founding fathers’ of sociology.” That is, following 
Paddison’s adopted definition it is an external, objective force [of history, people, institutions]
“ ‘not directly observable’ ” (1993 n.4, 318). For Adomo on sociology in general, see Adomo 
(2000d).
15. Cf. Street (1998,63).
16. Whilst undertaking her own research into the daily habits and routines of radio listeners, the 
radio scholar Jo Tacchi (2000) reflected on the ‘everydayness’ of radio for listeners which she 
characterised in a short anecdote. The essence of Tacchi’s argument is reformulated in the 
following imaginary monologue that supports and extends her inference. “Radio? well I never 
really listen to radio - except when waking-up with die radio alarm clock of course; having a
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shower (I was given a waterproof one last Christmas) - making breakfast - there’s my dad’s old 
Roberts set by the toaster - driving to work - our staff canteen always has it on lunchtimes - driving 
home so I can unwind a bit - cooking supper, kids listen then too - having a bath, Late Junction on 
Radio 3 is quite good -oh, and yes, when I can’t sleep at night, The World Service is pretty good 
too.”
17. Hie fundamental difference between (1) mediated political debate where semantic content and 
discursive activity is overtly ‘commonsensical’, pragmatic and dialectical and (2) a diffuse 
‘rationality’ of aesthetic work prior to discourse is duly noted.
18. For further and more general evidence of the growing concern for radio as a highly significant 
medium for ‘ethical discourse’ and cultural promotion, note should be taken of (1) the second 
International ‘Radiocracy’ Conference, September 2001 - Durban SA. Its publicity noted that
“ ‘Radiocracy’ as a term comes from John Hartley, after encountering the ideas of President 
Tambo Mbeki.” Hartley was responsible for the inaugural conference held in Cardiff, November 
1999; (2) Radio fo r Development - a media consultancy (founded 1995) that promotes public 
education through the media, particularly radio. It is supported in its aims by UNICEF, the EU and 
Oxfam.
19. In his Republic, Plato sketched for us the growth of luxuries beyond life sustaining necessities 
which include ‘‘painting, embroidery, music [...] reciters, actors, chorus trainers, producers” (Part 
2, Book 2, § 2 Civilized Society 337 1955, 107). He argued that children need to be told stories by 
those deemed suitable for the important task of educating morals, bodies and the development of 
opinion and aesthetic judgment Plato wrote of good and bad rhythm and good literature and good 
music (Part 3, Book 3, § Secondary or Literary Education, Summary 1955,141). Aristotle 
observed that leisure requires education in many things, not least in music. In The Politics music 
was “a stimulus to goodness capable of having an effect on the character [...] and surely has a 
contribution to make to the intellectual and cultivate pastimes” (Book Vm, Chapter 5,1962, 306).
20. During the Tory leadership campaign of 2005, the now party leader David Cameron was 
reported to have appeared on a community radio station with a youthful profile and to have 
shouted: “Keeping it real on Life FM”, source: PM Programme, BBC Radio 4, October 21 2005.
21. Culture Secretary Tessa Jowell spoke at the Radio Academy, Manchester, July 10 2001. She 
praised Radio 1 for its championing of live music. She also picked up her predecessor Chris 
Smith’s view that one should aim to make the good popular and die popular good.
22. Witness perennial discussion about subsidy and investment at the Royal Opera House Covent 
Garden. Consider too the intellectual and cultural implications of the initial success of Director 
Serota’s Tate Modem Gallery and the relatively poor attendances at the Centre for Popular Music 
sited in the City of Sheffield’s cultural quarter which closed in c.2002. And, at a more partial but 
no less informative level, consternation and puzzlement at the decision in 2000 to remove disc 
jockey Andy Kershaw’s ‘world music’ broadcasts from BBC Radio 1.
23. See principally Adomo (2006a, 75 et seq.). Radio, the invisible medium, remains close to the 
idea of presentational communication; through the loudspeaker, sound is as much focussed, 
produced and ‘neutrally’ conveyed as it is represented. Orality is thus reclaimed and 
technologically extended. McClary points out in her essay on Laurie Anderson that “The advent of 
recording has been a Platonic dream come true, for with a disk one can have the pleasure of the 
sound without the troubling reminder of the bodies producing it” (2002,136).
24. Electromagnetic radio waves travel at the speed of light, which is itself electromagnetic 
radiation, i.e 299,792 km per second in a vacuum.
25. Mark Thompson writing in 2004 argued that “There’s no need to change the BBC’s essential 
mission or its values. Reith’s phrase, about a public broadcasting enterprise dedicated to the 
‘service of humanity in its fullest sense’ still feels right But to preserve that idealism, to go on 
delivering that mission to audiences worldwide, almost everything else does have to change”. 
Thompson asserted that he had “come back to the BBC at a critical moment in its history; a 
moment which calls both for a spirit of conservation - for the nurturing and protection of some of 
the BBC’s greatest strengths and traditions - but also for a spirit of quite radical change.” He added 
“The BBC is a unique, some would say anomalous, British public institution. Even as I speak, the 
great and the good are furrowing their brows, trying to devise the perfect constitutional model to 
hold the BBC fully to account” Mark Thompson ‘Skate boarding with a Ming Vase’ lecture 
extract, The Guardian (December 8 2004, 24). For details of the proposed changes, deemed by 
some to be necessary to make the BBC leaner and more able to argue its case during charter 
renewal see: ‘Morale at all-time low as director general tries to save corporation by cost-cutting’ 
(ibid). For a critical stance towards the BBC’s perceived unaccountability see: bbcwatch.com.
30
26. Robert Hullot-Kentor alludes to the conjunction of music and electricity in his Introduction to 
Adorno’s Current o f Music (2006a, 13) as does Adomo in his outline structure for this book to a 
potential British publisher. See Hullot-Kentor again in Adomo (2006a, 54). Radio as a “working 
social power expressing underlying social laws” is a phrase used by Adomo (2006a, 530).
27. On Adorno’s current of music being essentially an electrical ‘stream’ of sounds see Robert 
Hullot-Kentor’s Forward to Adomo (2006a).
28. Robert Hullot-Kentor’s introduction to Current o f Music: Elements o f a Radio Theory 
reproduces part of Adorno’s letter of May 4 1938 to Benjamin where there is reference to his work 
on the question of music in radio 'Meine Arbeitsergebnisse zur Frage Musik im Radio’ (2006a, 
34).
29. Radio’s potential was spotted by David Samoff a wireless operator who had received the 
names of Titanic survivors in 1912. In 1916 he wrote a memo to his Marconi employers: “I have in 
mind a plan of development which would make radio a household utility. The idea is to bring 
music into the home by wireless. The receiver can be designed in the form of a simple ‘radio 
music box.’ [...] arranged for several different wavelengths [...] this proposition would be 
especially interesting to farmers and other living in outlying districts” Samoff cited in Settel (1960, 
31-2). Reith recalled that “Broadcasting [...] had emerged from die first flush of scientific wonder. 
It had to be accepted as part of the permanent and essential machinery of civilisation [...] an 
instrument of social good. The BBC had founded a tradition of public service and of devotion to 
the highest interest of community and nation” (1949,103).
30. The word Radio comes from Latin: radius, meaning staff or spoke; a straight line. By 
extension: ‘I radiate from here to there, as die first live mass medium, instantly.’
31. In recent years changes in methodology have resulted apparently greater accuracy of 
measurement. The impact of Internet and television as channels for radio has also boosted listening 
figures at least in the UK.
32. See Daviss [sic] (2004, 24-27). New technology will allow radio content to move freely 
through the ether obviating the need for orthodox licence and transmitter restrictions, lessening the 
need for national bureaucratic oversight. There’s now a trend termed podcasting: die practice of 
competent individuals using the Internet and free software to disseminate their own personal 
‘radio’ programming (speech and music) on a regular basis which can be downloaded onto 
portable digital audio devices. For an early account of podcasting, see: Goldberg (2004, 11). The 
BBC in the Spring of 2005 began to make radio content available as MP3 files via websites 
facilitating an off-air, time-shift cultural economy of narrowcasting. (In November 2006, Channel 
4 Television announced it would be making all of its programme content available online, this, 
coupled with the rapid rise in the profile of YouTube now owned by Google any claim that the 
broadcast model is dead seems more credible than ever before. On March 2 2006, the BBC 
announced an agreement with YouTube whereby BBC clips of old and current programming is 
made available). The BBC’s Charter was renewed in 2006, and will now run for another decade. 
The enduring issues of mass media representation, access, independence, funding and quality 
remain, and are joined by the BBC-led governmental project of conversion to digital platforms and 
now colour all serious debate about public service broadcasting in Britain. See Robins (2000) for 
an early account of digital public spaces that deals in passing with their utopian and eutopian 
aspects. We must acknowledge the existence of the MySpace.com phenomena. The popularity of 
MySpace on the Web as a site for the sharing of musical discoveries and musically derived 
identities is an interesting one. Is this the simultaneous model of transmission predicted by 
Breitsameter (2001) where eveiyone talks and no one listens? Of course, users do take cognisance 
of the content, but so does the owner of this particular networking site: Rupert Murdoch’s News 
Corporation.
33. Chris Smith [argued that] “the BBC has been “too much the judge and jury of its own cause” 
[...] he announced that the forthcoming white paper on broadcasting and regulation would include 
an extensive review of the public service role and the governance of the BBC [...] The BBC must 
[...] focus on its core services, the two main channels and the radio stations, and reinstate BBC1 as 
the centre of British cultural life” Janine Gibson ‘Blow for BBC means Dyke must get tough’ The 
Guardian (February 22 2000, 6). On air in 2000, Sir Christopher Bland (then BBC Chairman) said 
that the BBC and public broadcasting offered: “distinctiveness, quality, range and universality”, 
BBC Radio 4 February 22, 2000. If the licence fee were scrapped, resultant subscriptions (at least 
to TV) would end universal access and impact on public perceptions. Wholesale 
commercialisation would undermine levels of content and journalistic independence. Direct 
governmental grant would likewise undermine the institution’s independence.
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34. Habermas summarises his concept thus [by] “ ‘the public sphere’ we mean first of all a realm 
of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed. Access is 
guaranteed to all citizens [...] private individuals assemble to form a public body. They then 
behave neither like business or professional people [...] nor like members of a constitutional order 
subject to the legal constraints of a state bureaucracy [there is] the guarantee o f freedom of 
assembly and association and the freedom to express and publish their opinions. In a large public 
body this kind communication requires specific means for transmitting information, and 
influencing those who receive i t  Today, newspapers and magazines, radio and TV are the media 
of the public sphere” Habermas (2006, 73).
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2 Framework, theories & foundations
2.1 Introduction
Given the “multitude of radios [...] a heterogeneous domain, on the levels of its 
apparatus, its practice, its forms, its utopias” (Weiss 1995, 2), Adorno’s 
descriptive and critical phrase, “music in radio” effectively establishes a central 
topic of investigation for us here, namely Adomo and Horkheimer’s culture 
industry (1997) and three major fields of humanistic concern within that topic: 
socialization, aesthetics and administered mass communication. This complex 
topic and contexts are fundamentally addressed in this study within a critical, 
cultural theory framework which Horkheimer and Adomo might recognise. 
However, familiar Frankfurt School references are joined by a later twentieth- 
century linguistic turn, a (re)tum to a Gramscian account of agency; and a 
renewed interest in utopian analysis and socio-spatial concerns, particularly in 
Anglophone socio-philosophical studies.1
The method underpinning this inquiry is therefore not singular and distinct, 
but more an evolving, cross-disciplinary one in the spirit of critical theory’s own 
self-reflective, contingent methodology. In its range it aspires to be a constellation 
of thoughts and is thus a plurality of old and new analyses, each of them 
fundamentally Kantian, Hegelian and Marxist-inspired academic perspectives 
interested in the rational and historical development of human beings through 
knowledge, aesthetics and hope. In addition to some ongoing Mannheimian and 
Gramscian influence too, this study also proposes a re-evaulation of the liberatory 
aspects of aesthetics via Marcuse; interest in a proper use of the dialectical 
dynamic and a recognition of the significance of language and everyday social 
action via Schiitz and Habermas. Such an approach (to be seen in the following 
pages) is joined by various accounts and interpretations of the BBC’s history and 
intellectual principles then and now - Reith (1924), Scannell and Cardiff (1991) 
and Bom (2004), and by a case study of The BBC’s Music Live event of 2000 (for 
a general record of this see British Broadcasting Corporation, 2000b), and a 
qualitative survey of a live BBC Radio Wales Big Buzz event, which took place in 
the Summer o f2003.
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These analyses can assist in addressing the contingent conditions of 
modernity and its cultures; the character of broadcast technology, the motivations 
of public institutions and the fates of individuals set amongst such ideological 
and/or emancipatory conditions. Whilst arguably thus a complex method, it is to 
be broadly understood as critical socio-cultural theory and philosophy and a part 
of the critical theory project interpreting and evaluating historical and observed 
social and cultural data.
It is hoped this synergetic approach will not only go some way to address 
Douglas Kellner’s call for “productive dialogue” between the Frankfurt School 
and British cultural studies (Kellner, 2002), but also to identify the potentials in 
music per se and in music and radio as a socio-cultural artefact of organised 
sounds proffering an immanent transcendence whereby expression, self­
development and social mutuality might, at least temporarily have the upper hand 
over the irrational rationalities of instrumental forces.3
Structure in outline
Following the preliminaries of Part One; Part Two comprises three chapters 
considering the relevance of music’s sensory, imaginative and comprehending 
powers in the evolving thought of Bloch, Adomo and Marcuse. Positive and 
negative accounts of radio are set out here too.
In Part Three, Chapter 6 problematises the mediation of music through 
language, Chapter 7 explores music as a participatory medium and Chapter 8 
looks at the BBC and visits Foucault’s claim for alternative, heterotopian sites and 
spaces.
The two chapters of Part Four provide institutional observation and analysis 
of the BBC to set alongside Gramscian and Habermasian accounts of agency and 
communicative potentials. Chapter 11 Sensibility, imagination & understanding 
turns more directly to Kant and concludes the thesis.
2.2 Marxism
Fredric Jameson usefully reminds us that pioneering British political economics 
(the study of the present day, the ‘here and now’ present) had been combined with
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utopian socialism (a prospective philosophy) and Hegelian dialectic (dynamic 
encounters and change); and effectively gave us Marxism (2000b, 361). This 
study uses the twentieth-century critical social theory of the Frankfort School in its 
description and analysis of music radio, publics and audiences, theory which had 
very much grown out of the Marxism as formulated by Jameson. This study uses 
the School’s post-Marxist Western Marxism with its greater interest in culture, 
power relations and superstructure, together with its critique of ideology of the 
Enlightenment’s positivistic and instrumental tendencies.
Moreover, this study acknowledges contemporary social theory, social 
science, cultural and media studies, particularly their collective perspectives on 
audiences and their triviality, fragmentary nature and passive character. 
Additionally, it brings to these analyses and readings of mass audiences, Western 
philosophy’s sustained conceptual interest in knowledge formation, publics and 
their address, subjective autonomy and hope. With this articulation, the study thus 
becomes a critical socio-cultural theory and philosophy that moves beyond the 
descriptive and interpretative to reinvigorate a praxis, and self-understanding as a 
dialectic between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ takes place, determined by normative ethics and 
the moral imperatives of Kant (1998) with interests in independence, mutuality 
and good will.
Mannheim & Gramsci
The study as a whole seeks to proceed in the spirit of Mannheim’s utopian impulse 
and re-invigoration of ‘here and now’ circumstances and potentials. This was 
clearly set out by Mannheim and is worth quoting here:
[B]y laying the evaluative emphasis on utopia and revolution, the possibility of 
noting any kind of evolutionary trend in the realm of the historical and 
institutional is obscured [...] The conception of utopia [...] strives to take account 
of the dynamic character of reality, inasmuch as it assumes not a ‘reality as such’ 
as its point of departure, but rather a concrete historically and socially determined 
reality which is in a constant process of change [...] we do this because [...] we 
wish to single out the living principle which links the development of utopia with 
the development of an existing order. (1960,178-9)
It is not only a Mannheimian pragmatic utopianism influencing this study. It is 
also coloured, to a fair extent, by the work of Gramsci (1971). His pragmatic
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Marxism and theory unified his discursive analysis of the hegemonic and 
ideological with a solid, orthodox understanding of base, superstructure and the 
renewing potentials of active and informed individuals. Rejecting the rigidity and 
determinism of ‘scientific’ Marxism and its privileging of the socio-economic 
base as the determinant in social relations, locus of alienation and the ‘damaged 
life’ of ‘the species being,’ Gramsci returns us to the importance of a liberating 
individual agency. Attention paid to the organic intellectual and agent within 
history, saw him well placed to effect a move that presages the more gentle and 
oblique accounts of Raymond Williams (1989) and the intermittent, but 
immanently situated agents of well-motivated institutions mooted directly and 
indirectly in the work of Benhabib (1986), Levitas (1990), Bom (1993a), Bronner 
(1994) and others. What we have, in effect is Gramsci’s ‘war of position’ - that 
slow, complex struggle in modem life, fuelled by an intellectual-moral nexus of 
enlightened individuals, sensitive to national or global conditions which can 
operate in the interstices of hegemonic givens.
In essence, Gramsci turned, not to hope figured in music and the arts like 
Bloch had done throughout his writings on culture, hope and society, but to the 
systems of the cultural superstructure where ideological messages are produced, 
held in place and mutated. For Gramsci, the power of the leading classes 
(hegemony) is maintained through the social relations of work, politics and 
persuasively arrayed through the cultural realm where ideological
4
(mis)representations of real conditions are formulated and “held in language”. 
However, because ideology is consciously constructed in reality, it does not 
exceed or represent the whole of reality, and there is therefore, the chance for 
oppositional sketches too. Gramsci’s wish for a democratisation of knowledge and 
for ‘dialogue and compromise’ is attainable and it is these elements in his 
philosophy which seems to have provided the very necessary intellectual, critical 
arc into which can be inserted accounts of agency and figures like BBC disc 
jockey John Peel.
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2.3 Critical theory & its thinkers
Critical theory has long devoted itself to the analysis and then critical evaluation 
of the constitution of the self, studying the relationship between people; 
community and society; art and reality; and cultural imagination and present-day 
society. In asking what art and communicative technology reveal, promise, and 
change, much of the groundwork executed by critical theorists is preserved here. 
Indeed, in their studies of alienation, critical theorists had viewed the arts as a 
locus for the discussion of domination, hope and refusal.5 First Bloch, then 
Frankfurt School thinkers like Adomo and Marcuse, in studying the fate of 
individual subjects in society, often focussed on art and particularly music’s utopia 
to articulate these options. In the aesthetics of critical theory, music is considered 
as an emotive, open form of communication, capable simultaneously of being 
within and without affirmative social settings. Music for the likes of Bloch, 
Adomo and Marcuse could be put to work as a metaphor, symbol or an allegory of
social reality, but also perhaps, more directly, aid ongoing social process and
6progress.
It is important to note here that none of the critical theorists and 
intellectuals whose writings are deployed in this study conducted empirical 
investigations into the BBC model of non-commercial, monopolistic public 
service broadcasting and none, even though many were active in the 1960s and 
70s, sought to consider the symbiotic relationship of popular musics and the state 
on the airwaves. It is important to be aware too, this study seeks to break the loop 
of Adomo and Horkheimer who saw only recurrent audience oppression when 
examining the culture industry. Here it is suggested that alienation can be 
challenged, and capitalism and economics challenged too, in part, by way of the 
public corporation. Adomo did argue that a better world, indeed a “real possibility 
of utopia” and of “the reconciled” might follow “given the level of productive
7
forces the earth [which] could here and now be paradise” (1997, 9, 33). Of 
course, for Adomo, the political and bureaucratic realities of culture and the media 
would always preclude this.
In contrast to Adomo, Marcuse, whilst being critical of unfocused 
countercultural activity and artful illusion, did recognise the presence of desire and 
opportunity amid established order realities more fully. This is the very dialectical
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process stressed in this study: Marx’s, “motor of motion” extrapolated says Engels
g
(1940), from nature. This is where dualities, be they concepts, antagonisms or 
separate entities, are mediated (modified but not fully negated) by each other or by
9
a third, mediating term, that acts as a site of transition.
Bloch, music & hope
Bloch’s attention to music was profound, and whilst his musical history, imagery 
and interpretations may be dismissed by some as overly romantic with their 
allusions to music’s ineffability, he was undoubtedly alive to music’s visceral 
qualities and its near palpable call for our attention. For Bloch, music imparted 
somatic stimulation and pleasure, and familiar music showed us the comfort of
past times in contrast to a present sense of discontent that goads us into imagining
, 10 a better tomorrow.
Bloch’s work is additionally important in that for all of its romantic 
expressionism, it is, at root, a Marxist philosophy (albeit it in the form of a utopian 
rather than scientific socialism). As such, Bloch’s highly personal readings of 
music and the subject do discern social ills and proffer normative changes, not 
least through the dialectical engagement of the subject with a wider objective 
world.
Adomo, music & language
Following Bloch’s sometimes gnomic accounts of musical origins, Adorno’s 
explications of organised sound was much more intellectually thorough. For him, 
musical form was a loaded locale where subjects, society and history were made 
and reconciled. As such, music exhibited, even exuded socio-cultural 
morphologies. At the same time, and perhaps with some connection to the ideas of 
Bloch, music could be an artistic sphere free of mundane ties in which ideals ran 
free.
For Adomo, music was socio-cultural artefact and autonomous zone, but 
understood that both artefact and zone existed ultimately as philosophically and 
discursively invoked constructs. Whilst not totally dismissive of the ineffable
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‘power’ of music’s aesthetic surplus as privileged to some extent again after 
Adomo by Marcuse, this study holds fast to the ultimate need for linguistic 
analysis in the presence of musical expression. We need the proximate and 
approximating interpretative medium o f language to promote the human in music.
Certainly, of all the arts, perhaps it is music which most often delivers a 
large measure of ambiguity resulting in frequent meta-musical reinterpretation as 
writing and talk. Popular music’s pre-linguistic physiological impact, 
participation, yearning, lyrical nonsense and stylised delivery, establishes both the 
traditional and contemporary popular song as a site of diverse personal and 
collective significance, heavy with (1) an immanent utopian potential and then (2) 
a consequent, extrinsic potential for utopian conceits and allegorical discourse. We 
listen to music, experience its emotive force, and then, through cognitive and 
rational processes, begin to make sense of it through language. To recognise 
music’s own ambiguities and the consequent interpretative freedoms conferred by 
language, it is necessary therefore, to understand music’s potency as a clean slate 
but also anticipate its fate as a palimpsest11
Music, Adomo told us, is a-conceptual. It “is not identical with language” 
and “creates no semiotic system”, but nevertheless musical sounds “say 
something, often something human” (1998b, 1). The challenge is to (re)articulate 
that human element either as (1) a sensitive, creative musician interpreting a
musical score, or as (2) someone reflecting upon and writing about music and its
12meanings. It is this second, hermeneutical task that concerns us here.
Many of the theorists in the following pages work with the premise that 
music, language and utopia are allied concerns. This is evident in Adomo whose 
analytical writing respected composer intentions and immanent musical syntax; 
his sociological writing preserved accounts of musical production and distribution 
in a capitalist society; his philosophical and aesthetic work respected beauty and 
invoked utopian conceits. Undeterred by music’s own lack of inherent meaning 
and critical decisiveness, he persevered with writing about it all his life.13 For 
Adomo, music required a constant gloss from many quarters; its sounds are a form 
of expression caught in a necessary “unending mediation in order to bring the 
impossible back home” (1998b, 4). This mediation was evident not least in 
Adomo himself, being one of sensual and intellectual (re) interpretation through
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performance and language: (re)interpretations that were to invoke the impossibly 
utopian desire for a past or future home. As Adomo wrote: “because for art, utopia 
- the yet-to-exist - is draped in black, it remains in all its mediations recollection; 
recollection of the possible in opposition to the actual that suppresses it” (1997, 
135).
Marcuse, music & technology
If Bloch floated music’s potency and Adomo laid down the problematics attendant 
upon “Music in radio”, it was Herbert Marcuse who offered a way of opening up 
the increasingly interlaced fields of music, society and mediated communication 
that respected Adorno’s aesthetic theory and caution in the face of social facts, but 
which also seems to proffer eutopian possibilities more distinctly in the presence 
of art and reality. Marcuse wrote:
The sensuous immediacy which art attains presupposes a synthesis of experience 
according to universal principles, which alone can lend to the oeuvre more than 
private significance. This is the synthesis of two antagonistic levels of reality: the 
established order of things, and the possible liberation from it - on both levels, 
interplay between the historical and the universal. In the synthesis itself, 
sensibility, imagination, and understanding are joined (1972, 95)
It is Marcuse’s thoughts which effectively prefigure some of the themes and 
assertions of this thesis. His work moves illuminatingly between a grand 
philosophical overview of a Hegelian and Kantian cast, an interest in art works, 
and in individual bodily ‘desires’. The utopian and aesthetic theories of Adomo 
and Marcuse together argue broadly that, as semblance, the arts, (particularly 
music) offer subjects something critical of the present but also something new: a 
sense of that which has not yet been attained, or a sense of that now lost, but still 
recalled. In short, art’s qualities contribute to a common understanding of our own 
and others circumstances and desires. Music, be it sublime, uncompromising and 
‘serious’ or {contra Adomo) popular, instrumentally tainted and somatically 
situated, is a specially fine substrate for human imagination and empathy.
Marcuse’s argument in his 1978 essay The Aesthetic Dimension: Toward a 
Critique o f Marxist Aesthetics (1979) is, for the purpose of illuminating the 
present study broadly thus: art (including all music, although Marcuse focuses on
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literature) is (1) ideologically implicated (it is constructed from and is a reflection 
of the material and ideological status quo) and is (2) also a means of resisting and 
transcending the said status quo. Marcuse argues for art having the capacity to 
effect, via the sensuous and the utopian, a useful, ethical self-reflection as a 
prelude to a concrete utopia of praxis (rational thought and action). Some might 
view this as a compromising provisionality here in the present, but it is surely also 
a critical first step towards a mindful dissemination of culture.
Inter subjectivity as a common conceptual concern
What does link all of the many perspectives and concerns of this study is surely 
the nexus of philosophy, social theory, broadcast principles and action, where the 
pre-eminent concern is with intersubjectivity -  that locus of change via agency, 
language and institutional spaces where aesthetics and discourse reflect a Kantian 
valuing of mutuality and others as ends rather than means. Mediated 
intersubjectivity is neither just an opportunity for oppression nor one of unbridled 
emancipation -  it is of course both. The challenge is to secure the means of 
mediation and enculturation by intersubjective and objective forces which 
expound ‘good will’ and pursue ‘right’ aims -  a decision aided by observation and 
debated through philosophical engagement.
Emancipatory possibilities are potentially effected when any subject 
encounters any other subject or object through cultural forms and their supporting 
discourses. This intersubjective encounter results in a synthesis: a reasoned 
transformation of consciousness as a sort of triangulation between subject, art and 
objective world takes place. It is important of course to remember that not all 
encounters are emancipatory. When the aestheticisation of politics combined with 
the exclusivist ideology of Nazi Germany many, Adomo included, became 
exasperated and fearful.
2.4 Music & intersubjectivity
How credible is music as a site of explicit allegory and philosophical discourse? 
What can it sustain, what might it engender in socio-political terms, particularly if 
lyrically banal or devoid of words?
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Music as an immaterial semantically ambiguous form is a rich site for 
utopian “sketches”.14 All musics socialise and indoctrinate, but also through 
figuration, allegory and social representation, freely educate and enlighten the 
‘listening se lf. Through musical participation, subjects become ‘knowing’ 
individuals, members of society in respect of the self, the everyday and the Other, 
but also develop a relation to the past, the economic present, and any number of 
political futures. Such an optimism in the face of reality can be found well beyond 
even the reaches of critical theory’s more positive moments. Here is writer Salman 
Rushdie reflecting on some of life’s more intense experiences:
We live in a world of disappointment You begin with great hopes and the 
beautiful innocence of childhood but you discover that the world isn’t good 
enough, nor are our lives and nor are we. But there are moments in life when we 
can have an experience of transcendence, feel part of something larger or simply 
our hearts burst inside. Falling in love and the birth of a child can do that. So can 
hearing the voice raised in song. It is one of the keys to ourselves.
Salman Rushdie in conversation with Nigel Williamson about his novel, The 
Ground Beneath Her Feet [1999] Times Metro April 3-9 (1999,16-17)
Here is another contemporary figure’s awareness of such utopian or perhaps, more 
accurately, a ‘eutopian’ condition: Orchestral conductor Daniel Barenboim has 
called his East-Western Divan Orchestra a ‘utopian republic’, a real social place of 
resources and agents where, he argues, there’s equality of expression and 
interdependence. It is for the conductor, a somewhere where you can he says: “try 
to understand the other.”15
[M]usic holds out the promise of a radical transformation, not only in our habits 
of aesthetic response but in eveiy sphere of thought - ethics and politics included 
- where the relation between knower and known is a field potentially open for 
creative reimagining. (Norris 1989b, 312)
With likely allusions to Kant and Marcuse, Norris is suggesting that music is an 
art and social institution that can connect us all through its ability to foster a 
common affinity of sensibility, imagination and rational understanding. Through 
music’s many forms and settings, people connect and experience shared emotions 
and ambitions. Yet, how does the simple vibration of air particles do this? Musical 
structures and codes (rhythm, consonance, cadences, scales) effect subjective 
anticipation whenever music is heard, and thus allow for practical or imaginative 
participation. We can live and think ‘in concert’ through shared music. Music both
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played and heard is, in large part, the immediate, pre-lingual preserve of bodily 
actions and responses. We hear, feel and sing music. It is an aesthetic experience 
which fuels both instinct and reason. Music connects with the body and thus, 
initially avoids intellectual reification, but it can also provoke nostalgia for a lost 
childhood, or underscore a sense of hope: an optimism for a better tomorrow. 
Bloch’s recognition (anagnorisis)'6 Adorno’s personal, experiential “shudder” 
(Erfahrung), (1997, 245) and Marcuse’s “sensuous immediacy” (1972, 95), felt in 
the presence of music are each a moment of independence, empowering the
17listener prior to any wider domination and reification.
Music’s condition as sensuous but shared art makes it a prime candidate 
for discursive exploitation and interpretation by all comers as soon as the final 
notes fade. Indeed, Bom sensibly cautions us against an excessive utopianism 
when thinking about politicised musical potentials: “Music, with its pedagogic, 
ritual and emotive functions, has also been the medium par excellence for 
ideological conditioning and depoliticization” (1993a, 270). However, this thesis 
will argue that whilst music is ideologically vulnerable to linguistic exegesis, it is 
also where its broader emancipatory potential lies. Ben Watson argues that “For 
Carducci and Rotten, proletarian music-making is a utopian anticipation of a new 
way of doing things: it is ‘sensuous human activity’ [Marx]” (1999, 93). Watson is 
interesting as he, like Reynolds (1990), argues for the need to engage with the 
‘physicality’, subjectivity and ‘use value’ of the work produced by a Barthes-like 
musica practica (Barthes 1977b), and try to avoid dismantling the phenomenon’s 
categories in any analytical or textual fashion. Of course, this last request is a vain 
one, as no one listening to the generation of musica practica can escape the wish 
also to speak and write of it.
How do individuals constitute themselves cognitively and socially through music? 
If we tune to public service radio do we hear the real music of others or a 
distorted, managed, realistic imitation, bereft of any socio-cultural richness?
Whilst acoustic distortion may occur, a rational compensation or a
‘dialectical illusion’ in the ‘public-linguistic realm’ emerges of which we are fully
•  18 cognisant and use to imagine social emancipation. Human consciousness
becomes aware - through the senses - of some other thing or is ‘called’ or
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interpellated by it (a sound, another person, a crowd) which it acknowledges and 
assimilates as an object beyond itself. The individual is initially alienated by the 
phenomenon - ‘this is not me, it is another person, or a cultural sign,’ but 
subsequently is reconciled to it and assimilates it as an ontological knowledge 
about one’s limits and the cultural expressions of others. Such engagements all
19draw an increasingly modulated individual more fully into the social. How might 
this work in relation to music? Well, DeNora writes of music saying it is “a 
resource for agency”, that “its perception is acted upon” and “is constitutive of the 
social” and an element in “knowledge formation” (2003, 57, 65). With this, 
critical judgement about the objective world ensues.
This thesis develops the view that the cognitive development of the self 
and inter-personal engagement is a succession of social and cultural acts - a 
symbolic sharing and negotiating of art works and ‘texts’ between individual, 
community and mass. This can either be be direct, immediate communication in a 
real place, or a mediated address across the ether. The subject receives enough 
contextual information to process the content in the latter, and can compensate for 
any aesthetic or ideological distortions, thus the individual finally becomes a 
‘knowing’ individual. In this two-tiered act of intersubjectivity, this thesis draws 
to an extent on Crossley’s understanding of what he terms the (1) radical ‘I-thou’ 
relationship which corresponds to the presentational relationships of a 
Gemeinschaft (a place of live musical participation) and (2) the egological ‘I - it’ 
relationship a more abstracted (public broadcast) relationship between aggregated 
people who reify others in a modem, mass-mediated Gesellschaft (Crossley 1996).
Crossley’s particular understanding and the approach used here comes by 
way of Hegel’s early work on the historically situated reasoning subject, his
theory of alienation and growth Honneth (1995); the social theory of Alfred
20Schutz (1964a), the social behaviourism of George H. Mead (1962) and the
21allied auditory-social model of David Levin (1989). This account of 
intersubjectivity is also one that takes us generally, in both Crossley’s radical and
egological relationships from a phenomenologically constructed ‘I’ of the senses,
22to a ‘we’ of mediated mutuality.
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2.5 Utopian & eutopian foundations
There is no one way of looking at and understanding the complex phenomenon 
that is music. However, using the conceits of Utopia and musical eutopias is a 
useful way of understanding the socio-cultural potentials of music in a study of 
social idealism and social reality because it respects both the emotive, pre-lingual 
impact, and its subsequent mediation in language and reproductive technologies. 
Equally importantly, in its ambition to vault the limits of present reality, music 
stimulates imaginative, dialectical activity. Von Boeckmann points out that:
Dialectic is the desire of the mind, as Jameson puts it, ‘to lift itself up mightily by 
its own bootstraps’ {Marxism and Form, 307) to widen its object to include its 
own habits of mind in the act of apprehension. For Jameson, not only is dialectic 
the means of transcending the limitations of the individual, it is none other than 
the figure for that mode of future thinking for a social formation not yet come into 
being - the collectivity. Dialectic then, becomes the form for utopian thinking 
itself. (1998,39)
Eutopia then is More’s “pseudo-homonym” and “quasi-antonym” as Marin (1984) 
rightly claims. The latter sees here an instance of what he terms utopic play in 
language with Utopia as a paradigmatic ideal, and eutopia as a happy, grafting 
reality of people, materials and effective legislation. The deployment of Utopia 
and eutopia within an allegorical, socio-political conceit allows us to move, not 
just playfully between concept and object, history and universals, but in a 
dialectically productive way too. Utopia for Marin is also a disruptive literary and 
spatial concept which hosts a restless, ‘playful’ utopics, that raises the possibility 
of an immanent critique of the present (Marin 1984,196,198).
Postmodern utopias & eutopias
An understanding of the social potency of the alliances of music and language is 
to be seen in the work of Caryl Flinn (1992) and can be inferred in the postmodern 
readings of Ruth Levitas (1990, 1999) and David Harvey (2000) where the 
utopian conceit is revivified as an experiential and discursive guiding process for 
imagination and critique.
Ruth Levitas is a Utopia scholar who offers us a postmodern reading of the 
concept while at the same time preserving the fundamental hopes and aspirations
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of critical theorists in a convincing synthesis. Her book, The Concept o f Utopia 
(1990) is deemed to be the key contemporary survey and investigation of the field, 
a field she readily says must extend beyond traditional literary utopias. She views 
the term as a way station, a provisional location of ‘work in progress’, a site of 
contingency and minor narratives.
Utopia for Levitas is now all about provisionality, pluralism, a shift from 
specified content to process and framework, i.e. the ontological process of 
becoming. Levitas embraces the contingency of new utopias, but she says we must 
have a position, a value; our best selves there to transform life while avoiding
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moral absolutes. Her term: “Interstitial utopias”: small, standing between or 
carved-out spaces and co-operatives might correspond to this study’s account of 
eutopias and be represented not only by large institutions, but by the likes of local, 
community or pirate radio where abstract aspiration for something different and
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better finds concrete expression. Levitas has looked carefully at Bloch’s 
distinction between abstract and concrete utopia and sees socio-philosophical 
value in Bloch’s articulation of an “undisciplined dreaming” and a “disciplined” 
one (Levitas 1997, 65). The abstract utopia is the realm of desire, retrospection 
and compensation. It is one exploited and sustained by ideologically and 
hegemonically inflected forms of affirmative culture. It possesses an element of 
regression and fatalism in the face of the extant social order, but it is, for Bloch, 
the raw material of ‘being’ for his docta spes - his educated hope where it is 
preserved and used more progressively (for the becoming of the subject as a 
species-being) in a sublated form.
2.6 The BBC
It is still recognised both home and abroad, as a bastion of independent thinking. 
It also offers the only chance for a lot of people to understand the styles/tastes of 
different societies. (Big Buzz respondent no. 83,2003)
Philosophical speculation and social theory has to be about some thing. The thesis 
therefore looks at the principles behind the BBC’s early formations (well- 
delineated by Scannell and Cardiff, 1991), its postwar public service broadcasts 
and their political and cultural settings. In a post-colonial Britain of the late 1940s
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and early 1950s, industrial realignment, a maturing welfare state and new 
educational provision joined growing consumer affluence and distinctive sub­
cultural expression in youthful quarters.
It is during the brief period between the formation of Radio 1 (1967) and 
the broadcasts of MTV (c.1980) that we can perhaps best register institutional 
change, chart critical intellectual positions and test and apply socio-philosophical 
explanation with reference to eutopias. In Britain at least, this period marked a 
shift away from strategic, near-monopolistic prescription toward increased 
pluralistic activity in those institutional spaces assigned a ‘watching’ cultural
25brief. It will be suggested that this period was a transitional phase from a 
strategically shaped time of modernising collectives, prescribing a socialist Utopia 
to a tactical set of contingent ‘interstitial’, individualistic eutopias (temporal and 
spatial).
The BBC is undoubtedly a complex, evolving institution. It is neither 
wholly private, public or governmental. It is at once an institutional ‘space’ of the 
British State polity swayed by government complexion and a relatively 
autonomous mediating socio-cultural locale between government, commercial 
interest and the governed. It can be seen to occupy a Habermasian public sphere of 
civil interaction which seeks to resist state dictates. The ground on which such 
independency and agency can flourish is outlined by Durkheim:
If the collective force, the state is to be the liberator of the individual, it has itself 
need of some counter-balance; it must be restrained by other collective forces, 
that is, by those secondary groups [...] And it is out of this conflict of social forces 
that individual liberties are bom. Here again, we see the significance of these 
groups; their usefulness is not merely to regulate and govern the interests they are 
meant to serve. They have a wider purpose; they form one of the conditions 
essential to the emancipation of the individual. (Durkheim, Professional Ethics 
cited Nisbet 1970,161)
Institutions may indeed be Althusserian “Ideological State Apparatuses”, 
(Althusser 1992), but they are also spaces of conscious progress and social 
betterment facilitated through laws, education and the arts. Whilst a traditional 
Gemeinschaft may limit; the flux of a modem Gesellschaft may offer 
possibilities.26 There is certainly a need for Durkheim’s “corps intermediaries ” 
liberated by the emancipatory facets of society a place of opportunity and
27individual agency. Here, within institutional settings, the will of individual and
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group can be played out in the objective world. Idealism meets materialism in
28society. As one individual has commented:
The BBC [...] is far enough removed from the quick-response popularity game so 
as to be able to offer us the chance to listen to music that maybe of a quality level 
that is not instantly accessible. This is vitally important. (Big Buzz respondent no. 
124,2003)
This is an idealism in the face of commercial reality that takes us on to a 
consideration of the BBC. Today however, national public institutions and 
national politics have become outmoded by new technologies; unbridled free 
market ideology and international corporate strategy.29 The day of the national, 
state-sanctioned public service broadcaster might not quite be over, but the impact 
of the said sphere has changed as media technologies increasingly question the 
state’s legislative reach, consensual presence, territorial remit and singular cultural 
perspectives of ‘the state.’ Academic awareness of the subject at work in relation 
to music are found in Chapman (1992), Bennett et al (1993), Bom (1995, 2004) 
and Shuker (1998). Shuker (1998, 287) called for more study of musics and state 
policies. Consideration of the ‘civilisation’ and intellectualisation of popular 
musics by the state where there is stress on formalism, craft, authenticity and 
labour can be seen in Chapman (1992, 266). Pragmatic readings of the BBC 
informed by some optimism and a knowledge of Habermasian thought comes by 
way of Nicholas Gamham (1986,1992 and 1995).
BBC case studies & questionnaire
In order to insert some of the much-needed empirical evidence of the role of a 
present day BBC within national psyche, this study includes results of detailed 
written responses to a questionnaire furnished at the annual BBC Radio Wales Big 
Buzz event 2003, a live broadcasting and performance event which attends to a 
youthful audience through the appeal of popular musics (see Appendix A).
Whether eutopian gleams prevail now, and operate as breaks on total 
ideology and reification will be looked at theoretically and empirically with 
recourse to recent BBC musical events. Has the state and its institutions simply
•  30been engaged in a process of cultural reproduction sustaining the status quo? 
Might it instead, in the hands of intelligent, independent individuals, have educed
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equally independent, fulfilled individuals capable of discerning in its musical and 
allied output ontological truths, social realities and projected social betterment? 
Has the BBC been both a mirror allowing society to “commune with itself’31 and 
facilitating self-recognition and a window looking out onto a world of 
dialectically significant alterity?
The aims of the minor qualitative questionnaire were to: (1) solicit ‘rich’ 
opinion on the purpose of a free, outdoor BBC music event in the form of 
respondents’ detailed written replies to a number of open questions. (2) Solicit 
considered reflection on the BBC as an institution in the form of respondents’ 
written replies to a number of prepared evaluative statements. (3) Elicit an 
articulation of ideological awareness and critique of public service music radio 
amongst a contemporary listenership. Its chief objective was to provide qualitative 
background field material to the central socio-philosophical study which might 
allow for a ‘triangulation’ of living opinion and perspective and either corroborate 
or temper the study’s claims.
Whilst modest in scale and relatively narrow in respondent profile, the 
discursive data sought was of adequate reflection, detail and fluency to be of value 
to the central study. Opinion was strong across the board in respective of what 
might be termed an ideology critique, or immanent critique of the BBC, but 
equally, many were clear about their readiness to defend public service 
broadcasting in relation to national socio-cultural matters. The extent to which 
written responses were mere rehearsals of prejudicial populist rhetoric or instead, 
instances of more authentic critiques could only be fully determined with face-to 
face-interviews. Time constraints precluded this option.
This minor qualitative data questionnaire might be regarded as a pilot 
which could be revisited as a larger, more detailed questionnaire which might be 
applicable as a study to complement or temper any BBC-commissioned 
investigations of this kind. A more extensive questionnaire would need to ensure a 
greater cross-section of respondent profiles so that, for instance, mature reflection 
might be tempered with the views of more females, and those younger and older 
than those who did participate.
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2.7 Summary
Music radio is the topic central to this social and philosophical study of 
socialisation, aesthetics and administered mass communication. In seeking to 
theorise its place in the dialectical, socio-cultural processes of subjectification and 
intersubjectivity, this chapter has outlined a number of allied Kantian, Hegelian 
and Marxist-inspired concepts and modes of inquiry deemed necessary and 
suitable for their study.
The dialectical processes of socialisation examined in this study move us 
through listening, towards others and ultimately our ‘better selves’. We are 
mediated (formed) as much by ‘public intellectuals’ and bureaucratic 
manifestations of state and nation as we are by family, civil sensibilities and local, 
more ‘immediate’ cultural activity. Public service music radio is effectively 
identified as an ontological and epistemological space; a kind of forum lying 
between Gesellschafi and Gemeinschaft. It is certainly capable of driving the 
ethical/economic modelling of the individual, but is equally capable of forming 
and extending his or her socio-cultural experiences for the better. Public service 
transmission is not just an ideological/discursive device of instrumental and 
affirmative socio-cultural activity, but importantly an independent cultural motor, 
historical repository and necessary discursive substrate for individual growth and 
wider public good.
Here there is discursive and structural exchange, agency and the generation 
of provisional, contingent knowledge. It is not Hegel’s progress to a pre-exisiting, 
larger absolute but perhaps closer to Gianni Vattimo’s plurality of voices which,
32in their cacophony can negate the singular call.
In exploring the places and spaces of these processes, this study uses the 
familiar concept of Utopia as a discursive conceit of exclusion and purification but 
crucially conceives of provisional, localised ‘places’ of cultural inclusivity in the 
guise of musical eutopias - current places, or good public moments or spaces from 
which to approach the future.
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Notes
1. Today, what is broadly termed cultural theory has, in large measure developed from social 
philosophy and a range of methodologies in the social sciences and humanities. All of these allied 
perspectives seek to analyse, explain and evaluate the place of cultural processes in the formation 
and reproduction of power.
2. Such cross-disciplinarity perhaps echoes Fredric Jameson in his search for a plurality of entrees 
to given phenomena: here, the complex mediatedness of die modem individual. (See generally, 
Hardt and Weeks 2000). This is also akin to Adorno’s view that a constellation, or better still, a 
train of ‘constellations’ can reveal some of the substantive character of needs and particular 
contingencies. Bernstein, in discussing Adorno’s fragmentary yet at the same time broad 
theoretical engagement with his materials has written: “Through the multiplication of diverse 
perspectives a complex portrait of the phenomenon in question is produced” (Adomo 2001a, 8).
3. The German Kulturkritik tradition has tended to critique capital and the culture industry; 
privilege autonomous, high art, and avant-garde practice in music as the only sites of ‘alternative 
visions’ and praxis. Dialectical in inspiration it has foundered, post-Auschwitz on the particular, 
the sundered rather than the universal. That of the Anglophone tradition meanwhile, from Richard 
Hoggart (1957) to John Fiske and Simon Frith, has privileged and reclaimed the popular again as a 
marginal musical activity that is one of ‘alternative visions’ and praxis. Cultural theory in Britain 
was studied with a necessary respect for die two paradigms identified by Stuart Hall (1986a). The 
one he calls the ‘culturalist’ a strand prompted by the likes of Hoggart and Raymond Williams 
which address specific cultural manifestations, the second strand he terms ‘structuralist’ which is 
partly reflected in the work of Levi-Strauss but which of course also touches on Marxist models, 
Althusserian reification of die subject and upon non-historically and contextually sensitive 
semiotic practices. German and Anglophone traditions of cultural criticism have given us 
respectively an intellectual ‘Faith’ in serious music’s transformative, Apollonian potential and an 
opposing but comparable intellectual faith in Dionysian contemporary popular music. It is hoped 
that the evaluative aspects of established German critiques will be extended by the greater 
optimism of die anglophone cultural and socio-philosophical theory (Bennett, Mercer and 
Woolacott 1986; Frith 1983, 1996; Giddens 1993) which overtly or implicitly looks to Gramscian 
identification of the dependence and independence of popular cultures.
4. Hegemonic force operates where there’s not just a belief or acceptance of prevailing conditions, 
but where the promise of participation - die essential articulation of the deferential gesture - 
becomes reality. Regarding hegemony, Gramsci wrote that “The ruling class maintains dominance 
through achieving a popular consensus mediated through the various institutions of society 
including the schools, mass media, die law, religion and popular culture” (Gramsci cited Shuker 
1994,27).
5. “Critical theory is ultimately a defensive philosophy, protecting the fragile maturity already 
won, in contrast to Luk&cs’s offensive drive to communism in History And Class Consciousness” 
(Edgar 1987, 282-3). It is a mode of critical inquiry that identifies ideological points of origin but 
respects the uniqueness of a cultural text and specificity of context and does not elide entirely, 
creative agency, the individual subject and his or her drives and psyche.
6. Norris tells us that “Since Schiller, philosophy had held out the notion of art as a healing or 
reconciling power, a realm of experience where the conflicts and antimonies of alienated 
consciousness could at last find an image of perfect fulfilment in the ‘free play’ of human 
creativity, of sensuous cognitions in a state of ideally harmonious reciprocal balance” (1989b, 
330).
7. In the same passage, Adomo was as ever, quick to conjure the alternative “possibility of total 
catastrophe” when considering art in the company of productive and technical forces.
8. Engels wrote: “The general nature of dialectics is to be developed as the science of 
interconnections, in contrast to metaphysics. It is therefore, from history of nature and human 
society that the laws of dialectics are abstracted. For they are nothing but die most general laws of 
these two aspects of historical development, as well as of thought itself, And indeed they can be 
reduced in the main to three: the law of transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa; the 
law of the interpenetration of opposites; the law of the negation of the negation” (1940,26).
The dialectic as it is understood here is a special kind of logic predicated on antimonies - 
oppositional entities resolved by synthesis; a theory of logical reasoning seeking a clearer version 
of what is true, devised by post-Kantian idealists Fichte and Hegel, then developed by Marx. It is 
actually some rational, analytical knowledge and sensory experience of die real set about with
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language and contexts that fuel the constitution of the conscious subject as a reconciliation of self 
and other, ‘ you’ and ‘I’; me and not me.
9. Mediation is an active process of construction, say of subject by objective world of social facts 
(cultural phenomena with coercive impact). This objective world comprises media channels which, 
as agents, ‘mediate’ (convey) content but also shape our experiences, perception and knowledges. 
Individuals are mediated; they are brought together by art and by radio, formed by them but can 
also be isolated by the representational errors of art when art is coopted by the economic and 
political use of culture and broadcast technology. See Paddison (1993, 110-11) regarding Adomo 
and mediation.
10. Geoghegan (1996) reminds us that for Bloch, the “Whirring, drumming, rattling” of music 
belonged to the ruling elite (presumably as martial and ritual sounds). The lyrical yearning for die 
absent lover heard in the pastoral flute is where music of value and expression originates 
(Geoghegan 1996, 53).
11. McClary tells us that: “Like any social discourse, music is meaningful precisely insofar as at 
least some people believe that it is, and act in accordance with that belief. Meaning is not inherent 
in music, but neither is it in language: both are activities that are kept afloat only because 
communities of people invest in them, agree collectively that their signs serve as valid currency. 
Music is always dependent on the conferring of social meaning - as ethnomusicologists have long 
recognized, the study of signification in music cannot be undertaken in isolation from the human 
contexts that create, transmit, and respond to it” (McClary 2002,21). Cf. Bom (1995,19).
12. Acoustic works are phenomena that become works of art as we talk about them as such and as 
we turn them - using words - from object into textual and discursive locales. There is a great 
variety of writing about music that does just this. These range from (1) the formal and 
musicological concerned with the intrinsic analysis of musical production: technical construction, 
style, intentionality and subsequent interpretation (Dart 1967; Palisca 1968) through (2) an interest 
in precise musical expressivity via an analysis of idiom, genre and lexicon (Cooke, 1989) to (3) 
sociologically and culturally sensitive studies of musical consumption, keen to contextualise works 
in broader, extrinsic settings (Leppert and McClary 1987; Clayton, Herbert and Middleton 2003). 
In addition, there is the great swathe of music criticism and reviewing, particularly now for Rock 
from the likes of Marcus (1993).
13. Andrew Edgar has kindly brought to my attention the importance of enduring ambiguity in 
musical work and cites the example of Shostakovitch’s Symphony number 5 in D minor (opus 47) 
addressed by Richard Taruskin in his 1997 book, Defining Russia Musically, (Princeton, 1997).
14. Silbermann (1963, 154) tells us that organised sounds are in themselves “socio-musical 
institutions”, viewed here as ‘spatial’ and temporal places well-suited to utopian scrutiny.
15. Daniel Barenboim 2006 Reith Lecture, BBC Radio 4, April 7 2006.
16. See Zipes (1997,4).
17. Duttman’s Between Cultures (2000) looks at identity formation as a cognitive process using 
mediated culture giving what he terms a repeated recognition (wiedererkennen) which “refers to 
the identifying act through which one finds oneself in the other, or through which one finds 
something in what it is not, thereby overcoming otherness” (2000, translator’s note, ix).
18. L. J. Ray (1993,28) after Wellmer.
19. Hegel, says Inwood (after Schiller) conceives of education and its concomitant process of 
enculturation as one for subject and group of “alienation and opposition” and presumably 
reconciliation and synthetic progress. F. Schiller posited an aesthetic education for die fullest 
development of individuals: “The only way to develop die manifold potentialities was to set them 
in opposition to each other. This antagonism of forces is the great instrument of culture” Schiller 
(1795) On The Aesthetic Education o f Man in a series of letters, VI cited Inwood (1992,69). Hegel 
suggested that “estrangement” and “reconciliation” are key stages in the educational process for 
infants, children and youths. In wood adds: “The infant’s self-absorbtion - disrupted by awareness 
of an external world, which at first, strange [become] increasingly familiar - its natural inclinations 
are subjected to ethical and social norms, which, at first alien and expressive eventually become a 
second nature - the end product, the cultivated man, though he has fully absorbed the culture of his 
society, has more independence of thought and action owing to his stock of universal conceptions” 
(Inwood, 1992, 70). More generally on aesthetics, see Hegel (1087b, 1807c and 1993).
20. George Herbert Mead (1863 - 1931), was a social philosopher of an earlier generation whose 
accounts of socialisation through language, participation, and empathetic reflection are regarded as 
important for Habermas and his formulations and possibly colour the thinking of Simon Frith in his 
accounts of empathy for the other through shared cultural participation. See also Habermas 
(1992c).
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21. We return to Crossley in Chapter 7 Music, radio & intersubjectivity. His account of 
subjectification and intersubjectivity is a contemporary one which is not only consonant with the 
Hegelian model of personal development, but is an account that throws some light on Adorno’s 
theorisation and critique of immediate and mediated encounter. Additionally, Crossley’s model 
touches on the communicative politics of intersubjectivity and thus takes us into the ambit of 
Habermas.
22. The egological model of Crossley is a more mediated/objectifying relationship and is about 
what is experienced, reflected on and used rather than being a direct, face to face mutuality. The 
value of Crossley’s ‘I-it’ formulation is that is allows for art and language to instigate and enhance 
an engagement with the other, i.e. it is not immediate. This is potentially an unequal relationship 
where one displaces the other in the act of ‘empathy’, but it surely is better than an insincere ‘I- 
thou’ relationship or the instrumentality of a cold ‘I-It’ as it calls for a more imaginative 
consideration of the Other which requires language and culture to assist in an editing and 
adjudicating role.
23. Barbara Goodwin writes that Ruth Levitas’s “answer to the question ‘What is Utopia for?’ is 
that it functions are compensation, critique and catalysing change. Postmodern thinkers have a 
negative view of Utopia as a monolithic, totalizing form of thought based on truth, morality and 
grand schemes. Recent utopias reflect the postmodernist ‘turn’, dwelling on process rather than on 
plans or blueprints for a better society: they are provisional, reflexive and pluralistic. These 
features Levitas argues, can lead to a ‘pathological’ pluralism which reduces the critical capacity of 
utopia and jeopardises its transformative power. As a defence [...] she advocates moral 
commitment and substantive content” (2001,3).
24. Levitas, keynote address to a University of Warwick conference, Nowhere: A Place o f Our 
Own (1999).
23. In the sphere of public broadcasting, BBC Radio l ’s preeminence amongst daytime audiences 
was increasingly being challenged by advertiser and format dominant commercial radio stations. 
At the same moment, reliance in personnel terms on a succession of public school and Oxbridge 
educated individuals with their particular ‘great and the good’ ideology and commitment to 
delivering edifying material to the nation was subject to an emergent market-inflected critique of 
public sector broadcasting exploiting populist rhetoric and imbibing managerialist ideology. On the 
rise of Radio 1 generally and the BBC as first a pluralistic, non-establishment body, then 
something offering a musical orthodoxy, day and night, see Chapman (1992). Sidestepping both 
state and commercial modes of communication is community radio broadcasting, both pirate and 
legitimate. Cf. Partridge (1982), Land (1999), Hilmes (2001).
26. Durkheim sees society, the Gesellschaft of Tonnies (1957) as “community writ large” 
Durkheim initially saw it as the progenitor of “the individual” in a legalistic sense - a less 
mechanistic structure away from the constraints of the community.
27. Durkheim argued in his social model that in the past, people lived in smaller communities 
where conformity and homogeneity was the norm. In more complex and extended societies, 
patterns still govern much of our socialisation but their details and combinations are more diverse. 
To some extent, the ‘perfect’ but now lost immediacy and authenticity of agency in die community 
and independent of collective incorporation is actually a construct of those situated in our mass 
media age. The insularity and hermetically regulated state of More’s Utopia is inverted to become a 
community of all-comers which preserves its equilibrium and that of its subjects by becoming what 
has been termed a ‘community of strangers’ held at a distance from one another by technological 
distance. Held in such a mass mediated field, pluralities can be accommodated. “The only way to 
resolve this antinomy is to set up a cluster of collective forces outside the state, though subject to 
its action, whose regulative influence can be exerted with greater variety. Not only will our 
reconstituted corporations satisfy this condition, but it is hard to see what other groups could do so. 
For they are close enough to the facts, directly and constantly enough in contact with them, to 
detect all their nuances, and they should be sufficiently autonomous” Durkheim, Suicide (1896) 
cited Nisbet (1970, 157). Durkheim is here talking about pensions, atomised souls and the like but 
it could be extended to the provision of cultural support.
28. Arato hints that Adomo followed Durkheim (and Marx) in saying that we are products of the 
social. “The individual is a product of the general, Adomo insisted. Mediated consciousness is not 
bad, unreal consciousness, but die only consciousness available”. Arato goes on: “Even a false 
consciousness may be a true consciousness in this sense and a harbinger of transcendence, a map 
of new territory” (Arato and Gebhardt 2000,397).
29. Cf. Bom, who has called die “nation-state” an “inadequate unit of analysis” (1993a, 268).
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30. Individual engagement in culture is now at once individualistic and privatised, homogenised 
and public but neither of these conditions respect humanistic identity or fulfilment.
31. James Curran 1991 cited McGuigan (1996,27).
32. Vattimo argues that the mass media brings everything into view and might just be for a 
moment or two, before it is critiqued, Hegel’s “Absolute Spirit: the perfect self-consciousness of 
the whole of humanity, die coincidence between what happens, history and human knowledge” 
(Vattimo 1992, 6). Consider J. S. Mill’s view that social diversity and multiplicity is “a public 
good” {On Liberty 1859), cf. Edgar and Sedgwick (2002,162).
PART TWO | Music’s utopia
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3 ‘Venturing beyond’: Bloch & the utopian trope in music
3.1 Introduction
Until we become idealists and Utopians we cannot be effective and practical people.
Fred Henderson, The Case for Socialism (London, published by The Labour Party, 
1911)1
Music is the supreme art of utopian venturing beyond, whether it drifts or builds.
(Bloch 1995 IB, 1057)
This thesis is driven by an account of utopian desire as experienced in the 
presence of music - mediated or otherwise - and its subsequent linguistic 
articulation. For any such account, Ernst Bloch is a sensible point of philosophical 
departure as his ideas serve as prelude and gloss to the aesthetic and utopian 
accounts of the likes of Adomo and Marcuse which are attended to in the next two 
chapters.
Bloch’s view of music’s possession of immanent powers and the demands 
music makes on us for a hermeneutical rendering is here amplified, reexamined 
and extended in this chapter through the work of Caryl Flinn (1992) so that both 
the pre-lingual emotive power of music and its discursive contexts (philosophical 
or socio-cultural) are acknowledged and used to inform this study’s recurrent 
themes of music, language, intersubjectivity, and spatial conceits. The present 
chapter specifically explores the relation of music, Utopia, eutopia and language 
by way of Bloch; considers Bloch’s account of music’s part in subjectification and 
intersubjectivity, and outlines the wider implications of such perspectives.
Bloch’s philosophy was essentially two-fold in character: (1) it sought to 
outline what was wrong with the conditions of modem life through a focus on the 
past happiness and present condition of individual subjects, and (2), it sought to 
articulate a normative, hopeful counter of improved future conditions with 
recourse to a sustained deployment of the utopian conceit. Much of Bloch’s work 
on alienation and non-identity was couched in the guise of what he termed ‘the not 
yet’, a deferred, partly-modelled utopia that was constituted firstly as an abstract 
utopia of feelings and then secondly as a more directed and articulated concrete 
utopia of potential remedies.
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Bloch’s philosophy then was diagnostic and curative. It detected a 
condition of non-identity on the part of individuals who might, through a dynamic 
utopian ‘spirit’ crystallise anterior or anticipatory longings for a now lost past, or
yet-to-be future. Importantly, desires could be felt, not least in musical
2  •  •  •encounters. Bloch prosecuted a socialist agenda for a fulfilment in work,
relationships and pleasure within a dialectic of history, a awareness of objective 
reality, possibility and the value of art as a site of manifest possibilities. He looked 
constantly to works of high and low culture as profound and banal sites of 
imaginative recall or suggestive ‘traces’. In these traces, a subject might 
experience intimations of hope and utopian longing. For Bloch, music in 
particular was a profound source of subjective utopian speculation and guiding 
principles that would resonate whenever played, heard then later represented in 
words. Such musical texts were to be read and reread allegorically and thus escape
3
any symbolic, ideologically fixed ‘meanings’ (See Noms 1989b, 327).
3.2 Utopia, music & language
If Adomo has proposed for us ‘music in radio’ and Marcuse the challenge of using 
art and reality as a source of promises and practical chances, we must now fully 
introduce the theoretical motor which drives this study, namely the utopian trope 
in music and in so doing, turn to the writings of Bloch. Utopian tropes are, to a 
large extent, a particular set of interpretations that are driven by romantic notions, 
historical glances, and a deferred or blighted sense of hope. This thesis argues (in 
part after Flinn) that music’s utopia is for Bloch and many others simply a 
hermeneutical product, prompted by music’s emotional immediacy. As meaning 
resides in language, generated in the presence of the work, philosophical and 
allegorical readings of the aesthetic and contextual particulars must supplement 
the pre-linguistic aesthetic moment itself. The theoretical model proposed here 
which reflects this, is directly after Bloch, and is thus: music’s utopia accompanies 
musical works as first a subjective internalised, abstract focus of longed for 
change that is then, as a constituent part of an external, concrete utopia, more fully 
articulated and understood as extrinsic conceptual cooptions. This second utopian 
phase is regarded as the element of docta spes - Bloch’s educated hope, where
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longing and passion in the presence of a potent cultural artefact is directed by way
4of cognition and extrinsic linguistic and institutional evaluation toward praxis.
In short, Music’s utopia is first an aesthetic, expressive and social 
expression, then a ‘concrete’ Blochian form as a more distinct social imaginary 
that may ultimately, as a eutopia, reside in the real spaces and discourses of a 
well-disposed institutional or other socio-cultural entity.5
Allegory’s lack of closure is important for Bloch and the other critical 
theorists in their accounts of musical meaning, and so deserves some explanation 
here. It is attended to further in Chapter 6. An allegory (from the Greek: aXkoo 
[other] and ayopux [speaking]) is regarded as any creative, figurative work (a 
song, drama, or painting) that contains an implicit, partially hidden meaning 
(usually an abstract political or spiritual one) that sits ‘underneath’ any overt 
narrative, conventionally fixed symbol or denotative feature. It is, to some extent, 
a kind of sustained metaphor wherein the kernel of the work is enclosed in a 
visible outer shell. So, for example, More’s Utopia is a politically allegory of 
socio-political perfection, John Bunyan’s Pilgrim’s Progress of 1678 an allegory 
of spiritual development. These meanings are intentionally ‘encoded’ by the 
work’s originator, but in the pursuit of religious exegetical precedent, anagogical 
conceit or political sensitivity, the work speaks additionally and alternatively, and 
thus requires some hermeneutical excavation.
For Walter Benjamin, everything - every sign and story of fixed 
significance - invited allegorical decipherment and reinterpretation akin to the 
cabalistic revelation of dozens of likely meanings. Unlike symbols, which for 
Benjamin connoted a precise idea or romantically imagined presence, allegories 
were constructed to invoke the more obtuse, often absent, transcendent qualities of 
the artistic work. Bloch seemed to apply this allegorical approach to his catalogue 
of cultural works in his divination of hope and anticipated change. For Benjamin 
(as for Bloch) it was a stratagem of tactical, contingent readings taken from sacred 
practices and applied to the profane and ordinary to reveal the absent and the 
profound. Benjamin particularly wished to wrest commodities away from the 
auratic, fetishistic immanences conferred on them by capitalism so that they might 
be first of all redeemed for their intrinsic worth, then allegorically reworked for 
some greater, non-capitalist purpose. Thus we have in the writings of Benjamin,
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Bloch and later Adomo, a keen ability to explicate abstract concepts and absent, 
deferred states such as the utopian in the presence of the mundane - be it a comic 
book or popular song - once it was taken away from the market. (See Kearney 
1986,153-6).
One question that needs to be asked is whether critical theory’s allegorical 
exercises in discerning the utopian are textual readings off, or textual inscriptions 
upon a work. The answer is that it is often the context rather than musicological 
form or content of an ordinary object’s history: say its nostalgic, spiritual, erotic 
or emotive significance for the owner or listener which encourages highly 
personal allegorical readings of consequent latitude and subsequent philosophical 
potential.6
Benjamin and Bloch, even as they wove elaborate allegorical readings of 
music and the like, were surely aware of the potency of a work’s remaining 
ambiguities and arbitrary purposes and turned them to their advantage in the 
presence of music and utopian thinking. As Norris writes, it is the “condition of 
deferred interpretative grasp” which is so prevalent in the presence of music and 
which avoids “the delusive promise of fully achieved understanding” (1989b, 
327).’
Musical discourse & a critique o f Bloch’s romantic tendencies
Whilst Bloch’s interest in the role of popular culture and the need to go ‘bare’ to 
others anticipates many of the themes of this thesis, his subjective temperament 
did not really see him going much beyond introspective musing or a ‘singing-to- 
oneself. This reserve precluded any suggested Blochian praxis in which 
individuals might not just feel or even articulate that which was felt to be ‘wrong’ 
but actually deal with the absences, losses and alienations his philosophy detects. 
In spite of his own extensive writings on the subject, Bloch underplays the role of 
musicological discourse perhaps as some fear of reification which might obscure 
the potency of imagination and hope. He in fact decries language: “People [...] 
attach to it [music] fondly cherished feelings of which the musical work knows 
nothing. They attach little images which they have painted in their own minds or 
hackneyed, allegedly explicatory words [...] Music is surrounded by grouping 
colloquies that never cease” (1985, 183).
59
Yet if we simply nod, wordlessly in the direction of music’s ineffable 
qualities, are we not guilty of romanticising a creative medium that is also shot 
through with social facts? Equally, not to speak or write of music so to preserve its 
‘autonomy’ is to run the risk of there being a single song and a thousand meanings 
for a thousand different listeners. Music’s meanings have long been represented in 
language by musicians, critics and national leaders. Why shouldn’t philosophers 
take their turn? So how then is this shifting, often contested balance between the 
immediate and felt sense of music and any consequent logical reading to be
g
carried out? How do we balance romantic readings with reasoned analyses?
Romanticism pictures the individualistic, struggling ‘voice’ against 
enlightenment certainty and classical order. Yet why must we, in avoiding the 
romanticisation of music, dismiss any image which helps us see perhaps hope in a 
Wordsworthian retreat back into nature from the modem world, or Adorno’s 
Beethoven struggling against society and his own physical disability? Why must
9personal imagery necessarily imply any sort of diminution of the individual? To 
dismiss romanticism and alienation in relation to music and utopia, is to reject the 
energies of aversion and hope.
Romanticism, according to Flinn valued “music for its distinction from 
language, its lack of mimeticism, and its irrationality, believing that these features 
enable it to express important spiritual resonances, hidden from the phenomenal 
world” (1992, 48). Yet how are such resonances to be shared and articulated to 
useful effect?10 In studies of alienation in industrialised society, critical theorists 
have viewed the arts generally as a locus for the representation, detection and 
discussion of domination and refusal. Music for them could be a ‘social deposit’ 
put to work as index, metaphor or allegory.11 Music itself does not constitute a 
language imparting concepts, but does, as Adomo asserted, have an intentionality, 
and whilst he claims we can only interpret it through a performance or score
reading, we also might reasonably regard it as an aesthetic form prompting
12common emotive comprehension amongst every listener too. Additionally, as 
Paddison (1990, 209) reminds us, Adomo did not see any final internal 
significance, and that music must always be heard in context.
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3.3 ‘What has gone wrong?’ non-identity, subjectification & intersubjectivity
Alone, many people are slightly insane, they sing a piece of that which used to be 
wrong with them and has not yet been fixed. They are distorted and imagined 
puppets, because they have been forced to grow up even more distorted and 
desolate. (Bloch 1997,216)
Bloch here wrote of music’s presence alongside the alienated self. He suggested 
music has an ability to provide a sort of rudimentary ontological or 
psychoanalytical insight, writing “Having started as a physical phenomenon, 
musical tension turns into a psychical one” (1985, 200).13 He also wrote that “in 
music everyone understands without knowing what it signifies [it] says everything 
and decides nothing” (1985, 72). In effect he seems to be suggesting that music’s 
intense presence allows listeners to move away from their empty, inner self to 
encounter the music of others and then (jointly), through language give meaning 
to the musical notes.14
Identity
A concept of importance to discussions of utopian yearning in the presence of 
music is the attainment of identity for the individual. The culture industry it would 
seem, had sundered socially autonomous musical activity of authenticity and 
intrinsic value, thereby foisting alienation amongst music-makers and listeners 
alike. An inauthentic, estranged human condition, a ‘non-identity’ resulted, 
whereby the subject was alienated from their own creativity, community and 
society, and was now, moreover a reified element: part of a consuming mass 
audience in a larger, instrumental system of commodity exchanges. Such a 
mechanism and consequences have been exposed by theorists adopting a critical 
stance in the study of all modem cultural forms, not least those of popular musics.
Cultural product as well as labour promoted alienation from benign, 
natural conditions and intersubjective respect. Here was a non-identity where the 
self was misaligned with the self; where self was isolated from the Other, and 
where there was also alienation from nature and a removal from one’s own 
productive powers.15 On a striving for identity, Bloch wrote:
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From early on we want to get to ourselves. But we do not know who we are. All 
that seems clear is that nobody is what he would like to be or could be [...] 
Attempts have always been made to live commensurately with ourselves. (1995 
III, 927)
Utopian readings pertinent to our interest in music and radio attend to the
experience, representation and possible eradication of such non-identity. These
readings do so in a number of ways. (1) As accounts of anterior states, of ‘what
was’; of abandoned ideals or instances of fond remembrance - in short, recourse to
romantic, historical, personal or familial evocations from the past with regulative
and inspirational value for present and future. This sort of account corresponds to
Bloch’s compensatory “recollection”16 (anamnesis), which includes the concept of
Heimat1 (the childhood security and community of home) and more generally
18nostalgia, but it also relates to his potentially radical “recognition” (anagnorisis) 
- the shock of the old where an unexpected reappearance or relived sense of 
previous contentment can be transformed into a more active, prospective wish for 
a re-united self or community. (2) A utopian reading as an optimism founded on 
recent or incipient socio-cultural action. This seems to correspond with Marcuse’s
19sense of “a golden age” - a better past, as for example where the Great Refusal 
of the 1960’s countercultures is today framed as a momentous movement of 
creative and political progress. (3) Interest in the dissemination of radical and 
affirmative popular arts grounded in current technologies and further potentials. 
(4) As a pragmatic focus on present realities and tactical advances articulated 
throughout this study’s conceit of eutopia.
M usic’s other potentials
Grounded in the everyday, but still loaded with subjective, aspirational inferences; 
music remains an emotive social institution. As Bloch wrote:
On the one hand music is not a thing apart; it is, as it were, too promiscuous for 
that [...] On the other hand music is not a merely generalised thing either, since it 
is in turn too strong for that, too unabstract, too gripping, too fraught 
ontologically. (1985, 72)
Music certainly moves us. It is a universal palliative, a site of unity, ‘safe’ 
dialectical exploration and the expression of repressed voices as in jazz; and is
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also a site of potential wholeness. The challenge is first to articulate these 
emotions and give them some political relevance. Imparting subjective expression 
through our voices, or by playing a musical instrument to effect a lyrical, sonorous 
or rhythmic music, alerts us to the physiological and emotive power of organised 
sounds. Music - as part impulsive gesture and part historically and culturally 
structured form - inserts performers and listeners into a familiar ‘place’ of close, 
meaningful ‘association’. Martin expresses music’s social role thus:
In the modem world, it [music] provides one of the ways in which people can live 
in communities, however amorphous, illusory or fantastic they turn out to be. The 
close-knit communities of Romantic mythology have given way to the quest for a 
sense of belonging, which is satisfied less and less by locally-based networks of 
family and friends. Instead, individuals may seek to identify themselves with 
symbolic entities [...] organisations [...] teams [...] heroes [...] In both simple and 
complex societies, it seems, there is an awareness that the satisfaction of material 
needs tends to pull people apart from each other, and it is often in music that they 
seek to repair the social damage. (Martin 1995,275)
Whilst music is, today, integrated into channels of production and dissemination, 
there are few who would doubt the initial or even residual if ultimately ‘ineffable’ 
potency of much music as a still unadministered human resource.
No other cultural form exudes such collective potency and, it could be 
argued, music making or listening to music constitute one of our single most 
profound, aesthetic, cognitive and intersubjective experiences as Homo sapiens.
Music can certainly afford Marcuse’s “sensuous immediacy”; a true 
engagement with will, instincts and even the ecstatic. Conceptual reification and 
ideological choreography can be avoided for a while as we ourselves listen, sing 
and dance. But Schopenhauer argued we should also seek to transcend the Will 
via our reason to reach greater insights.20 This move from sense to reason can be 
understood, suggests Simon Reynolds in his account of the ecstatic in Rock 
music, as a translation from Barthes’s transient “jouissance” into his “plaisir” - 
where fleeting feelings of an exposed but ultimately larger self are fixed and 
articulated in cultural discourse of “secure enjoyment of identity through time” 
(1990, 9). In short, music might be said to move us so that we first of all feel and 
then articulate pleasure, loss and hope. In music the past can be recalled, the 
present enjoyed and tomorrow anticipated - and all three prospects discursively 
addressed. Reynolds resists any comprehending account of music’s aesthetic
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surplus in favour of the somatic and the confounding which is an a-conceptual 
phenomenon that “holds (a) culture together” (1990, 10-11). Yet his call is a 
belated, forlorn one, as to some degree it is contradicted by his own act of writing.
Bloch’s own early account of music is expressionist and very particular, arguing 
as it does for an inwardness that renders it private and discrete in contrast to the 
visual arts, yet capable of configuring a mental image of what could lie ahead. 
What is unclear is whether the powers of speculative reception he attributes to it 
are immanently encoded and aesthetically ‘decoded’ or extrinsic thoughts 
summoned in its emotive presence. In Bloch’s model, human expression and
reflections of the socio-economic are joined by a “visionary hearing” (Hellhdren)
21which would replace Hellsehen (second sight or clairvoyance). It would be better 
to understand this attribute, less as precise prediction and more as anticipation - 
that in the presence of subjects engaging aurally with the world, something might 
be imagined but not in any detailed, certain fashion.
Music’s a-conceptual, uncommodified excess of feeling - Bloch’s abstract 
utopia - has an initial subjective impact and also becomes, consequently, his 
concrete utopia a site of self-reflection and reason. Set within an actual historical 
and empathetic social context, it then also becomes an accompaniment to the 
eutopian. This combination of the sensuous, rational and pragmatic allows us to 
use music as a utopian trope detecting emotion, intersubjectivity and then a route 
to eutopian praxis. Humanistic improvement can only happen in the presence of 
music that is felt and heard by the listener, and subsequently articulated using 
utopian tropes and eutopian settings. In music per se, there is no ‘as of right’ 
ascent, either to any Hegelian Absolute, or any drift to a benign socialism through 
simple acoustic exposure. Music is always heard, felt, and then assimilated, 
thought about, explained and re-explained in words. The fluidity of music’s 
interpretation is its source of emancipatory power in wider settings.
Bloch, intersubjectivity & agency
Just what do I seek when I hear something? I am seeking, when I listen, to grow 
richer and greater in content But I shall receive it by fetching it myself, going 
further in terms of content, beyond passive enjoyment. (Bloch 1985, 84-5)
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Whilst we can continue to simply ‘sing-to-oneself, Bloch recognised the ability
22of music not only to take the subject away from the present but also into society. 
Bloch wrote:
In order to know itself, the bare self must go to others. Intrinsically it is sunk 
within itself, and the inwardness lacks its counterpart. But through the Other 
whereby a normally clouded inner life comprehends itself, it readily enters 
foreign realms and travels away from itself again. Only sound and that which is 
expressed in sound, is referred back to an ‘I* or a ‘we’ [...] this agitated life now 
listens to itself, as a song travelling on its own or mingling with others. (Bloch 
1985,195)
In a sense, Bloch was living out his own subjective development in the 
presence of texts, including music which can also sharpen the consciousness of 
other subjects too and who may detect their own ‘traces’ of something better. We 
read:
People thought they had discovered that everything present is loaded with 
memory, with the past in the cellar of the no-longer-conscious. What they had not 
discovered was that there is in present material, indeed what is remembered [...] 
an impetus and a sense of being broken off [...] and an anticipation [...] this does 
not take place in the cellar of consciousness, but on its Front [...] it is a question 
of the psychological processes of approaching, which are so characteristic above 
all of youth, for times of change, for the adventures of productivity [...] The 
anticipatoiy thus operates in the field of hope; not taken only as emotion [...] but 
more essentially as a directing act of a cognitive kind. (Bloch 1995 1 ,11-12)
The Introduction to Principle o f Hope reminds us that “Bloch was no utopist, he 
considered his philosophy to be concretely utopian, mediated with real possibility, 
and his philosophy advocates engagement with, rather than contemplation of, the 
world” (Plaice, Plaice and Knight, 1995, xxxiii). In Bloch’s general insistence on 
the ‘concrete’, and by implication historical possibilities we see a parallel with the 
work of Antonio Gramsci, who argued strongly for the transforming powers of 
individual genius and intellectual agents within the superstructure and given,
23 _historically informed social settings. This is a view which encompasses the ideas 
of informed activity and edifying work.24 Moreover (and perhaps unsurprisingly), 
Bloch seems confident in assigning the task of mediating difference through the 
cultural superstructures of society - something Gramsci also advocated as a 
corrective to the more deterministic versions of Marxism, fixated on the primacy 
of economics and material production.
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Bloch & popular musics
We should note that Bloch’s severe stance on ‘rationalised’ forms of expressive 
culture like jazz can be explained, as in the case of Adomo, as largely a
25
generational perspective, as much as one of musicological insight. However, 
Bloch did hint at the importance of youthful energy in historical enterprises that 
seems to foreshadow some of Marcuse’s insistence on seeing revolutionary youth 
in the 1960s as a potentially transforming body of hope. Geoghegan writes that 
“The Not-Yet-Conscious is deemed to be present in the excitement, the sense of 
endless possibility, and the strong but dimly understood desires of the young” 
(1996, 34). If wary of Jazz and the hedonism of its white, affluent supporters, 
Bloch did have undoubted patience with other banal, popular works which could 
be subjected to hermeneutical interrogation guaranteed to expose the latent 
utopian trace beneath an ideological gloss. This is a practice and ‘faith’ clearly 
demonstrated in the exegetical readings of popular forms such as film that we later 
see in Fredric Jameson - a contemporary theorist determined to offer a prospective 
diagnosis of current culture.26
3.4 Caryl Flinn on Bloch & music’s utopia
Music’s utopia is undoubtedly complex in character. However, we can turn to 
Caryl Flinn’s important 1992 study of Hollywood film scores for some guidance. 
Flinn says ‘music’s utopia’ is an alternative sign system referring to memories, 
social and emotive excesses and anticipated alternatives (Flinn 1992, 9, 10-11, 
101). Flinn says that context determines the utopian sketch:
[A]n idea, a sign, or a piece of music is going to appear utopian only to certain 
listeners, much as in the same way that its overall significance will depend on its 
particular social, historical, and institutional context. [Bloch] suggests that 
utopian meaning is fixed within the trace itself. That its significance is somehow 
immanent [...] and not shaped by reading. (1992,103)
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Flinn is central to an understanding of Bloch and Music’s utopia and she too 
stresses the pre rational, pre-linguistic role of music and the place of context and 
discourse. She writes that:
Music [...] has the particular ability to ameliorate the social existence it allegedly 
overrides, and offers, in one form or another, the sense of something better. 
Music extends an impression of perfection and integrity in an otherwise 
imperfect, unintegrated world. (1992, 9)
Flinn summarises and theoretically situates for a more contemporary readership,
27what is a long-term fascination for music’s capacities. Flinn, writing about 
music’s utopia observes that many studies attending to music and film assert in 
their different ways and to different degrees that:
Music offers something more than conventional language; that it reveals glimpses 
of a better, more unified world (or a more profound experience of our own); that 
it unveils universal truths or essences and opens doors to exotic situations or 
lands; and lastly [...] that it can capture the sense of lost integrity and grandeur. 
(1992, 91)
Flinn’s own study considers the role of sound cinema as a maturing mass 
entertainment and site of social imagination. She looks at emigre German 
composers and deals poignantly with exile, escapism and hope in a commercial 
context. Her study suggests that utopian activity in relation to music can be either 
(1) an anterior interest in ‘loss’, manifest in psychoanalytic, Romantic, historical 
or nostalgic readings or (2) theoretical speculation on music’s prospective potency 
as an allegorical cultural entity. (1) and (2) are two accounts that broadly 
correspond to Blochian abstract and Blochian concrete utopias respectively. This 
is a clear regimentation of utopian thought, which, when joined by another 
category of utopian musical activity made possible through technology, allows 
accounts here of Bloch, Adomo, Marcuse and others to be systematically 
addressed. This basic schema is developed in more detail below. It is Bloch, who 
anticipates Flinn’s work and, in spite of expressionist and metaphysical tendencies 
most comprehensively and optimistically fuses anterior concerns for future 
development in a here and now setting and has thus been the focus of this opening 
chapter.
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Bloch, Flinn & Anteriority
How might evocations of the past assist any utopian prospects? Nostalgia,
reminiscence and retrospection, can function in a dialectical context, not simply as
remembered states but interestingly as continuing benchmarks. Nostalgia might be
understood with reference to what Flinn terms, in part “bygone wholeness” (1992, 
28 _ «53-4). This is the false ‘universality’ of the new subject prior to their dialectical 
particularisation and individualisation. This might be regarded as the rehabilitation 
of our experiences of that false ‘Universality’ of our infancy which with maturity 
and particulars continues to promise a yet to be occupied ‘home’ of Identity. This 
antagonistic, subjective presence of the past as a spur for summoning nostalgic 
‘traces’, and a better objective tomorrow we see in Bloch with his interest in 
childhood texts. In no way does this sort of anteriority suggest to Bloch the 
likelihood of any ‘dangerous’, stalled maturity or regression that so exercised
29
Adomo. Adorno’s dismissal of a return to young, adolescent forms as regressive 
might be reassessed in the light of Levin’s constitution of the listening self where 
a recollection of this kind adds to the ontological picture and ethical strength of
30the individual. Much of the present writer’s memory of Radio 1 is quite possibly 
bound-up in this recollection of a never to be regained, safe, domestic, pre-adult 
past. It may even extend back to Kristeva’s Chora - the site of maternal sound and
31security as discussed in Flinn (1992).
Fantasies do not only emanate from the depths of the mind, but just as often from 
newspapers, from adventure books with their wonderfully glossy pictures. From 
Booths at the fair where chains rattle and are broken, where the song to the 
evening star is sung and the half moon shines. (Bloch 1995 1,25)
Flinn usefully surveys these anterior states to some effect. She talks of Barthes, 
Kristeva and Adomo who viewed music’s utopia as “an impossible, 
plenitudinous, and nostalgic condition” and she then observes Adomo, Ballantine 
and Shepherd seeing music as:
An abandoned ideal. [An] idealized moment [...] conceived of as an 
irrecoverable prior moment in histoiy - just as psychoanalysis conceived of it as a 
lost period within the history of the subject [...] notions of lost wholeness, 
integrity, and cohesion, even when this wholeness is itself put into question. 
(1992, 75)
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Flinn argues that sound, particularly early maternal sounds that are somatic, pre- 
lingual and then latterly lingual, are important elements of experience and 
construction for the young subject. This enculturation, this primary socialisation at 
the breast and in the home is, forever, subsequently longed for or nostalgically 
recalled.32
The paternal voice of the family home is later superseded by the secondary 
socialisations of school, peers and the mass media. Bloch himself argued that 
home and school condition people for later life (1995 II, 928). In technical or 
Grammar school, the aim was “the compliant member of bourgeois society [who 
is] one who never regrets what has been learned, but also never makes use of it to 
find out and to learn what could be awkward for those who invigilate from above” 
(1995 II, 929).
Notions of one’s early listening experience do of course invoke 
psychoanalytical interpretations of the now suppressed or forgotten, infantile or 
even pre-cultural states that are but dimly felt by adults. These deserve some 
attention as they perhaps offer some way of perceiving a primary stage of 
development that might be rooted in our earliest experiences (if not the 
commonality of some deeper ‘collective unconscious’) of music and operate as a 
focus for comparative discontent In any event, early recollections most likely do 
inform the enculturation of individuals and may well resurface intermittently in 
the ecstatic, joyous, ‘free’ activities of dance. Bloch suggested that it was dance 
that:
[Ajllows us to move in a completely different way to die way we move in the 
day, at least in the everyday, it imitates something which the latter has lost or 
never even possessed. It paces out the wish for more beautifully moved being, 
fixes it in the eye, ear, the whole body, just as if it already existed now. (1995 I, 
394)
The pull of home is a strong one. Kellner (1997, 80-95) reminds us that Bloch not 
only attended to libidinal desire but the more childlike and domestic desires for 
food and security which, he tells us is where such needs are neglected by socialists
33but attended to by fascists. Could there be a real private space or sense of family 
community, shielding us from public travails? Flinn tells us that:
69
Marothy argues that this communality, this potential socialist utopia, can in fact 
be reactivated within existing social, historical and representational orders. His 
position does not so much promote the actualisation of an impossible 
otherworldly “no-place” as it uses portions of it as model for future change. 
(1992, 95)
Bloch & the Anticipatory
Bloch’s anteriority is perhaps, in a final analysis somewhat overly subjective and 
regressive in character, but he offered much more beside which we can 
incorporate into an account of music’s utopia. Bloch was, both in respect of 
cultural forms and social potentials, more comfortable than any other thinker in 
moving between past, present and future. Considered dialectically, the terms 
Bloch used to articulate his intricate philosophy where a better tomorrow can be 
addressed today include: “Latency” -  “the possible content of the future, lying 
latent in the present” (Geoghegan, 1996, 33) and “The Not”, which is a primary 
element in the account of Utopia’s driving force - that sense of lack, or absence 
which is consistent with accounts of non-identity. Adorno’s utopian prospects are, 
by comparison, muted observations about absences and deception, shaped very 
much in relation to a personal history. Adorno’s interest in current potentials late 
in life, possessed none of Bloch’s energetic certainty or interest in a wider 
humanity’s likely future. Benjamin’s work, whilst tinged by a degree of ‘old 
world’ spirituality, had the intellectual range of Bloch, and more readily accepted 
artistic and technological transformations as likely repositories of radical insight. 
Bloch’s utopian reserves often lie in a pre-modem (often musical) past, rather than 
a bourgeois-negotiated progressivist present (cf. Jameson 1980,210).
3.5 In conclusion
Much of Bloch’s reading is predicated on a belief in music’s power to exceed the 
given. Without it projecting beyond the ‘established order’, back into the past or 
on in to the future, it is of little speculative value. Might unencumbered popular 
musics and radio wavelengths on which they are transmitted be entitled to join 
Bloch’s ‘utopian canon’ in an honoraiy fashion? They can be argued in some 
configurations to have affinities with his outlook, and might at least deliver his
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prospective hopes for a changing world. Of some significance, and one that 
chimes with Adorno’s late conversion to radio’s value as cultural repository is 
Bloch’s idea of a continual trawling of past accomplishments.
The role of nostalgia and tradition in the explication of musical forms is 
important and is different from Adorno’s more historically specific longing for 
past composers and more traditional modes of performance which must, to some 
extent, have populated his own privileged youth. Bloch’s approach accepted the 
emotive quality of these losses or memories as they preserve a relationship with 
the past for the present in order to deal with the future whilst finding a secure, 
cosy place to hide. He wrote: “The hidden boy is [...] breaking out He is 
searching for what is far away [...] because outside is still indistinct, it becomes a 
place of wonder” (1995 1,23).
Bloch’s life’s work was dedicated to the prospect of hope - giving succour 
to imagination and nostalgia through its exegetical detection in texts past and 
present, high and low. Critics might argue that Bloch’s encyclopaedic survey 
might be most easily and swiftly described by cataloguing those cultural 
phenomena he fails to log, but this would be to miss the essential point about the 
need for what has been called his ‘decipherment’ and which receives renewed 
energy in the hands of Jameson.34
Bloch taught us that whilst music is instrumentally directed, it exceeds it, 
and that whilst music is ‘immediate’ and sensuous, it also brings forth 
interpretation and discourse. At its best it ‘promises’ and urges us to go out into 
the world. Whilst music is escape, it is also, to borrow from John Blacking on the 
African Venda tribe: “an adventure into reality [...] It is an experience of 
becoming, in which individual consciousness is nurtured within the collective 
consciousness of the community” (1976, 28). Bloch’s readings of music are neatly 
summed-up in the following quotation:
It is always the consumer sector and requirements, the feelings and aims of the 
ruling class which are expressed in music. Yet at the same time, thanks to its 
capacity for such directly human expression, music surpasses other arts in its 
ability to absorb the manifold griefs, wishes and rays of hope common to the 
socially oppressed. And again, no art so outstrips a given age and ideology - 
although this, of course, is an outstripping which never abandons the human 
sector. (1985, 201)
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Music’s utopia offers a chance, in terms of Marxist aesthetics to (1) experience the 
condition of non-identity; (2) serve as the ground for discursive and philosophical 
debate (immanent and overtly as lyrics) that offer anterior and anticipatory 
exegesis with reference to those experiences of non-identity.
Ernst Bloch and thinkers like Adomo and Marcuse when studying the fate 
of individual subjects in society, often focussed on musics as an morphological 
index of existing social conditions; aesthetic works of ideological power and, 
when viewed from a suitable angle, metaphors and allegories of resistance and 
latent social change. For them, when subjected to critical study seemed to offer 
itself as a substrate both for a hermeneutics of despair and a potential for 
affirmative utopian projections.
Bloch’s musical philosophy appears to attach itself, in part, onto music’s 
aesthetic surplus, its ineffability. Critics might surely see this somewhat indistinct 
musical vision come close to what Norris claims Bloch would have dismissed as 
“mystical irrationalism”.35 Does the accusation of a private metaphysics evaporate 
in the simple act of constructing a coherent, and shared hermeneutical strategy 
that can absolve the theorist of any such charge of romanticism or solipsism? 
Surely matters improve when we look to Bloch’s suggestion of a concrete, 
immanent transcendence and there see his philosophy begin to bite.
Any listening that might well summon subjective romantic notions, and 
childhood memories could usefully, in addition, focus our senses, memories and 
mind to educate conscious desires and hopes in the direction of objective social 
improvement. Vattimo writes “With the end of metaphysics and the faith in 
progress, utopia’s only possible content is that of inventory, nostalgia, rm va/” 
(1992, 86).36 However, Geoghegan writes that Bloch’s particular locus for change 
was the present as a:
Concrete utopia [...] rooted in objective possibility; it is grounded in the 
ascending forces of the age and is the most pregnant form of the utopian function. 
Concrete utopia is Bloch’s reformulation and further development of Marx’s 
concept of praxis, the unity of theoiy and practice [...] At the level of 
consciousness the best elements of historical abstract utopia need to be refined, 
and the dross of contemporary abstraction removed, to produce docta spes 
(educated hope) which in turn, becomes an intellectual and material force in the 
production of concrete utopia [...] This requires both the warm stream of passion 
and imagination, and the cold stream of rigorous analysis: ‘enthusiasm assists 
sobriety’. (1996, 38-9)
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Bloch looked ahead to praxis and place but indeed avoided specifics claiming 
“The utopian function is [...] the only transcendent one which has remained, and 
the only one which deserves to remain: One which is transcendent without
37transcendence. Its support and correlate is process” (1995 1 ,146). In short, Bloch 
is reviving utopian and scientific socialism where, through the latter, universal 
emancipation is achieved via an historical awareness, but was seeking to privilege 
culture and individuals as the locale and prime movers of progress. Properly 
framed, music can illustrate non-identity, alienation and estrangement which can, 
as part of a concrete utopia ‘educate’ hope and desire side by side to disrupt the 
extant. This is why music lends itself so well to utopian discourse - bodily desire 
and the hermeneutical impulse meet in the social expression and experience of
38sounds. Neither Adomo nor Marcuse assimilated or sanctioned this Blochian 
rationalisation of desire. Perhaps, in the wake of the evident failings of what 
Marcuse termed “the great refusal”, Bloch thought it necessary to ask 
mischievously for the suspension of Utopia in his 1974 radio broadcast Farewell 
to Utopia? (Zipes 1997,11).
Might not contemporary art, the socio-cultural spaces of broadcasting and 
yes, even language sometimes combine to sponsor a non-reified activity where 
there is a momentary experiential surplus and an independent discursive moment 
at least prior to any use or exchange values?
Ernst Bloch’s reappraisal and reformulation of utopian desire in the 
context of a search for immanent, non-revolutionary, secular transcendence is of 
particular interest. Both on its own terms, and as an illuminating parallel or 
precursor to sympathetic theorists, Bloch’s all-encompassing account of culture, 
social prospects and deferred human progress stands here as an important 
foundation in a study of popular musics and public service radio. Let us preserve 
Bloch’s hope and his discursive radicality in the face of an established order and 
its hegemonic, affirmative culture. His accounts, in the presence of music of that 
which is lost and that which is still to come constitute his utopian trope that is a 
fusion of instinct and reason with which we might now seek to identify ‘eutopian’ 
places and spaces.
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Notes
1. Cited: www.utopianstudies.mcmail.com.
2. Jameson characterises Bloch’s relationship to the utopian by stating that for him it was more a 
technique of decipherment than cultural diagnosis. (2000b, 364).
3. Bloch explored the utopian images of various secular cultural works: William Blake’s 
Jerusalem (set to music by Parry), Mozart’s Magic Flute; Robinson Crusoe, Beethoven’s 9th 
Symphony; also myth, folk and fairy tales, Robin Hood, Eldorado, Atlantis, The Big Rock Candy 
Mountain. All share immanent or extrinsic accounts of ethical worlds, lost worlds or the pleasures 
of real life perhaps now passed.
4. See Levitas (1997) for a lucid account of Bloch’s abstract and concrete utopia.
5. Cf. the relationship of the utopian and scientific socialism of Frederick Engels whereby the 
former drives the activity of the later (Engels 1995). Norris tells us that Bloch asks us to draw on 
past dreams and ideas, rather than seeking radical revolution. (Norris, 1989b, 306). Fredric 
Jameson has noted that “It is not, of course, necessary to limit ourselves to Bloch’s own formula, 
and Marxists ought to be in a position to identify any number of variations which a Utopian 
principle might take, from that of a renewal of a collective life to that of justice, or instinctual 
gratification, as well as the nightmare opposites of all these tilings. By tapping such powerful 
sources of collective fantasy, mass and commercial culture not only provides itself with an energy 
power but also puts itself in a position to manipulate and control such energies as well” (2000b, 
366).
6. See Norris (1991, 99-105).
7. In the postwar period, Paul de Man was critical of allegorical readings rich in mystifying, 
rhetorical flourishes in the name of objective philosophising as they tended to obscure any 
reasonable or inherent truths, and ignore any deconstructive gaps and tensions. There is some 
overlap in the work of critical theory and de Man with regard to the personal reading having some 
wider, real-world significance. Norris (1989b) writes of a return to a purposeful Marxist faith in 
utopian exposition and devotes space to an account of Bloch, de Man and Jameson in relation to 
music as a resistant artistic form.
8. See Edgar (1999) for one resolution.
9. Paddison usefully discusses the reification of individuals as they invest themselves in music as 
commodity, contrasting this with a more dynamic musicological investment of the self. (1990, 
198-9).
10. Flinn also flags up Attali’s (1985) admonishment of the elision of Otherness in unifying moves 
seeing it as colonial control and effacement. The “will to construct a universal language operates] 
on the same scale as the exchanges made necessary by colonial expansion: music of a flexible code 
was dreamed of as an instrument of world unification, the language of the mighty” (cited Flinn 
1992, 27). This Eurocentric position is also addressed more generally by Bom and Hesmondhalgh 
(2000). To read thematic development as a morphological representation of individual 
estrangement or enlightenment as Adomo has done requires not simply a firm musicological 
understanding, but a creative mind which may discern clues about social conditions but will 
supported ultimately only by its own metaphors and self-imposed encodings.
11. Bloch was close to Kracauer (1995a-j) in attending to popular cultural products, both 
possessing belief that the banal can serve as a profound text, whilst Bloch sought utopian traces or 
incipient hermeneutical threads, Kracauer however sought more to develop a Marxist aesthetics 
which would detect morphological representations, or at least symptomatic impressions of socio­
economic conditions in the works themselves, prior to any discursive reading. And it is this ‘faith’ 
in the fabric and morphology of music which stimulated Adomo who seemed to take from both.
12. See Adomo, ‘Music and Language: A Fragment’ (1998b).
13. Adomo noted how improvisation and embellishments: “In daring jazz arrangements worried 
notes, dirty notes, in other words false notes [...] are apperceived as exciting stimuli only because 
they are corrected by the ear to the right note” (1990, 309). This is interesting as an instance of 
harmonisation in the face of the disharmonious - perhaps where promise of unity is addressed in its 
superficial absence. Adorno’s objection would be that this is a confection of harmony in musical 
language, not any deeper sense of intersubjective unity.
14. Musicological codification of musical forms deemed part of the Western tonal canon has given 
us metaphors of wholesome conditions or dialectical terms seeking closure. We have for example 
terms like consonance, dissonance and harmony, tension and resolution, ‘the home key’ antiphonal 
call and response. All, in some degree, allude to actual or anticipated wholeness and
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correspondence - what might be understood as a utopian aspiration. For Adomo of course, 
dissonance is an expressive force that is antithetical to the harmony of semblance: “Dissonance is 
affectively expression; die constant and harmonious want to soften and eliminate it. Expression 
and semblance are fundamentally antithetical” (1997,110).
15. As far as music itself is concerned, ‘identity’ is in one respect, a somewhat loosely configured 
romantic formula, located by Adomo within his negative dialectics which proves to be the crucial 
but absent condition in his discussions of degraded, reworked, reiterated classical forms and 
‘deceitful’ popular musics.
16. See Zipes (1997, 4). Adomo, anxious not to romanticise any past ideals wrote: “The object of 
art’s longing, the reality of what is not, is metamorphosed in art as remembrance [...] Ever since 
Plato’s doctrine of anamnesis the not yet existing has been dreamed of in remembrance, which 
alone concretizes utopia without betraying it to existence. Remembrance remains bound up with 
semblance: for even in the past the dream was not reality” (1997, 132).
17. See Daniel (1997, 58-9).
18. See Zipes op cit.
19. Geoghegan (1997,23-4).
20. Norris tells us that, “For Schopenhauer especially, music gave access to a realm of primordial 
experience - the Will in all its ceaseless strivings and desires - which the other arts [...] could only 
express at a certain distance” (1989b, 309).
21. See Drew Introduction to Ernst Bloch, Essays on the Philosophy o f Music, Bloch (1985, xxiii).
22. Cf. John Blacking (1976,28) on music’s ability to integrate us socially.
23. With perhaps some allusion to the progress of the Hegelian Geist from private to public 
settings Geoghegan, writing of Bloch, explains his “Objective hope is die concrete possibility 
generated by each successive age, which enables subjective hope actively to develop the world. 
Together they constitute the ‘subjective and objective hope-contents of the world’ ” [Bloch] (1996, 
34).
24. Geoghegan writes: “Bloch is particularly interested in the mode of transformation which, in 
effect, creates true consciousness out of false consciousness; work, which while displaying die 
marks of die age, none die less transcends it” (1996,48).
25. “Nothing coarser, nastier, more stupid has ever been seen than the jazz-dances since 1930. 
Jitterbug, Boogie-Woogie, this is imbecility gone wild, with a corresponding howling which 
provides the so to speak musical accompaniment” (Bloch 1995 I, 394).
26. Jameson writes: “For Bloch’s work suggests that even a cultural product whose social function 
is that of distracting us can only realize that aim by fastening and harnessing our attention and our 
imaginative energies in some positive way and by some type of genuine, albeit disguised and 
distorted, content Such content is for him what he calls ‘hope’, or in other words the permanent 
tension of human reality towards a radical transformation of itself and eveiything about it, towards 
a Utopian transfiguration of its own existence as well of its social context To maintain that 
everything is a ‘Figure of Hope’ is to offer an analytical tool for detecting the presence of some 
Utopian content even within the most degraded and degrading type of commercial product” 
(Jameson 2000b, 366).
27. Flinn carefully traces historical and contemporary variations on this theme which see music as 
an influential source of emotional control (Plato); a route to the spiritual realm (St. Augustine), an 
echo of celestial harmony (in the European Middle Ages), a Romantic, transcendent phenomenon 
beyond immediate contingency, or a subversive, late-twentieth century form for youthful 
resistance. Flinn explains that “Like Hollywood’s interest in romanticism, romanticism’s own 
interest in Hellenic totality can be understood in terms o f a desire to exceed contemporary 
experience, to get beyond the sense of social, economic, and subjective fragmentation or 
impotence” (1992, 50).
28. vocrtoa- [nostos] - Greek, ‘return home’ and aXyia, [algia] a pained condition. Flinn asserts 
that music in film [and elsewhere] “repeatedly bears the burden of these nostalgic enterprises. [...]
It has functioned as a sort of conduit to connect listener - and commentators - to an idealized past, 
offering them the promise of a retrieval of a lost utopian coherence. But, because it is tied to 
anterior moment, music is obliged to operate as an outside term, an elsewhere removed from 
contemporary social relations and from the production of meaning” (1992, 50).
29. Cf. Levin’s exploration of the maturing, ‘listening self passing through a succession of 
comprehending stages (Levin, 1989).
30. Even John Peel (a subject in a later chapter) betrays and idealises or perhaps even privileges 
his earlier life in his Home Truths programme on BBC Radio 4 (See July 7 2001, Peel 
sentimentalises and stresses his own humanity with a readiness to admit tearfulness, reflecting on
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the death of Billy a retired Liverpool FC player (“Give it to Billy”). Interestingly however, in an 
appearance on the TV programme Stars and Cars (Channel 5 July 6, 2001), Peel argued that he 
did not listen to old music, preferring the new. However, when he listened to a Roy Orbison 
greatest hits his partner knew some emotional crisis was immanent.
31. The chora of Julia Kristeva is described by Flinn as: “A receptacle which houses the subject 
before its entry into language, inhabited [...] by gestures, rhythms, sounds, and movements offered 
through the maternal body” (1992, 58-9). Flinn says: “The chora is a pre-Oedipal, imaginary place 
in which the infant cannot distinguish self from mother, subject from object [...] for the subject it 
offers a place of self-fulfilled plenitude, a utopian moment within its early history” (1992, 59). 
With reference to Kristeva’s own sense of the limits here, Flinn suggests it is a theoretical 
projection, and being so lays down her thesis (supported in this thesis) that utopias are theoretical, 
discursive constructs. Flinn is right to point to the cooption of pre-linguistic, maternal anterior 
states as sites of masculine ‘becoming’ and uses this to remind us that utopian interpretations are 
predicated on the gender and related contexts of the interpreter.
32. Flinn writes of psychoanalysis and its interest in “the place of the musical within the early 
history of the subject, for whom it is linked to a pre-Oedipal, pre-linguistic condition [...] Theorists 
argue that the infant enters the auditory realm before it has access to visually encoded information, 
asserting that the child can distinguish it’s mother’s voice from other voices before it can 
distinguish her visually” (1992, 53). As Flinn puts it after psychoanalyst Guy Rosolato, “As a 
primordial fantasm, one that endures throughout subjectivity, sounds have a certain regressive 
nature, but sounds and music per se do not: they merely put into play a series of fantasies of lost 
representations” (1992, 54).
33. Geoghegan tells us that Bloch concludes The Principle o f Hope on this note: “ ‘once he has 
grasped himself and established what is his, without expropriation and alienation, in real 
democracy, there arises in the world something which shines into the childhood of all and in which 
no one has yet been: homeland’ (Heimat.) The term is also meant to evoke the emotions and 
connotations of being at home, at ease, in comfort and of having a sense of belonging; of 
familiarity, freedom and so forth. Coming home is not mean to suggest finality or closure; home is 
the arena in which humanity will flourish” (1996,41).
What Geoghegan omits are the following sentences which reconcile but also lay down (as 
a call to action) his metaphysical sentiments meeting with ever-present reality: “all and everything 
still stands before the creation of the world, of a right world. True genesis is not at the beginning 
but at the end, and it starts to begin only when society and existence become radical, i.e. grasp 
their roots. But the root of history is the working, creating human being who reshapes and 
overhauls the given facts” (Bloch 1995 EH, 1375-6).
34. Today, cultural studies feeds off the popular incessantly but in critical theory ease in the 
presence of the mass produced has been hard won. We see it of course most convincingly in 
Jameson (2000a). Norris tells us that “In Bloch’s collaboration with Otto Klemperer on a 1929 
Vienna production of The Flying Dutchman [his] contribution was a programmatic essay - The 
Rescue o f Wagner through Surrealistic Penny Dreadfuls - which argued for die vitalising power of 
popular culture, die intimations of a better world that could be glimpsed in ‘debased’ modem 
forms like the comic strip, sentimental romance, advertisements and adventure stories” (1989b, 
342).
35. Norris says music was “For Bloch, as for others. [...] Schopenhauer and Nietzsche [...] at once 
the most-humanly revealing form of art and the form most resistant to description or analysis in 
conceptual terms. But this was no reason, he argued, for retreating into an attitude of mystical 
irrationalism which denied music any kind of cognitive import, or (conversely) for adopting the 
formalist standpoint which reduced it to a play of purely abstract structures and relationship devoid 
of expressive content” (1989b, 307-8).
36. Derrida is more assertive in claiming a right - enshrined in law to access all previously-aired 
materials for historical and philosophical reasons which would also expose the collusion of 
ideological activity and technological forms. In Britain The British Library National Sound 
Archive, British Film Institute and BBC now systematically collect and make available audio, 
filmic and programme content. In this case, Bloch’s bottomless cultural repository is extended and 
Derrida’s critical interrogation of mass mediated communication addressed. (Derrida, 2002).
37. To this, Norris adds a comment on negativity: “Bloch’s philosophy makes common cause with 
that strain of rigorously negative thinking espoused by theorists like Adorno and de Man. To keep 
faith with music’s utopian potential may require an effort of demystification that appears 
superficially far removed from any hopeful or affirmative standpoint But it is precisely this 
undeceiving ‘labour of the negative’ - this testing of hope through a hard-won knowledge of
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everything that presently conspires against it - which marks the difference between Bloch’s and 
other, more naive utopian creeds” (1989b, 343).
38. McClary offers a positive reading of the music of Madonna “a musician who dares to create 
liberatory visions” (McClary 2002,161).
77
4 “La Promesse du Bonheur”: Adorno, music & radio
4.1 Introduction
Whilst being supposedly materialist and Marxist at root, what we have just seen in 
Bloch’s elaborate philosophy of music and popular texts, are thoughts enmeshed 
in quasi-romantic accounts of authentic, pre-modem freedoms. Bloch’s socialist 
intimations of hope were conjured in the presence all manner of cultural texts, 
high and low. For Bloch, they ever preserved an aesthetic excess, a residual 
autonomous potential for listeners, and a potential for utopian exegesis, regardless 
of the weighty structural matters of contemporary economic production and 
technological distribution. More generally, Bloch’s utopian theory built on this 
unproblematised reading of cultural works and texts and offered a model 
comprising anterior and prospective views with which an abstract sense of 
personal loss or socio-political latency might be delineated. We must now turn to 
Adomo and a more sophisticated and directly informed account of culture and its 
mediation that nonetheless preserves a utopian spirit.
Adorno’s position on radio and music radio was complex. It was 
somewhat influenced by his grudging respect for its technical reach and musical 
potentials but these positive facets were - as most accounts of Adorno’s 
philosophy relate - obscured by his fundamental critiques of all things popular and 
mediated. With this complexity in mind, this chapter seeks to achieve several 
things, namely: a brief rehearsal of Adorno’s critiques of subjects and music in 
radio; an outline of his relation to the more positive thoughts of Benjamin and 
Brecht; identification of the discursive example he offers o f writing in music’s 
presence, and his often oblique but important allusions to utopian spatial conceits. 
This chapter also strives to foreground his coy sympathies for music in radio.
A re-reading of Adomo is important for the tenor and structure of the 
present study because in his often bleak but by no means hopeless accounts, we 
can see a bridge between Bloch’s subjective, inclusivist hermeneutics, and the 
slightly more populist and somatically informed analyses of technology and 
popular arts by other contemporaries. A re-reading teaches us that whilst we might 
accuse Adomo of offering a personal, partial account of our subject, and did not
78
always operate as a strict dialectician, there is still much to consider and carry 
forward. His empirical brushes with the real business of radio, life-long dialogue 
with music and broadcasting and his philosophical dalliance with utopian 
possibilities show us that musical experiences and their conceptual articulation 
provide epistemological grist and the prospect of transcending closed thought, so 
as to admit of humanistic good will and optimism. As one writer has expressed it:
It is Theodor Adorno’s great achievement to have revealed the affinity between 
philosophical and musical thought, and hence, by distilling musical processes 
through the mesh of social functions, to have realised music’s ability to 
undermine closed thought - patterns which are the medium of political repression. 
(A. Williams 1989,187)
I hope to show that this reading of Adomo will acknowledge his critique of 
standardised popular musics as a spur to fetishisadon, regression, illusion and 
distraction but equally consider his suggestion to Benjamin that in the hands of 
‘enlightened’ individuals privy to cognitive experiences, discourse and 
independent popular musics can, in fact consciously acknowledge and engage 
dialectically with, the non-identity of cultural product and be there when “truth is 
glimpsed in the determinate negation of what is false” (Jarvis 1998, 51).
4.2 Re-reading Adorno’s critiques
While radio marks a tremendous technical advance, it has proved an impetus to 
progress neither in music itself nor in musical listening. Radio is an essentially 
new technique of musical reproduction. But it does not broadcast, to any 
considerable extent, serious modem music. (Adomo 1945,275)
Bloch and Adomo each sought an educated desire and hope whereby passion and 
reason could unite to deliver human emancipation. Yet the latter’s oeuvre is, in the 
main, more pessimistic than that of Bloch. This was so because Adomo, given his 
specialist musical training, Frankfurt credentials and experience of broadcasting 
provided a more distinct musicological and mass media critique. Adorno’s 
readings in contrast to Bloch’s are, in his early writings, more thorough-going, 
relatively contextualised and bleak. A good deal of music he heard was now 
indeed commodified; being sold or broadcast by a culture industry to a reified 
mass of consumers who were then likely to fetishise its standardised qualities as
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they listened to it atomistically at home. Music no longer offered any redeeming 
features as a realm of autonomous expression, but instead became a form for 
compensation. The best that could be done would be to open it up to critical 
scrutiny, expose its repressive, ideological dimensions, and highlight its ability to 
offer illusions of authenticity rather than truth itself. For Adomo this was a 
requisite aesthetic illusion and subsequent allegorical exposition of an otherwise 
inaccessible reality. Adomo indeed averred that “since the image of utopian 
happiness has vanished from great music, it is preserved only by inferior music, 
but in caricatured form” (1998c, 38).
Yet are people really condemned to settle simply for Stendhal’s promise of 
happiness, “/a promesse du bonheur”, as a kind of emancipatory limbo, or might 
a compensatory utopian attitude of resignation be challenged by a more assertive 
utopia of ‘recognition’ in the face of capitalism, lost community qualities and by 
those ‘irreconcilable’ musical spheres, the serious and the popular which can 
flourish together in the right settings?1 Instrumental creation and distribution of 
music by state or commerce for Adomo was likely to diminish aesthetic integrity 
and thus have a significant impact on the experience and understanding of 
listening subjects who were listening to nothing other than the ‘phantasmagoria’ 
of radio with its intimacy, immediacy and cultural riches.
In the 1930s and 1940s, Adomo as musicologist, philosopher and social 
and psychological researcher specifically considered the tearing apart of music’s 
autonomy and energies into two separate halves - the serious and the 
commodified. Music was being tom apart, and aesthetically and ideologically 
distorted. Adorno’s accounts o f the problematics of musical translation across the 
ether are best set against his dialogue with Walter Benjamin, careful critic and 
sometime advocate of new modes of mass communication like cinema We can 
read a retrospective interpretation of Adorno’s own motivations and 
preoccupations in a transcript o f a radio lecture Adomo gave in 1968.
The text on the fetish character was intended to conceptualize the recent musical- 
sociological observations I had made in America and to sketch out something like 
a ‘frame of reference’ [...] At the same time the treatise also represented a sort of 
critical reply to the work of Walter Benjamin on the Work of Art [...] I 
underscored the problematic of production in the culture-industry and the related 
behavioural responses, whereas it seemed to me that Benjamin strove all too 
directly to ‘rescue’ precisely this problematic sphere. (1998k, 218)
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2 .Adorno’s critical stance in the presence of the popular is well known. Whilst 
undoubtedly not the prejudicially flawed set of precepts as many casual 
encounters with his work conclude, it is a critique of the popular that does have 
some (perhaps intentional) shortcomings. These are usefully summed up by Bom 
(1993b, 224) who has rightly characterised much of Adorno’s work as “reductive 
and polemical”, a body of work ignoring the discursive cultural politics of 
autonomous music, and his own politico-cultural institutional situation as he 
intently figured his oppositional categories of commodified and independent 
music. The main accusation Bom has levelled at Adomo is that he had “an 
inadequate theory of power in culture, one which - focusing on the dynamics of 
capitalism renders benign the differently hegemonic apparatus of subsidized and
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administered culture, as a refuge” (Bom 1993b, 226). It is, to an extent, the aim 
of the present study to detect such a refuge, but it is hoped this is not at the 
expense of any disregarded hegemonic and discursive matters, nor any disregard 
for artistic work per se. Sensing shifts away from a close scrutiny of the aesthetic, 
towards a more conventional Marxist reading of institutional contexts, authority 
and power, Bom (1993b, 233-4) indeed warns that a call like that of Tony Bennett 
(1990) for an internal, ‘strategic’ influencing of cultural policy, can, if we are not 
careful, minimise the inherent power of the aesthetic. At all times creative 
production, aesthetic import and institutional context must inform any and all 
readings of mediating institutions and technologies.
In this chapter, Adorno’s critical engagement with music and radio is 
addressed and shown to be an evolving one which, from time to time, alighted on 
the progressive possibilities and chances they contained.5 Adorno’s formulation of 
what he termed “intermittent dialectics”,6 partial, provisional activities affording 
praxis and structured, mediated glimpses of better times is positive, but ultimately, 
even as a fragmentary strategy consonant with his method, fails to be sufficiently 
rigorous, empirical or liberal.
In revisiting the insights that run alongside Adorno’s more one-sided 
analyses, several writers have sought (often within the spirit of Adorno’s own 
relentelessly self-critical procedures) to rehabilitate Adomian perspectives which 
can deal usefully, and perhaps more synthetically with contemporary cultural 
commodification. The present work too seeks to look more closely at his thought
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(especially his late thought) which is more sophisticated than headline objections 
might allow, and thus go beyond ‘theoretical’ resistance to the popular by those, 
like Adomo, who were accused of ‘resignation’ and look closely at the likely
7
presence of immanent optimism and resistance.
For much of his career, Adomo did not build positively upon his critiques 
of popular musics, and so he failed to deliver any prospective optimism, any 
distinct ‘utopian projections’ in their presence. Quick as he was to condemn much 
musical content and the extrinsic conditions of music’s dissemination, any 
thoroughgoing dialectical activity in the face of transgressive musicological 
content or creative broadcasting is effectively absent. As much as seeing music as 
a homological or even morphological analogue of social realities, Adomo was 
granting music the task of figuration and afforded it a role in a symptomatic 
reading of subject and society but would not grant it an emancipatory role. 
However, music per se as aesthetic work cannot change anything, its power 
resides in those who bring it forth as a linguistic text and with those who also give 
it a context.
Adomo, in most of his arguments worked with the assumption that the 
culture industry converted legitimate cultural form into commodities whose only 
non-commercial ‘use value’ for music lovers in their form of sound recordings or 
radio broadcasts was in their continuing promise of happiness and delivery of 
compensation. Moreover, commerce reduced works of art of all descriptions to an 
exchange value and, more significantly, objectified the subjectivity of any work of 
art conferring a simple, transactional exchange value devoid of genuine human 
intercourse.9
Adorno’s philosophy
What underscored Adorno’s critical theory? Adomo drew his philosophy in part 
from Kant’s epistemological approach which equipped him with an interest in 
matters of synthetic epistemological processes: the senses, representational 
illusion and an individual’s innate rational faculties and categories of 
philosophical analysis which might direct their understanding of the objective 
world and their moral obligations to others. Adomo also seemed to retain much of 
Hegel’s dialectical motor whereby (partially formed) subjects would encounter
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objective difference as they mature in historical conditions but, in the interests of 
preserving art and philosophy as ongoing, mutually beneficial realms of 
experience and rationality, Adomo always rejected Hegelian Idealism and its 
march towards any absolute condition of assumed conceptual and actual 
correspondence and consequent rational stasis.10
Marxist analyses furnished Adomo with the lexicon of material base, 
technological and social relations of distribution and superstructure, alienation and 
history. The culture industry and its content as conceptualised by Adomo and 
Horkheimer (and typified by cinema and radio broadcasts) seemed to affirm rather 
than critique contemporary modes of its own production and technological 
distribution. The omnipresence and near omnipotence of Adomo and 
Horkheimer’s “instrumentaliz[ed] science” led technologies of communication to 
constitute nothing more than an “applied science”, effectively “paid for with an 
increasing diminution of theoretical awareness” (Adomo and Horkheimer 1997, 
xiii, xi). The atomising, alienating experiences of tailored culture limited the likely 
emergence of autonomous, thoughtful subjects.
Cinema and radio for Adomo and Horkheimer were, in reality, media 
which foreclosed civilised progress. Under these circumstances, the 
Enlightenment project falters and “social freedom [which] is inseparable from 
enlightened thought” is absent. All that remains is “blindly pragmatized thought 
[which] loses its transcending quality and, its relation to truth” (Adomo and 
Horkheimer 1997, xiii). All that is left is a degree of resignation and a vague, 
ideologically maintained belief in social improvement promised by modem 
technologies and their commericalised culture.
Weber’s account of rational modernity additionally presented Adomo with 
a picture of a “totally administered society”, a controlling whole of structure 
(manufacture and distribution) and superstructural positivism, politics and 
intellectual life - what Adomo termed “an open air prison”, overseen jointly by 
capitalism and its state allies.11 Presumably, any Marxist instinct of Adorno’s to 
call for the withering of the state was curtailed on his arrival in the freemarket 
economy of the USA where an absence of regulation heightened the effects of 
capitalism. Yet in Adorno’s Theses about the Idea and Form o f Collaboration o f 
the Princeton Radio Research Programme we read:
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Radio is to be regarded as a instrument influencing and ruling the masses. [...] As 
far as suggestions for the improvement of radio are concerned, we must be fully 
conscious of the fact that improvement of radio is by no means a priori identical 
with tendencies of the visual type of educational broadcasting or cultural uplift. 
[...] under present-day conditions, we should not regard radio regimented by the 
state as progressive, and commercial radio as reactionary. Under certain 
circumstances more progressive tendencies might be realized under the form of 
free competition. (2006a, 675)
Adorno on music & torn halves
An obstacle for us in seeing music as a substrate of happiness were the “Tom
12halves” Adomo identified. An image of the sundered is surely more than the 
creation of a binary model with which he perpetuated some sort of elite 
perspective. How and where might his tom halves be reunited? Can music reveal 
social iniquity, and the reality o f a humanistic non-identity to the subject through 
the ether as a prelude to a truer consciousness? Adomo seemed to be saying that 
we should not discard the tom halves.13 Apart, they would still have a dialectical 
value independent of any commercially driven or institutionally driven 
reunification and therefore their potential is preserved even in their divided state.14 
Adomo asked the question: “How can we bring good music to as large a number 
of listeners as possible?” (1945, 272). Here his assessment of denuded musical 
potency is set out prior to another exposition on music’s potential residual worth 
in the here and now:
The power of the street ballad, the catchy tune and all the swarming forms of the 
banal has made itself felt since the beginning of the bourgeois era. Formerly it 
attacked the cultural privilege of the ruling class. But today, when that power of 
the banal extends over the entire society, its function has changed. The diverse 
spheres of music must be thought of together. (Adomo 2001b, 34)
154.3 Radio: “A format worthy of the human”
The mid-century fascination for, and scrutiny of the radio in a time of totalitarian 
regimes and a constrictive ‘culture industry’ was not the preserve of Adomo.16 
For some, might radio increase, rather than reduce, the creativity and freedom of 
composers, performers and the listeners. Adomo as we know was largely reluctant 
to value the more positive, cultural and socio-political potentials of technically
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modified acoustics. In time, popular musics were to take full advantage of
M. . • 17electrical technologies, be that with instruments, recording facilities or reception. 
(One cannot fiilly conceive of the popular record without amplified voices and 
instruments heard on mobile transistor radios).18
Many artists and critics, unlike Adomo were open to the creative 
possibilities o f new, mass media forms. Some wrote expansively about its 
ethereal, otherworldly qualities, whilst the likes of Benjamin were more specific 
in their evaluations. The notion of the radio as both collective oracle and 
mesmeric device is well charted by the poet Velimir Khlebnikov who was alive to 
early radio’s seductive, phantasmagorical powers:
The slightest halt in the working of the Radio would produce a spiritual swoon of 
the entire country, a temporary loss of its consciousness. The Radio becomes the 
spiritual sun of the country, the great sorcerer and ensorceler.19
Khlebnikov surmised that “The programme of national education would be 
put into the hands of the Radio” and imagined that as an all-pervasive medium 
“the radio will forge the unbroken links of the world soul and fuse together all 
mankind”.20
Benjamin
Of significance are the somewhat complex views of Benjamin on radio which, as 
is well known, run counter to those of Adomo in the 1930s. In his 1931/2 essay 
Theater & radio: toward their mutual control o f their work o f instruction, we read 
of Benjamin’s support for radio as a fine medium for the drama of his creative 
partner Bertold Brecht, and is dismissive of the idea of the assumed superiority of 
theatre simply because it was a presentational, “living medium” (1993, 30).21 
Benjamin offered praise for radio’s experimental potentials, and commented on its 
suitability for audio montage. However, Benjamin had reservations, uncertain 
perhaps about the combination of instruction and critical listenership fostered by 
Brecht. Brecht’s somewhat didactic, epic theatre on air had incorporated 
alienating formal effects to disrupt both audience absorption and the mimetic in 
order to foster and/or maintain a critical self-awareness (Verfremdungsejfekt).22 
With such Brechtian distraction, critical self-reflection and analysis, why was it
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that for Benjamin, these particular didactic-experimental modes of production 
were suspect? We might look to Adomo for one explanation. Adomo, in Aesthetic 
Theory suggested that Brecht’s certainties and presuppositions precluded 
ambiguity in the face of the work and thus, as a consequence, prevented genuine 
analysis, evaluation and synthesis on the part of the audience (1997, 242). 
Benjamin too warned against moments when ‘Instruction (and judgement) take 
the place of culture (and knowledge). It is especially incumbent upon radio to go 
back to a kind of “cultural core curriculum” but not, he says as a “gigantic folk 
culture factory” but as “a format worthy of the human” (1993,29-31).
Thus Benjamin preserves the pre-lingual power of art (important for 
Adomo) but in so doing, undervalues, or even precludes rational self-reflection 
brought on by Brecht’s directing and alienating formal effects. It was Benjamin’s 
subsequent 1936 essay which so provoked Adomo, for it not only dismissed any
23concern for the disappearance of aura (as works of art were now casually and 
easily reproduced for the masses), it additionally argued positively for the 
democratic opportunities afforded by new media, principally film. (Benjamin was 
perhaps ignoring popular, mainstream cinema and looking more to European, 
avant-garde techniques). The essay also now suggested that unlike that written 
1931/2, (1993), avant-garde, modernist techniques were new modes of 
visualisation that could indeed empower artists and ‘make strange’, hitherto 
mimetic representations of contemporary life which would challenge audience
24perspectives. In short, film and radio would take art into a more politicised arena 
affording closer engagement for all, and which, if  carefully allied to a progressive 
prospectus could have a radicalising role. Art could be more useful than 
heretofore - if mediated carefully in a guise free of any singular Brechtian
25instruction. The earlier subtleties of Benjamin’s and Adorno’s calls for aesthetic 
and thus cognitive ambiguity seem here to be overshadowed by a more radical 
Benjamin, privileging intentionality and the techniques of alienation, but, 
importantly also trusting in the emergence of an enlightened and enlightening 
discourse between radio and audience.
Adorno’s response to Benjamin’s assessment was a fear that only 
barbarism would remain once art was handed down to the masses. There’s no real
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sense of Adomo either trusting the masses, or detecting or even simply hoping for 
a mediating institutional discourse:
The laughter of the audience at a cinema [...] is anything but good and 
revolutionary; instead it is full of the worst bourgeois sadism [...] despite its 
shock-like seduction I do not find your theory of distraction convincing - if only 
for the simple reason that in a communist society work will be organized in such 
a way that people will no longer be so tired and so stultified that they need 
distraction. [...] the idea that a reactionary is turned into a member of the avant- 
garde by expert knowledge of Chaplin films strikes me as out-and-out 
romanticization. (Adomo 1980,123)
On the subject of avant-garde techniques, Adomo said he saw little avant-garde 
technique used in the German film studio. “You under-estimate the technicality of 
autonomous art and over-estimate that of dependent art; this in plain terms would 
be my main objection” (1980, 124). In a 1938 letter to Adomo, Benjamin argued 
that:
I tried to articulate positive moments as clearly as you managed to articulate 
negative ones [...] Your analysis [in On the Fetish Character of Listening] of the 
psychological types produced by industry and your representation of their mode 
of production are most felicitous [...] I see more and more clearly that the 
launching of the sound film must be regarded as an operation of the cinema 
industry design to break the revolutionary primacy of the silent film, which 
generated reactions which were hard to control and hence politically dangerous. 
(Benjamin 1980,140)
Was Benjamin at this point in the discussion, capitulating in the face of Adorno’s 
strong critique, or was he also again paying more attention to what must have 
been, in 1938, an increasing fear that the provocation and directing of instincts 
would fall under the control of domineering, totalitarian forces. This refinement 
and adjustment of an intellectual position by Benjamin is not unlike the 
ambivalences and qualifications we later encounter in Marcuse. Both do present 
an intellectual trajectory that is at once certain and yet contingent.
Bertold Brecht
Brecht requested that: “A communications apparatus for the general benefit of the
public should be made out of the radio. This is an innovation, a suggestion that
26seems utopian and that I myself admit to be utopian” (2000g, 45).
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Brecht was intrigued by representational media, and was involved in radio 
dramas broadcast on public radio. For both, film, radio and popular culture offered 
a challenge to the exclusivist aura and the high art canon. They also offered a 
chance to attract attention via sensation and formalist devices which could activate 
listeners so they might became engaged, more critical ‘producers’. 
Acknowledging its role as distribution channel and its character as a device for 
cultural monologue, but not dialogue we read of radio that it was for Brecht “In its 
first phase as substitute; a substitute for theatre, opera, concerts, lectures, coffee 
house music the local pages of the newspaper, etc.” He added: “From the 
beginning, the radio imitated practically every existing institution that had 
anything at all to do with the distribution of speech or song” (2000g, 41). Brecht 
continued:
It is only a distribution apparatus, it merely dispenses [...] it must be transformed 
from a distribution apparatus into a communications apparatus. The radio could 
be the finest possible communications apparatus in public life [...] if it understood 
how to receive as well as to transmit [and] bring him [the listener] into a network 
instead of isolating him. (2000g, 41-3)
27Brecht pushed hard for radio to develop a political, democratic facet too. Here, 
Brecht seemed to offer radio a new, participatory role which might meet his “call 
for a kind of rebellion by the listener, for his mobilization and redeployment as 
producer” (2000f, 39). With reference to the potential role of the state given its 
actual socio-economic interests he concluded:
The Flight of the Lindberghs [radio play] has no aesthetic and no revolutionaiy 
value independent of its application and only the state can organise this. Its 
proper application, however, makes it so ‘revolutionaiy’ that the present day state 
has no interest in sponsoring such exercises. (2000f, 40)
Brecht’s optimism is also tempered in a minor way when he reflected on radio’s 
likely day-to-day content and bourgeois direction. For him, [radio] “was a colossal 
triumph of technology at last able to make accessible to the entire world a 
Viennese waltz and a kitchen recipe. An ambush so to speak. A phenomenon of 
the century, but to what end?” Brecht (2000d, 36-7). In a passage worthy of 
Adomo for its refusal to be singular or final, Brecht offered the following:
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I strongly wish that after their invention of the radio the bourgeoisie would make 
a further invention that enables us to fix for all time what the radio 
communicates. Later generations would then have the opportunity to marvel how 
a certain caste was able to tell the whole planet what it had to say and at the same 
time how it enabled the planet to see that it had nothing to say. (2000d, 37-8)
Ironically, given the cooption of radio by the Nazi party in the next few years we 
also read in one of Brecht’s unfinished typescripts:
Art and the radio must be put to pedagogical purposes [...] The possibility of 
implementing such a direct pedagogical utilization of art does not seem feasible 
today because the state has no interest in educating its youth about collectivism. 
(2000e, 38)
We see then that Brecht’s reflections on radio technology and output in the late
1920s and early 1930s are ambitious, optimistic and cautious. In tone they are the
thoughts of a socialist and cultural modernist seeking positive social
transformation through technology in the hands of a well-meaning polity. His
writings do not anticipate the totalitarian co-option of radio, but instead promote
the achievement of a culturally beneficial independence. Whilst we see Brecht
using the term ‘ambush’ in relation to popular radio’s likely content, neither he
nor even Benjamin, writing in 1936 - and touching on the aestheticisation of
politics and the politicisation of aesthetics - really grappled with radio’s
28propagandists, dystopian potentials.
We should not forget either Brecht’s ambitions for radio as a modem, 
channel for intersubjectivity. In his 1932 essay, The Radio as a Communications 
Apparatus, (2000g) he wrote of active listeners who might become producers. He 
argued for technological innovation to bring about what he termed the “formation 
of the other order”. This might not have been for him, a fully fashioned socialist 
state but, at the very least, an arena of cultural and political participation. In 
Explanations [about The flight o f the Lindberghs], Brecht records a passage from 
the radio play (music by Weill and Paul Hindemith) where he encourages 
audience participation - promoted by the state - which will “be obliged to have 
many skills” and in relation to music “shall provide whatever requires special
29apparatuses and special skills” (2000f, 39).
To sumarise: Adorno’s critiques of radio music and its listeners were often 
severe. Benjamin and Brecht on the other hand saw, for a time, the new
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technology at the very least offering-up some interesting possibilities. Benjamin 
talked of new aesthetic perceptions offered by ‘mechanical’ and electrical 
reproduction, namely close-ups and intensifications. He conceded that art in 
reproduction would not preserve any hermetic purity, but could continue to exist 
(usefully) as significant content within a new perceptual ground and moves too 
from work to text. Significance in a work of art can be ‘translated’, but not 
faithfully reproduced.
Benjamin had welcomed the large audiences cinema engendered, but 
ultimately for him, individuals would have been most likely to have been in a state 
of distractedness, seduced by the phantasmagoric qualities of the cinematic 
mainstream and the experimental devices in progressive film derived from the 
likes of Eisenstein. Adomo was certain that cinema (and radio) precluded the 
development of an audience of autonomous, thinking subjects who could reflect 
on sights and sounds, and who would not be diverted and passive. Whilst the 
discontinuity of montage and experimental editing in cinema might be thought of 
as a device that would encourage audiences to be aware that they were looking at 
a technological confection, Adomo felt it was more likely to be embraced as a 
mesmersing, formalistic device in its own right or, at the very least, a supportive 
rhetorical trope that would be a sort of metaphor for the arbitrary, pacy quality of 
modem society.
For Benjamin and Adomo then, cinema offered an intriguing but uncertain 
balance between the potential mass mediation of significant content and the 
pitfalls of a distracting formalism. Filmic realism and exciting edits might 
together offer narratives and themes worthy of public attention, but of course, 
verisimilitude and motage were equally likely to fulfil a propaganda role for 
commerce or state, a fear Benjamin and Adomo shared in 1930s Germany in 
equal measure.
Bom is quick to dismiss technological and phenomenological readings 
(past and present) which de-couple the cultural politics of institutional and 
aesthetic factors (1993b, 227-8). She writes: “It is meaningless to consider 
technologies themselves in the abstract as a sufficient basis for a cultural politics” 
and adds “technologies themselves do not amount to an aesthetic” (1993b, 228, 
230). She qualifies this with:
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While I agree on the benefits of examining the materiality of particular media and 
how this may set the limits to aesthetic or indeed cultural political possibilities, 
my point is that the technological/phenomenal cannot stand in for an aesthetic 
politics, let alone for a politics of cultural production. (1993b 230-1)
Consideration of the selection and administration of content and form by the 
culture industry is undoubtedly as important as an examination of its technological 
means and manifestations.
Adorno’s critique of music on air was consistent with (1) his strident 
musicological analyses of commercialised music; (2) his Weberian and Lukacian 
influenced critique of bureaucratic, reified tendencies of state and capital and (3) 
his witnessing of the Nazi exploitation of film and radio and his subsequent 
empirical, sociological analysis of U.S music-devotees and radio listeners. It was a 
critique given some impetus by Adorno’s earlier correspondence with Walter 
Benjamin on art and technical reproduction.
4.4 Current of Music: Adorno’s radio theory & the autonomous subject
Adomo unambiguously took sideswipes at technology. He touched on what he 
termed “gadgeteering” or “instrumentalization” - where means dominates ends - 
and argued that this precluded a stable subjectivity, any autonomy and a stable, 
subjective voice:
Subjectively, all this is promoted by the anthropological phenomenon of 
gadgeteering, the affective investment in technology that exceeds every form of 
reason and inhabits every form of life. [...] McLuhan is right: the medium is the 
message. The substitution of means for ends replaces the qualities in people 
themselves. (1998n, 270)
We have seen above his dismissal of cinema. Radio too atomises and 
mythologises; yet it is perhaps the most invisible of technologies. Adomo saw it 
(initially) as a circuit of vain musical reproduction and repetition until all was 
unintelligible:
In the face of the culture industry art maintains [...] dignity, it enrobes two 
measures of a Beethoven quartet snatched up from between the murky stream of 
hit tunes while tuning the radio dial. (Adomo, 1997, 39)
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The title of Current o f Music (2006a) must allude to the dynamic unfolding of a 
musical motive (or human subject) - the individual element as a score is 
performed and heard. If this is the case, there is a certain irony in this given that 
radio listeners could move from station to station fragmenting their evening’s 
listening, whilst radio professionals too might offer arbitrary, ‘dismembered’ 
selections. Music for Adomo should be heard without disruption. Compositions 
from the classical tradition could introduce and develop a theme which the expert 
listener might trace across an entire symphony. The training, memory and 
confidence required to do this was alien to many ordinary audiences. Moreover, 
die fragmented nature of radio broadcasting and listening (alluded to above by 
Adorno’s account of Beethoven on air), was akin to the montage of cinema 
delivering less of a cogent current than an aural collage and most unlikely to
30encourage informed listening. It could be argued that because of the nature of the 
mass media in question, the word ‘current’ implies a movement passing between 
people in a broad, unlimited fashion. Indeed the Latin root cuere - ‘to run’, 
implies the swift passage of a signal. Etymologically, the notions of a 
communication of consensus, an unending passage movement, electrical flow or 
present occupation are evoked. Adomo may well have considered these or similar 
definitions with which to allude to radio as a channel of musical dissemination. It 
is surely no coincidence that the derogatory term ‘tap listening’ has been applied 
to indiscriminate radio listening and the wide notion of ‘flow’ as a succession of 
planned content, meaningful across time was later deployed by Raymond 
Williams in his studies of the mass media (1974, 86-96).
Adorno: aesthetics & the phenomenon o f radio reception
Adorno’s central objections to radio as an aesthetically limiting channel of social 
domination are well summarised here:
The step from the telephone to the radio has clearly distinguished the roles. The 
former still allowed the subscriber to play the role of subject and was liberal. The 
latter is democratic: it turns all participants into listeners and authoritatively 
subjects them to broadcast programs which are all exactly the same. No 
machinery of rejoinder has been devised [...] Any trace of spontaneity from the 
public in official broadcasting is controlled and absorbed by talent scouts, studio 
competitions and official programs of every kind selected by professionals. 
(Adomo and Horkheimer 1997, 122)
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Frank A. Biocca (1988) asserts that “Three aural technologies - the telephone, the 
phonograph and the radio” led to “A whole new environment of structured and 
meaningful sound” (1988, 61-2). He draws attention to the likes of conductor, 
composer and later Bell Labs researcher Leopold Stokowski and to composer 
Davidson Taylor who, unlike Adomo, looked in a more measured and open 
fashion on the possibilities of aural reproduction and transmission as they stood in 
the 1930s (1988, 68). Biocca also draws our attention to the first international 
Conference on Radio Music, held at Baden Baden in 1929 and lists a number of 
new musical instruments using radiophony to generate musical sounds and control 
(1988, 65). In short, Biocca shows us a good deal of progressive, optimistic 
musical activity in the presence of radio, not least what Stokowski regarded as a 
consequent development: a more receptive, perceptually expanded ear of the 
listener attuned to modem music and life (1988, 70-71). Stokowksi, Biocca notes, 
set down many of his utopian views in an article entitled New Vistas in Radio in 
The Atlantic Monthly 155, of 1935. Adomo was dismissive of such “selecting 
professionals” like Stokowski, a composer, conductor and acoustic scientist 
participating in new technological and cultural arenas. Whilst he and others might 
profess to embrace opportunities for creative and democratic reasons and 
influence developments to meet their own, radical agendas, they were effectively 
legitimising radio’s fundamental technological character, socio-cultural reach and 
impact. A charge Adomo could have levelled equally at the amateur radio 
enthsiasts, the radio hams who are discussed below.
Adomo argued then that listening was now ‘framed’ by mediating forces. 
So, not only did radio mediate production, consumption, and intersubjectivity, it 
also articulated the discourse of interpretation. The challenge was to consider the 
intentions and legitimacy of the media institutions in question (see generally, 
Adomo 2001b, 45).
“Especially for you ”
Radio listeners for Adomo were commanded or seduced as part of the obedient
31mass or as an egotistical bourgeois individual.
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The inherent tendency of radio is to make the speaker’s word, the false 
commandment, absolute. A recommendation becomes an order. (Adomo and 
Horkheimer 1997,159)
Adomo, as we have now seen loved radio and hated radio. He enjoyed hearing 
Cage’s Piano concerto on air, hated what tinny transistor radio speakers could do 
to Beethoven. Peters tells us: “The danger of radio [for Adomo] was not its 
rabble-rousing, but its individualizing ability, its skill at tucking the listener into a 
cocoon of unreflective security” (Peters 1999, 221).32 “Especially for you” - 
Adomo used this saccharine address in English in the original after the work of 
Karl Kraus (Adomo 1998c, 43) - is a sentiment heard in American popular
33quarters said Adomo.
‘Especially for you’ the birds are singing ‘Especially for you the bells are 
ringing.’ [...] The cynicisms has a precise function. By telling the consumer he 
has no influence [...] he is meant to realise that he is being mocked. [...] he has 
no choice but to conform, whether as buyer, singer, lover or as a simple member 
of what is gradually turning into an organization of cosmic proportions. The truth 
is made explicit [...] by a warning. “Any copying of the words or music [...] 
makes the infringer liable to criminal prosecution under the U.S. copyright law.” 
After reading this, anyone who had harboured the illusion that an object existed 
especially for him [...] will dismiss the idea. (Adomo, 1998c, 44-5)
Radio for Adomo rendered people politically inactive and self-satisfied whilst 
creating the illusion for the listeners that they were part of a cultural project of 
high public ideals. Participating they might be in the ‘free market’ of the United 
States, they were, Adomo reflected, unaware of the culture industry’s sleight of 
hand. This was not unsullied exposure to high culture. He wrote:
Radio music’s ideological tendencies realise themselves regardless of the intent 
of radio functionaries [...] music under present radio auspices serves to keep 
listeners from criticizing social realities; [...] The ruined farmer is consoled by the 
radio-instilled belief that Toscanini is playing for him and for him alone, [...] 
radio is giving him culture [...] In this respect radio music offers a new function 
not inherent in music as an art - the function of creating smugness and self- 
satisfaction. (Adomo 1945,275)
Did Adomo confuse real with realistic? Surely many listeners would have 
understood this distinction. The view that radio cannot deliver a full interaction 
has been shown, in part with reference to John Durham Peters, to be a somewhat 
harsh understanding of the medium of radio, which, like any can only deliver an 
approximation or partial system of interactivity. “Adorno’s negative dialectics
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constantly undermines the dream of reconciliation between people - in the name 
of that dream. Removing false hope is a fine service so long as it does not damage 
our animal faith, since all action rests on strategic illusion” (1999, 224). John 
Durham Peters also asks whether “we are more afraid of being suckered by power 
or deprived of hope” (1999,224).
Current o f Music objections to “music in radio” were then as follows: (1) 
radio’s impact on musics, as a sensuous, atomising “technical tool” (2006a, 76, 
97); (2) radio’s general “illusion of closeness” and its influence on the subject as 
both an “objective and infallible [...] voice ‘and a substitute ear’ [the radio 
microphone] which replace the listener’s own” (2006a, 81-3). As these tendencies 
increased, such a modem “public mechanism” as radio would attempt, Adomo 
argued “to conceal [itself] behind a facade of the individual’s adaptability, privacy 
and intimacy” (2006a, 114), and added that with regard to need for a subject’s 
identification with others, “one of the only psychological refugees is identification 
with those very powers juts as a prisoner may grow to love the barred windows of 
his cell” (2006a, 161). Thus, any later cultural theory (the present study included) 
which might argue for the liberatory, or simply educative, aspects of radio already 
has objections laid down which are to be acknowledged. One justification for the 
present study’s accent on the positive is Adorno’s philosophical and stylistic 
penchant for articulating a synthesis of analytical inferences which often touches 
on potentials for immanent critique and thus transcendence. For example, having 
pointed to radio’s powers of musical diminution and listener dependency, for 
much of Current o f Music, Adomo then held that these characteristics were 
already prior traits, possessed by mass produced art and most individuals. 
Consequently for Adomo a brief ray of hope appears, and if this is so then: “radio, 
like other means of communication, would be less an instrument of influence than 
of social revelation: it would demonstrate to the individual the identity of the inner 
and the outer and thereby continue to reconcile him with the reality which 
otherwise he would find hard to bear” (2006a, 533).
If art did not always preserve truth in its translation, it might still convey 
mutually beneficial knowledges about the human condition in the form of a story 
and might even give on to a sort of epistemological critique of its own technology. 
Adomo is elsewhere dismissive of what he sees as a psychological dependency on 
certain forms of radio music:
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Music today is largely a social cement [...] a means by which they achieve some 
psychical adjustment to the mechanism of present-day life. This ‘adjustment’ 
materialises in two different ways, corresponding to two major social- 
psychological types [...] the ‘rhythmically obedient’ type and the ‘emotional’ 
type. Individuals of the rhythmically obedient type are mainly found among the 
youth - the so-called radio generation. They are most susceptible to a process of 
masochistic adjustment to authoritarian collectivism. (Adomo 1990, 311-12)
Adomo in discussing fetishisation is dismissive of the radio ham and is here 
quoted at length:
The eager person who leaves the factory and ‘occupies’ himself with the music in 
the quiet of his bedroom. He is shy and inhibited, perhaps has no luck with girls, 
and wants in any case to preserve his own special sphere. He seeks this as a radio 
ham. [...] He patiently builds sets whose most important parts he must buy ready­
made, and scans the air for shortwave secrets, though there are none. [...] he 
becomes the discoverer of just those industrial products which are interested in 
being discovered by him [...] Of all fetishistic listeners, the radio ham is perhaps 
the most complete. It is irrelevant to him what he hears or even how he hears; he 
is only interested in the fact that he hears and succeeds in inserting himself, with 
his private equipment, into the public mechanism, without exerting even die 
slightest influence on i t  (2001b 53-4)
In a few sentences, Adomo was able to be critical o f the radio industry, hobbyists, 
and immature listeners weaned on the childhood adventures presumably enjoyed 
by the likes of Bloch. The utopian moment of becoming someone active (true 
amateur radio was a two-way activity), someone making a domestic transmitter as 
well as receiver is followed by their reabsorbtion into the system of
« . 3 4commercialised radiophony as a whole as they condone its capabilities.
Standardised musical product was tempered by what he termed pseudo­
individualism. He concluded by arguing that radio music (serious and popular) 
was “entertainment” only, arguing that “entertainment may have its uses, but a 
recognition of radio music as such would shatter listeners’ artificially fostered 
belief that they are dealing with the world’s greatest music” (Adomo, 1945, 276- 
9). A more positive gloss runs that hobbyists were using radio kits and sets as way 
of retaining some element of choice and participation in the face of capitalist 
pressures, and thus radio is a resource for individuals as much as a tool for 
reification and socio-cultural programming. Radio therefore not only reinforces 
exposure to infantile tunes, it also extends our tastes by running, dialectically, the 
familiar alongside sounds of alterity.
96
4.5 Adorno’s mature thought
Empirical work and aesthetic theories
A pivotal moment in Adorno’s career was his time in New Jersey. Here, his 
perspectives on broadcast music and popular preferences were at once confirmed, 
but it also might be suggested, subtly challenged; both by interaction and 
observation faced with the diversity and vitality of American musical life. Whilst 
on his return to Germany Adomo the critical theorist reasserts himself, this period 
of empirical engagement was not without influence on his later work.
Adomo had moved to New York in February 1938 to work on the
35Princeton Radio Project. Because of his Institute of Social Research ties, he was 
allowed some latitude and undertook a fair amount o f self-directed research and 
writing.36 Adomo claimed to enjoy the discursive interviews, but suggested that 
such responses were probably already conditioned ones, not immediate and thus
37demanded scrutiny of the system which of course he was not encouraged to do.
In Aesthetic Theory Adomo conceded a benefit for the subject in an 
exposure to the presence (albeit as semblance) of alterity and a wider world.
Whoever, rightly, senses unfreedom in all art is tempted to capitulate, to resign in 
the face of the gathering forces of administration, with the dismissive assertion 
that ‘nothing ever changes’, whereas instead, in the semblance of what is other, 
its possibility also unfolds. (1997,18)
More radically, certainty about the invasiveness of the ideological is replaced by a 
growing respect for independent thought. In a 1968 radio lecture, Adomo warned 
that ideological content was not directly taken-up by the listeners, a superficial 
form may have only a superficial impact, or it may not entirely coincide with the 
outlook or unconscious of the listeners: “There are established limits to
38manipulation” (Adomo 1998k, 227). In a study of the mass media coverage of 
the marriage of Princess Beatrix o f Holland we read:
It was possible to detect symptoms of a split consciousness. On the one had 
people enjoyed it as a concrete event in the here and now [...] What the culture 
industry presented people with in their free time [...] is indeed consumed and
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accepted, but with a kind of reservation [...] The real interests of individuals are 
still strong enough to resist [...] total inclusion [...] but I think we can here 
glimpse a chance of maturity (Mundigkeit), which might just eventually help turn 
free time into freedom proper. (Adomo 200le, 195-197)
Of interest is Adorno’s reply to a question concerning overwhelming social 
conditions that preclude individual action in a discussion following a lecture “The 
Meaning of Working through the Past” Appendix 1 (Adomo 1998d, 298).
Question: How can the working-through succeed if self-examination already 
assumes abilities the majority of people doesn’t have? Prof. Adomo: This is of 
course correct. And here you precisely define the problem, that is, it would be 
wholly wrong if we were to preach self-examination and then expect that because 
of this sermon people will examine themselves. That is illusory. What we can do 
is give people contents, give them categories, give them forms of consciousness, 
by means of which they can approach self-reflection, (ibid. 300)
One can almost hear Adomo plead with broadcasters to take stock of the medium 
they administer and the responsibilities it might perform in providing a positive 
epistemological framework:
The radio [...] both wears out music and over-exposes it [...] perhaps a better hour 
may at some time strike even for the clever fellows: one in which they may 
demand, instead of prepared material ready to be switched on, the improvisatory 
displacement of things, as the sort of radical beginning that can only thrive under 
the protection of the unshaken real world. (Adomo 2001b, 59)
He also sounded a note of caution:
Snobbishness toward the mass media is idiotic. Only by changing the function of 
the mass media can the intellectual monopoly of the Culture Industry be broken; 
it cannot be accomplished by retreating into social impotence. Today the radio 
also can provide a shelter for new music, separate as it is from the market, and 
can take up its cause, which is that of human beings, in its battle against human 
beings. (2000e, 37)
In the years following WWII, the development of recording technologies using 
magnetic tape (developed in Germany), became highly significant for all music 
and for music radio. The experimental impulse o f creative and technically minded 
amateurs meant that local performing talent was given an opportunity to record in 
small regional studios, the results receiving airplay across the hundreds of small 
radio stations of the USA and Europe to bring diverse popular voices to new 
audiences. Creative and technically minded professionals led to avant-garde
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experimentation and cultivation by seriously minded radio broadcasters. The 
1950s might indeed be seen as a moment of eutopian activity in eutopian places.
In Vers une musique informelle, Adomo (1998p) addressed post-formalist musics 
and acknowledged the part some radio stations have played in their development 
Jameson (1990, 246-7) notes that “this essay documents his sympathy and support 
for the new postwar musical production organised around the Cologne radio
39station and the experimental music concerts in Kranischstein and Darmstadt.” 
Adomo finally made space for postmodern potentials and activity in music that 
has let go of the totalizing modem systems of composition for an ambit of the 
localised fragment more truly subjective and direct In a call to promote musical 
understanding, Adomo also advocated the broadcasting of rehearsals: “to open the 
meaning of works to audiences” (Adomo 2000a, 38). Radio may indeed comprise 
a wholly experimental, progressive remit permitting experiment and
40development.
While speculating on “the autonomy of the radio, to fend off the organised 
commercial pressure” Adomo is critical of the ghettoisation of high culture: “the 
most obvious manifestation of this is the institution of the Third program41 [...] 
Indispensable though such segregation may be on occasion” (2000e, 36-7).
4.6 Adorno & the dialectic
What Adomo extracted from the cultural commodity form was a non-identity, a 
highlighting of the absent presence of any humanistic identity whose shape is 
there only in outline, traced by feigned aesthetic expressions of human unity and 
pseudo-community, an unfulfilling, ideological space of false consciousness and 
false promise. These misaligned representations which promised listeners a 
concordance between individual and society, subject and object were formed by 
hidden socio-economic realities and glossed by distorting ideological rhetoric.
How was the ordinary listener to move beyond their accommodation with 
and dependency upon the culture industry? How might an immanent critique be 
conducted upon music and radio without simply resorting to new conceptual 
generalisations? S/he had to call upon art and music, but also on two vital means 
of their translation: language and radio. In addition, the non-identity of
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consciousness where ego and id are misaligned and a socio-cultural non-identity 
exist between subjects there is Adorno’s dialectical dynamic there to foster a 
resourceftd philosophy. Finally, there had to be a fruitful tension between free- 
thinking agent, material conditions and reductionist accounts of ideological 
subjectification and intersubjectivity, of which, he himself was an example. Thus 
Adorno’s negative dialectics constitutes a dialectical dissonance between things 
inexpressible, enduring truths, free conditions and the realities of economic, 
cultural and technical illusions. As such, it qualifies as somatic and rational 
modelling moving from a Blochian abstract sense of something better, to an 
educated ego amid concrete particulars of the real world. Like Bloch, Adomo 
wanted to see a balance struck between sensuousness and enlightenment in music: 
popular, Dionysian musics and Apollonian musical refinement where Nature 
might be tamed in a culture that delivers both a physical and intellectual freedom. 
Whilst Adomo would not admit of this as close to the eutopia detailed in the 
present study, he is surely quite close to the romantic, nostalgic realms of Bloch’s
42anterior state and the ‘good place’ o f an informing, culturally heterogeneous 
BBC concerned with the technical translation through broadcasting of many 
cultural forms high, low Western and non-Western that feeds an additional 
‘discussive’ facet of an enduing public sphere, midway between commerce and 
state prescription. Sensibility, imagination and understanding emerge here 
amongst listening subjects as the genuine creativity that is expressed and 
experienced within and about radio’s ambit, and importantly, we then talk to each 
other about it in our immediate life-world and in a wider public sphere. The facts 
of perception and conscious discussion attest to a rationality and a freedom. So:
Art holds fast to the promise of reconciliation in the midst of the unreconciled: 
This is the true consciousness of an age in which the real possibility of utopia - 
that given the level of productive forces the earth could here and now be paradise 
- converges with the possibility of total catastrophe. (Adomo 1997, 33)
Whilst aware of the dangers present in affirmative culture and capitalism, Adomo 
did not always counsel despair in the face of their institutional sites and 
technologies of mediation, rather he promoted insight and scepticism to fuel the 
promotion of a Blochian, concrete utopia and, late in his work we might even 
detect arguments for a eutopia as a place of enlightened process.43 He begins by
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attending to art in freedom: “Drawing on the Hegelian conception of art as the 
sensuous illusion of the truth content of the Geist, Adorno argues that a work of 
art does not merely encode the contemporary social structure, but through its 
immanent struggle with aesthetic problems, and specifically its own existence as 
an illusion, presents a criticism of the illusory existence of society” (Edgar 1987, 
5-6). This of course requires an exposition which Paddison neatly sets out for us 
the illusions and divisive character of music:
The truth of the work is revealed through philosophical interpretation. This both 
makes use of immanent analysis and sociological critique as well as going 
beyond them to suggest how the ‘authentic* autonomous musical work is not only 
isolated from society (even though deriving its material from society) but also 
points to something beyond existing society through its emphasis on non-identity. 
(1993,62)“
Adorno, Utopia & eutopia
Adorno had a nostalgia for early years spent in a safe, childhood home. We 
witness it in Minima Moralia where Adorno talks about the hopes and fears
45conjured in the presence of childhood songs (Adomo 2005, 128). Michael 
Rosen, in a review of Adomo biographies (2005) states that:
Music was central to the Wissengrund-Adomo’s family life. They sang together, 
played piano duets and were a fixture at concerts and the opera house. His happy 
childhood was a beacon that was to guide Adomo for the rest of his life. The 
decisive reason why he came back to Germany after the war, he later explained, 
was that ‘I simply wanted to go back to where I had my childhood; my feeling is 
that, in the end, what one does in life is little more than the attempt to recover
46
one’s childhood in a transformed way.’
Without memory, without recollections of what has be lost, intensified by 
time and (in Adorno’s case) distance, where would the spur for a better life come 
from? Flinn successfully points to Adorno’s ambivalent relationship to ‘ideal’, 
absolute musical pasts and regressive, ‘maternal pasts’. As he later conceded, 
radio allows for experiment and archival replay Flinn terms his position prior to 
this point a ‘knotted lament’ (Flinn 1992, 84).
Toward the end of his life, Adomo began to rework the concept of Utopia. 
Adomo indicated his imagined future, his deferred Utopia as an absent presence in 
commodified art and an aesthetic trace in the avant-garde. Adomo argued that
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although reasoned projections and hopeful possibilities for improvement might 
constitute a ‘utopian’ element in thought, this was always an imagined state of 
completion, not in any sense an attainable situation. In conceding this, Adomo 
was not ruling out permitting the postulation of a here and now eutopia which 
may be a compromise with the status quo but does at least deliver praxis, 
immanent critique and a collective consciousness of commodification, ideology 
and power.
Adorno’s identification of radio as a musical shelter may seem like a 
bankrupt gesture towards a shallow, marginal ‘home’, hosting little more than 
nostalgically charged performances or ‘difficult’ aesthetic experiments. However, 
one senses on the page, a continuing hope for a subjective transcendence of non­
identity and revised social relations in any cultural place, however remote that 
may be.
Adomo seems to have had his visions and stance tempered as postwar 
pluralities and reality hardened against pre-war elitist cultural discourse. Adorno’s 
position here was not one of disillusioned compromise or desperation, but more of 
strong resolve to relocate the site, form and duration of utopian intimations. It is 
telling that we now witness the identification by Adomo of potential locales for 
his ‘intermittent dialectics’. Surely these are allied to Levitas’s interstitial, 
postmodern utopias and the ‘good places’ o f Musical eutopias as postwar
47philosophies and actualities have dictated and sanctioned?
4.7 In conclusion
What shifts of outlook permeate Adorno’s later work; what opportunities did he 
forsake, and might he in fact be more an exasperated optimist than negative 
dialectician? Are we right to imagine that serious, singular Western Art with 
universalist ideals has ever joined with the particulars of a diverse set of popular
48musics? Might we not even deconstruct Adorno’s priority of the first over the 
second, and thus regard popular musics as a mode of comprehending elevated 
commonalities?
In the 1930s, Adorno’s presence in Oxford and the direct links of 
Adorno’s musical associates Krenek and Webern with the BBC - the former
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seeking to have Adorno’s music performed - attest to his knowledge of the then 
fledgling broadcast institution early in his career.49 Indeed, in Current o f Music, he 
refers to the positive readings of music in the medium by Krenek, who in 1938 
saw some aspects of domestic radio listening as an enhanced mode of 
understanding (Adomo 2006a, 104-5).
Adorno’s analytical project exposing the workings and limitations of the 
culture industry and his consequent, near-fatalistic knowledge: his ‘melancholy 
science’ are intimately bound-up in his musicological, sociological and 
philosophical preoccupations. Both his purpose and cross-disciplinary perspective 
have travelled extensively as two shadows across most of the interrelated 
academic fields which are of importance to Musical eutopias.
The road from observation through critical interpretation and on to 
glimpses of the metaphysical is, for Adomo, a long and circuitous one in some 
ways. This does not however preclude the emergence of concepts and arguments 
of great value en route, which can well serve a study of this kind.
Adorno’s concept of ‘non-identity’ and the recognition on his part of the 
possibility of a change in consciousness leading to greater self-knowledge and 
potential socio-economic mutability are all to be considered as useful in 
understanding the human condition of aspiration, hope and activity. As such they 
suggest that Adorno’s philosophy is not totally bleak, but indeed contains an 
optimistic strain demonstrated in part by his own ‘transcendent’ analytical 
activity. Surely Held is wrong to ask whether Adorno’s “vision of potentialities” 
has “anything more than a formal or logical status”? (1990, 383-4).
Adomo offers us socio-philosophical inquiry in the presence of art, reason 
and reality. He neither mounts the barricade nor glides across the dance floor. A 
musical synthesis of popular material and serious, avant-garde ambition situated 
for Adomo somewhere “between Schoenberg and the American film” does not 
crystallise on his watch. His contribution lies in his rigorous reluctance to allow 
music and radio to become the handmaids of ideological activity or equivocal 
ethics.50
Adomo regarded popular musics as serving the affirmative but also, in 
their semblance, and ‘lack’ i.e. what they were not, he gave them a somewhat 
dialectical role. Pop of course began to give us, in the years immediately before
103
and after Adorno’s death in 1969 what might be termed avant-rock, and also free 
and improvised musics. For Adomo, music was a site of mediation. In its presence 
there would be the mediation of the individual and social; subject-object; material- 
spiritual contact and change. Music, and music in radio is thus always a site of 
(eutopian) becoming, thus precluding Adorno’s fears of conceptual reification, 
dialectical closure and idealist conclusion.
Choosing to put music into the ether is part of a modem Gemeinschaft that 
rebuilds relationships by challenging anomie and alienation. No representational 
medium is ‘whole’ in its translations of content and emotion from subject to 
subject. As intense, auditory artifact, radio provides new modes of near- 
immediate, near-presentational communication that reconnect, connect and 
subvert. Everyone is again in the same ‘space’ at the same time listening to the 
same exchanges.
It is not Adorno’s reduced communication that is bereft of the artistic. 
Radio can serve to deliver content that bridges the gap between public idealism, 
individual desire and cultural particulars. By transmitting both, the tom halves 
may still not add up, but at least their ‘rending’ can be discerned. What the 
mediation of subjects does seem to constitute is a just, socially configured site of 
dialectical activity which, because of its material rootedness and critically aware 
listening subject generates an awareness o f non-identity.
How then might mass communication in the hands of a public service 
broadcaster offer autonomous art, authentic intersubjectivity and emancipatory 
potential with its hegemonic and atomising tendencies? Whilst Adomo long 
resisted technology as arms of the ruling class o f a capitalist society, others, like 
Benjamin and Brecht saw the value early on of new technologies as opportunities 
to foster aesthetic estrangement and disrupt the harmony of immediate 
intersubjective presentation.
In sum, with Adomo, we detect a tardy set of potentials but even as a 
fragmentary strategy consonant with his method, it fails to deal sufficiently 
positively with popular musics and people. Adomo, though surprisingly ‘positive’ 
was still hamstrung by his fear o f totalitarian technologies and his musicological 
biases.
Bom (1993b) offers us a contextualising approach which incorporates 
institutional dimensions and, at the same time, presents a way of ‘repairing’
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Adorno’s unbalanced readings of the popular and the serious so as to fuel the 
negation of his particular critical model. Bom accuses Adomo of “evading the 
completion of his own project” with a “theory that is opportunistic” (1993b, 225). 
She seems to suggest that his distinction allowed for his sustained “aesthetic and 
sociopolitical critiques” through oppositional negation (ibid.). Bom suggests we 
must draw on Adorno’s more thoroughgoing critique of the popular, and extend it 
to accounts of autonomous and avant-garde forms. If we do consider institutional 
matters and the aesthetic of high art in relation to his tom halves, we can says 
Bom, begin to:
Analyse cultural production as a constellation of simultaneous social, 
institutional, technological, aesthetic and discursive forms - as a complex, 
multitexual and intertextual composite. In this way Adomo points towards a 
cultural theory which avoids the twin poles of formalism or sociological 
reduction; and which may allow for the politicization of each or all of the 
mediations - aesthetic, technological, social, institutional - of cultural production. 
(1993b, 224-5)
This it might be argued gives us a more complete approach for a consideration of 
the diverse cultural production and reproduction of the BBC.
While there were indeed ‘intermittent dialectics’ in evidence in his later 
work, a life-long antipathy to popular musics and the mass media precluded any 
full-blown dialectical study of contemporaneous avant-garde and popular forms. 
This serves to illustrate Adorno’s own frequently appraised ideological fixity - 
verging on the metaphysical - precluding any truly trans-generational, populist or 
democratic impulse that might exploit critical exposures faithful to Marx’s own 
belief that social transformation may come through happy, ‘in and for itself 
activity and positively-applied technologies. If popular musics and authentic 
music are, for Adomo, tom halves of a humanitarian whole, every effort must be 
made by musicians, broadcasters and not least theorists to transcend the extant 
and, in a truly utopian way, deploy dialectical activity to advance society through 
a plurality of cultural expressions.
So with an eye to Adorno’s writings, what do we see and infer?
(1) Music is a regulative principle of mutual understanding effected at somatic, 
pre-lingual, phenomenological, performative and discursive levels. For Adomo,
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what mattered was one’s ‘identification’ with nature and one’s true self. Subjects 
should not be reified or dealt with conceptually, but we can however use concepts 
alongside subjects and particulars and thus delimit what Held terms “a space for 
freedom - creative, spontaneous thought and action” (1990, 214). Indeed, concepts 
for Adomo “comprehend more than a particular object [...] they point to a set of 
ideal properties” and for Held “there is a utopian aspect in concepts” (1990,215).
(2) That if correctly ‘read’, lack and Utopia can fuel negation to destroy 
reification and fuel emancipation. Intermittent dialectics can exist in discrete 
moments, in the commodified, the kitsch, the more radical aesthetic works, even 
though the latter might also have at least some ‘compromising’ dalliance with 
mainstream channels, institutions and pressures.
(3) That radio can serve as a site for such avant-garde work and that radio and 
records can serve as a radical historical repositories re-presenting past liberations 
or sketching-out new possibilities.
(4) In this space where idea and reality meet, we can perform an Adomian 
immanent critique of institutional ideals and ideas. Perhaps by his strict reckoning, 
the BBC fails, as it does not meet its own high standards. But the BBC does give 
us a eutopia which is a socio-cultural flux and process. What we can encounter is 
what Held says is “historically crystallised standards [that] suggest what the object 
sought and seeks to be. They also suggest possibilities which are rarely, if ever 
realized” (1990,215).
(5) A late admission that some people are aware of the deceitful nature of the 
culture industry, enjoy it anyway, and are not subsumed.
Notes
1. “Because all happiness found in the status quo is an ersatz and false, art must break its promise 
in order to stay true to it. But the consciousness of people, especially that of the masses who in an 
antagonistic society are separated by cultural privilege from consciousness of such a dialectic, hold 
fast to the promise of happiness; rightfully so, but in its immediate, material form. This provides 
the opening for the culture industry, which plans for and exploits die need for happiness” Adomo 
(1997,311).
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2. His condemnation of popular musics as regressive, deceitful products of die culture industry is 
is well charted by the likes of Robert W. Witkin (1998) and Max Paddison (1993) and (1996). See 
also Adomo (2001c and 2001d). It is not the aim in the thesis to repeat such easy attacks.
3. After her first encounter with Adomo, one of my undergraduate students in the Cardiff School 
of Art & Design characterised him as “the guy who hated stuff’, a description that has resonated 
with many other students since.
4. In Adorno’s defence he is briefly seen alluding to the Invitation to Music: A Study o f the 
Creation o f New Music Listeners by the Radio, a study by Edward A. Suchman in Radio Research, 
1941,140-188, which dealt with the varied levels of musical taste between concert-goers and radio 
listeners. Adomo concedes this has much to do with one’s upbringing. (Adomo 1998k, 228-9).
5. From the 1930s until his death in 1969, Adomo argued that music was an autonomous, a- 
conceptual entity and a socially marked artifact. However he condemned music (and art) in 
general - both high and low - as ‘semblance’, mere images or at best, utopian intimations of 
something better, not a site of social transformation.
6. Flinn notes that Adomo used the phrase “intermittent dialectics” in expressing his view that 
Utopia might be articulated in what she interprets as “bits and pieces - that is as negative critical 
moments [...] in art or other cultural practices but it could never be mounted as a fully elaborated 
coherent system” (1992,90).
For his own defence see Adomo (200If).
7. Bom in a review of such rehabilitations, responds to 1990s reconsiderations of Adomo in 
relation to gramophone records and television by Thomas Y. Levin and John Caughie respectively 
(1993b 223). See too: Yvonne Sherratt (2002); Tia DeNora (2003). and more generally, Ray 
(1993).
8. Consider commercial music’s cliched lyrics, standardised cadences and rhythms, sonic novelties 
or instrumental solos which can be read as analogous to society conventions, production line 
drudgery relieved by vain expressions of individuality.
9. Paddison explores the reification, the fixing of the subject in music per se and, in contrast, the 
more dynamic progression of freer subjects in more organic musical structures as explained by 
Adomo (1990, 198-9).
10. Focussing on the false consciousness of the present wherein identity and emancipation are 
merely feigned as people seek ‘wish fulfilment’ and catharsis, Adomo insisted on deploying his 
“negative dialectics”: a philosophical logic that is, in its contradictory character, a ‘positive’, 
ultimately optimistic gesture of defiance to counter intellectual stasis.
11. Adomo from Prisms, cited in Lechte (1994, 178). Here is additional comment from Adomo on 
administered, bureaucratic culture suggesting that even those of good will are ham strung: 
“Administration [...] is no longer merely a national or communal institution existing in clear 
separation from the free play of social forces. The tendency of every institution towards expansion 
- both quantitatively and qualitatively - was designated as immanent by Max Weber in The Theory 
o f Social and Economic Organisation [...] the immoderate size of even those institutions not 
concerned about profit - such as education and radio - furthers the practices of administration 
through the demand for organisational gradation. These practices are strengthened by 
technological development; in the case of radio, for example, that which is to be communicated is 
concentrated to the extreme and disseminated as far as possible” (Adomo (2001g, 111).
12. Adomo wrote: “ ‘Les extremes me touchent’ [Gide], just as they touch you - but only if the 
dialectic of the lowest has the same value as the dialectic of the highest, rather than the latter 
simply decaying. Both bear the stigmata o f capitalism, both contain elements of change (but never, 
of course, the middle-term between Schoenberg and die American film). Both are tom halves of an 
integral freedom, to which however they do not add up” (Adomo from London 18 March 1936, to 
Walter Benjamin as notes to his The Work o fA rt in the Age o f Mechanical Reproduction in Bloch 
et al Aesthetics and Politics London, Verso 1980, 123).
13. “The seriousness of high art is destroyed in speculation about its efficacy; the seriousness of 
die lower perishes with the civilizational constraints imposed on the rebellious resistance inherent 
within it as long as social control was not yet total” (Adomo 1991, 98-9).
14. For Adomo, what were the positive qualities of the popular namely “impulse”; “subjectivity” 
and “profanity” and which were once “adversaries of materialistic alienation now succumb to if’ 
(Adomo, 2001b, 32). And that now the “fundamental characteristic of popular music [is] 
standardization” (Adomo 1990, 302). Popular music for Adomo is often revived: “the famous old 
hits which are revived set the patterns which have become standardized. They are the golden age 
of the game rules” (1990, 307). Regarding distraction, Adomo asserted that “The frame of mind to 
which popular music originally appealed, on which it feeds and which it perpetually reinforces, is
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simultaneously one of distraction and inattention” (1990, 309-10). “People want to have fun. A 
fully concentrated and conscious experience of art is possible only to those whose lives do not put 
such a strain on them that in their spare time they want relief from both boredom and effort 
simultaneously” (Adomo, 1990, 310). For Adomo, regression of listening is “listening [...] arrested 
at the infantile stage” (2001b, 46). “Thus the popular is undemanding, ‘pre-digested.’ The 
composition hears for the listener. This is how popular music divests the listener of his spontaneity 
and promotes conditioned reflexes” (1990, 306). “Hits conform to genres both dance and 
‘character’ e.g. ‘mother songs’, ‘home songs’, ‘laments for a lost girl’ ” (1990, 302). Adomo on 
regressive listeners wrote: “Whenever they have a chance, they display the pinched hatred of those 
who really sense the other but exclude it [...] The regression is really from this existent possibility, 
or, more concretely, from the possibility of a different and oppositional music” (2001b, 47).
15. The quotation is from Benjamin’s call for radio to be a civilising locale (1993 29-31).
16. The technological utopia is a fairly common theme. Stimulating is die 1978 essay of Raymond 
Williams, Utopia and Science Fiction which viewed Utopia to be a place of moral, social and 
material improvement Williams quotes Wordsworth: “Not in Utopia [...] but in this very world 
[...] we find our happiness or not at all!” He then identifies four types of utopian fiction including: 
“The technical transformation in which a new kind of life has been made possible by a technical 
discovery” (Williams, 1980b).
Allen S. Weiss in his Phantasmic Radio (1995) lists the radio art of: “F. T. Marinetti 
‘wireless imagination’ and futurist radio; [...] Leon Trotsky: revolutionary radio; Dziga Vertoz: 
agit-prop and the ‘Radio-Eye’ [...] Glen Gould: studio perfectionism and ‘contrapuntal radio’ [...] 
the labyrinthine radio narratives of Horspeil; die diversity of community radios; free radio; 
guerrilla radio; pirate radio” (Weiss 1995, 2). One needs to add the experiments typified by Cage, 
and later AMM, see Prevost (1995, 18). In Edward Bellamy’s Looking Backward (1888) another 
utopian text we find: “ ‘it appears to me, Miss Leete,’ I said, ‘that if we could have devised an 
arrangement for providing everybody with music in their homes, perfect in quality, unlimited in 
quantity, suited to every mood and beginning and ceasing at will, we should have considered die 
limit of human felicity already attained, and ceased to strive for further improvements’ ” (Cited in 
More 1965, 19).
17. He acknowledged that improvements in studio tape and the introduction of Stereophony and 
high fidelity later render some of his criticisms redundant (Adomo 1998k, 227). “Yet I believe that 
this affects neither die theory of atomistic listening nor that of the particular ‘image character’ of 
music on the radio” (ibid.).
18. Bom refers us to an account by Thomas Y. Levin as an instance of what she terms Adorno’s 
“redemptive reading” of the popular, particularly with regard to the vinyl record as an autonomous, 
transcription of musical intent, free of institutional misrepresentations; a reading which is still 
sensitive to the record’s commodified condition (Bom 1993b, 226-7). Thomas Y. Levin, For the 
record: Adorno on Music in the age o f its technological reproducibility, in October, no. 55 23-47, 
Winter 1990.
19. Khlebnikov, The Radio o f the Future in Strauss (1993,32).
20. Khlebnikov in Strauss (1993, 35). On a more measured note, Ulf Poschardt states: “Velimir 
Khlebnikov, who, like Moholy-Nagy, was fascinated by the possibilities of radio saw it as a 
medium for the intellectualisation of the people and the democratisation of knowledge. Radio 
libraries, radio clubs, radio lectures, even radio diagnosis and therapy” (Poschardt 1998, 350).
21. Andrew Edgar has drawn my attention to a footnote in Benjamin (1992b) where, in a 
discussion of Faust he acknowledged that theatrical delivery would preserve an auratic relation 
between actor and audience and would thus be better than any representational, cinema version. It 
is thus not completely clear whether Benjamin values, or seeks to supersede die auratic and its 
powers. More generally, it also raises the question as to whether the live radio voice and musical 
performance preserve the auratic, and if so, what the implications are.
22. “Benjamin, following Brecht, insisted that these characteristics of film produced a distanced 
estrangement (\erfremdungseffekt) on the part of the audience that led to a critical-active attitude 
to what is seen. The audience as a result, acting collectively and critically has a chance to reject or 
complete an intrinsically unfinished work” (Arato and Gebhardt 2000,210). Kurt Weill’s views on 
radio are also of some interest In 1926, he commented on conservative opposition to radio in some 
music circles, and whilst conceding there was room for acoustic improvement in the radio sets 
themselves, he wrote that greater knowledge would overcome these difficulties and added: “It isn’t 
clear to us why radio should be viewed as such a dangerous enemy of creative or performing 
artists” (Weill 1993, 26-8). Weill argued, radio performances would replace concerts of “social 
occasion” to serve as “uplifting, festive hours for the broad mass” Weill (1993,26-8).
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Weill looked beyond technical limitations and ignored claims that it was detrimental to live 
musical events. He prefigures Benjamin’s hope that mass mediation would strip die aura of sacred 
place and uniqueness, but preserve and extend music’s aesthetic and perhaps by extension, its 
moral kernel.
23. Works of aura produce concentration, empathy, absorption and identification on the part of the 
reader, or audience - modes of response that lead according to Brecht and Benjamin to political 
and esthetic passivity. Benjamin depicts the decline of aura primarily in terms of technology but 
also economy and social tendencies. The growth of technical methods of reproduction which 
Benjamin deduces from the Marxian dialectic of forces and relations of production leads to a 
‘tremendous shattering o f tradition’ (Arato and Gebhardt 2000, 209). It is interesting to note that 
Benjamin delivered a number of radio talks for children.
24. Kate Lacey writes: “By the 1920s, film was being theorized as the new sense organ presenting 
a distracted, modem (and potentially progressive) way of seeing. But the really new medium of the 
1920s was the radio, which quickly became defined as a secondary medium broadcasting 
fragmentaiy, ephemeral content” (2000,279).
25. cf. Kearney (1986, 166-68).
26. A superficially similar vision is presented a year later by Nazi propaganda minister Paul Joseph 
Goebbels in his opening address to the tenth German radio show (Deutsche Funkausstelimg) in 
Berlin, a view which may have been responsible for Benjamin’s reconsideration of the medium 
and which proved to be a chilling dystopian command of extant conditions and emerging forces: 
Radio was for Goebbels the “chief mediator between the Movement and the Nation, between Idea 
and Man [...] We need a broadcasting that is in step with the nation, radio that works for the 
people” (Bergmeier and Lotz 1997,6).
27. In this essay, Brecht advocated outside broadcasting with compact equipment to cover debate 
in the Reichstag ( Brecht, 2000c, 35).]
28. We should note that as early as 1929, Hitler had appointed Goebbels as 
Reichspropagandaleiter. Bergmeier and Lotz record that just four days into his new role, Goebbels 
wrote die following in his diaiy: “Broadcasting is now totally in the hands of die state. We have 
put a stop endlessly swinging this way and that; we have thus ensured that there will be uniform 
control” (1997, 4). On the development of the Volksempfanger people’s set of 1933 and the 
smaller Deutscher Kleinempfanger of 1936, see Bergmeier and Lotz (1997, 8-9). They estimate 
that by 1939 what they describe as ‘Greater Germany’ had approximately 50 million radio 
listeners.
29. Brecht wrote: “Where music is concerned the state shall provide whatever requires special 
apparatuses and special skills, but the individual shall provide an exercise. Unchecked feelings 
aroused by music, special thoughts that may be conceived when listening to music, physical 
exhaustion that easily arises just from listening to music, these are all distractions from music. To 
avoid these distractions, the individual participates in the music, thus obeying the principle: doing 
is better than feeling, by following the printed music with his eyes and adding the passages and 
voices reserved for him, by singing to himself or in conjunction with others” (2000f, 39).
30. ‘Current of music' is a fine metaphor for dialectical development and if space allowed could 
form a separate part in this study where retrospective glances and prospective fortunes in a musical 
score are given a suitable utopian gloss. Cf. Paddison on August Otto Halm (1993, 73-4).
31. “Radio, the progressive latecomer of mass culture is a private enterprise which really does 
represent the sovereign whole and is therefore some distance ahead of the other combines. 
Chesterfield is merely the nation’s cigarette, but the radio is the voice of the nation [...] The radio 
becomes the universal mouth piece of the Fuhrer; [...] The National Socialists know that the 
wireless gave shape to their cause just as the printing press did to the Reformation. The 
metaphysical charisma of the Fuhrer invented by the sociology of religion has finally turned out to 
be no more than the omnipresence of his speeches on the radio, which are a demoniacal parody of 
the omnipresence of die divine spirit” (Adomo and Horkheimer 1997,159).
32. In his refreshingly optimistic account of our collective ‘speaking into the air’, John Durham 
Peters (1999) privileges humanistic hope over technological limits and philosophical ‘wony’ in the 
presence of communicative acts. He writes: “ ‘Communication’ is a registry of modem longings 
[...] a utopia where nothing is misunderstood, hearts are open, and expression uninhibited [...] 
Only modems could be facing each other and be worried [...] it is a rich tangle of intellectual and 
cultural strands [...] an apparent answer to the painful divisions between self and other, private and 
public [...] it is a sink into which most of our hopes and fears seem to be poured” (1999,2).
33. “The sheer trashiness of radio! The tedium and garbage and fruity pomposity and Mr. 
Hennesy’s maundering about the Emerald Isle in that warbly voice [...] the false bonhomie of
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fatheads like Leo (‘Hey, have we got a bam-bumer for you tonight, folks, and here’s a little girl 
you're gonna love’) [...] ‘Evening folks, and welcome to the Best is Yet to Be and I just want to 
say how much it means to us to know that you’re there’. Bullshit But that’s what radio was all 
about! False Friendship. That was radio in a nutshell. Announcers laying on the charm to sell you 
hair tonic” (Keillor 1992, 50).
34. For a postwar account of Ham radio as an autonomous activity see Ullyet (1976).
35. Adomo worked “half-time for the Institute of Social Research and half-time for the Princeton 
Radio Project The latter was directed by Paul F. Lazarsfeld, with Hadley Cantrill and Frank 
Stanton, at that time still Research Director of the Columbia Broadcasting System, as co-directors” 
(Adomo 1998k, 217-8). The Princeton Radio Project was located in an old Newark brewery. 
Adomo saw that data was prepared for the industry or for “cultural advisoiy boards and similar 
bodies” - what he termed “administrative research” (Adomo 1998k, 219). “The project’s charter, 
which came from the Rockefeller Foundation, explicitly stipulated that the investigations had to be 
carried out within the framework of the commercial radio system established in the USA” (ibid.). 
There were moves for Adomo to develop a music education radio programme for The New York 
City Radio Station (WNYC) in 1940 he had “half an hour completely at my disposal [...] with an 
audience of literally hundreds of thousands of young people [...] I have an almost unlimited 
archive of recordings [and] a staff of collaborating artists. One cannot yet imagine the 
consequences.” This project was abandoned, see Adomo (2006b, 43). He did introduce some 
concerts for the station in that year, see Adomo (2006b, 47, 51). In 1941 he moved to California, 
returning to Europe in 1949. In 1952-3 he was in Los Angeles to work with Hacker Foundation to 
undertake social psychology. This was when he undertook his two television studies. See also 
Adomo (1998e and f) for his views on television.
36. “In the theoretical texts I wrote for the institute at that time, I formulated the standpoints and 
experiences I then wanted to evaluate in the radio project In the first instance, this work concerned 
the essay On the Fetish-Character in Music and the Regression o f Listening [also] In Search o f 
Wagner [that] endeavoured to combine sociological, technical-musical, and aesthetic analyses [to 
look at internal matters] on the other hand - and what seemed to me more essential - die internal 
technical findings in turn should be brought to societal expression and be read as ciphers of 
societal conditions”(Adomo 1998k, 218).
37. “It would be incumbent upon research first of all to investigate to what extent such subjective 
reactions of the experiment’s subjects are in fact spontaneous and immediate as these subjects 
suppose, or rather to what extent are actually involved not only the mechanisms of dissemination 
and the apparatus’s power of suggestion, but also the objective implication of the media and the 
material with which the listeners are confronted - and ultimately the comprehensive societal 
structures all the way up to the societal totality” (Adomo 1998k, 220).
38. Adomo was not averse to radio appearances - before and after the war - and took pride in being 
a good communicator. See him appear with Bloch in a discussion recorded for Sudwestfunk in 
1964 to talk about “contradictions in utopian longing” See Drew’s Introduction to Bloch (1985), 
xl. “Incomplete documentation indicates that between 1950 and 1969 Adomo participated in more 
than 160 radio programs”, Pickford in his preface to Adomo (1998d, viii). Pickford also notes: 
“Adomo most clearly describes his practical engagement in the mass media for the purpose of 
what he calls ‘debarbarization’ in texts collected in Adomo, Erziehung zur Mundigkeit: Vortrage 
und Gesprache mit Hellmut Becker, 1959-1969 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1970)”, Pickford in Adomo 
(1998d) pp.viii - ix and note 6, 315-16.
39. Concerts involved Pierre Boulez, Karlheinz Stockhausen, John Cage. See generally also 
Adomo (1998g-j) for more insight into his late thought.
40. Adomo had a deep interest in the significance of the musical avant-garde, a set of ‘difficult’ 
peripheral forms that challenge the homogeneity of the commercial sphere. Aesthetic dissonance 
detectable here may serve as an allegory of alienation, non-identity or a preliminary immanent 
critique for musician and the listener.
41. Adomo is refering here to the common practice of public radio stations transmitting their 
serious output on a third station, distinct from those dedicated to mainstream entertainments, news 
and sport. It is not a direct reference here to the BBC’s Third Programme, even though the Third 
Programme in Italy for instance was named after the BBC’s. See also Brecht (2000b) for pre-war 
views on how the radio industry should engage with significant music.
42. Adomo came late to psychoanalytical concerns. Might his ‘yearning’ for a past in any way be 
understood with reference to Jung as well as to Bloch? Anthony Storr stated that: “poetry, like 
music, can transmute the mud of die banal into the gold of the transcendent One of Jung’s central
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ideas was that modem man had become alienated from this mythopoetic substratum of his being, 
and that therefore his life lacked meaning and significance for him” (1973,42).
43. The only thing that can exist in philosophical materialism is an a priori utopia and a eutopian 
referential condition of ‘becoming’. The former, once figured and articulated in art and politics, 
once pursued by a cognisant, politicised class as part of the onward march of history it is no longer 
a potentially ‘free’ goal as it is a directed state of becoming effected by social reality and 
philosophical discourse.
44. Adomo never gave any credence to popular musical forms as he encountered them and 
moreover seemed wilfully neglectful of any Afro-American musics or progressive jazz or rock 
from the 1960s. Imagine Adomo arguing away die difficult, but liberating avant-garde qualities of 
the ecstatics of John Coltrane and Jimi Hendrix, the experiment of Sonic Youth, the formal 
informalities of Derek Bailey or the intense textures of Radiohead. See Paddison (1996, 100-1) 
who cites: Zappa, The Velvet Underground, John Cale, Henry Cow and Carla Bley and Paddison 
(2001) where he returns to the avant-garde aspects of Frank Zappa’s (post)modem musical 
bricolage, quotation and parody as a critique of the Culture Industry. See also Cutler (1993,75-85; 
103-40) who has looked at progressive musics in Britain with accounts of Hie Residents, Slapp 
Happy and Henry Cow.
45. Hie return home is not without its dangers. Andrew Edgar has drawn my attention to the feet it 
is present in Adomo and Horkheimer’s reading of The Odyssey where to get home, one has avoid 
hearing the sirens - we must perhaps have to rely on the aristocratic leader to take the longer view, 
and shield the others from distractions.
46. These issues of exile are touched on by Edgar (1987,281-2).
47. Bom tells us that “Adorno’s essay Culture and Administration which considers Weberian 
themes indicates the limits of his approach to subsidised high culture. Rather than critical analysis, 
the essay depicts it as a refuge from consumer society - a space in which ‘spontaneous 
consciousness’ might still be able to ‘create centres of [cultural] freedom’ ” (1995, n. 26,343).
48. Bernstein tells us that this collapsing, this dovetailing felsely reconciles die universal with the 
particular. (Adomo 2001a, 23).
49. See Doctor (1999 316,324).
50. For Adomo, to saddle music with a role of cold instrumentality or, at die very least, degrade it 
through its reproduction and broadcast was to render it highly suspect. Music in this way was 
denuded of its ‘relative goodness’; any authentic origin or radical potential. The phrase “the 
middle term between Schoenberg and die American film” comes from Adorno's letter to Benjamin 
in Bloch et al (1980,123).
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5 Technology, art & liberation: Marcuse reviewed
5.1 Introduction
This chapter consists of a review of Herbert Marcuse’s formulation of human 
instincts, particularly as it plays out in relation to popular musics, intersubjectivity 
and the disembodying processes of broadcast technologies. Marcuse tends to echo 
Adorno’s presiding suspicions in the face of the all-conquering loudspeaker and 
offers accounts of listening and liberation that run counter to the more optimistic 
and unproblematic one’s of Benjamin and Brecht In contrast to their work, 
Marcuse tends to offer a more overt psychological gloss, and a clearer articulation 
of the involvement of the dialectical process in the act of transmitting and 
receiving. Marcuse’s work is additionally relevant and important in a 
consideration of mediated listening as he returns us to the work of art, addresses 
the liberatory potentials of a near-Blochian desire and is more sympathetic 
towards popular cultural movements but not their culture. He therefore at once 
offers a critical supplement to Adomo but also a more overtly positive prospectus, 
and in so doing serves as a bridge between Bloch’s utopian project; ‘ideology 
critique’ and subsequent, more populist readings which thus maintains a 
significant momentum towards the eutopian readings of this study which privilege 
chances over promises.
5.2 Technology & mediated listening
Writing of “the dialectic of civilization” in his 1956 book Eros and Civilisation: A 
Philosophical inquiry into Freud, Marcuse had suggested th a t:
Under the rule of economic, political and cultural monopolies, the formation of 
the mature superego seems to skip the stage of individualization [...] the ego 
seems to be prematurely socialized by a whole system of extra familial agents 
and agencies. As early as the pre-school level, gangs, radio and television set the 
pattern for conformity and rebellion [...] the experts of the mass media transmit 
the required values; they offer the perfect training in efficiency, toughness, 
personality, dream and romance. (Marcuse 1998a, 97)
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Here, Marcuse has given us a complex model of listenership, and has crucially 
observed the omission of the development of a maturing individual who might be 
in a position to demonstrate a modicum of independence, free participation and 
self-reflection. Marcuse’s words echo Adorno’s concern that established order 
realities and media were tainting music’s autonomous powers and thus bring 
about a premature social adjustment akin to unreflective obedience, (see Marcuse, 
1968a, 88-133 on affirmative, extant culture).
Is there anywhere in Marcuse, a tentative reconciliation of humans and 
technology whereby authentic art is more sensitively and usefully disseminated? 
In Marcuse’s retreat away from radio and into art (for him the only radical 
medium of resistance) we seem to have come almost full circle whereby Adorno’s 
‘difficult’ art and ‘nostalgic’ art are where things once again begin and end. For 
subjects to engage and ‘meet’ with others through music, Marcuse’s simple 
answer was, contra Benjamin and Brecht, to switch o ff our domestic televisions 
and radios: “Massive socialization begins at home and arrests the development of 
consciousness and conscience” (1968b, 192). Marcuse went on to outline the 
consequences of a switching-off which, unlike the prediction of a spiritual swoon 
of the nation from Khlebnikov (in Strauss 1993, 32), is a moment that liberates in 
its disorientation:
The mere absence of all advertising and of all indoctrination media of 
information and entertainment would plunge the individual into a traumatic void 
where he would have the chance to wonder and to think, to know himself (or 
rather the negation of himself) and his society. (1968b, 192-3)
However determined he was to privilege the aesthetic, and however critical he 
was of technology, Marcuse could do nothing other than embrace the 
technological means and potentials of mass mediation as he invested hope in those 
who used such channels for expressing resistance.
The brutal state response to social unrest in Europe and the USA during 
the late 1960s had seen an abandonment of street action and an emergence of 
alternative cultural expression and personal development, typified by the 
mediating role of popular musical forms and their allied technologies of mass 
distribution. The creative empowerment of communities with access to musical 
production and distribution was to become a feature of both countercultural and
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politically sponsored activity in Britain, the USA and Europe in the 1970s. The 
former was in the ambit of commercially driven spheres of recording and pirate 
radio, the later in the care of socialist authority decree, keen on promoting access 
to recording and broadcasting technologies. Whilst Marcuse would have regarded 
such intense engagement with the popular media as being inimical to 
emancipation, he did find it within him to credit mass media technology with 
some potential. Interestingly, as a professional media researcher during the war 
Marcuse had, elsewhere, distinguished between technology as: (1) a system of 
oppressive manufacturing and reified relationships where human qualities are 
handed-down in a standardised form paying scant attention to the distinct, 
aesthetically motivated individuals and (2) technics as ‘neutral’ devices that might 
well be humanistically advantageous when in the ‘right’ hands.1 This grudging 
acceptance of technical creativty in some respects prefigures the postwar ideas of 
Hans Magnus Enzenberger who believed democratically distributed media
technologies might empower everyone, both creatively and through the acts of
2
wider representation and alternative modes of transmission. Marcuse’s hesitancy 
and qualifications make it hard to decide if his views on radio are more or less 
advanced than those of Adomo who, by this time, had himself often been ‘on air’. 
Marcuse at least wrote positively of radio’s ‘technics’:
Utopian possibilities are inherent in the technical and technological forces of 
advanced capitalism and society: the rational utilization of these forms [...] 
would terminate poverty [...] but we know that neither their rational use nor [...] 
their collective control by the ‘immediate producers’ (the workers) would by 
itself eliminate domination and exploitation: a bureaucratic welfare state would 
still be a state of repression. (1969,4)
He went on to explain what was needed:
In order to become a vehicle of freedom, science and technology would have to 
change their present direction and goals; they would have to be reconstituted in 
accord with a new sensibility - the life instincts. Then one could speak of a 
technology of liberation, product of a scientific imagination free to project and 
design the forms of a human universe without exploitation and toil. (1969 19)
Marcuse, whilst intrigued by technical potentials, turned to address the prior 
significance of human desire in any emancipatory exercise.
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53  Desire
A character in Garrison Keillor’s period novel Radio Romance exclaims:
Radio is not lines [...] radio is air! [...] literary principles of form mean nothing - 
radio has no linear content whatsoever. It is dreamlike, precognitive, primitive, 
intimate. It has less to do with politics or society, than with sex, nature and 
religion. (1992, 146)
The presence of the human body and acts of artistic expression are never far from 
Marcuse’s accounts of mediation, and require some explanation here as ideas 
connect with the work of Bloch and Freud in Marcuse’s analyses of postwar social 
and cultural circumstances. We see Marcuse’s interest in the power of impulses in 
Eros and Civilization (1998a). Here he insisted that we seek to overcome what he 
termed the performance principle - where technocratic logic and the reality 
principle together had manufactured a conforming, affirmative culture - a 
sublimating ‘civilisation’ that in its insistence on self-control precluded somatic 
self-expression and consequently any initiating change for the better. Contrary to 
Freud (who had feared the unleashing of human instinct and so was resigned to an 
unhappiness in the presence of a controlling elite), Marcuse wanted individual 
desires and instincts to be acknowledged and liberated, not commercially 
exploited or socially suppressed. Marcuse, with reference to psychoanalytical
3
thinking, sought to liberate unconscious energies, longings and desires as might 
be accompanied in song and expressed though play. Passive, unfocussed longing 
(music’s abstract utopia) might be given positive expression in a libidinally 
charged praxis. For Marcuse, “sublimation and domination hang together” (1998a, 
215), but might be overcome he argued by consciously directed instinct (as a 
component of a concrete utopia) which “In accordance with Freud’s notion of 
Trieb [impulse], refers to primary ‘drives’ of the human organism which are 
subject to historical modification; they find mental as well as somatic 
representation” (1998a, 8).
For Marcuse, a great refusal of desublimated, abstract desire and wishes 
could occupy an historical reality populated by youthful individuals, dissident 
thinkers and Non-Western peoples. For Marcuse, any continuing, ego-weak 
dependence on mere immature fantasies, or the safety of parental mores or
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paternalistic substitutes (be they totalitarian leaders or phantasmic technologies) 
could be set aside in the pursuit of physical pleasure: a “jouissance” which invites
4
the company of music and is usefully sustained as a knowing “plaisir”. Basic 
instincts which many national governments had feared and sought to control 
could, Marcuse believed be positive, not destructive forces which might be 
desublimated to liberate individuals from personal alienation. Adomo himself had 
elicited Freudian discourse and the concepts of id, ego and super-ego in which to 
locate his account of “ego-weakness”; a non-autonomous ego in the face of a 
paternalistic media constructing the sort of collective individuality Marcuse had 
also condemned.5
Orpheus & Eros
In theorizing the erotic as a liberating urge, Marcuse placed importance on the 
mythic figure of Orpheus wherein notions of genuine freedom and creativity 
might join art. Specifically, Marcuse argued that the image of Orpheus offers 
“redemption”, “peace” and “salvation by pacifying man and nature, not through 
force but through song [...] His language is song, and his work is play” (1998a, 
170-1). Marcuse effectively concocted his own ‘aesthetic dimension’ of 
sensuosity and reconciliation, but little is said here about the erotic as a force for 
uncompromising change. It is only in a later chapter that Marcuse spelled out the 
potential for instincts. It would be a regression to instinct, but one inflected by 
reason where sustained work and social relations could be forged. But Marcuse 
did not say where such an awareness and discourse might reside to best effect. At 
one point, Marcuse praised Fourier’s utopia (New Amorous World) where sexual 
pleasure and work were allied, but he dismissed this proposal, for apparently 
Fourier had abrogated its implementation to “a giant organisation and 
administration and thus retains the repressive elements” (1998a, 218). Whilst at 
once more hedonistic, ‘realistic’ and critical than the likes of Benjamin and 
Brecht Marcuse was still perhaps overcautious in the face of radicalised subjects 
of his ‘great refusal’ and was presumably unable to imagine a marriage of 
technology and oppositional culture in a way implied by the perspectives of 
Enzenberger, and unable to foresee any institutional involvements. Whilst 
welcoming youthful resistance, Marcuse detected an absence of rationality and yet
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was unable to sanction any intervention from the very forces of quasi-independent 
cultural institutions themselves like the broadcasters of Europe or the United 
States, or their technologies which might mediate the energies and music of the 
young but preserve their utopian desires. The remembrance of pleasure seems to 
have been a more potent process for Marcuse.
Recollection & phantasy
The memory of gratification is at the origin of all thinking, and the impulse to 
recapture past gratification is the hidden driving power behind the process of 
thought (Marcuse 1998a, 31)
For Marcuse, unconscious and partially conscious memory joined one’s clear 
recollection of early experiences of gratification (and in most cases domestic 
security) which together fuelled a Blochian, abstract sense of past bodily 
satisfactions which presaged useful thought. Marcuse wrote that:
If memory moves into the center of psychoanalysis as a decisive mode of 
cognition, this is far more than a therapeutic device; the therapeutic role of 
memory derives from the truth value of memory [where memory can] preserve 
promises and potentialities which are betrayed and even outlawed by the mature, 
civilized individual. (1998a, 18-19)
In accordance with the Blochian embrace of our childhoods, but contra Adomo, 
Marcuse boldly asserted that:
Regression assumes a progressive function. The rediscovered past yields critical 
standards which are tabooed by the restoration of the present. Moreover, the 
restoration of memoiy is accompanied by the restoration of the cognitive content 
of phantasy. (1998a, 19)6
Marcuse wrote that “Phantasy is ‘protected from cultural alterations’ and stays 
committed to the pleasure principle” (1998a, 14). It is allied to childhood play and 
persists in us all as the adult’s day dream. In short, phantasy joins a subject’s 
unconscious and imagination with reality and, at a mature level, is manifest in the 
work of art. Phantasy can thus also be argued to be a connecting principle between 
an abstract utopian sense of remembered pleasure, and a more concrete utopia of
7
embodied, articulated and orientated action. Marcuse argued that indeed it was a
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bridge from the unconscious, through imagination to serve as a cognitive vehicle 
that would contest alienation:
As a fundamental, independent mental process, phantasy has a truth value of its 
own - namely, the surmounting of the antagonistic human reality. Imagination 
envisions the reconciliation of the individual with the whole, of desire with 
realization, of happiness with reason. While this harmony has been removed into 
utopia by the established reality principle, phantasy insists that it must and can
g
become real, that behind the illusion lies knowledge. (1998a, 143)
We must then distinguish between individual experience, memory and phantasy, 
and a more societally considered and situated hope. For Marcuse, this subsequent 
state of socialisation is characterised by a more reasoned ambition or concretised 
‘desire’ achieved through reality’s opportunities for intersubjectivities which 
modulate the individual impulse in the form and content of art.
9
5.4 “Between the dance floor & the barricade” : Marcuse & art
Musical participation for Marcuse seemed to hold out the prospect for an 
articulated, situated hope; if it had to be the likes of radio which melded impulse 
and praxis then there were those willing to try. In 1967, the BBC used the first 
ever communication satellites orbiting the Earth to link-up 24 countries for a live 
transmission of the Beatles singing All You Need is Love.10 This programme was 
titled Our World which was “bringing man face to face with mankind as far apart 
as Canberra and Cape Kennedy, Moscow and Montreal, Samarkand and 
Soderfors, Takamatsu and Tunis” (Sweeting 2002, 5). This was an early, post­
colonial attempt by the BBC to capitalise on technological opportunities and 
proffer a vision of multicultural harmony, safe in the hands of a globally 
successful, English-speaking rock band. Amusingly it featured snippets of both 
The Marseillese and Glen Miller’s In the Mood in an echo of Marcuse’s barricade 
and dance floor.
At this time, Marcuse’s own sceptical resistance to radio content and 
impact as a whole remained steadfast, whilst his search for freedom and political 
change in popular musics also remained set about with reservations.
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Whilst seeing much art as a site of ‘truth’, happiness and refusal for 
liberated individuals, Marcuse asserted that popular cultural artifacts were not, in 
themselves, elements of any coherent political praxis. Indeed he had distinct 
reservations about the ‘individuation’ and emotive content of popular musics. 
Marcuse seemed to be caught between somatic pleasures and radical activity, 
unable to resolve the dialectical potential to his own satisfaction. Today it might 
be argued that the visceral, often overtly sexual content of rock music11 and the 
expressive abandonment of audiences at music festivals is consonant with 
Marcusian wishes for libidinal emancipation, yet Marcuse was never willing to 
accord even playful popular musics any role as ‘work’ (artistic or otherwise) as he 
saw it, nor see it take any role in the articulation of the political. Whilst he flirted 
with what he perceived to be a useful, conceptual space ‘between the dance floor 
and the barricade’, for him it was only serious art, and more specifically literature 
that tended the flame of resistance, not popular musical expression. If popular 
music did not exactly lead to Adorno’s regressive listener it was then for Marcuse 
at the very least, a ‘politically mute’ medium. Likewise, a suspicion of media 
technology as false experience lingered in Marcuse’s mind for much of the time. 
As we have seen, television and radio for him were, at that time, ‘dangerous’ 
channels of a still extant dominant performance principle and an enduring, 
sublimating reality principle. Most significantly, they stripped out physical 
contact, sexual consummation and human contact of any immediate kind.
We read in the transcript of a Richard Kearney interview with Marcuse:
Marcuse: I am wary of all exhibitions of free-wheeling emotionalism and as I 
explained in Counter-revolution and Revolt, I think that both the ‘living’ theatre 
movement [...] and the ‘rock’ cult are prone to this error [...] the ‘rock-group’ cult 
seems open to the danger of a form of commercial totalitarianism which absorbs 
the individual into an uninhibited mass where the power of a collective 
unconscious is mobilised but left without any radical or critical awareness. 
(Kearney 1984, 75-6)
Whilst retreating from an embrace of the popular, it is fair to point out this is less 
due to any uneasiness with the Afro-American forms and conceits heard within
rock and jazz (as was the case with Bloch and Adomo), but simply due to its
12effect of immediate stimulation rather than articulate reflection. Adomo, as one 
would expect, had long before formulated his response to music and
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countercultural activity in the 1960s, and chose to repeat it in a passage from 
Aesthetic Theory. Adorno’s identification of the inevitability of recuperation by 
the culture industry of countercultural threads is also outlined:
The recently adopted insistence on cultivating uncultivation, the enthusiasm for 
the beauty of street battles, is a reprise of futurist and dadaist actions [...] 
recommending jazz and rock-and-roll instead of Beethoven does not demolish the 
affirmative lie of culture but rather furnishes barbarism and the profit interest of 
the culture industry with a subtefuge. The allegedly vital and uncorrupted nature 
of such products is synthetically processed by precisely those powers that are 
supposedly the target of the Great Refusal: these products are the truly corrupt 
(1997, 319-20)
In the same 1976 interview with Kearney, Marcuse laid renewed stress on the 
aesthetic (in a broad sensory way) as a mode of revelation and transformation, 
overlooked by Karl Marx (Kearney 1984, 71-88). He additionally suggested what 
its limits were. For Marcuse (after Adomo) art was an emotive, imaginative, 
promissory substrate which belonged to a larger, emancipatory formula. Marcuse 
stated “Art can never and never should become directly and immediately a factor 
of political praxis. It can only have effect indirectly, by its impact on the 
consciousness and on the subconsciousness of human beings” (Kearney 1984, 74). 
We have already observed that in his last book, The Aesthetic Dimension: 
Towards a critique o f Marxist aesthetics, Herbert Marcuse wrote “Art cannot 
redeem its promise, and reality offers no promises, only chances” (1979, 48). As 
with Adomo, art for Marcuse seemed only to be illusory promise in need of a 
critique. And whilst Marcuse, unlike Adomo, did try to turn his attentions to the 
‘chances’ and opportunities history and the established order might afford society, 
ultimately he still seemed to be in the thrall o f the elder Adomo, and unable to 
truly clarify his positions on popular musics and the mass media. In Marcuse’s 
1969 Essay on Liberation we do find what reads like a repairing of cultural ‘tom 
halves’ and a combining of the serious and universal with the culturally popular 
and more specific. Marcuse here argued for a free society where “the aesthetic 
truth” of higher culture is no longer isolated but “dissolves in desublimated 
‘lower’ and destructive forms, where the hatred of the young bursts into laughter 
and song, mixing the barricade and the dance floor, love, play and heroism” 
(1969,25-6).
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Let us take Marcuse at his word here. After all, at the heart of critical 
theory is a willingness to step down from metaphysical thought into the real 
world. Let us look at the chances reality gives us so that we can get past timidity, 
prejudices and blind spots. The actualities of music-making and broadcasting 
surely do more than sustain the deceit of a culture industry, might they not foster 
community action and communication? Indeed as we shall see, Marcuse himself 
argued for the possibility of activity in the interstices of institutions.
While Adomo suffered student criticism at the end of his life, Marcuse, the 
younger man was always quick to praise youthful refusal but, in his last years, 
was still reluctant to acknowledge any element of praxis within popular musical 
activity. For all of his love for the potential of erotic energy and his awareness of 
world revolutions, Marcuse refused to credit popular art with effective political 
power. For him, art offered an independent critical picture of enlightenment but 
not liberation and this was its strength For him, popular movements of resistance 
might stimulate and ‘touch’ people, yet were, ultimately, mass-mediated
13commodities symptomatic of failure, not sites of immediate, articulate progress.
5.5 Marcuse, aesthetics & intersubjectivity
The critical function of art, its contribution to the struggle for liberation, resides 
in the aesthetic form. [...] Art is committed to an emancipation of sensibility, 
imagination and reason in all spheres of subjectivity and objectivity. (Marcuse 
1979, 8-9)
One of the essential mechanisms of advanced industrial society is the mass 
diffusion of art, literature, music, philosophy; they become part of the technical 
equipment of the daily household and of die daily work world. In this process, 
they undergo a decisive transformation; they are losing the qualitative difference, 
namely, the essential dissociation from the established reality principle which 
was the ground of their liberating function. (Marcuse 1970b, 58)
How then is human emancipation achieved in a ‘here and now’? How do we move 
from a social idealism of individual happiness and freedom to a social reality of 
intersubjectivity where mutuality, happiness and freedom replaces subjugation? 
Marcuse suggested that in the face of disembodiment by radio, and die retreat of 
collective libidinal potentials, we must turn instead, once again to literature and 
the traditional arts. Art affords engagement with our unrepressed (animal) selves
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and our human intellect. It shows us, via a felt and imagined ‘estrangement’ from 
ourselves, the truth of reality’s deceit in the present; it shows us what once was in
14the past and shows us what ideally could be again.
This thesis to a great extent accepts Marcuse’s positive evaluation of high 
art, but argues that indeed, popular music and musical places can also deliver 
opportunity for instigating the process of self-reflection and change. It also wants 
to suggest -  perhaps in the spirit of the pre-war enthusiasts - that music in radio, 
by extension, can provide cultural plenitude and, more importantly, spaces for 
socio-philosophical discourse and the ‘discussive’. If Marcuse’s ‘neutral’ technics 
are allied to the hopes of the pre-war generation and benignly nurtured in popular 
cultural expression, then things are possible.
How exactly does art allow us to transcend or, at the very least, move us 
on to a cognitive and ethical level? Marcuse argued that “the encounter with the 
fictitious world restructures consciousness and gives sensual representation to a 
counter-societal experience” (1979, 44). Developing from the work of Bloch and 
Adomo, we (according to Marcuse) encounter art as a mediating site that allows 
us to glance backwards to an anterior state of greater happiness. This comparison 
with the present shows us what might be called a concentrated, sensuous truth, 
namely that the current joys of the culture industry are illusory and simply 
perpetuate a non-identity where, said Marcuse, “In all its ideality art bears witness 
to the truth of dialectical materialism - the permanent non-identity between 
subject and object, individual and individual” (1979, 29). The Sckein of art is the 
revelation of the truth that it is deceit and promise alone. Art, and in particular 
music, makes us aware - through work and text - of the Other, not just others. It is 
in this opening out, this engagement with the objective world of others that a 
concrete utopia is activated as frustration and enlightenment collide. Art takes on 
the role of perception, self-reflective process and intersubjectivity where 
subjective experiences are shared, imagined and consciously acknowledged. Such 
a formulation as intimated in Marcuse should not exclude the popular.
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5.6 Art, radio & Otherness
To hear other people is not however an automatic apprehension of Otherness. 
Tuning-in to music radio we perhaps initially attend to our own moods and 
existing tastes. However, the act of admitting new sounds consciously presented 
to us in a challenging format like that of John Peel on night time Radio 1 in the 
1970s does invite a reasoned response to the unfamiliar. An initial stage of 
listening of this kind would involve attending to the immediate agendas of 
songwriters and performers. Of course, given background information on the 
artists, we may be in a position to attend also to any values and aspirations of the 
contextualising community. For example, Peel’s fascination for dub reggae in the 
1970s brought an hitherto experimental popular music to a wider British audience, 
largely ignorant of the formalistic practices of musicians and producers in the 
studios of Kingston Jamaica. The echo and reverberation treatments of lyric-free 
backing tracks were not directly accompanied, when broadcast, by any overt 
references to their possible psychoactive inspirations. Nor were any allegorical 
accounts offered of their intriguing musical soundscapes as sites of free 
expression - and by extension, analogous socio-cultural development outside the 
limitations of a record industry mainstream. The act of selecting and sharing 
tracks by the likes of King Tubby and the Upsetters was certainly sufficiently 
meaningful for many of Peel’s non-black listeners to process the sounds 
attentively. Whilst many attacked Peel for giving black music airplay, night after 
night, those more confident in their sense of self, and more sensitive perhaps to 
Britain’s post-colonial issues such as immigration, engaged in a serious way with 
Peel’s airing of the unfamiliar.
One of radio’s many features is its extensive use of live transmission. 
Unlike television that requires set construction, rehearsals and the like, radio (until 
the advent of studio web cameras) only needed turntables, a playlist, a producer 
and disc jockey. Whilst listening to Peel in the 1970s was not, in any way a 
dialogic activity, there was, because of radio’s ‘liveness’ an ‘interpellation’, an 
invitation to listen and, in return a willingness to hear and think. This was more 
than a pleasurable but passive enjoyment of the entertaining or novel. It was the 
beginnings of thoughtful engagement with others and Otherness. For a short
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period, the homogenising tendencies of record industry and mainstream radio 
were evaded by this sort of alternative spatial framing.
To encounter these sounds on record and on air is, of course to encounter a 
mediated subject and a mediated a rt However, the audio recording and radio 
station are as much apparatuses for aesthetic experiment and engagement as they 
are tools of commercial distribution. Without the relative freedom of some of the 
BBC’s radio spaces, many popular musics would remain rooted in communities 
and be reported on only by ethnomusicologists and well travelled music 
journalists. If recording contracts and playlists objectify and distort marginal 
voices as sins of commission, their total absence in the homes of others is possibly 
a greater sin of omission.
We might turn to Marcuse’s argument that art’s distance from any situated 
political action or praxis is probably its strength, yet without ‘situated’, 
discursively handled music of ‘rebellion’ it surely remains impotent and its 
undoubted, Marcusian promise rendered dumb for any practical purpose.15
5.7 In conclusion
Art is where idealism and reality meet. Bloch and Adomo suggested that educated 
desire, hope and knowledge reside in art amid the messy realities of the 
established material and socio-economic order. In so doing, an encounter might 
allow us to act ethically. But can music really (as an art) do any more than simply 
promise? Can it join reality to become a site for chances? Where exactly might 
music with such potentials be made and shared?
Music might be an emancipatory chimera as demonstrated by Adomo and 
restated in part by Herbert Marcuse, however, a way forward is spelled out by 
Marcuse himself. His approach is summed up in his 1976 interview with Kearney 
(1984). for Marcuse, Marx:
did not fully realise that a purely economic resolution of the problem can never 
be enough, and so lacked the insight that a twentieth-centuiy revolution would 
require a different type of human being and that such a revolution would have to 
aim at, and, if successful, implement, an entirely new set of personal and sexual 
relationships, a new morality, a new sensibility and a total reconstruction of the 
environment. These are, to a great extent, aesthetic values (aesthetic to be 
understood in the larger sense of our sensory and imaginative culture which I
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outlined in Eros and Civilisation, following Kant and Schiller), and that is why I 
think that one viewing the possibility of struggle and change in our time 
recognises the decisive role which art must play. Kearney (1984,74)
In the face of rapid, postwar changes in social and cultural sensibilities, 
Adomo and Marcuse were, in most of their writings, incapable of allowing for the 
possibility of immanent cognitions and discourses effecting a new consciousness 
and consequent praxis. As we have already seen, concessions regarding radio 
came late to Adorno’s thought and arguably in a form that has the appearance of a 
resigned, grudging concession in the face of radio’s embrace of new music rather 
than to any perspective formed by any pragmatic re-readings of Walter Benjamin 
or the likes of Brecht. Nor do the thoughts of Adomo or Marcuse in the 1960s 
seem to presage later critical thought in Britain and elsewhere which have been 
more alive to the astute readings of base, superstructure and agency offered by 
Antonio Gramsci. Of course, the writings of Fredric Jameson, and to some extent 
Jurgen Habermas do rework the Germanic project, and there are efforts elsewhere 
to revitalise Adorno’s resolute negativity in the face of a postmodern passivity that 
are not without a certain sense of purpose.16
Despite its place as a bridge between Germanic cultural critique and 
populist sympathies, Marcuse’s work is complicated throughout by the 
ambiguities set in train by his long loyalty to the independence of the aesthetic, his 
attraction to the potency of the libido and his residual uneasiness in the presence 
of mass-mediated culture. It is a somewhat subtle, shifting set of positions, but, for 
this very reason, it is not to be entirely rejected, for many of Marcuse’s concepts 
and his intermittent accommodations of the young and their expressions serve to 
inform the dialectically determined ambivalences and sublations of this study and 
its topics as a whole.
There’s much in Marcuse’s accounts of culture that builds on Blochian 
interest in recollection glossed with allusions to Freudian interest in phantasy and 
Eros that might be said to extend the notions of abstract and concrete utopia 
respectively. Marcuse’s interest in the erotic, and his hopes for collective refusal, 
are each underscored with psychoanalytical readings that outline useful prospects 
for desire, libido and music. The crucial ingredient for Marcuse was undoubtedly 
the play of these forces and prospects within an historical and technical reality. 
Whether he ever truly gave free reign to these forces in his philosophy and
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critiques is a moot point Adomo had singularly failed to trust such impulses 
amongst the masses, and Marcuse was, in the case of popular musics, reluctant to 
saddle instinctive, youthful expression with any immediate rational awareness. 
This chapter has looked at the ‘ somatic turn’ of Marcuse which is a move away 
from more orthodox Marxist concerns to those of the body, senses and art. A 
subject’s emancipation for Marcuse was to come from an embodied realisation of 
suppressed desires, which might be given expression in art and a general ‘refusal’ 
of hegemonic conditions. What Marcuse does retain of Marxist origin is the 
continuing belief in technological possibilities. However, he fails to consider the 
somatic alongside the technical in any overt way, and also refuses to see a musical 
genre like rock as a likely site of praxis and articulate political expression. What 
Marcuse does contribute, is his continuing optimism and his willingness to 
maintain an expectation of progress offered by reality’s chances. In short, his 
prescriptions are complex, sometimes ambivalent, and shot through with an 
Adomian fear of technocratic forces.
Adomo and Marcuse were too timid to concede the possibility of praxis in
17popular musics. Cultural emancipation of the social was, for them, a stalled 
project. I want to argue, contra Adomo and Marcuse, that in fact, there has been, 
in Marcuse’s own words, the “mixing of the barricade and the dance floor”; that 
there’s some evidence of conscious political insight, and free, social action in the 
presence of popular musics - off and on air.
Early optimism from Brecht is salvaged in the wake of the Second World 
War by Marcuse who suggests the superstructure of culture contains (in its gaps) 
the power to change the economic base which itself might ‘carry’ the good news. 
And if, as Marcuse argued, art could not directly bring down a government, might 
it not fuel desire or, at the very least, serve as a catalyst for educated desire and 
hope?
Whilst Marcuse ultimately offers us an ambivalent set of thoughts, the 
worth of seeking to identify places and spaces of likely praxis in the midst of 
current order is finally suggested by Marcuse himself which should serve as a 
useful step forward for this study: “In established societies there are still gaps and 
interstices in which heretical methods can be practiced without meaningless 
sacrifice” (Marcuse (1970c, 76-7). We will turn to the precise nature of such gaps
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in due course, but we must first look more closely at art, and intersubjectivity so 
that we then might assess the formation, form and survival of the later in 
mediating places and spaces.
Notes
1. See Some Social Implications o f Modem Technology [1941] in Marcuse (1998b, 41-65). It 
should be noted that Marcuse worked with the American Intelligence Bureau of the Office of War 
Information between December 1942 and March 1943 analysing Nazism and advising on U.S. 
approaches to mass media propaganda. Hans Magnus Enzenberger cited McGuigan (1996) seems 
less certain of the radical potential of the mass media in the 1960s because of tight ownership and 
control in private and public sectors. Many who might become creative were, according to 
Enzenberger, destined to remain consumers only. McGuigan notes that although “Enzenberger’s 
youthful belief that everyone could and should become a cultural producer in relation to the major 
media of public communication was hopelessly utopian”, yet he sees in the ensuing decades a 
ground-swell of public and community arts and recently a strong interest in video, and home music 
making which attests technological competence and individual creative agency (1996,79-80).
2. Hans Magnus Enzenberger, Constituents o f a Theory o f the Media (1970), reproduced in part at 
www.medienkunstnetz.de/source-text/51/ [November 2005].
3. In Freud’s case, Marcuse argued the psychoanalytical to be “in its very substance 
‘sociological’ ”(1998a, 5). For Adomo on Freud and fascist propaganda, see Adomo (2000b).
4. On die eclipse of the father figure; resistance to institutional paternalism and the dialectical facet 
of instinct and culture, see Marcuse (1998a, 64,74, 78 et seq.).
5. See Held on the rejection of the father/family and subsequent attachment to a false, 
paternalistic/technocratic alternative (1990, 133).
6. Here is a characteristic Adomo opinion on regressive listening: “The research finding that 
among radio listeners, die friends of light music reveal themselves to be depoliticized is not 
accidental. The possibility of individual shelter and of a security which is, as always, questionable, 
obstructs the view of a change in the situation in which one seeks shelter. Superficial experience 
contradicts this. The ‘younger generation’ - the concept itself is merely an ideological catch-all - 
seems to be in conflict with its elders and their plush culture precisely through the new way of 
listening. In America, it is just the so-called liberals and progressives whom one finds among the 
advocates of light popular music, most of whom want to classify their activity as democratic. But 
if regressive hearing is progressive as opposed to the ‘individualistic’ sort, it is only in the 
dialectical sense that it is better fitted to the advancing brutality of the latter (Adomo 2001b, 55).
7. On the subject of imaginative play, we should not overlook Simon Frith who perceptively 
writes: “An identity is always already an ideal, what we would like to be, not what we are. In 
taking pleasure from black or gay or female music I don’t thus identify as black or gay or female. 
(I don’t actually experience these sounds as ‘black music’ or ‘gay music’ or women’s voices’) but, 
rather participate in imagined forms of democracy and desire, imagined forms of the social and the 
sexual. And what makes music special in this familiar cultural process is that musical identity is 
both fantastic - idealising not just oneself but also the social world one inhabits - and real: it is 
enacted in activity. Music making and music listening, that is to say are bodily matters; they 
involve what one might call social movements. In this respect, musical pleasure is not derived 
from fantasy - it is not mediated by day dreams - but is experienced directly: music gives us a real 
experience of what the ideal could be” (1996,274).
Frith continues: “We all hear the music we like as something special, as something that 
defines the mundane, takes us ‘out of ourselves’, puts us somewhere else. Our music is from this 
perspective, special not just with reference to other music but, more important, to the rest of life. It 
is this sense of specialness (the way in which music seems to make possible anew kind of self- 
recognition, to free us from every-day routines, from the social expectations with which we are 
encumbered) that is the key to our musical value judgments. ‘Transcendence’ is as much part of 
the popular as of the serious music aesthetic, but in pop, transcendence articulate’s not music’s 
independence of social forces but a kind of alternative experience of them [...] Music constructs
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our sense of identity through the experiences it offers of the body, time and sociability, 
experiences which enable us to place ourselves in imaginative cultural narratives. Such a fusion of 
imaginative fantasy and bodily practice marks as well the integration of aesthetics and ethics” 
(1996,275).
8. Marcuse later adds: “Phantasy is cognitive in so far as it preserves the truth of the Great Refusal, 
or positively, in so far as it protects, against all reason, the aspirations for die integral fulfillment of 
man and nature which are repressed by reason” (1998a, 160).
9. A paraphrase of Marcuse (1969,25-6).
10. In the late 1960s, records in the hands of George Martin and the Beatles became the new 
radical art form produced for radio listening and domestic playback.
11. We might couple this with Marcuse’s “socially useful aggression” (Marcuse 1998a, 23).
12. The common equation of non-Western musics with fundamental urges is neatly problematised 
by Frith (1996,127-143).
13. When asked in an interview in 1976 whether art for the masses might, after Benjamin, 
radicalise them, Marcuse replied: “Any attempt to use art to effect a ‘mass’ conversion of 
sensibility and consciousness is inevitably an abuse of its hue functions [...] Its true functions 
being (1) to negate our present society, (2) to anticipate the trends of future society (3) to criticise 
destructive or alienating trends, and (4) to suggest ‘images’ of creative and unalienating ones” 
(Kearney 1984, 76-7).
14. Marcuse claimed that: “Art can give you the ‘images’ of a freer society and of more human 
relationships but beyond that it cannot go. In this sense, the difference between aesthetic and 
political theory remains unbridgeable: Art can say what it wants to say only in terms of the 
complete and formal fate of individuals in their struggle with their society in the medium of 
sensibility; its images are felt and imagined rather than intellectually formulated or propounded, 
whereas political theory is necessarily conceptual (Kearney 1984, 75).
15. Marcuse did see some hope in “the protest against the definition of life as labor, in the struggle 
against the entire capitalist and state-socialist organization o f work [...] in the struggle to end 
patriarchy, to reconstruct the destroyed life environment, and to develop and nurture a new 
morality and a new sensibility” (1979, 28). This, it may be argued is what the Live8 body of 
musical concerts coinciding with the G8 economic summit in Edinburgh, July 2005 was moving 
toward. “More than 5.5 billion people will be able to tune in through a variety of media” to witness 
free popular concerts. “Producers estimate that 85 per cent of the world’s population will be able 
to see the live broadcast”, David Smith and Ned Temko ‘Billions will hear Live8’s poverty plea’, 
The Observer, July 26,2005,6.
16. Buchanan (1998, 24) tells us that Jameson identified a “weaker form of Utopian thinking, 
namely the attempt to change the world by transforming its forms.” Yet in condemning such a 
Fabianist approach with his uncompromising call for pure utopian reach Buchanan reminds us that 
Jameson’s slogan “always historicise” invites us to project back from the ideal future to the present 
where we indeed might effect reasoned change.
17. Musical activity can sustain what is termed praxis - that “synthesis of thought and action” - 
{The Oxford English Dictionary - D. McLellan, 1969). Praxis is for Marxists (Marx, Gramsci and 
Luk&cs) “the free, conscious, creative, essentially human activity, alone capable of generating a 
new and better social order” (Mautner 1997). Interestingly, Marcuse refused to grant die arts such 
a radical, articulated role of communicative action. Andrew Edgar writes: “At its simplest, and 
most dramatic, praxis suggests revolutionary practice. As such it is a fusion of theoiy and practice, 
and thus the point at which philosophers have ceased to interpret the world [...] and have 
developed a (materialist) account of the world that will allow the proletariat to understand their 
place in it and thus transform it” (Edgar and Sedgwick 2002, 309).
PART THREE | Musical eutopias
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6 Meta-musical readings & the utopian conceit
6.1 Introduction
The acoustic, physiological phenomenon that is music is received prior to any 
aesthetic, sensible logic, and before any extra-musical, reifying language of 
explanation. ‘Unmediated’ musical works promote aesthetic and imaginative 
responses, and, because they are made with intent and received within socio­
cultural contexts, also make for reasoned interpretations articulated in language. 
This study terms such interpretations meta-musical readings.
Some meta-musical readings may be shaped by subjective, highly personal 
recollections of nostalgic yearning or by impatient, rebellious desires. For 
example: an adult re-encountering a wistful theme from a childhood television 
programme or a counter-cultural line from a popular song of their youth may lead 
to the crystalisation of a subjective, abstract utopia, as a synthesis of past feelings 
and current frustration. These mental ‘crystalisations’ appear as the music 
mediates objective realities and autonomous subjective wishes. These elements, 
these sensibilites and imaginings are recollections and urges that may prompt, for 
writers and philosophers discursive, allegorical glosses which may remain private 
or become more widely shared. Adomo indeed averred that any intelligible insight 
into an acoustic work cannot simply be intuited. There must be external 
interpretation and discussion. Adomo wrote: “The spiritual mediation of the 
artwork, by which it contrasts with the empirical world, cannot be realized without 
the inclusion of the discursive dimension” (1997, 98). Adomo affords us a 
reception and reading of music as artwork that is first experience and then textual 
reflection. It is, in a sense, Bloch’s abstract and educated utopian conditions. 
Adomo was unhappy about bodily responses to music: “Mistrust is called for in 
face of all spontaneity, impetuosity, all letting oneself go, for it implies pliancy 
toward the superior might of the existent” Adomo (2005, 25). Sensuous 
immediacy left Adomo concerned that it reduced the subject’s experience to one 
that was merely physical and somatic rather than felt then considered. Without a 
reasoned reflection on experience the subject might become a reified object. 
Bronner tells us that “Adomo maintains his rejection of ‘false’ immediacy, of
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enjoyment, in the name of a structured experience capable of grasping the 
utopian” (1994, 193). However, the immediate experience and the subsequent 
reflection are linked. The essential character of humanity is arguably its mix of 
residual natural desires and civilised culture. The former is a sphere of Dionysian 
sensuality, erotic impulse and a fundamental phenomenological engagement with 
here and now being, the sensory world and our place in it. The later, an 
Apollonian musicality of civilised communality and rational ‘becoming’.
The experiential elements o f the musical work fuse with imagination, 
thought and language to foster rich, meta-musical texts and discourses. Whilst the 
meta-musical does determine the construction of the utopian, we must not 
overlook music’s sensuous immediateness and excess that allows for the 
transcendence of the given present. The acoustic, sensory excess forming the 
immediate phenomenon is not eclipsed as musical artwork becomes text, but 
remains as a sensory pendant that is often a spur to an abstract utopian state of 
emotion and desire.
It is the intention of this chapter to focus on this triangulation of music, 
emotion, and in particular, discursive, meta-musical activity. We begin with the 
problematic of divining and articulating the utopian in the presence of the artwork.
Utopia can only exist in, and through language, it cannot be seen.
(Tremlett 1999)
Is Paul Tremlett right and if so, must we infer that Utopia cannot be heard in the 
musical arts either? However, might it be that at the very least, intimations of 
alternative existences in the visual or musical arts can be ‘seen’ or ‘heard’, 
courtesy of one’s sensibiltity: a receptivity and an orientation towards the 
presentational qualities of a work which, in combination with a productive 
imagination and a discursively fulled understanding may furnish us through 
language, with metaphorical, allegorical and meta-musical readings?
Tremlett is right to stress Utopia’s exisitence in verbal articulations, and 
indeed, this study relies significiantly on the manifestiation of utopian theory in 
philosophical discourse, but to exclude the abstract utopian state of desire from a 
tentative appearance in the arts as apprehended by the subject, is to misunderstand 
the importance of the acoustic per se. Musical vibrations whilst often a system of 
codified cultural communication, will tend to exceed die intentions of composer
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and performer to constitute amongst other things, an array of ‘empty’ sonic signs 
‘fulfilled’ through interpretational language. Music is a discursive locale because, 
as both mute art and social fact, it so often elicits subjectively and collectively - 
significant linguistic translation and interpretation. It is the acoustic reception and 
subjective experience of music which preceeds its interpretation (musicological, 
utopian or otherwise) in words. As Adomo wrote: “Experience culminates in 
aesthetics: It makes coherent and conscious what transpires in artworks obscurely 
and unelucidatedly” (1997, 264). We experience much of our music in common, 
and as we do so, we are sensitive to it, to imaginative prompts and to each other. 
We ‘trade’ experiences and cultural interpretations of that music in 
communicative, but not necessarily linguistic ways (think of dance steps or dress 
codes). Whilst music can then indeed serve as a language of affect and identity, it 
is, says Schiitz, also “a meaningful context which is not bound to a conceptual 
scheme” (Schiitz cited Martin 1995,198).1
Whatever a composer’s or performer’s artistic intention, and whatever 
semantic detail lyrics may contain, musics do attract broad interpretation. Indeed, 
Adomo observed that one problem in the interpretation of musical experiences 
was the “difficulty of verbalizing what music subjectively awakens in the listener, 
the utter obscurity of what is so blithely called ‘the lived experience of music’ ” 
(Adomo 1998k, 220). Thought and language must be brought to bear on that 
experience: “Every artwork, if it is to be fully experienced, requires thought and 
therefore stands in need of philosophy” (Adomo, 1997, 262). However, as Martin 
has argued (1995, 143), before wholly accepting Schiitz’s separation of meaning 
and any subsequent conceptual cooption, we must accept that music cannot be 
‘read’ philosophically to mean whatever one likes. The meta-musical 
interpretation of music must be rooted in the the presence of the music, its 
emotional, analogical ‘tenor’ and all existing socio-cultural musical contexts. 
Music must, at the very least be a point of departure, not a mere pretext for 
predetermined expositions, a position that Schiitz himself would surely support.
Of course, Schiitz and Martin are both right. Music’s ambiguities create 
Schiitz’s possibilities of decoupling its affective, aesthetic communication from 
any precise, non-negotiable content. But it is this very ambiguity that so often
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influences that formation of the particulars of the socio-cultural context and meta­
musical discourses to which Martin alludes.
To recap, personal feelings, memory and ambition are fired-up in an 
abstract musical utopia; a more directed collectively significant and 
representationally concrete utopia is subsequently constructed as meta-musical 
readings appear to provide a gloss on our complex emotional and reasoned 
responses to the music we hear, be that Beethoven’s Symphony number 9 in D 
minor (opus 125), or Jimi Hendrix performing Bob Dylan’s All Along the 
Watchtower at the Isle of Wight Festival in 1970. These pieces touch us and may 
resonate with us in highly personal ways. The wider socio-cultural meaning of 
these two pieces of music is, however, bound-up in two considerations: (1) the 
historical specifics of their composition and performance and (2) the meta-musical 
inscription in language of additional but still germane interpretations that respect 
immanent acoustic qualities, musicological and textual content and the attendant
issues implicit in the music itself, which give rise to subsequent and highly
2plausible re-mterpretations.
Many of us will have been emotionally and somatically moved by music, 
but careful recollection will probably see us deflecting that ‘ineffable’ moment 
into some contextualising frame - be it one of nostalgia, a family event, cinematic 
moment or collective celebration to make sense of it. Music certainly moves us 
bodily and emotionally and may, within the logics o f the experiential, also add to 
our common sense view of ourselves and others via the discursive. Powerful 
though music is for us all, its aesthetic, social and philosophical currency demands 
(paradoxically) that we speak and write of it. It is at these moments of articulation 
that music’s qualities are both ‘revealed’ but also sometimes ideologically 
exploited.
In this chapter, such matters as the importance of language in the 
interpretation of music; our obligation to talk about music’s ineffability and the 
role of song lyrics are all addressed. The general theoretical stance is one where 
musical works are not regarded as absolute, formal exercises, or prefabricated 
symbolic works, but as likely spurs to emancipatory allegory.
Norris (1990b) has demonstrated how music as an ‘empty sign’ ushers in 
the sublime and a Kantian reason (by way of sensibility, imagination and
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understanding) in the individual which opens-up ethical considerations. In short, 
music stimulates us physically, imaginatively and intellectually. Lone subject and 
social group ‘play’ with music using words that allow for conceptual games of
3
hope that can inform Knowledge and praxis. Norris reminds us that in the 
nineteenth century, music was regarded:
As a language ideally removed from the crass contingencies of everyday usage or 
referential meaning, a language sui generis, existing in the space of its own self- 
authenticating truth. This tradition goes back to Pythagoras and the belief that 
music, like mathematics, embodies certain ultimate laws or reason, proportion or 
formal harmony which cannot be grasped by way of mere sense-perception. 
(1990b, 208-09,216)
The problem here is that to make any sense of this, we are then back in the realm 
of non-negotiable linguistic symbol. Such ‘readings’ in the present study will be 
rather a search for preferred allegorical meaning that is locally and historically 
sensitive but also flexible. If we simply assume musical meaning is internal, fixed, 
and not open as an allegory to historically or redemptively driven re-
4
interpretation, then it cannot ever ‘mean’ anything new. Meaning would be 
confined to formal play, number, programmatic content or nostalgic recall. Far 
from denuding music o f its power, language amplifies its writ and import. It is in 
this context that this chapter considers utopian potentials and eutopian conceits. 
Once the inevitability of linguistic mediation is accepted in the presence of music 
(and other cultural forms) then one needs to adopt a critical position to discern 
ideological ‘command’ and intent which is never too far behind music’s
5
‘suggestiveness’.
Philosophically, the semantic blankness of musical composition for some 
may mean it is a tabula rasa, ready for discursive inscription. Music’s non- 
linguistic, sensual character gives it an attractive air of autonomy and resistance. 
Notionally free of explicit ideological command, it promotes for many an emotive 
framework or a formalistic, self-referential language. Whilst Adomo has written 
convincingly about music’s internal, non-verbal grammar, he did not regard music
simply as a work governed by an inner, non-semantic syntax and nothing more.6 
Music for him could also be a mute historical text which might be analysed to
7
reveal historical forces and potential. If we are unable or unwilling to conduct
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any musicological or historical readings, what do we face when we hear music? 
Are we simply invited momentarily into a sonic field created for us by active 
musicians wherein our bodies, but not our minds might respond in some kind of 
kind mimetic correspondence?
Adomo himself could not accept the reduction of music to a simple
g
‘sensuous immediacy’ of momentary identity for musician and listener. For him, 
such an ‘irrational’, somatic state would render it prone to uncertain domination 
and reification. But the alternative approach, arguing that music only has content 
so remote from ordinary experience, intellect and language that it can only ever be 
alluded to elliptically means it is forever ‘ineffable.’
So how credible and robust then is music as a site of linguistic discourse? 
What can music sustain, with or without words? What might it engender 
extrinsically in socio-philosophical terms? Eyerman and Jamison (1998) rightly 
aver that musical works and even songs are, in themselves, not at all prescriptive. 
A time signature, cadence, patriotic chorus or programmatic title may steer the 
listener towards certain cultural conventions as part of some traditional
9
hermeneutics that respects composer, performer and audience. However, there is 
still an opportunity in the presence of all music for ‘meta-musical’ readings that 
may be more suspicious and critical, or even utopian and allegorical. Musical 
meanings inflected with matters utopian can be an historically situated 
instantiation of community knowledge and self-comprehension or an unfolding, 
constantly reworked social reading (in the form of an extended metaphor) which 
draws on a wider, more diffuse sense of loss or anticipation.
Music per se cannot safely be said to signify anything approaching firm 
semantic meaning, let alone an articulated politics. Undoubtedly, lyrical readings, 
discourse and allegory can illuminate authorial intentions or suggest radical 
interpretations, but all such interpretations are negotiated. Together or alone, 
negotiated readings operate as constitutive and productive codes: if one person 
hears or imagines they hear a nostalgic tone, ‘utopian strain’, or another person 
proposes a suggestive allegory, then the act of articulating this will fashion a 
discourse and, in time, influence the perspectives of many others attending to the 
music.
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6.2 “With hope in your heart”9: Lyrics, protest & eutopia
Sacred and profane songs ‘tell’ of experience and hope. Coupled with the affects 
of the musical arrangement, they stir feelings of desire, longing and nostalgia. For 
example, spirituals and gospel songs use biblical texts and stories to express 
discontent, injustices, and desire for something better; some secular lyrics deal
with the particular injustices of the day.10
The insights of disenfranchised individuals and whole communities are 
sung and (it is assumed) emotionally understood by everyone else. Eyerman and 
Jamison (1998) say that “the civil rights movement made it possible for black 
music to bring a new kind of truth into American society, a redemptive, visionary, 
even emancipatory truth.” They argue that “By momentarily resolving, or 
synthesising, the contradictions and tensions inherent in their own condition and 
their own music - African-Americans could hold up a mirror to American society 
and show a path to what Martin Luther King Jr. called the promised land” (1998, 
44). Eyerman and Jamison see that “in the songs of social movements, concepts 
are humanised and made less abstract, but there are visions of a better day, of a 
different world, of a not-yet-existent reality”. “This utopian aspect” they suggest 
“expresses in symbolic form what a movement stands for, what it is that is to be 
overcome” (1998,167).
However, remote listening contexts can sideline original import and 
preferred exegetical reading. Additionally, the impassive quality of a particular 
performance can obscure rather than stress the discontented sentiments of the 
song.
In the 1960’s this writer sang and heard on the radio such ‘radical’ songs 
as Blowing in the Wind, Little Boxes, Big Rock Candy Mountain, and I f  I  had a 
Hammer (the last, a Pete Seeger song, interpreted sweetly by Peter, Paul and 
Mary). They each made direct or indirect lyrical allusions to ‘radical’ social 
affairs largely unknown to me. When sung in the context of a school music lesson, 
or heard on children’s radio programmes, each devoid of any informed gloss, the 
intended imagery and political import of the songs considerably lessened. British 
broadcaster and writer Charlie Gillett recognised this as part of a bigger problem 
and wrote: “despite their genuine political beliefs which they expressed by singing
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free at political rallies [...] the sound of Peter, Paul and Mary was soft and easy on 
the ear [and] unlikely to stir activity in the passive pop audience” (Gillett 1983, 
297).
Not all songs relevant to this study are strictly spiritual or utopian. Some songs 
can express a desire to be somewhere else - precisely - and thus be about a better 
here and now that is only just over the horizon. Lyman Tower Sargent refers us to 
a nineteenth-century Irish emigrant song that sketched a more positive reality that 
was not only desirable, but (largely) attainable for the price of a steerage ticket. It 
is a seductive lyric subtly defining a ‘eutopia’ - a place of actuality and graft but 
still contains the more utopian (and unrealistic) promise of a government-free 
existence. Its value resides in its potential to effect immanent change in the lives 
of many thousands exploited in nineteenth-century Europe.
If you labour in America/In riches you will roll/There’s neither tythes nor taxes
there/Nor rent to press you down/it’s a glorious free country/To welcome
11
everyman/So sail off to America/As soon as e’er you can.
Music and song are most interesting when they move into a discursive realm and 
stir an entire generation. This is seen when social movements and their political 
aspirations are bound-up by well-loved, widely known musical styles and 
arrangements.
Eyerman and Jamison (1998) identify such momentary coalitions that 
address more than just particulars and can come to be a much more widely 
adopted mode of social expression. Their view is not one dependent on any 
transcendent quality within music, but simply on music’s role as a social medium. 
For them, music:
can communicate a feeling of common purpose, even amongst actors who have 
no previous historical connections with one another. While such a sense may be 
fleeting and situational, it can be recorded and reproduced and enter into memory, 
individual as well as collective. (1998, 162)
A good example of this was witnessed at the March 2003 UEFA football Cup tie 
when singer Gerry Marsden led a crowd of nearly 70,000 Liverpool and Glasgow 
Celtic fans in a rendering of the supporters’ anthem which the two clubs share, 
namely Rogers and Hammerstein’s You'll never Walk Alone from the musical 
Carousel. It was a song that transcended national and football rivalries to unite
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them and expose deeper Roman Catholic affinities and working class docker 
roots. Eyerman and Jamison write:
Social movements emerge in particular times and places [...] they create new 
contexts, new public spaces for addressing the particular problems of their time. 
They are not to be reduced to the organisation or institutions that they eventually 
become; what is central is their transience, their momentariness, their looseness. 
(1998,21)
They continue: “Social movements [...] are contingent and emergent spaces 
which are carved out of existing contexts; they are creative, or experimental 
arenas for the practising of new forms of social and cognitive action” (1998, 21). 
What we perhaps have are Foucauldian heterotopias, alternative realities of wider 
significance as shortly addressed in Chapter 8. Eyerman and Jamison suggest that 
social movements fuse their knowledges and the discourses of their ethical 
“vision” with what they term other “knowledge interests” found within contingent 
institutional settings and is an “integration o f its utopian vision” with what they 
identify as “specific practical activities and organisational forms” (1998,21).
John Lennon
A similar instance of meta-musical exegesis comes from Richard Middleton who
has discussed John Lennon’s class-bound social critique in the song Working
12
Class Hero and the utopian strains of Imagine. Lennon, a Merseysider and artist, 
carefully wove together a class-bound politics with the strains of American 
popular music and an avant-garde, metropolitan sensibility. Middleton plausibly 
positions Lennon in the protest song tradition and writes of:
[The] important junction of politics is to bring [class] differences into dialogue 
[...] and one sphere in which that process can take place is ‘culture’ - because 
culture is never a simple class possession [...] What there is, is a body of 
practices, materials, habits and values which, in particular circumstances at 
particular times, can be identified with particular social interests and positions 
[...] the outline of a life is figured, performed out; it’s possible to imagine a 
social reality [...] for as long as the performance lasts - and maybe longer. (2001)
Middleton goes on to discuss the significance of Rock in the fifties, as novel 
cultural space for the construction of youthful identity and expression. 
Participation in, and the purchase of popular musics, and their accompanying
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fashion codes also has to be understood as participation in an attainable affluence, 
and thus may be at times, little more than a politics of consumption. Even so, 
radical lyrics, social movements and individual agents produced imagery and 
debate which has remained a corpus of lyrical and discursive potentials.
63  Expressive obligation
‘The spirit’ is afflicted with the curse of being ‘burdened’ with matter, which [...] 
makes its appearance in the form of agitated layers of air, sounds, in short of 
language. Language is as old as consciousness, language is practical, real 
consciousness that exists for other men as well, [...] language, like consciousness, 
only arises from the need, the necessity, of intercourse with other men. (Marx 
1974, 50-1)
This chapter has so far suggested that without language, and without a discursive 
frame, the value of music remains, at best, one that is an abstract array of 
inarticulate, subjective hopes. Above, Marx suggested that spiritual release is, in 
part, found through bodily sounds. Marx has clearly laid stress on a semantically 
precise symbolism, namely a language of representation and intercourse which he 
seems to imply has a practical, socially useful rationality beyond any mere 
expressive role. Whilst the Marxist aesthetics of Marcuse and Adomo offer a 
seductive account of art’s sensuous immediacy they are, like so many other 
aesthetic theories, also reliant on an extra-linguistic gloss to be comprehensible 
and useful. Fortunately there’s adequate precedent for meta-musical readings in 
the literature of critical theorists, Adorno’s socio-musicological work and the 
wider corpus of utopian writings. If we ourselves acknowledge that music exerts 
an emotive influence on us, we must surely be prepared to elucidate and preserve 
that influence. We can do this through symbol, allegory, metaphor, discursive 
spaces and all with the ordinary tool that allows us to do all of this - verbal 
language, the ‘conscious, agitated air’ o f Marx.
If physiological apperception precedes anything rational and 
representational, then music’s autonomy and potential is never truly going to be 
sullied in speaking about it. A map as an analogical representation of place might 
encourage visitors to trample enthusiastically across the most pristine of 
territories, but it cannot be held responsible for any subsequent overexposure or
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destruction of sensitive sites. Moreover, without the map, and agreed signs, subtle 
configurations remain hidden, and any collective attempt at preservation and 
sharing is made harder. In short, those believing in music’s value are obliged to 
chart it for others with words - whatever the risks.
As we have already seen, one of the most plausible and subtle ‘readings’ 
of Utopia and cultural form comes from Caryl Flinn whose thoughts on film 
music, expressed in her book, Strains o f Utopia (1992) have furnished us with a 
useful means of addressing Bloch in Chapter 3. In her general interpretations of 
music’s utopia, Flinn argues convincingly that music can only be heard in the 
present For her, its nostalgic, Blochian ‘anteriority’ or prophetic tendencies are 
effectively subjective, and are generated close to hand as a text by the writer. 
Flinn is able to reflect on her linguistic methods of interpretation even as she 
offers them to us. Here she writes of her own discursive incursion:
The responses and readings I have offered here are not so much contained within 
the film scores ‘themselves’ as they are produced by the audition and analysis of 
a specific critic [...] this is the only way that utopia is broached at all - as a 
strategy, a way of reading and of negotiating the texts around us. (1992, 150)
Flinn exemplifies the way in which meta-musical readings of an academic kind 
can be sensitive to ideological, historical and social conditions but can also, in a 
creative and critical manner, offer a verbal ‘projections’ of music’s potency in the 
form of ‘discursive ideals’. Flinn tells us:
Utopian projections need to be acknowledged as theoretical constructs; utopian 
fullness and integrity cannot be treated as if they had actually existed or could be 
currently actualized. The purported integrated subjects or harmonious culture of 
utopia exist only as a result of critical interpretation; they are nothing more than 
discursive ideals [and] do not identify conditions that really existed. (1992, 89)
Frith, has also identified the seductive space between sounds and semanticity and 
insists on the consequent pleasures but also necessity of us responding 
linguistically to music. He writes:
The gap in music between the nature of the experience (sounds) and the terms of 
its interpretation (adjectives) may be more obvious than in any other art form, but 
this does not mean that the pleasure of music doesn’t lie in the ways in which we 
can - and must - fill the gap. (1996,264-5)
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In summoning utopian readings of music then, care must be taken to remember 
what they are, namely Frith’s pleasurable filling of the “gap” and Flinn’s 
“discursive ideals”. This is not to decry any attempted interpretation. In a 
reference to pre-literate musics, Flinn says that it is now the conditions of 
modernity that calls for a utopian music, and, presumably by extension, following 
her arguments, a modem, utopian gloss (Flinn 1992, passim.). We can perhaps 
regard Flinn’s discursive ideals as a contemporary variation on the configuration
13or constellation metaphor of Benjamin and Adomo. In seeking to view current 
socio-economic conditions from alternative perspectives, those we may term 
dreamers and thinkers of a utopian persuasion might, as they look eidetically at 
such conditions from an alternative vantage point, not only begin to articulate 
what they see in a variety of ideal utopian figures of rejection or change, but also 
begin to comprehend what it is to be a human in expressing dissatisfaction and 
hope. Such a ‘linguistic philosophy’ effecting a momentary model of comment 
and comprehension may not ultimately change conditions in any prescriptive, 
‘here and now’ resolutions, but reflecting on them provides us with a broad 
critical philosophy of the subject’s (and thus our own) developing consciousness.
How might such critical perspectives be formed? A utopian gloss may 
begin as a reading of certain aesthetic elements of expression, emotional 
analogues of genuine desire say on the part o f a singer present in a performance 
which become for the listening subject, metaphorical exemplars which call forth 
particular qualities. These expressions might sometimes only be conventionalised 
modes of vocal delivery or simply a lyrical yearning denoting a presumed utopian 
desire, but these and the more intensive of expressions may be connotative and 
suggestive for the listener who is able to bring to them, their own metaphorical 
and allegorical interpretations. This later move towards the associations of the 
subject’s imagination and understanding is not to misread or distort the original 
cultural text as the metaphorical and allegorical readings are fashioned. As Nelson 
Goodman suggested: “expression is by intimation rather than imitation” (1976, 
46). The detection (assumed or divined) of a Blochian trace of the ‘not yet’ for a 
sensitive listener primes the work for personal textual readings beyond any 
immediate intentionality. The emerging metaphor or allegory of the listener might, 
at this point articulate the utopian conceit more ftdly or simply ‘drag’ the work
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into a new realm of meaning belonging to the listening subject As Goodman 
further suggested: “a metaphor is an affair between a predicate with a past and an 
object that yields while protesting [...] metaphorical application defies an explicit 
or tacit prior denial of [a] label [...] to that object” (1976, 69). In short, music and 
its aesthetic surplus can support the determined utopian reader, even if overt 
utopian intent or referents are absent.14
Fluid interpretations
In invoking the utopian in an allegorically driven discourse of interpretation, a 
critical, socio-philosophical dynamic is established. This is best explained by 
Jameson who, in a few sentences, marries allegory, convention and dialectic to 
describe active, modem interpretations in the presence of the cultural text:
The newer allegory is horizontal rather them vertical: if it must still attach its one- 
on-one conceptual labels to its objects [...] it does so in the conviction that those 
objects [...] are now profoundly relational [...] When we add to this the inevitable 
mobility of such relations, we begin to glimpse the process [...] as a kind of 
scanning that, moving back and forth across the text, readjusts its terms in 
constant modification [...] which one would be tempted (were it not also an old- 
fashioned word!) to characterize as dialectical. (1991,168).
Norris too suggests we must look to the dialectical aspects of the here and now, 
the material, the ideological and the resistant and find a place for reinserting what 
he tells us (after Jameson) is the “literal, moral, allegorical and anagogical” 
(1989b, 306). If this is not done, we simply end up with a cmde, Althusserian set 
of determinations. As Norris puts it, this is to [reduce]: “consciousness, history, 
culture and subjective agency to mere effects of a dominant structural complex 
whose workings can only appear under the aspect of detached theoretical 
knowledge” (ibid.).
Adomo (2000f) wrote of the dialectical value of the essay form. Whereas 
much of the philosophical writing tradition for him sought to offer a clear 
summation of invariants and essences, any dialectical thought predicated on a 
preclusion of absolutes and a critical acceptance of contingency needed a more 
fluid form of exposition. For Adomo this was the essay wherein provisional, 
contradictory and speculative ideas could be give a free reign. In relation to this 
O’Connor (2000) argues that in the writing and reading of the essay, writer and
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reader were able to draw on sensory and historical experiences to engage in the 
creative interpretation of a cultural work. This was for Adomo a subject’s 
autonomous, “dialectical consciousness” at work (not a inauthentic consciousness 
formed by ideological forces) but one freed by understanding and purposeful, 
prospective imagination and “as such” says O’Connor, “it is a praxis” concluding 
that the “essay is especially suited to the task of interpretation” and that “Adomo 
is attempting to establish a freer, though rational, approach to the understanding of 
experience” (2000, 91-2). We might conclude at this stage that for the 
autonomous, imaginative, understanding individual to listen and then write of 
things utopian, is a process which is a legitimate, meaningful translation of music 
into prose.
6.4 Aesthetics & the dangers of language
In spite of a wish to articulate music’s power verbally, some defence of Music’s 
ineffable, ‘inexpressible’ qualities seem to be central to many of the ideas of
15Bloch, Adomo and Marcuse. This is partly explained by the attitude that any 
linguistic articulation of music’s power to effect personal recollection, shudder, or 
aesthetic surplus is perhaps to lay music open to the corrupting influence of 
language as social fact and the inevitable imprecision of language as a tool of 
conceptual correspondence.16 Bloch was aware of the need to objectify 
subjectivity and clearly saw the need for the discipline of aesthetics so that our 
passions might be comprehended. There must be ‘emotional insight’ Bloch wrote: 
“intellectual contact [...] with the emotions is necessary for every piece of self- 
knowledge” (1995 I, 72-3). In order to avoid accusations of protecting a natural 
musical essence or primitive human urge, Bloch and others turned to words 
without ever abandoning reservations. In discussing Wagner’s Meistersingers, 
Bloch asserted that words “may imitate music’s secret, immoderate power of 
action by ways broadly connected to it, but with its demystifying, ‘more logical’ 
resources it cannot readily prove itself up to the mark that the music requires” 
(1985, 80). Marcuse had argued that aesthetic sensations foster an autonomous,
17
pre-lingual reason, free of instrumental and economic factors. Whilst this is
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clearly not entirely true of any work of art, but true for the aesthetics of Marcuse, 
the extra-linguistic, aesthetic surplus o f the arts at their moment of perception is 
powerful, and gives them the apparent and perhaps actual potential to silence their 
factual origins for a moment or two. Simon Reynolds (1990) sets a great deal of 
store by the somatic impact of much rock music, and continues to defend creative 
works as autonomous sonic forces. Everyone - Marcuse to Reynolds - can only
effectively isolate and address such a force through speaking and writing - the
18process which may distort or fall short.
The bodily sensation, it is implied, is pure and immediate; that pre-
19linguistic moment is where music’s power resides. Whilst a seductive 
proposition, this is little better than a silent conspiracy and may be fallacious. If 
one does not then try to articulate assumptions about music - turn a ‘work’ into a
‘text’ (after Barthes) one is surely failing to test one’s experiences, faith and
20
philosophy inter subjectively. One is also failing to contribute to, on a more civic 
level, any socio-cultural discourse. A silent belief about music’s powers is as 
much an indication of intellectual limits as it is one of philosophical fear. 
Epistemological and social projects are surely confounded in the presence of the 
sacrosanct and ineffable. An absence o f articulated critical theory about music is 
also to leave it open to the ideological glosses of other, less reputable discourses. 
To deny music a story is also to deprive it o f an important cultural role. Lawrence 
Kramer claims, quite plausibly that:
Music does important cultural work by being spoken of, and would not be what 
we call ‘music’ otherwise. Words situate music in a multiplicity of cultural 
contexts [...] words invest music with the very capacity to ‘speak’ of its contexts 
that is usually thought to lack [...] Neither the speech nor the contexts [...] are 
‘extrinsic’ to the music involved. (2003,124-5)
Beyond music, conventionalised intellectual fixities address the phenomenon of 
music and instigate interpretative dialogue. It is in language that hermeneutical 
readings are capable of generating tropes, figurations caught in the wake of
musical experience. Discursive analysis and interpretation follows the artistic
21
work (as it does in the present study).
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6.5 Allegory & music
Having suggested that literary tropes are post facto  conceits, it can be conceded 
that there may be with metaphor, a conscious solicitation of meaning, or 
analogous form and effect in music which itself operates alongside cognate 
sensory experience. Allegory on the other hand revels in the fluidity of language 
and operates without too many difficulties as an extrinsic and post facto trope, less 
dependent on the senses.
This chapter has sought to demonstrate the inevitability of meta-musical 
readings in music’s presence. Whilst interpretations o f all kinds can stress music’s 
artistic and historical import, care must be taken to guard against any foreclosing 
discourses. One literary aspect of language, which keeps meanings and potentials 
alive and supple, is the allegory. Allegory is usefully defined as “a figurative
narrative or description conveying a veiled moral meaning; an extended
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metaphor”. Such a definition lends itself to More’s Utopia and is the ultimate 
point of departure for all subsequent accounts of music which are, in effect, 
allegories - elaborated metaphors describing musical fields loaded with critical 
potentials to delineate the Blochian ‘not yet’. Street tells us that symbolism sees 
the artwork as a static, spatial figure. Radio and music are by contrast temporal 
domains re-presented across time and within ongoing discourses of interpretation. 
Allegory is thus comfortable within musical contexts of several kinds. Street 
writes:
Allegory prolongs its interpretative message in recognition of a continuous and 
ineluctable temporality. From this viewpoint, music could be said to take its place 
as the allegorical art par excellence, in de Man’s words, it becomes “the 
diachronic version of the pattern of non-coincidence within the moment”. (1998, 
89)
Rereadings over time as music is heard and heard again is what fosters a 
dialectical dynamic in pursuit of better circumstances. Norris reminds us that:
For Bloch, as indeed for de Man, music is allegorical through and through, since 
its significance can never be grasped once and for all in an act of fulfilled, self­
present perception [...] Just as melody unfolds through a temporal process [...] so 
musical works take on their significance through time, in a history of successive 
re-encounters whose meaning can never be exhausted. (Norris 1989b, 341)
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Just as important as the ability to revisit and re-read a work is the knowledge of 
allegory’s limits, and thus operate as what Norris says is “a powerful, 
demystifying trope” (Norris 1989b, 318). Hardt and Weeks, explain, with help 
from Jameson:
In contrast to the symbol [...] allegory is a discontinuous form of representation 
that highlights its disjunction from what it represents. “In our time [...] the 
referent - the world system - is a being of such enormous complexity that it can 
only be mapped and modelled indirectly, by way of a simpler object that stands 
as its allegorical interpretant” [...] allegory presupposes the impossibility of 
representation in any naive or mimetic sense and highlights its own status as an 
interpretation. (2000,24)
Care must be exercised when discussing music and Utopia. Flinn says that the 
nostalgic, utopian interpretations of music, predicated on perceived loss, 
ideological cooption or non-verbal, nonsensical loss actually deprive it of any 
immanent potential, “the utopianization of music forecloses its ability to interact 
within a larger social and discursive context and essentializes [...] Music 
consequently, is barred from generating meaning and participating in discourse at 
all” (1992, 88-9). However, more modest readings do seem to find favour:
The partial and preservable traces of [more recent] utopias are more humble than 
conventionally conceived utopian thought. They are simply fragmented moments 
of hope, of desire. But they also raise the possibility of change, returning to 
representation, discourse, and perhaps even social action the fantasies and hopes 
that were prompted by these circumstances in the first place. (Flinn 1992 154)
6.6 Radio & discourse
It was not the music which gave meaning to music radio, but music radio which 
gave meaning to the music. (Bennett et al 1993, 100)
Radio as instrumental force has long stimulated music-making and recording and 
it is this ‘social fact’ which stimulates categorisation and ‘meaning’. Local talent 
aspires to national and international recognition which is best achieved through 
the broadcasting of recordings. Radio as creative and commercial platform 
inevitably is dependent on instigating and regulating a broadcast ‘flow’ of content 
(after Williams) within an ‘industrial time’ (after Berland 1993) which it does 
through scheduling, selecting and speech. Radio broadcasting is saturated with
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language and we may enjoy the disc jockey glosses as much as the music. (Many 
seem to enjoy live interjections and ‘of the moment comment’ as much as the pre­
recorded sounds they frame). Popular genres and sounds from musical history rely 
very much on the lexicon of music radio. Frith tells us: “It was radio that created 
the musical map that we now use to distinguish high and low music, youth and 
older people’s music, the specialist musical interest, and the mainstream” (2003, 
96). Diverse popular musics are selected, labelled, broadcast and discussed. 
Differences and similarities are articulated and in such a process, a useful dialectic
23and praxis for musicians and the listening public is created. These broadcast 
points of reference articulate a mutually dependent professional and listener 
discourse comprising tour news, interviews dedications and stories.
The term discourse is here broadly defined after J. A. Walker (1989,14) as 
a flow of artifacts, texts and conversation which produce and sustain knowledge. 
David Howarth has defined discourse as an institution of coordination, a 
“cognitive schema” which presumably effects a useful intersubjectivity (Howarth 
2000, 3). Such a discourse of flow and cognition resides in the language of social 
spaces where subjects are mediated.
Discourses, whilst being ‘stable’ repositories of social meaning are, at the
24same time competing ‘world views’ emanating from base and superstructure. 
These take shape within institutional settings and are mapped onto individuals and
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groups who are constituted by these discursive perspectives. Harvey says that:
To accept the fragmentation, the pluralism and the authenticity of other voices 
and other worlds poses the acute problem of communication, and the means of 
exercising power through command thereof. (1990,49)
To offer a response to Harvey, what is important to remember is that no listener is 
ever wholly dependent on one source of discursive formation. Family, school, 
peers and press also mediate (change) the individual. Official national discourses 
do tend to dominate because of the support received from seductive and rational 
argument claiming national legitimacy as it stands above parochial interest. 
Broadcasting, with a brief to embrace and share a range of discourses, is 
positioned above the fray as an index of benign rule. Broadcasting further rules by 
consent and receives an injection of authenticity and independency from the
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presence of intellectual agents who use the ether to reach communities and wider 
society they themselves value.
In the hands of other classes such as ‘intellectuals’, gatekeepers and Peel’s 
‘gateways’, cultural diversity is praised, and any social divisiveness challenged 
and transcended. These albeit imperfect contestations or figurations of
contestations on radio are the groundings of immanent critique and dialectical
26
movement.
Foucault, in his 1966 formulation of the heterotopian saw the language of 
such alternative locales as one that would be able to confound dominant language, 
discourse and common sense. He seemed to be suggesting that ‘new’, somewhat 
hermetic languages are formed and known only to a few. However, a secret 
language operating without conventional signifiers is limited. Foucault does not 
seem to have developed this idea much further, perhaps because of his insistence 
on the need for the exchanges of interwoven discourses (normative and 
alternative) between groups and sites as generators of power, potential and 
resistance. In contrast to heterotopias, Foucault saw the utopian mode as one 
which might encourage a common discourse. Surely, it is when his alternative 
languages are shared that their utopian import is nurtured and extended? Foucault 
wrote:
Utopias afford consolation: although they have no real locality, there is 
nevertheless a fantastic untroubled region in which they are able to unfold [...] 
Heterotopias are disturbing, probably because they secretly undermine language 
[...] Utopias permit fables and discourse; they run with the veiy grain of 
language. (Foucault cited Harvey 2000,183)
Utopian discourses may in fact be discrete, and operate in these heterotopian 
spaces of Foucault but, through wider discussion can also be offered up too for 
broader contemplation. Such a linguistic turn containing a Habermasian 
communicative exchange is an opportunity for articulate cognitive activity and 
praxis that is within agreed norms and conditions. This surely takes place in real 
spaces and channels of communication and is therefore a supply of ready utopian 
referents and consequent eutopian praxis. It is this culturally configured but 
socially deferred utopia that provides the excess and fuel for a continuance of 
‘sensibility, imagination and understanding’.
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Discourse & dialectics, stability & progress
To be effective, articulate, socio-cultural exchange depends on agreed codes and 
rules. Indeed, even the philosophical articulation of things dialectical is highly 
dependent on extant language; on its signifiers, concepts, relations and referents. It 
is the contention of this thesis that Structuralism (linguistic, semiotic and 
anthropological variants) can be used to explain the dialectical inception of 
‘sensibility, imagination and understanding’ because of the platform it constructs
27of useful, stable cultural codings and mechanisms. Of course there are 
philosophical objections to the use of structuralist binaries. There is for instance 
the critical exposure of the falsity of language at the very moment we construct a 
theory reliant on such a device, particualry when it entreats us to work with the 
formula of subject and object. Adomo, always alive to the deceitful non-identities 
of language, nevertheless bracketed his ideological objections to it in order to 
articulate and share potential for betterment, hermeneutical reading, critique and 
praxis. So, Adomo too had to live with concepts and binary opposites. Adomo 
wrote: “necessity compels philosophy to operate with concepts [...] the substance 
of concepts is to them both immanent, as far as the mind is concerned, and 
transcendent as far as being is concerned” (1973, 11-12) In effect, conceptual 
thought adresses objective realities and subjective aspirations and they contribute 
to a dialecitical process. With regard to its application in utopian theory Adomo 
argued that “Regarding the concrete utopian possibility, dialectics is the ontology 
of the wrong state of things” (1973, 15), and must involve an imaginative ‘what
i f  element. Adomo wrote: “Even after breaking with idealism, philosophy cannot
28do without speculation” (1973, 13). Importantly, what he sought was a critical, 
independent subject who might use their own experiences and creative and 
intellectual agency to produce novel concepts such as that of the utopian that 
might dialecitically exceed constitutive reality and dominating concepts. As he 
wrote: “Philosophy [...] must strive, by way of the concept, to transcend the 
concept” (1973,15).
As stable codings, these binary opposites assist musicians, the culture 
industry and listeners in a day-to-day labeling of the myriad cultural forms we 
encounter. Concepts and binaries move through social and cultural discourses to 
name, grade and define; dialectical transformation and ‘growth’ is then applied to
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these ‘agreed’ terms, finding expression and circulation through new referents and 
structures of meaning. This infusing of the structuralist schema of intercourse with 
immanent historical detail, latent change and individual agency provides a means 
of productively accommodating what might appear to be incompatible theories - 
namely dialectical mutation and the communicative fixities of discursive 
structures.
Adorno’s concession to extant, linguistic structural devices, and his call for 
an evolving, self-critical philosophy allows us here legitimately to consider 
moving from conceptual fixities to something more fluid as outlined above, and is 
effectively there in his account of the essay (2000f), which to some extent 
prepares us for Habermas and his linguistic turn whereby individual emancipation 
is founded on collective, linguistically constituted norms of ethical 
communication as a prelude to praxis.
We can surely continue to use binaries to understand our lifeworld. 
However, in order to effect the dialectical movement advocated by Adomo and 
others we must, even more effectively than he did, move towards a post­
structuralist, deconstructive position where we can effectively (1) ‘weaken’ stable 
binaries to expose their interdependence as differentially related terms and (2) 
usefully invert the implied hierarchies of these binaries. A short exercise in a 
deconstructive inversion of the binary opposite of the highly valued live musical 
venue and the somewhat inferior representational phenomenon of radio 
bradcasting is carried out in the next chapter.
6.7 In conclusion
The ability of subjects to will, project, imagine, and recreate are familiar human 
characteristics that are found within the individual and are expressed in culture 
and social institutions. Cultural production and allegory together in socio-cultural 
settings ensure the survival of a sort of dialectical hermeneutics where alternatives 
come and go, a sort of fluidity of meaning ensuring that whilst comprehension and 
interpretation is never deferred, symbolic finality and closure is.
The ‘musical eutopia’ in particular, when wedded to the strong 
metaphorical and allegorical force that is Utopia and to the presence of music in
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radio is a useful, meta-musical locale combining epistemological awareness, 
reflection, discourse, hope and praxis. As Norris writes: Utopia is a political form 
that offers “counter-hegemonic readings” (1989b, 319) and, when allied to music 
and its sonic qualities, utopian allegory’s potency is further increased (1989b, 
passim).
Desire, freedom or nostalgia are experienced and imagined in music’s 
presence, but anything more intelligibly utopian must, as per Tremlett’s assertion 
at the start of this chapter operate as a conceit that can only be properly explicated 
by language. Because language can be deterministic in both instrumental or 
utopian contexts, it is important to be sympathetic to music’s ambiguous qualities 
and its enduring potentials which precede the meta-musical. The provisionality 
and contingency of a critical allegory - of which Utopia is an example - is a 
positive mode of guaranteeing ongoing emancipatory readings in the face of 
ideological command.
Careful movement between music’s sonic impact, aesthetic potentials, its 
allegorical readings, and a critical linguistics offers much for music in society. We 
must not dismiss the instinctual “primordial experience” of music as Norris puts it 
in his account of Schopenhauer’s denigration of the other arts but it is certainly 
not “the truth to which philosophy aspired but which could never reach” (Norris 
1989b, 309). It is a subsequent, interpretative, dialectical process that we should 
seek in the presence of music. Cultural production and allegory together ensure 
the survival of that which is forever new.
Music’s inherent lack of semantic meaning is the reason for its continuing 
prominence as a locus for glosses of affiliation, import and contestation across all 
societies. It is not only nature that abhors a vacuum. Human imagination and 
culture rushes in to attend to works lacking overt and fixed meaning, converting 
them into texts. Whilst Nietzsche warns against imputing music’s forms with 
‘meaning’, many have sought to burden it with philosophies of hope or despair. 
Whilst this thesis is perhaps guilty of a disregard for musical ‘autonomy’, it is 
intended that whilst perhaps neglecting singular works, it does identify some of 
the more concrete, and potential features of musical activity when shared across 
the ether. As Jameson (1980, 2000a) argues (following Bloch), it is the enticing, 
residual or ‘yet to become’ utopian ‘content’ of popular culture we must attend to 
as we critique the ideological.
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Notes
1. The difference between sonos (instrumental sound) and phone (the spoken and sung word) is 
explored by Steve Sweeney-Tumer (1996). Sweeney-Tumer explains that music is an emotive, 
non-representational end in itself, language, a symbolic means to an end.
2. Beethoven’s last symphony contains a setting of Friedrich Schiller’s 1785 ode to Joy (Freude 
schdner Gotterfunken - ‘Joy [or Freedom] thou glorious spark of heaven’). Dylan’s All along the 
Watchtower opens with: “There must be some kind of way out of here”.
3. Prevost (1995) contains the writings of a musician - not a sociologist of music - keen to gloss, 
post facto , the production, ‘meaning’ and implications o f improvised musical performances that 
float momentarily as non-mimetic, non denotative sound waves, outside verbal discourse. The 
term meta-music is one deployed specifically by Prdvost to describe a continuing musical presence 
where by it fosters considered action. (1995,36).
4. Norris (1990b) has reminded us that the presence of any immanent articulations of emotion, 
truth and knowledge have long been disputed. What is relevant for this chapter is that die exegesis 
of such immediate power has, from Pythagoras to Schopenhauer taken die form of linguistic 
representation - the very form of intellectual reiteration and poetic interpretation deemed inferior 
to music’s immediacy.
5. Cf. Bom: “One reason for attention to multitextuality is to foreground the social character of 
music, whether the immediate social relations of musical performance or the macrosociological 
dimensions addressed by institutional and political-economic analysis” (1995,17).
6. Immanent musicological logics can create the impression of a musical language comprising 
phrases, resolutions and the like, but these are themselves formalistic or structural, generating 
immanent musicological difference and development only. They do not literally ‘mean’ anything 
(cf. Adomo 1998b).
7. For an explanation of how this applies to Adomo, we can turn to Paddison who wrote: “For 
Adomo, truth lies in the particular which evades die universalizing tendency of conceptual 
thought. But the ‘truth content’ of musical work is historical and concerns the way in which it 
works, through the particularity of their form, attempt to deal with the antinomies of the handed- 
down musical material, which are seen as social in origin” (1993,15).
8. See Witkin(1998, 111).
9. Nietzsche had called essential emotive content into doubt when wrote the following about 
music: “Its primeaval union with poetry has deposited so much symbolism into rhythmic 
movement, into the varying strength and volume of musical sounds that we now suppose it to 
speak directly to the inner world [...] it was the intellect itself which first introduced this 
significance into sounds” (1977,128).
10. On slave song see Lawrence Levine (2002). Consider too the ‘Red Songs’ of Hanns Eisler. 
Shusterman advises us that “Rap not only insists on uniting the aesthetic and the cognitive; it 
equally stresses that practical functionality can form part of artistic meaning and value. Many rap 
songs are explicitly devoted to raising black political consciousness, pride and revolutionary 
impulses” (1992b, 213).
11. Wright, 1975 cited in Sargent (2001,96).
12. ‘A Working-Class Hero is Something to B e’: Pop music, class and Utopia, a seminar paper 
given to Cardiff University Music Department April 2001. I am most grateful to the author for 
providing a copy of this paper. For more about the significance of popular lyrics see Middleton 
(1990).
13. See Jarvis (1998, 175-192) for an overview of the constellation thinking of Benjamin and 
Adomo.
14. Lest this be seen as illegitimate as a hermeneutical and creative response, we should not forget 
that we find many inspirational responses to music’s expressive forms in the visual arts and, of 
course in dance.
15. “For Bloch, as for others before him in the German philosophical tradition - notably 
Schopenhauer and Nietzsche - music was at once the most humanly-revealing form of art and the 
form most resistant to description or analysis in conceptual terms. But this was no reason, he 
argued, for retreating into an attitude of mystical irrationalism which denied music any kind of 
cognitive import, or (conversely) for adopting the formalist standpoint which reduced it to a play 
of purely abstract structures and relationships devoid of expressive content” (Norris 1989b, 308-9).
16. Music can be ‘framed’ as a ‘tabula rasa’ of uncertain meaning. But this simply renders it a 
sensuous moment of ‘pre-rational’ excess free for subsequent discursive, dialectical colonisation.
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Richard Dyer (1993) in his discussion of utopia and entertainment writes of “non-representational 
signs” in a discussion of the predominance of signifiers over signifieds (Flinn 1992, 11). Of 
course, such a readiness to mark-off, encode parts of music as being ‘uncolonised’ can lead 
paradoxically to hermeneutic overload where music simply means ‘everything and nothing’.
17. See the introduction to Marcuse’s A Note on Dialectic in Arato and Gebhardt (2000, 444). 
Consider Marcuse’s preoccupation with liberation.
“[T]he senses are not only the basis for the epistemological constitution of reality, but also for its 
transformation, its subversion in the interest of liberation. Human freedom is [...] rooted in human 
sensibility: the senses do not only ‘receive’ what is given to them [...] rather, they discover, or can 
discover by themselves, in their ‘practice’, new (more gratifying) possibilities and capabilities, 
forms and qualities of things, and can urge and guide their realization” (1972,71-2).
18. See Simon Reynolds (1990, 1998) on desire and loss of the self - a different, non-intellectual 
engagement with music.
19.1 am grateful to my colleague Clive Cazeaux who explains that our senses do receive discrete 
information, but they are fused in a ‘logic of the senses’ (after Alan Beck, University of Kent). 
One set of data prompts parallel sensory awareness. With sound alone, there is a sound world that 
offers an incomplete engagement. This, concludes Cazeaux, is a positive factor that calls for 
‘supplementation’ i.e. memory, imagination, etc.
20. As Barthes said: a work is held in the hand - or in our case body within a site of socio- 
philosophical and cultural significance; as a text - it is held in language (1977c, 155-64).
21. See also Kramer (2006), a collection of essays exploring the conditions in place for our 
responses to music and also Nattiez (1990) for another discursive interpretation of music based on 
the semiological signifier that is the acoustic object and upon consequent signifieds.
22. The Oxford Companion to English Literature Oxford University Press, 1998.
23. Frith reminds us that: “Radio is still the most important source of popular musical discourse, 
defining genres and genre communities, shaping music history and nostalgia, determining what we 
mean by ‘popular’ in the first place [...] Radio is important not least as a means of access to music 
otherwise inaccessible, whether the BBC’s systematic policy of musical education or in the furtive 
use of Radio Luxembourg, the American Forces Network, and pirate radio stations as windows on 
another world” (2003,96).
24. Bom suggests that music “Offers little resistance to discursive invasion and universalizing 
ideology” (1995,20).
25. Mikhail Bakhtin’s interest in ‘texts’ and ‘carnival’ may prove useful. For him, ‘texts’ 
constitute instances of discourse; contributions to an ongoing social dialogue made in a particular 
historical situation. Although Bakhtin developed this idea on carnival and discourse in the field of 
literature, a friend and colleague Ivan Sollertinsky developed his argument on carnival as discourse 
undermining the universality of political and cultural authority, particularly with reference to 
music. See Hirschkop (1989).
26. As Bom has argued, high-profile institutions can accommodate discursive oppositions within 
its own walls. Bom in looking at IRCAM argues (after Bourdieu) that this is a knowing consensus 
of oppositions (i.e. what’s in, or out). This is a tamed, affected ‘opposition’ within a field (say 
Radio 1), different from an absolute opposition between fields (1995, 27-8). “The musicians’ 
meetings were imbued with an implicit utopianism expressed most obviously in the open and 
egalitarian character of debate, but also by two aspects of the content of discussions, both touching 
on the social. The first was die concern with small systems and real-time networks for live 
performance. This had utopian leanings in a revealing of an awareness of IRCAM’s relations with 
the outside world, through projections of the needs of users beyond IRCAM and of die institute’s 
potentially wider progressive effects. The second dimension was internal: the proposal for a new 
social organisation of research as a ‘musical think tank’. The quality of communal utopian 
projection - of predicting necessities or desires - was shown by the common use in meetings of the 
phrase ‘Imaginez que...’ ” (1995,207).
27. Norris has argued that “there is simply no conceiving of society except in terms of a 
differential system that must always to some extent - even in ‘primitive’ cultures - rest upon 
distinctions of class, gender, kinship and other such socially-imposed categories [...] any 
‘language’ that lacked the identifying marks of structural relationship and difference would in fact 
not be language at all, but merely a string of pre-articulate sounds with some possible emotive 
significance” (1989b, 337-8). This at once calls forth structural sharing of knowledge but also hints 
at the non-verbal potencies of so many musics.
28. Jarvis writes: “We will need to continue to use, even whilst criticising die language of concept 
and intuition, subject and object” (1998 150).
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7 Music, radio & intersubjectivity
7.1 Introduction
What most encourages harmonious, self-integrating, self-developing, and self-fulfilling 
processes are conditions of interaction, within the family, the larger society, and the life 
of the culture, that respect the inherent needs and norms of individual ‘human nature* and 
work in harmony and attunement with them. (Levin 1989,61)
Musical eutopias is addressing enduring, socio-philosophical dualities: subject 
and object; individual and society; private and public; self and the Other; 
particular and universal. These are more than differential relations; they are taken 
to be terms of a rational, dialectical process of ‘becoming’ mediated by 
communicating cultures, technologies and institutions. The resultant synthesis (the 
meeting and changing) of subject (and object) is catalysed in ethical, moral and 
politically sanctioned ways which may be characterised as eutopian. In such 
processes and practices, listening is an indispensable ontological, epistemological 
and social attribute. This chapter is an inquiry into communicative processes of 
intersubjectivity, and the role of music and radio as mediating, socio-cultural 
phenomena contributing to these processes. It begins by setting out a social and 
philosophical model of self-development and intersubjectivity with some 
reference to Adorno’s formulations. There is reference then to music as it is 
directly experienced and intersubjectively addressed. This is followed by critiques 
of radio and mediated intersubjectivity’s ‘illusions’ of mutuality and a rejoinder 
by way of a positive modelling and critique of the mediated intersubjectivities of 
radio.
The main proposition is that subjective development and an intersubjective 
mutuality is achieved through listening and importantly, concomitant, ordinary 
interaction. A Habermasian ‘lifeworld’, a common sense corpus of experiences, 
behaviour and resultant knowledge is gained as we engage aurally and orally, both 
in socio-cultural places of local musical performance and with the wider space of 
the determining social systems of music in broadcast media.1 Whilst the first 
interaction in an immediate lifeworld is acknowledged to be an intense
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communicative, dialogical relationship - typically found as far as this study is 
concerned in places of immediate musical engagement formed by families, 
schools and communities - it can also be an enhanced experience when allied to 
the latter sphere: a socially systematised, ‘second-order’ mediated and mediating 
locale of consensus-forming national and international socio-cultural space. One 
such a space is that constructed by the BBC, complete with its culturally active 
disc jockeys and producers: its agents of change. The systematised, ‘colonised’ 
and ‘totally administered’ society ‘on air’ is without doubt a problematical 
‘second nature’ sphere regarded as it often is as one of free communication, but it 
is arguably also a space never wholly disabled by technological distortion and 
political power, and will thus always be a eutopian space of opportunity. The next 
chapter deals with the dialectical possibilities of these immediate and mediated 
locales - of lifeworlds and socio-cultural systems - but we must first look carefully 
at human interaction itself.
7.2 Sociological & philosophical models of intersubjectivity
The perceiving subject is dialectically constituted (socialised, educated, 
‘cultivated’) by its interconnection or synthesis with the perceived/known object 
(another person, social group, the natural world). This mediation can be 
‘immediate’ as in simple, face-to-face, so-called presentational communication 
and thus, through a direct sensory experience, be a radical intersubjectivity within 
the Gemeinschaft. Modem subjects can also be mediated, brought together by 
channels that stand between them and other subjects they have never met.
Self-estrangement
Consciousness ‘divides’ itself into ‘me’ and ‘not me’; the subject confronts the 
objective and, at the same time senses itself as an outsider, an object lacking unity 
and affinities. This selbstentfremdung - self-estrangement - is not only a 
prerequisite of development, but is useful in the development of ‘understanding’
and empathy. Armed with an epistemology of self and subject, the culturally
* 2‘educated’ individual matures to take their place as part of society.
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Dynamic presentational and representational communication is mediated 
variously by collective cultural expression and macro-social structures; in other 
words by the arts, language, public institutions (museums, colleges), and networks 
of dissemination (press, broadcasting and new media), these latter in a more 
abstracted Gesellschqft.
Hegel outlined a theoretical development of subjects in his early writing. 
This stressed the historical situatedness of all subjects in their self development as 
they moved intersubjectively through social, political and cultural institutions 
towards an ethical interaction with others. His was a social and political 
philosophy which moved beyond Kant’s philosophical paradigm of prior 
consciousness and self-interpretation which had privileged a more autonomous 
subject, and which had drawn upon regular categories of cognition and morality
4
prior to the impact of any external contingencies. Marxism too provided an 
account of historical materialism which re-sited humans in the ebb and flow of the 
political and economic here and now. Twentieth-century theories of socialization 
sensitive to the philosophical, materialist and psychological accounts have been 
dialectical in their understanding of subjective engagement and growth. These 
have been offered by the likes of Mead (1962), Schtitz (1964b), Habermas 
(1987d), Levin (1989) and Crossley (1996). All of them offer some useful insight 
in support of this study with accounts of autonomous agents and what is termed, 
after Habermas and his philosophical and ethical paradigm of interaction: 
‘communicative action’. This communication takes place in the day-to-day 
‘lifeworld’, and privileges ordinary cultural signs and language. Adomo et al had 
sketched philosophies of intersubjectivity that have drawn upon Hegel and Marx, 
but tended to deliver protracted critiques of technological distortion and 
institutional ideologies bound up in such processes of interaction at the level of 
the modem social system. Some of these critiques are woven into the account 
which follows in order to recover what is useful from Adomo, but it also moves 
beyond his shortcomings where necessary, to effect more positive critiques which 
ally themselves with the thoughts of second generation critical theorist, Habermas.
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Subjectivity & Intersubjectivity
Whilst acknowledging the objections to a philosophy of any essential and 
subjective consciousness, subjectivity here is dealt initially with theoretically as a 
‘prior’, asocial state for the purposes of forming a system of personal becoming or 
subjectification on the part of the animal object. It is the subsequent, socially 
situated formulation of a ‘fabric’ of mutuality where such subjective attention is 
directed that consequent interpersonal ‘collocution’ occurs. The ‘raw’, unmediated 
subject or Mead’s ‘I’ is quickly particularised on encountering others before it 
assumes, over time, the state of a cultivated individual: the socialised ‘me’ of 
Mead that is empathetic to broader moral and politico-legal concerns.5
Intersubjectivity is essentially a state of mutual attention, recognition and 
agreed (linguistic) significance in the face of a shared, ‘objective’ reception of 
natural and social data. It is a logic of epistemological engagement effecting 
change and critical insight; a secular phenomenon where the species-being is 
grounded in history, ideology and encounters with socio-cultural particulars.6
Whilst individuals have the potential to impose atomisation and alienation 
on others and the Other too through reification and control, we also have a 
somewhat more innocuous process of objectification. Subjects may not only 
knowingly externalise their own feelings in a work of art or commodity in order to 
increase self-understanding, but also where one subject may regard some other 
person or group as an object of attention for the purposes of empathy and 
understanding. However dangers can of course surface when the assumption is 
that such intersubjective objectification is always an equitable act of openness and 
equality, thus discounting the need for any moral investigation.
Adomo & intersubjectivity
Adorno’s views on mediated intersubjectivity are discussed shortly but it is 
interesting to look first of all at his social theory of (and hopes for) 
subjectification and of intersubjectivity which seems to be somewhat at odds with 
the socio-cultural critiques he levelled at radio as a means of sincere, equitable 
interaction. Adomo certainly recognised that an ontological and intersubjective
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‘cohabitation’ with others was conceivably a rational route to personal fulfilment 
and a contingent happiness.
Adorno’s social theory was founded on a socially grounded 
intersubjectivity drawing on both Durkheimian structural pattemings and an 
account more sensitive to subjective agency whereby shaped individuals might 
also contribute to emergent conditions as independent agents in practical and
7
conceptual ways. It was therefore, in many respects, akin to a Hegelian model of 
ongoing subjective development and social interaction through experiences by a 
conforming but also potentially independent subject-cum-agent. Adorno’s 
position was thus: “[I]t is an illusion sharply criticized by Goethe and Hegel that 
the process of humanization and cultivation necessarily and continually proceeds 
from the inside outward. It is accomplished also and precisely through
g
‘extemalization’, as Hegel called it” (1998k, 240). Because of the emancipatory 
potentials offered to the subject by such a dynamic, Adomo cautioned against any 
undue resistance by anyone to the formation of what he regarded as an outgoing
9
character. He wrote:
We become free human beings not by each of us realizing ourselves individuals, 
according to the hideous phrase, but rather in that we go out of ourselves, enter 
into relation with others, and in a certain sense relinquish ourselves to them. Only 
through this process do we determine ourselves as individuals, [my stress] 
(1998k, 240)
Central to Adorno’s thought as a left Hegelian was the role of the aesthetic, 
particularly music which could serve as a substrate for subjective engagement 
with self and society, where we can be “touched by the other” (1997, 331). Art 
and music could, when being experienced, ‘mirror’ or intensify one’s sense of 
non-identity and unhappiness but could also offer the listening subject the ‘face’: 
the physiognomy of a modem social world which might give on to a 
comprehension of others’ predicaments and perspectives.
Adomo as we know valued all live and ‘authentic art’ which when 
experienced delivers “shudder” as he called it which was for him “a memento of 
the liquidation of the I, which shaken, perceives its own limitedness and finitude. 
This [personal] experience [Erfahrung] is contrary to the weakening of the I that 
the culture industry manipulates” (1997, 245). He returns to the business of 
shudder later in Aesthetic Theory writing:
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Ultimately aesthetic comportment is to be defined as the capacity to shudder, [...] 
That shudder in which subjectivity stirs without yet being subjectivity is the act 
of being touched by the other. Aesthetic comportment assimilates itself to that 
other rather than subordinating it. Such a constitutive relation of the subject to 
objectivity in aesthetic comportment joins eros and knowledge. (1997,331)
It is interesting too to consider matters o f mimesis in relation to understanding the 
Other. Adomo wrote of what he called “mimetic comportment [in art] - the 
assimilation of the self to its other” (1997, 329).10 In listening to music we readily 
slip into an affinity with performers and other listeners. It is a process of 
‘following’ and echoing perhaps an action, vocal inflection or dress code. After 
the formative years of childhood, adults usually renounce such ‘copying’ and 
instead develop affinities and empathies in a more rational, less imitative way. 
However imitation is a particularly rich way of learning and empathising. Levin is 
quoted here on the matter:
When I first read Horkheimer’s argument for the utopian, emancipatory 
significance of mimesis, I was taken aback. I could think of imitation only as a 
reactionary process. [...] many years later, my work with the texts of Merleau- 
Ponty’s last phase enabled me to appreciate the utopian, emancipatoiy potential 
for which Horkheimer was pleading. Moreover, I realised giving mimesis an 
interpretation which locates it in the reversibilities of the flesh, I could connect it 
to the corporeal schematism of reciprocity, a fundamental process in the life of 
the body politic we are struggling to achieve. (Levin 1989,165-6)
Adomo & Mundikeit (maturity)
Whilst uncharacteristically willing to conceive of the erotic aspects of an 
aesthetically instituted ‘shudder’, and presumably being in agreement to some 
extent with Horkheimer on the value of physical imitation at a certain stage in 
one’s life, Adomo equally stressed the need for a subject’s rational thought which 
would facilitate mature, individual opinion and decision-making:
Critique and the prerequisite of democracy, political maturity, belong together. 
Politically mature is the person who speaks for himself, because he has thought 
for himself [...] he stands free of any guardian. (1998m, 281-2)
We see here for Adomo the importance of language and rationality in the mature 
person, who is at once independent and aware of others through experience and 
‘extemalisation’. Pickford in his notes to Adorno’s essay writes “Adomo here
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draws on the definition of ‘political maturity’ [Mundigkeit] from Kant’s essay 
What is Enlightenment? (1784) and draws implication from the formulation itself: 
miindig, literally ‘come of age’, [...] no longer requiring a guardian [Vormund], 
who makes one’s decisions for one [bevormtinden]. All these expressions in turn 
stem from the mouth [Mund\; hence political maturity also means deciding and 
speaking for oneself, not parroting another” (1998m). Allying things popular with 
things youthful this is where Adomo (and later Marcuse) refuse to observe 
“political maturity”.
7.3 “The listening self9: intersubjectivity & music
The general proposition in the present study is that there is, in all music and its 
transmission by radio, an opportunity for the maturation and construction of the 
self as others are listened to and heard. This epistemologically primed self is more 
than a condition of potential, it is, dialectically speaking, already a synthetic third 
term - a maturing subject that has sublated (incorporated but not fully 
transcended) its own being and the antithetical concept of ‘society’ in the process 
of becoming a fully socialised subject through aesthetic and intersubjective 
encounter then reflection.
The dialectical process for infant, rebellious youth and mature individual is 
perhaps most usefully understood with reference to Levin (1989) who seeks to 
construct a practice of what he terms “the listening self’ whereby an individual 
may engage more fully via social and cultural discourse and, in the process, 
become a more complete, moral and knowing being. Levin’s account initially 
offers a Blochian or a Marcusian listening to one’s own felt needs as a 
subjectification that he identifies as an attentive listening “that enables us to listen 
to our own body of felt needs [and] what they are calling for” (1989, 38). This 
Levin says may involve a return to an infantile recollective state, but he argues, it 
is not a “pathological regression” (1989, 55, 74-5).11 With careful, empathetic 
attention to ourselves but then also to others, we can avoid ideologically 
constructed need and instead “steer public life towards the fulfilment of more 
authentic needs” (Levin 1989, 88). What is interesting here is Levin’s
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determination to proffer a route to Habermas’s communicative ethics by way of a 
close reading of subjective and intersubjective listening and hearing.12
This section now raises the question of music and its contribution to 
intersubjectivity and engagement with others, and pays attention to the generation 
of authentic as opposed to any ideological subjectification and patterned social 
interactions.
Crossley, Schiitz & music’s ‘inner time ’
In a model of listening and hearing that privileges the temporal dimension of the 
musical work as a locus of interaction, we turn to Crossley and Schiitz. The 
temporal in music is argued here to be a significant ontological, ‘chronotopic’ 
substrate which can support positive intersubjective engagement Time itself is an 
evasive notion, and may best be conceived of as being temporal and 
metaphorically spatial in its capacity to be occupied as it is measured (objectively) 
or experienced (subjectively) between significant events such as the short interval 
between verse and chorus where joining others in singing the familiar refrain is 
anticipated or the more drawn out but still important intersubjective process 
moving from unknown and ‘yet to meet’ to the now familiar and well met. 
Listening to each other at the same moment enhances our experience of the 
objective world and allows for collective synchronisations. Crossley argues this 
point well: “temporality is equally important in the constitution of an interworld, 
however, as is shown by Alfred Schiitz’s notion of ‘mutual tuning-in’ [1964b, 
161] the meanings of our actions and utterances are not given at once, Schutz 
argued. They unfold through time, with a rhythmic and melodic structure. 
Subjects ‘must share the same time line horizon’ ” (Crossley 1996, 37). This can, 
of course occur during the reception of a piece of music performed live for the 
listening subject. Schutz (1964b, 159) called this an ‘intermediary’ locale, 
connecting us with composer, fellow dancer or performer. Such a sonic place of 
cultivation and intersubjectivity is both real and imaginative in its dimensions: a 
temporal place for cognitive, epistemological understanding and the expression of 
one's personal identity but, importantly for this study, a place of shared moments 
too of imagination important for intersubjective education and respect Writing of 
Schiller and the aesthetic, Habermas similarly argues that art (and by extension
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music) is a critical ‘third space’ of ideals, free from the direct constraints of reality 
and that Schiller “conceived of art as the genuine embodiment of a communicative 
reason” addressing human interaction and understanding (1987c, 48). Thus at this 
point we can pause to align the thoughts of Hegel and Schiller, Adomo, Schutz 
and Habermas because each has valued the place of the aesthetic (including 
auditory attentiveness and cognition) in human communication. Habermas has 
argued that the Schiller’s work:
Sketches out an aesthetic utopia that attributes to art a virtually social- 
revolutionary role. Art is supposed to become effective in place of religion as the 
unifying power, because it is understood to be a ‘form of communication’ that 
enters into the intersubjective relationships between people. (1987c, 45)
In a brief overview of mutuality, Schutz referred directly to what he identified as:
Sartre’s basic concept of ‘looking at the Other and being looked at by the Other’ 
(le regard) [...] what might be called the ‘mutual tuning-in relationship’ upon 
which all communication is founded. It is precisely this mutual tuning-in 
relationship by which the ‘I’ and the ‘Thou’ are experienced by both participants 
as a ‘we’ in vivid presence. (1964b, 161)
This participation in a vivid presence must equally extend to musicologically 
founded interaction. What Schutz suggests is that music occupies time (a three 
minute song, a weekend music festival) and as it does so, it possesses what Schutz 
identifies as ‘inner time’ for writers, performers and listeners is a shared sequence 
of musically instigated intersubjectivity. As both a work then a text, it impacts on 
the subject to elicit an abstract utopian suite of concerns: In the words of Schutz 
“It evokes in the stream of consciousness participating in it as interplay of 
recollections, retentions, protentions and anticipations which interrelate the 
successive ornaments” (1964b, 170). Schutz went on to say that the ‘flux’ of 
organised sounds allows the listener from a specific point of a performance to 
recall the opening and anticipate the ending. Schutz explained that “The beholder 
thus, is united with the composer by a time dimension common to both, which is 
nothing other than a derived form of the vivid present shared by the partners in a 
genuine face-to-face relationship such as prevails between speaker and listener” 
(1964b, 171-2). Thus Schutz is proposing both a Blochian abstract utopia likely to 
provoke an emotive engagement with others, and an Adomian theory of musical
162
aesthetics whereby interaction is less emotive and more musicologically and 
metaphorically rooted.
So far then, we have a musical inner time where the teleology of a piece 
can be mentally mapped, so that after Schiitz, sounds can be productively shared 
(1964b, 173), but by extension, emotional recollections and anticipations can also, 
in the context of utopian theory, be intuited, metaphorically implied and lyrically 
or intellectually articulated as Chapter 6 has tried to show.
Popular musics & intersubjectivity
If all music can effect this social synchronicity through its temporal and 
musicological character, it is possibly the intense experiential, visible and 
participatory dimensions of popular musics which most lend themselves to a 
profound subjectification and intense intersubjectivity. Preoccupations with the 
erotic, expressivity and allied notions of identity formation and validation have 
long made make popular musics a prime medium for the drawing-out of the 
subject into a wider world (consider the social centrality of dancing). This is 
usefully articulated by Middleton who writes that since the 1700’s:
Popular music has been centrally involved in the production and manipulation of 
subjectivity [...] popular music has always been concerned, not so much with 
reflecting social reality, as with offering ways in which people could enjoy and 
valorize identities they yearned for or believed themselves to possess [...] The 
thrust of modernization [...] has resulted in an increasing stress on the sphere of 
culture, and especially popular culture, as the primary site for the interpellation of 
subjects. (1990,249)
Frith, in a way consonant with the theoretical model explored here identifies the 
emotional and cognitive qualities of the sonic pop encounter, and in quoting the 
musical anthropologist John Blacking, he articulates its function and situation as a 
prelude to collectivisation and a rudimentary intersubjectivity:
In responding to a song, to a sound, we are drawn [...] into affective and 
emotional alliances [...] music is especially important for our sense of ourselves 
because of its unique emotional intensity - we absorb songs into our lives and 
rhythm into our own bodies. In John Blacking’s words, ‘because music is 
concerned with feelings which are primarily individual and rooted in the body, its 
structural and sensuous elements resonate more with individuals’ cognitive and 
emotional sets than with their cultural sentiments, although its external manner 
and expression are rooted in historical circumstances’. Music, we could say,
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provides us with an intensely subjective sense of being sociable [...] it both 
articulates and offers the immediate experience of collective identity. (1996,273)
Frith then quotes Paul Gilroy who was “provided by black music with a means to 
gain proximity to the sources of feeling from which our local conceptions of 
blackness were assembled [...] the most important lesson music still has to teach 
us is that its inner secrets and ethical rules can be taught and learned” (Gilroy in 
Frith 1996, 273). In short, Frith applied a number of roles to music in the process 
of intersubjectivity. In it he identifies insights into the real, the fantastic, and 
‘somewhere else’. More importantly, he writes of “imaginative cultural 
narratives” and “imagined forms of democracy and desire” (1996, 273-5), which 
might, in a mature subject given on to ethical considerations.
Music & ‘interworld ’
In attempting to move beyond the more metaphysical conceptions of mutual 
interaction, the concept of a lifeworld as the arena for socio-cultural sharing has
13been proposed by the likes of Schutz and Habermas. Does the aesthetic and 
social aspects of music fully constitute or at least contribute to such an arena? 
Nick Crossley says that social discourse - intersubjectivity - requires an 
“interworld”, an interval; a lifeworld and has to be “Space and its (mutual) 
occupation” (1996, 37). He in fact uses the term ‘fabric’ as a metaphor describing 
the weaving of individual lives into a coherent, functional set of relations. Whilst 
this thesis favours concrete ‘places’ of mediation for intersubjectivity - in its bid 
to rescue culture and society from the ‘no-place’ of distant or future utopias - 
clearly a conceptual ‘space’ is a logical adjunct which lends itself well to 
considerations of the more amorphous cultural and discursive ambits of music and 
radio broadcasts where we can elect to hear others. It would perhaps be wrong to 
see Habermas arguing in actual fact for named places of exchange per se (it would 
be hard however to think of Habermas’s eighteenth-century coffee house in 
London as anything other than a real place of resort and social exchange), but his 
argument that “we can think of the lifeworld as represented by a culturally 
transmitted and linguistically organized stock of imperative patterns” (1987d, 126) 
must hint at the possibility of real places framing a lifeworld’s socio-cultural 
patterns (and variants) which might be amplified finally in both ‘system’ and
164
‘non-system’ broadcast channels. Habermas claims that “speakers and hearers 
come to an understanding from out o f their common lifeworld about something in 
the objective, social or subjective worlds” (1987d, 126). Armed with this 
knowledge, we can, in the presence of music, start to reflect on ourselves, on 
others and on contingent social realities. In fact, Habermas writes of the role of 
situated reason and everyday language in relation to the construction of what 
might be termed ‘finite lifeworlds’ and what he call ‘particular totalities’ which do 
seem to have concrete substance:
Concrete forms of life replace transcendental consciousness in its function of 
creating unity. In culturally embodied self-understandings, intuitively present 
group solidarities, and the competences of socialized individuals that are brought 
into play as know-how, the reason expressed in communicative action is 
mediated with the traditions, social practices and body-centred complexes of 
experience that coalesce into particular totalities. (Habermas 1987b, 326)
7.4 Adorno & critiques of mediated intersubjectivity
As we have seen, Adorno’s social theory of subjectification and intersubjectivity 
made clear reference to the development of mature, considerate individuals 
through an engagement with the aesthetic. It was for Adomo a surprisingly bold 
theory, including as it did, references to the erotic and the mimetic, references to 
somatic and infantile concerns which, in his critiques of contemporary culture 
society elsewhere he tended to dismiss as ones remote from reason, autonomy and 
maturity. Unfortunately, as already alluded to above, this social theory never 
allowed him to be more forgiving of popular music. In addition, when reflecting 
on technological mediation and the mass media, his social theory mutated into 
severe, socio-cultural critique. He was unwilling or unable to admit of the 
possibility that a wholesome (albeit different) subjectification and 
intersubjectivity might accme across the ether. Adorno’s model of personal 
development continued to be guided by a philosophy of immediate dialectical 
exchange between subject and object, but it failed to analyse or problematise in 
detail, the real and actual channels and socio-cultural arenas of these exchanges, 
something even Habermas later criticised.14 The wartime Princeton Radio project 
failed to suggest any postwar European empirical work to Adomo. Content to rest
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easy with a positive critique of social realities that admit of his theoretical 
dialectics in the ‘presence’ o f ‘real’ art and music, Adomo railed against the 
actualities of an insincere culture industry and the impact of its rationalising media 
channels. For him, prospects of resistance, emancipation and fair understanding 
taking place in a systematised, technologically driven society were unlikely.
Yet does technology for instance offer a potential emancipation or does it 
only produce a simplified cultural array and a domination of the subject? There 
are certainly arguments for and against mass-mediated encounters in the 
contemporary world. With the introduction o f radio technology, human 
experiences and interactions are at once both extended and curtailed. Face-to-face 
social contact in the market place, and immediate aesthetic experience in the 
theatre is replaced by an ersatz, diminished level o f interpersonal engagement. 
Similarly, the balance between equitable social interaction and domination in the 
presence of communication technologies has always been a fine one.15 E. L. 
Krakauer (1998) draws attention to Adorno’s concern that technologies (including 
language) simply render the objective world (especially others) for the subject as 
little more than ‘data’. For Adomo this was a mastery and “preparation of the 
object” which lent the subject a dubious superiority (ibid., 33-37). However 
Adomo did also concede that “it is not technology that is the catastrophe but its 
imbrication with the theoretical relations that embrace it” (Adomo, 2003b, 118).16 
Again, matters of contol and intention were crucial in his critiques of mediated 
culture.
7.5 Intersubjectivity & radio: positive critiques
What are the attitudes of some British music lovers and radio listeners on the topic 
of mediated listening and public service broadcasting?
It is often the only way we have any ‘contact’ with some sections o f the 
community and our opinions may in part be derived from how other sections of 
the community are portrayed. (Big Buzz respondent no. 61, 2003)
It is by far the m ost available medium to all demographic groups within the 
country, thereby helping to break down the barrier between the various groups by 
fostering knowledge and understanding. (Big Buzz respondent no. 83,2003)
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Public service broadcasting can provide a powerful insight into the lives of others 
- it can provide a voice for the community, but be both representative or 
misrepresentative. (Big Buzz respondent no. 114, 2003)
These short responses from The Big Buzz questionnaire o f2003 (see Appendix A), 
give on to a number of questions about its value and returns us to the question of 
sincerity through the ether. John Durham Peters neatly sums up the enduring 
concern:
In the apparently innocuous questions whether Kate Smith can be sincere over the 
air and whether such a performance can afford a ‘mutual’ experience, then, is 
found the intellectual and political heart of mass communication theoiy, the 
question of mediation - in other words, the possibility of interaction without
17personal or physical contact (Peters 1999, 224)
Peters lays down a challenge to Adomian perspectives on the ‘unreality’ of the 
mediated by proposing notions of a ‘realistic’ communion between speaker and 
public. He argues persuasively that individual and society ‘meet’ sincerely 
through broadcast sound, though this is more a witnessing than a one-to-one, 
experiential mode, and moves from Crossley’s radical I-thou intersubjectivity 
which is immediate, interactive contact, to become the egological: a more diffuse 
engagement. It is this second form of contact which is less to do with dialogue and 
more to do with the dissemination of radio. Peters in not alone is seeing a positive 
side to mediated encounters. John B. Thompson (1995) has a three mode model of 
communication comprising face-to-face engagement (involving “co-presence”), 
mediated interaction (for example by telephone), and what he terms “mediated 
quasi-interaction” (1995, 83). For Thompson, this third mode lacks “interpersonal 
specificity”, but “creates a [...] social situation in which individuals are linked 
together in a process of communication and symbolic exchange” and this process 
affords “bonds of friendship, affection or loyalty” (Thompson, 1995, 84). This 
“mediated publicness” is for anyone who, as an objectified subject is part of a 
mass audience, what Thompson calls “a plurality o f non-present others” (1995, 
245).
Music radio delivers a set of ‘foreign’ sounds into the private sphere. 
Experience tells us that sounds have physical origins and, moreover are the results 
of human actions so that they possess, I would argue, a residual ability -  even 
through a loudspeaker to quicken the heart and prompt some feint mimetic
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impulse. Radio does even more, in that in its representations, it also presents a 
public mode of hearing and joins other technological spheres of representation and 
intersubjectivity from print to cinema that have extended our perceptions and 
offered similarly remote encounters. So radio, as a medium conveys or at least, 
fabricates a sense of immediacy even as it represents a distant, often previously 
recorded event. The ‘liveness’ of the instant transmission of a live performance 
retains the experiential aesthetics of the work so that it remains intimate and felt as 
much as it is subsequently heard, ‘read’ and understood.
Technologically mediated intersubjectivity is, undoubtedly, problematic. 
But, as Frith points out, on hearing a disembodied voice we can easily “picture” 
its corporeal source, and, moreover, imagine its socio-cultural and emotional 
origin (Frith 1996, 196). This is no inferior mode of intersubjectivity. For Schiitz, 
‘tuning-in’ does not only involve a ‘vivid presence’:
It is of no great importance whether performer and listener share together a vivid 
present in face-to-face relation or whether through the interposition of mechanical 
devices, such as records, only a quasi simultaneity between the stream of 
consciousness of the mediator and the listener has been established. The latter 
case always refers to the former. (1964b, 174)
As he continued, Schutz touched on the qualities of mediated intersubjectivity 
which troubled others:
The difference between the two shows merely that the relationship between 
performer and audience is subject to all variations of intensity, intimacy and 
anonymity. This can easily be seen by imagining the audience as consisting of 
one single person, a small group [...] a crowd filling a big concert hall, or the 
entirely unknown listeners of a radio performance [...] in all these circumstances 
performer and listener are ‘tuned-in’ to one another, are living together through 
the same flux, are growing older together while the musical process lasts [...] the 
social relationship between performer and listener is founded upon the common 
experience of living simultaneously in several dimensions of time. (1964b, 174- 
5)
Levin is aware of the constraints technology imposes on the ‘traditional’ human 
acts of perception and communication but offers a positive reading of 
technological potentials: “there are other factors, some of them generated by 
technology which [increase and refine] our communicative possibilities” (1989, 
113). We should therefore not just heed Marcuse and turn off all televisions and 
radios (1968b, 192).
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So, technological mediation does not necessarily result in regression. Just 
to recall the limitations of mediated subjectivity and its associated, regressive and 
ego-weak features we return briefly to Adorno’s critiques: “Modem 
communications media have an isolating effect [...] Communication establishes
uniformity among men by isolating them” (Adomo and Horkheimer 1997 221-
182). Yet might not this passive, isolating form of listening have be seen by 
Adomo as an opportunity for an Apollonian modulation of Dionysian impulses,
19privileging the rational and collective?
Adomo is clearly unhappy with what he regards as unreflective, 
mass-mediated listening. Paddison has devoted some space to considering 
Adorno’s listening types which suggest that at best, when the majority lack 
Adorno’s musicological expertise needed for a “structural reading,” the listening 
is regressive or, at best “adequate”.20
To hear music, we can tune in to the transistor radio privately under the 
bedclothes or play music on our car radios. Music heard alone can create an 
insulated, private "place’ that could be seen as a decisive disengagement from 
others. But radio listening can be an act o f reaching out - a symbolic, 
intersubjective sharing through the ether, a reconciliation of subject and object 
beyond any immediate lifeworld that can help to bind as a community or nation.
This is, in a sense, a cultural interpellation of music between subject and object,
21self and the ‘other’.
Arguably there is enough in intersubjective theory, to begin to build an 
optimistic account of subject encountering subject (through listening and hearing) 
as long as equality is preserved and the dialectical dynamic remains. Music (live, 
recorded and broadcast) certainly provides what may be seen as a field of 
intersubjective engagement. Profound ontological development may ensue as 
sounds are temporally encountered. They may simply propose a gentle 
engagement with composer or performer, or perhaps reveal and invite the sharing 
of socio-cultural codes. It might indeed even offer the chance to enter into an 
imaginative alliance with others and Otherness.22 It is important to distinguish 
between what Bom and Hesmondhaigh term “ontologically and sociologically 
prior identities” represented, encountered and acquired through an attentive 
hearing and cultural participation (often a musica practica) and Bom’s concept of
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the musical imaginary where it is argued here that such identities are merely 
listened to (Bom and Hesmondhalgh 2000, 35). Whilst it is the latter encounter 
which they argue is subjected to much criticism as a spur to “psychic tourism” 
(2000, 35), it does, as a collectivised mode of imaginative understanding, have a 
significant role to play, and is the conceit of a constructed site of hearing used in 
this study which envelops and publicly shares prior, localised musical places of 
listening and more direct interaction.
The problematic o f listening to & hearing others
Far from greater understanding arising from the sharing and encountering of 
others’ music there are, of course, many issues of domination: in seeking to 
overcome self and other, there can be an eradication or colonisation of the Other. 
It can be argued that listening to music fosters the self, immediate collective 
belonging and a wider appreciation of other traditions, yet clearly there are also 
issues of exploitation, ownership and ideological justification. Synthesis cannot 
negate the prior qualities of subject and object, but results in a sublation 
(Aufhebung) both in the original subject and in the place or instrument of 
connection. In this way, the privileging of an invasive, dominant object (for 
example the socio-political world) over a relatively passive, subordinate subject, 
must be considered more carefully, and we should ask to what extent subjective 
agency also mediates (changes) its object Consider American radio’s first all­
black station WDIA, Memphis in the postwar decades wherein the newly 
discerned potential of Black consumers was exploited. It however gave Bluesman 
B. B. King his first break; was regarded as the most racially integrated place until 
the 1960s, and still operates today as a community-driven station.23 Without 
‘intervention’ and ‘sponsorship’, much talent would remain marginal and unheard 
in the West. Questions of ownership do however remain. Commenting in the last 
quarter of the twentieth century on white musicians (The Rolling Stones) 
reworking his rhythm and blues songs, one Afro-American musician. Muddy 
Waters is reputed to have wryly quipped ‘They stole my music, but gave me my 
name.’ Bom, in discussing Paul Simon’s Graceland (1986) album points out, with 
some justification, that the music may feature Black musicians alienated by an 
apartheid regime, but it belonged to Simon (and presumably his record company).
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(Bom and Hesmondhalgh 2000, Introduction). Ry Cooder relates that a 
memorandum from President Clinton afforded him a 12-month period to work 
with the musicians of Cuba, unencumbered by the United States’ embargo on US- 
Cuban collaborations - whilst laudable in aims and musically powerful, again we 
must question ‘ownership’.24
The West cannot deny its past colonial engagements or fail to provide 
cultural representation of other communities. Refusing to acknowledge the now 
widespread engagement with other musics prevents opportunities for common 
experience, pleasure and more benign musical exchanges where economic benefit 
and cultural representation can counter oversensitivity to the representation of 
non-Western musicians. Those who do over-sensitise matters of commercial 
cooption or cultural integrity do not readily engage with the fact that many 
musical forms and musical instrumentation have always leaked from one culture 
into another.
Criticism sensitive to social relations - where it exists - tends to disregard, 
or at least, fails to appreciate the creative outcomes of the dialectical process of 
cultural engagement. White appropriation, for example (the ‘bleaching of jazz’) 
and other forms of musical syntheses are varied, both across and within traditions. 
British-Asian Musicians like Talvin Singh use broad taste and technology to 
deliver a World music, fusing Western and Non-Western textures, rhythms and 
structures. Whilst American Bluesman Taj Mahal is seeking, through his North 
American Blues, to reconnect with the blues inflections and sentiments of 
fourteenth-century Mali. As local purity is invaded so that anthropological field 
recordings of the authentic and untainted are no longer possible, local musics are 
feeding freely off imported forms. At the same time, ethno-cultural diasporas are 
carrying musics into new territories.
Debate about World Musics as art and economic fact are frequently 
debated on BBC radio where we witness BBC Radio 3 now present its own World 
Music awards on an annual basis; broadcast coverage of Womad (The World of 
Music and Dance Festival, founded in 1982) and transmit the culturally diverse 
musical ‘discoveries’ of disc jockey Andy Kershaw each week. The organisers 
and audiences at the Womad festivals see it as an instance of “two worlds 
colliding” in a place of “inclusivity and equality”. Womad today is effectively a
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brand and has a worldwide profile, supported by the world music label, Real 
World Records. However, an enduring interest in all opportunities for 
“engineering dialogue” has seen the organisers remain loyal to music and dance, 
but extend the offerings to include international foods too.25
What is at issue are matters of objective representation and discursive 
interpretation. In the hands of public service broadcasting there is, perhaps, a 
greater chance for equitable engagement with the Other, and a cautious response 
to the overtly exploitative. An insightful position of evaluative compromise in 
respect of socio-cultural crossovers and fusions is presented in Bom and 
Hesmondhalgh’s introduction (2000). It comes from Richard Middleton who 
observes the “astonishing confluence in a twin triumph, of global capital 
circulation in the political economy, African musical diaspora in the sign 
economy”.26 Later in their Introduction, Bom and Hesmondhalgh acknowledge the 
possibility of positive cultural fusions but then remind us of the essentialist 
assumptions of such a process where the distinct and pure of one place meets
27
another. Theirs is a stimulating collection of essays and set of problematisations.
Their phrase “differential permeability of the boundaries of various cultural
lineages and forms” may, or may not represent a intellectual ‘holding position’ on
the subject for the moment (2000, 27). One might ask how one can develop a
sensitivity to the existence and predicament of others if  cultures are not
(re)presented to us? Where they are encountered, we can, with ethical
representation, identify and acknowledge cultural hybridity and thus acquire a
28new truth in the presence of popular musics.
So, how do intersubjective interactions play out in the ether? Radio 
extends a subject’s egological (but disembodied) engagement with the wider 
world. Subjectification and socialisation take place as the maturing individual 
develops imaginatively beyond family and locality in the presence of incoming 
social and cultural data from remote sources. As Christos Barboutis has expressed 
it: “enhancement of the individual’s sensory, spatial and temporal horizons 
resulted in them being in a position to acquire ‘non-local’ knowledge of 
information and communication without being in thrall to the aura” (2001). The 
subject engages with a technology of mass communication and hears but does not 
see a modem experience of social flux, ‘perils and possibilities’ where, to
172
paraphrase Marx further, all that was solid and enduring has been taken up and 
scattered across the ether. The hearing subject understands this for what it is, 
namely the familiar physiognomy of modem life. S/he is able to process it easily 
as radio concocts what Barboutis has called a semblance of interpersonal 
interaction that deploys the ‘presentational’ devices of location, time and 
personalities in a recreation of the collective, concrete experience, right in the 
middle of the hearer’s actual lifeworld.
Peters and Thompson above have argued for the positive aspects of 
“mediated quasi-interaction”. Their perspectives can be supplemented by the work 
of Scannell on radio, (1996, 2000) who identifies broadcasts as everyday matters 
for the personal use of listeners who engage with radio’s “intentionality” and 
conceptual “Common ground” with its “sociable” affect as its “basic ethos”. 
(1996,16,4) This ‘ground’ is where I am addressed along with anyone else (1996, 
13); a mode of broadcast address that Scanned characterises being not just for 
anyone, but one within a “ ‘for-anyone-as-someone’ structure” (2000), a standard 
functional ‘service’ received and used in personal ways by some individual. This 
is a modem mode of address I know to be for everyone else as wed as myself, but 
one which Scanned says “expresses ‘we-ness’. It articulates human social sociable 
life” (2000, 9). Here there’s a recognition of the listener as anyone who is ‘out 
there’, but also a person complete with what Scanned says are social and cultural 
“entitlements” (2000, 12) recognised through this form of mediated
intersubjectivity in a public manner.
As I hear, and as you hear, we know that the presenter’s musical choices 
and personal is address is for us both, and for everyone potentiady too. Stepping 
back from the artefact that is radio, we experience an array of disparate cultures
29
and communities, not as anonymous dsteners, eavesdroppers but as addressees.
This egological engagement with a sonic modernity, complements the 
localised, ontological experience characterised by seeing and dstening and takes 
on an epistemological role. Radio’s musical output assists in an inclusive, general 
address which constructs an on-air discourse of an intersubjective character. It is 
potentiady what Adomo would regard as a bourgeois, ideological fiction of social 
engagement, but also it is a discourse of shared curiosity and purpose. Here, each 
subject notionally acknowledges the broadcaster and others in the act of aural
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encounter. This is equally a point of departure for a subsequent discussive, ‘I-
•  •  30thou’ intersubjectivity back in the localised lifeworld.
It is being argued then that the process of dialectical engagement through 
intersubjective communication, the arts and the discursive realm of philosophy 
within social arenas (home, school, gallery, broadcasting space) facilitates a 
developing self-consciousness of life’s truths about affinities, power and 
behaviour. The process is usefully summarised here by S. M. Weber:
As forms of praxis, aesthetic experience and self-reflection have in common the 
restoration of autonomy and reciprocity through the intervention of a reflective 
moment [...] both [...] refer directly to a model of the ideal reciprocal relationship 
between subject, others, and object; and both intervene directly on behalf of 
potential wholeness and autonomy. [...] it is the fact that aesthetic experience and 
self-reflection have this emancipatory process in common that has made them of 
continuing interest to critical theorists. They are both reflections of the ideal and 
avenues to it, and they will always be the necessary complements of strategic 
action. (1976,102-3)
We can assimilate the truths about mediating cultures and mediated relationships 
without dismissing them out of hand as false instances of interconnectedness. 
Through cultural reflection and a eutopian participation in general, subjects 
become ‘knowing’ individuals, members of society in respect of (1) the self and 
the everyday, (2) the past, (3) the economic present, (4) instances of alterity and 
(5) any number of socio-political futures.
7.6 In conclusion
Productive transcendence for self and society must commence, in Eagleton’s 
phrase with “self-understanding” (1997, 4). Self-understanding encourages the 
subject to seek out further cultural and/or technological mediation - in short, an 
intersubjectivity that facilitates a personal maturity and collective awareness of 
general benefit. Eagleton adds: “There is no need to justify this dynamic, anymore 
than we need to justify a smile or a song; it just belongs to our common nature” 
(1997,19-22).
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Music, it is proposed, serves as an aesthetic site supporting self expression 
and self reflection, but also an intersubjectivity as one hears and listens to 
representations of a wider world. As musician Prevost has expressed it:
The most fundamental reason for making music is to communicate and this 
ability and its fulfillment is fundamental to human existence [...] There may be no 
more important thing for a human being to do than make a sound and know that it 
is being heard by another [...] it is confirmation of individual existence and of 
species being. (Prdvost 1995,43)
Crossley says understanding the objective world is a intersubjective project, “it is 
a view of the world arrived at through mutual confirmation and negotiation [and] 
it requires language and listening”. He warns us however that it is not always a 
process of benign respect: “The intersubjective fabric is at once a site of sharing 
and agreement, and of competition and contestation” (1996, 23). For Crossley, 
‘The Other’ is no mere conceptual trope and in the act of engagement: “we have 
obligations” (1996, 3). Ultimately, the intersubjective process sees us becoming 
“citizens because we can ‘take the attitude of the other’ transcending our 
particularism and assuming a communal view” (1996, 158).31
Music moves us into society, but it can also be a regressive medium (but, 
pace Adomo, not necessarily in a destructive way where immaturity and 
dependence remain). It can take us back into ourselves, where we can recall 
happier times. Such memories and feelings spur the imagination and provoke the 
mind. They draw us into a personal dynamic between past, present and future 
where we can consider what has been lost, what is wrong with us today, and what 
therefore should change to improve tomorrow’s prospects. In communing with 
ourselves through listening, we, as subjects simultaneously engage a wide social 
world of family (our children and our elders), peers, commercial activity and state 
policy, but also our selves, individual feelings, and reminiscence are joined by an 
imaginative and rational understanding of others. In short, music as imaginative 
medium and socio-cultural institution facilitates personal and subjective 
cognitions; Marcuse’s ‘private significance, subject and society’.
As Chapter 6 has already shown, communication and shared 
comprehension in the presence of music takes place as someone listens, hears and 
then converses. This listening, hearing and glossing, effects a maturing awareness 
of others, and may take place in, and about, specific broadcast locales.
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Without a state-regulated mass-media, and a state-sanctioned set of 
institutions providing diffuse, modem populations with common cultural arenas, 
neither individual becoming, nor desirable oppositional identities would thrive. 
Perhaps, without the delimiting forces of legislative and bureaucratic public 
institutions, intersubjectivity would be too instrumental or amorphous. The 
absence of singing and listening in common would simply hamper the dialectics of 
individual expression and realisation, and any enlightened public discourse and 
social rejuvenation.
Neither objective material nor social progress can accrue until the 
individual as a cognitive agent seeks to move with purpose beyond their 
immediate sense of lack, loss or deferrals into the wider world. The somatic and 
nostalgic self, wrapped in an abstract utopian world of desire must become a 
socio-political self as part of a particular, concrete utopia which may, in time 
articulate a more ‘universal’ suite of values. This is not far removed from the 
Hegelian shift of self and ‘rational spirit’ from the intimate to the public realm, 
and is consonant too with Marx’s view that our shared, essential condition as 
natural and social beings is one of ‘becoming’ through collective experiences. It
32is, however, less idealist than it is materialist, pragmatic and socialist.
Music’s appeal stimulates recollection of better times. Its most important 
role in the context of the present study is its ability to intensify the present and 
allow us to encounter other identities and moods. Once this is effected, better 
socio-cultural relationships might be conceived. Music is a vital element in 
concrete utopian ambition which manifests itself as eutopian chances. What is 
required is a distinctive space for this cognitive activity.
Notes
1. For Habermas’s account of lifeworlds and systems see Habermas (1987d, 113-153).
2. Bloch writes of Bildung as both the resultant form and die form in process of formation. Bloch 
(1995 n, 985). This is repeated by Inwood (1992), who tells us that Bildung stresses the end of 
education (a culture acquired), whilst the term erziehung is the process. For Raymond Williams, 
culture could be both process and outcome.
3. See Honneth (1995,11-17).
4. For an account of Hegel’s interest in social mediation of the subject and the postmetaphysical 
accounts of Mead and Habermas see Honneth (1995, Translator’s Introduction; 5, 68 and Chapter 
2 and 4 of die main text). Hegel’s metaphysical modelling of his later years, which built on his
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move in his System o f Ethical Life (1802) from the situated and ethical to the Absolute is of less 
significance here. See also Dews (1999b).
5. Mead (1962,173-178; 193-200) wrote of the ‘I’ as a free, independent and impulsive individual, 
an initiator of action and a ‘Me’ as a socially-mediated self. He wrote: “The principle which I have 
suggested as basic to human social organization is that of communication involving participation 
in the other. This requires the appearance of the other in the self, the identification of the other 
with the self, the reaching of self-consciousness through the other” (1962,253).
6. It can be argued that one’s particular being as a biological entity facing the outside world, is, in 
fact, not a natural or neutral state of pure being but, from infancy, a ‘mediated immediacy’- a 
nexus of body and mind already touched and mediated by that which is external; the sensorhm of 
the perceiving body and a conceptualising mind located firmly within the temporal, concrete and 
social world, and is receptive to further sensuosity, ideological, discursive and dialectical 
determination.
7. In 1968 Adorno spoke obliquely about die then Marcusian Great Refusal amongst 
countercultural movements: attesting to this motor of negation by individuals and critically-aware 
groups: “Only in more recent times have traces of a countervailing trend become visible among 
various sections of the younger generation: resistance to blind conformism, die freedom to choose 
rational goals, revulsion form the world’s deceptions and illusions, the recollection of die 
possibility of change” (2003b, 123-4).
8. Hegel had seen education as a drawing away from the natural towards a second nature that is 
ethical. Whilst Hegel's philosophy became increasingly abstract, Inwood points to an increasing 
awareness by Hegel and contemporaries of non-German culture and the consequent view that 
contact with diverse societies broadened the human picture and, at the same time, intensified 
knowledge of one’s own cultural peculiarities. Hegel suggested that ‘estrangement’ and 
‘reconciliation’ are key stages in the educational process for infants, children and youths. “The 
infant’s self-absorption - disrupted by awareness of an external world, which at first, strange 
[become] increasingly familiar - its natural inclinations are subjected to ethical and social norms, 
which, at first alien and repressive eventually become a second nature [...] the end product, the 
cultivated man, though he has frilly absorbed the culture of his society, has more independence of 
thought and action [...] owing to his stock of ‘universal conceptions’ ” (Inwood, 1992, 70). Such a 
theory, when particular and individuals are privileged over reified subjects makes for a fascinating 
parallel alongside Levin’s phenomenologically constructed individual that can culminate in an 
informed and engaged ethical listener.
9. Pickford in his Preface to Adomo (1998d) refers to Adorno’s essay ‘On the Question: What is 
German?’ and writes: “Hegelian Entaujierung, translated as ‘extemalization’, is the development 
of consciousness through its immersion in what lies outside it, a process Adomo calls genuine 
Erfahrung, ‘experience’ ”.
10. See Bom and Hesmondhalgh (2000, 33) on the playful, postmodernist ‘frying on’ of diverse 
identities through music.
11. In a defence of the regressive we read Levin who says we can effect a hermeneutical return to 
his Stage I, a “recollection of being”. Stage I is redeemed not repeated (Levin 1989, 55,74-5). This 
practice of the self is discussed at great length but is prescribed by four essential phases of 
listening. They are: (1) Zugehdrigkeit. Primordial attunement; (2) Eveiyday listening (jederman); 
(3) Skilfully developed listening; (4) Hearkening: listening as recollection. (Levin 1989,45 et seq.) 
These stages parallel the maturing individual but are not automatic. The final stage is not easily 
attained; it appears to require a knowing regression, the deliberate return to the primary phase to 
effect an ontological calibration of sorts beyond the ego. Tables are deployed to plot the subjective 
and phenomenological detail of these stages which are too extensive for reproduction here.
12. In setting up listening and hearing as a mode of humanistic engagement Levin tells us that: 
“Nietzsche expresses his contempt for the gift of hearing: ‘The ear, the organ of fear, could have 
evolved as greatly as it has only in the night and twilight of obscure caves and woods, in 
accordance with die mode of life of the age of timidity [...] in bright daylight the ear is less 
necessary” (1989, 218-9). Levin suggests that this is the contempt of a patriarchal male, typically 
privileging vision and bright daylight and putting our capacity for hearing lower down in the 
hierarchy of perceptual powers. Levin further states that “Nietzsche cannot understand the 
strengths and virtues of the ears, their distinctive contribution to the character of our moral and 
political life. He can see only their passivity [...] He cannot see their active role in communication, 
relationship and cooperation; he cannot see their capacity for responsiveness” (1989,218-9).
13. Crossley informs us that the ‘lifeworld’ of Habermas comes from the later Husserl and Schutz, 
and focusses on the radical I-thou relation where assumptions, and expectations meet. Habermas
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sees the lifeworld as a cultural system “with its own conditions of reproduction and operation” 
according to Crossley and thus is an immediate ethical locale which can also have relevance for 
the mediated forms of intersubjectivity which is of Crossley’s egological kind (1996, 101). 
Crossley: “Communicative action in the lifeworld, as Habermas defines it, is orientated in three 
directions: towards mutual understanding, towards the coordination of action and towards 
socialisation. Moreover it is mutually orientated and mutually negotiated. As such [...] it serves to 
transmit and renew cultural knowledge, to achieve and maintain social integration and to form and 
sustain personal identities. Each of these three functions refers to a distinct structure of the 
lifeworlds: culture, society and the person” (1996,103).
14. Talking critically of Horkheimer and Adorno’s narrow perspectives in their Dialectic o f 
Enlightenment, Habermas spoke of their vistas that “render one insensible to the traces and 
existing forms of communicative rationality” (1987d, 129).
15. On this point, see E. L Krakauer (1998,28-9).
16. On an administered society limiting human imagination see Adomo (2003b, 120-121).
17. Kathryn Elizabeth Smith (1907-1986) was an American singer described as the ‘first lady of 
radio.’ She appeared in musicals, made nearly 3,000 recordings and an estimated 15,000 radio 
broadcasts. She had her own advice and variety radio programmes on air and was a highly popular 
patriotic figure, particularly during WWII. See in particular. 
www.nytimes.com/specials/magazine4/articles/smidil.html. Accessed August 8 2007.
18. For a sophisticated, sobering critique of Western broadcasts heard in secret in a pre-Glasnost 
Eastern Europe where they were often regarded as ‘promissory’ heralds of geopolitical change or 
only as compensatory pleasure, we simply need to look at the short essay ‘Radio’ by Deimantas 
Narkevicius, where he encountered radio as an abstract source of information which intensified his 
comprehension of East and West as separate ideological entities: “the difference gave rise to a 
distance, to a more abstracting picture of one about the other, and in the end, this sketchy image 
began to obstruct the ability of people to build other opinions” (Narkevicius 1997,178).
19. See Sherratt (2002,43-4). On the matter of the utopia of intersubjectivity in Adomo we should 
turn briefly to Sherratt who offers some general ideas and clarifications on subjectivity and also 
flags up the possibility that ongoing mediation is a site of a positive dialectic which has, as its 
target a utopia which is of a unified person: unification of ego and id, mind and body, humanity 
and nature. Utopia is thus the goal (i.e. utopia as Identity) striven for in an intersubjective dialectic 
within a mediating space; and thereby we might through history, culture and time, strive to reach 
values or at least an enlightenment of self-knowledge which well might be Adorno’s own utopia 
wherein ‘self-discovery’ (in contrast to Enlightenment teleology) takes place and negative 
dialectics are perpetuated. Sherratt matches Adorno’s enlightenment through time/history with 
Freud’s maturity of die self through time. (2002, 67-8). Sherratt argues: “For Adomo, reason and 
its concomitant maturity live in the whole self, not just part of it. And it is that whole self which 
needs to communicate with its external world or with other subjects. [...] Reason to be reasonable, 
must counterbalance itself with die opposite. The self to be whole must melt its boundaries, the 
mind to be rational, drown in pleasure, the self to maintain control, abandon itself, the identity to 
remain distinct, become absorbed. Enlightenment, to be enlightened needs Subjects who can 
communicate rationally, and to do so, they need not to attempt to ‘transcend’ their own humanity, 
or attempt to ‘civilise’ it in its coffee houses, they need to be so intensely receptive to their world, 
that they can be, in one moment fully rational and in the other, fully absorbed” (2002,239).
20. Paddison (1993) writes: “Adorno’s sketch for a typology of listeners is speculative and, as we 
have seen is not directly grounded in empirical research (although it is clearly based on ideas 
which emerged from the empirical work he did in the United States). Like all aspects of his work it 
is value laden. At the same time, however, it is consistent in all respects with his music theory 
taken as a whole. That is to say, the conviction underlying it is that musical works are objectively 
structured and significative, and therefore call for a form of interpretation which is able to follow 
the inner logic of a work as experience while also being able to reflect upon and account for the 
‘social content’ of a work ‘from the inside’, and its ideal is a form of ‘structural listening’ [...] 
Although Adomo takes the musical work as an ‘in itself as his starting point and constant point of 
reference, the work itself is, of course, inseparable from the various forms of experience and 
understanding - and of perception and interpretation - which also constitute its mediation” (1993, 
209-13). Paddison tells us that Adorno’s types are formulated in his Enleitung in die Musik- 
sociologie 1962 and 1968 and range from “expert to musically indifferent listener”.
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21. Duttmann’s Between Cultures (2000) looks at identity formation as a cognitive process using 
mediated culture - what he terms a repeated recognition (wiedererkermen) which “refers to the 
identifying act through which one finds oneself in the other, or through which one finds something 
in what it is not, thereby overcoming otherness” (Duttman 2000, translator’s note, be).
Of course, ‘overcoming’ Otherness through assimilation has its critics. (See: Barthes, 1973, 151- 
2), and generally: Bom and Hesmondhalgh (2000) and Hutnyk (2000). Of related interest is The 
United Nations Declaration o f Human Rights, drawn to our attention by Harvey (2000): “10. The 
right to difference including that of uneven geographical development The UN declaration 
(Articles 22 and 27) states that everyone should be accorded ‘the economic, social and cultural 
rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality’ while also pointing 
to the importance of the right ‘freely to participate in the cultural life of the community’ and to 
receive protection of ‘the moral and material interests resulting from scientific, literary or artistic 
production.’ This [says Harvey] implies the right to be different, to explore differences in the 
realms of culture, sexuality, religious beliefs and the like. But it also implies the right for different 
group or collective explorations of such differences and, as a consequence, the right to pursue 
development on some territorial and collective basis that departs from established norms” (Harvey 
2000, 251).
22. Harvey (2000) writes about James Boyd White [1990] who set out how that balance between 
self and other is effected, how diverse aspirations are ‘translated’: Harvey cites White: 
“[Translation means] confronting unbridgeable discontinuities between texts, between languages, 
and between people. As such it has an ethical as well as an intellectual dimension. It recognises the 
other - the composer of the original text - as a center of meaning apart from oneself. It requires one 
to discover both the value of the other’s language and the limits of one’s own. Good translation 
thus proceeds not by the motives of dominance and acquisition, but by respect. It is a word for a 
set of practices by which we learn to live with difference, with the fluidity of culture and with the 
instability of the self [...] Our task is to be distinctly ourselves in a world of others; to create a 
frame that includes both self and other, neither dominant, in an image of fundamental equality. 
This is true of us as individuals in our relations with others, and true of us as a culture too, as we 
face the diversity of our world”, White cited in Harvey (2000,244-5).
23. ‘Revolution in the Memphis Air’ BBC Radio 4, February 15 2003.
24. Information on Cooder comes from an interview with him on BBC Radio 4’s World Sounds 
documentary, July 26 2005.
25. Ideas, specifics and quotations here derive variously from BBC Radio 4’s World Sound 
documentary July 26 2005 and BBC Radio 4’s World ofWomad documentary, July 24 2007.
26. Middleton ‘Repeat Performance’ in Taija Hautamaki and Helmi Jarviluoma Music on Show: 
Issues o f Performance Tampere, Finland, Department of Folk Tradition 1998, cited Bom and 
Hesmondhalgh (2000,22).
27. We can detect an essentialist blind-spot in the following extract from an interview between 
Richard Kearney and Marcuse: “Kearney: What is your view of ‘living’ or ‘natural’ music which 
has always been associated with the oppressed classes in the West and particularly with the black 
culture? Marcuse: What originally stated out as an authentic cry and song of the oppressed black 
community has since been transformed and commercialised into ‘white’ rock, which by means of 
contrived ‘performances’ serves as an orgiastic group therapy which removes all the frustrations 
and inhibitions of the audiences, but only temporarily and without any socio-political foundation” 
(Kearney 1984, 78-9).
28. See Bom and Hesmondhalgh (2000, 28) and Frith in Bom and Hesmondhalgh (2000, 305- 
322).
29. One might look to Charlie Gillett’s World o f Music, for example on the BBC’s World Service. 
On July 16 2007, his half hour programme featured recorded songs from Nigeria, South Africa, 
Vietnam, Madagascar, Hungary and die Czech Republic. Whilst transmitted at 02:30 GMT and 
thus be regarded as an instance of a Ghetto-like approach to non-mainstream sounds, the BBC’s 
digital ‘listen again’ facility does allow British and non-British audiences alike to hear this 
programme and others like it at more convenient times.
30. Consider the current character of radio programmes with their discussion boards, email and 
phone texts linking station and audiences and also listener with listener. Consider too, the role of 
the now defunct BBC magazine, The Listener, 1929-1991.
31. “In rendering public life accessible to all” says Barnett in a similar analysis, “broadcasting 
cultivates a form of reasonable subjectivity, characterised by a willingness to listen and openness 
to other viewpoints that is essential to the maintenance of a shared public life. Private life and
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public events are now intermingled in new spatial configurations, and public life is as much about 
pleasure and enjoyment as about reason, information and education” (2003,45).
32. Marcuse tells us that the dynamic of the dialectic for Hegel was die subjective. This is 
presumably because as a maturing natural being, a person has latency and tendency and uses 
his/her self as a motor of development in that they experience and can use alienation, non-identity 
and lack, however, in Hegel's scheme the actual subject becomes a cipher. (For Hegel a subject is 
objectified and invested with rationality, a spirit (geist ) an idea which ‘knows’ and through the 
person manifests the Idea. As ciphers, Hegel’s subjects lack any human or societal will.
180
8 Performative places & broadcast space
8.1 Introduction
The present epoch will perhaps be above all the epoch of space. We are in the epoch of 
simultaneity: we are in the epoch of juxtaposition, the epoch of the near and far, of the 
side-by-side, of the dispersed. (Foucault 1967, f  1)
When I was filming my Falklands film, Tumbledown, in the 1980s, I was in Wales in the 
rain when a prop man said to me: “I like working here, you get to make good 
programmes.” “Here?, in Wales?” “No, no”, he said “I mean at the BBC.” Here was a 
territory of the mind, a heartland. (Richard Eyre, former BBC Governor, 2003)2
This chapter is concerned with the dialectical relationship between local, concrete 
places of musical performance, and the extended, conceptual space of music 
broadcasting. Such places and space afford freedoms, but also an ordering of 
performer and audience, and both of them can operate as real, ‘here and now’ 
eutopian locales. Some musical places might indeed be alternative cultural and 
social locales (termed here heterotopias after Michel Foucault’s 1967 concept of 
heterotopies) but inevitably, as sites within a stable, local community, they can 
also be places of order and predictability. When this latter condition holds, those 
individuals inimical to such order may turn away from their locality to a wider, 
extra-community horizon of the air, which for those rejecting local order is a place 
of alterity. Broadcast space is never ever just an ersatz, ordering entity, 
marshalling illusions of a bigger world. Sometimes it is a liberating, tenable space 
that frees ns socially and culturally from the domination and ordering of 
immediate places with its alterantive choices. For those alienated by 
neighbourhood tastes, broadcast space becomes itself, a Heterotopia, a space of
3
cultural alternatives.
As David Harvey has argued: “Space for Foucault, is a metaphor for a site 
or container of power which usually constrains but sometimes liberates processes 
of becoming’ (1990, 213). For musical performance, geographical and temporal 
points define for us Foucault’s “near” and “side-by-side” concert locale whilst 
radio effects for us a metaphorical space of Foucault’s alternative “far” and 
“dispersed” which together have a relationship of “simultaneity” and 
“juxtaposition”. Lest we confuse the significance of places and space, we need to
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remember that people occupy places; space on the other hand is for an abstract 
‘public’. Barnett useftdly tells us that “The public is not a subject, [...] in 
democratic theory and practice, [it] is constitutively disembodied [...] It is the 
figure for the uncertain addressee of communicative acts oriented towards 
universality” (2003, 5).
This chapter deliberately seeks to sharpen Foucault’s useful but somewhat 
impressionistic 1967 account of Other spaces, - Des Espace Autres - into a more 
distinct picture of relatively informal, real places of human contact and an 
institutionally mediated broadcast space, where the later, in the words of singer 
Ian Curtis affords “touching from a distance”.4 This seeks to be a faithful 
resolution of Foucault’s concept of heterotopias, and is a necessary stabilisation 
of what is otherwise, in various socio-philosophical writings (Lefebvre 1991, 
Harvey 2000), a sometimes loosely applied set of locational and spatio-temporal 
conceits.5
Specifically, Foucault’s heterogeneous ‘other spaces’ (heterotopias) are 
here, following his speculations, deliberately divided into two: the first diverse 
microcosmic socio-cultural nodes, and the second a more fully formulated ‘other 
space’ that is a Heterotopia: a single macrocosm for all subjects to encounter (as a 
public) institutional constellations of ‘other places’. With regard to the specific 
concerns of this study, Foucault’s term is equated specifically with two musical 
lieux: (1) real, dispersed places of alternative musical performance and (2) an 
extended, collective, broadcast space of public service music radio.6
Here, neither performative places nor broadcast space are privileged, both 
have something to contribute to musical life. Place needs extended broadcast 
public space, and space needs place. Places need the unfamiliar and familiar 
musical codes (nostalgic and new) of space to use or resist; space needs place in 
order to take-up new content and deliver it as its flow, that is there is not only a 
differential relation but an ongoing dialectical relation “which shuttles 
productively from one standpoint to the other” (Norris 1991,27).
This chapter shows that we can discern the identification of many 
alternative places and spaces in the writings of other theorists which can be 
characterized as eutopias because of their contributions to processes of musical 
creativity and communication. Jacques Attaii’s compositional mode in Noise
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(1985)7 and Hakim Bey’s temporary autonomous zones (TAZ’s) (2002), together 
with Bom’s site of “aesthetic imaginary” and the heuristic utopia of Williams, all 
seem to qualify as heterotopian locales of utopics and eutopian value.9 These 
examples are more than just theoretical conceits; they are locales in society’s 
Gemeinschaft - community-led arenas that are immediate rather than remote. 
Upon technological mediation by microphone and transmitter such places 
(musical or otherwise) take on new roles. They can join a broadcast schedule and 
offer wider socio-cultural representation for the originating musicians and 
communities on the national platform of a Gesellschaft which might be regarded 
as a locale for Bom’s “social imaginary”, a space for public encounter,
imagination and understanding; put simply, a bigger eutopia of continuing
, . . 1 0  opportunities as much as mainstream co-option.
To recap, the heterotopian concept is now extended to identify the mass 
mediated reflection of other places in what is here identified as a Heterotopian 
space: a cultural array of diverse popular and other musics, constituted by the 
technologies, programme flow and discourses of public service music radio. This 
mainstream institutional space of ‘ordered’ cultures will be shown to be of 
comparable socio-cultural value to the ‘other places’ of individual town, city and 
region, and moreover, will be shown to play a part in their cultural constitution.
Heterotopian space as sketched here is institutionally mediated, and thus 
its cultural merits are less widely acknowledged. Yet it too must to be regarded as 
a site of alternatives when local identities and ideologies become too constrictive 
for cultural innovators. To underline a positive critique of a broadcast Heterotopia, 
part of this chapter then also ‘deconstructs’ the usual hierarchy of superior and 
authentic performative places, and what is normally assumed to be an inferior, 
affirmatively orientated broadcast space under pressure to deliver the acceptable. 
It moves beyond binary opposites to establish a dialectic of exchange, influence, 
praxis - in short a ‘process’ which can be regarded as felicitous and good." Both 
are sites of some freedoms and some social order. Neither is superior nor prior to 
the other, and each requires the existence of the other.
This is perhaps postmodernism’s utopia: a eutopian place and a eutopian 
space, a succession of interactions and continuous development, not a final 
destination. A progressive, ‘here and now’ set o f solutions and change, music’s
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utopia, musical eutopias and a ‘universal’ Heterotopian space - a broadcast 
musical eutopia - can together usefully mediate subjects to give us, in combination 
and alone, Foucault’s epoch of space, simultaneity, juxtaposition and dispersal.
8.2 Historical & theoretical places & space
The emergence and interpretation o f past places and spaces is o f relevance and 
thus briefly recounted here. Foucault observed:
In the Middle Ages there was a hierarchic ensemble of places: sacred places and 
profane places, protected places and open, exposed places: urban places and rural 
places (all these concern the real life of men) [...] There were places where things 
had been put because they had been violently displaced, and then on the contrary 
places, where things found their natural ground and stability [...] the space of 
emplacement (espace de localisation). (1967, f2)
Foucault argued that, commencing with Galileo’s successful detection o f the 
Earth’s mobile character, macro-spatial conceptions began to disrupt the insularity 
and stability o f localised place. As Foucault expressed it: “extension was 
substituted for localization” {Vetendue se substitute a la localisation) (1967, |3 ). 
Development in secular society o f scientific perspectives allied to aristocratic 
purview encouraged the formation o f the Newtonian and socio-cultural 
‘overview’. Harvey (2000) argues that by the eighteenth century, Europeans truly 
understood the political value o f measuring and logging. Topos, time and people 
could thus be parcelled and ordered. Factories, maps, clocks and canals were 
commissioned, built and run by merchants, capitalists or an overseeing state. 
Overarching regulation inevitably bred social and cultural sites o f resistance. In 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, social and cultural debate, conspiracy and
revolution in heterotopic margins challenged mainstream political, legal and
12public spheres and their institutionalising and universalizing tendencies.
Shortly after this collision o f emergent modernism and radical reactions to
13it, a new wave o f technological media emerged (such as the telegraph and radio).
It was at this moment that institutional space could be constructed to connect into 
and recuperate isolated, alternate points o f activity. As a consequence, discursive 
debate as to the relative merits o f local, alternative and the more public spaces o f
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wider representation ensued. We return now to Foucault and the heterotopian. 
Heatherington sets out a definition of the term:
[The] concept [...] heterotopia, is a medical one that Foucault has introduced to 
the social sciences. Places of Otherness, sites constituted in relation to other sites 
by their difference [...] I define heterotopia as spaces of alternate ordering. 
Heterotopia organise a bit of the social world in a way different to that which 
surrounds them. (Heatherington 1997, viii)
Alluding to the anatomical origin of the word heterotopia in descriptions of “parts 
of the body that are either out of place, missing, extra, or like tumours, alien”, 
Heatherington explains that for Foucault, “places o f Otherness are spaces, whose 
existence sets up unsettling juxtapositions of incommensurate ‘objects’ which 
challenge the way we think, especially the way our thinking is ordered” 
(Heatherington 1997, 42). Heatherington then adds that it is the outsider’s distinct 
presence, and their perspective on us, that allows us to regard what we see/hear in 
return as being in spatio-temporal relation to but at the same time, socio-culturally 
‘incommensurate’ with ourselves (1997, 43, 51). In a way this is an adjunct to the 
self-estrangement of Hegelian subjectification whereby as we apprehend those 
who are not like us, we ourselves are simultaneously scrutinised and reflected 
upon, thus making us aware of another’s objectifications.
Hakim Bey & the Temporary Autonomous Zone (The TAZ)
In the ideas of Hakim Bey we find other finite, temporal sites; other places that 
challenge mainstream order. Hakim Bey’s 1985 conception of the TAZ is at once, 
a socio-culturally diverse catalogue, and a passionate call for creative liberty. “I 
don’t intend the TAZ to be taken as more than an essay [...] a suggestion, almost a 
poetic fancy” (2002, 115). He notes the absence of serious academic attention to 
insular activity (which he traces back to the somewhat anarchic islands of 
eighteenth century piracy) but observes contemporary alternative settlements of 
lived, politicised critiques. Moreover, Bey sees technology as a route to fixture
14autonomous zones. Bey’s aspirations for society are clear, he asks:
Are we who live in the present and doomed never to experience autonomy, never 
to stand for one moment on a bit of land ruled only by freedom? Are we reduced
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either to nostalgia for the past or nostalgia for the future? Must we wait until the 
entire world is freed of political control before even one of us can claim to know 
freedom? (2002,114)
Contrary to Bom’s injunction to look to state-prescribed possibilities for 
dialectical progressions (Bom 1993a, 282), Bey strongly dismisses any official 
interference:
The slogan ‘Revolution!’ has mutated [...] no matter how we struggle we never 
escape that evil Aeon, that evil incubus the State [...] if the State IS history, as it 
claims to be, then the insurrection is die forbidden moment, an unforgivable 
denial of the dialectic - shimmying up the pole and out of the smoke hole, a 
shaman’s manoeuvre carried out at an ‘impossible angle’ to the universe. (2002, 
115)
What is the likely consequence of this momentary act o f independence? Bey 
suggests “such moments of intensity give shape and meaning to the entirety of a 
life. The shaman returns - you can’t stay up on the roof forever - but things have 
changed. Shifts and integrations have occurred - a difference is made” (2002, 
116). So, whilst an imperfect alternative, it is an act o f defiance, and thus qualifies 
perhaps, as a eutopian moment or hideaway, even as the dialectic falters. Bey 
expresses the value of an immanent gesture of possibilities when he writes: 
“Because the TAZ is a microcosm of that ‘anarchist dream’ of a free culture, I can 
think of no better tactic by which to work toward that goal while at the same time 
experiencing some of its benefits here and now” (2002,117).
8.3 Places, space, music & Foucault
What relations of propinquity, what type of storage, circulation, marking and 
classification of human elements should be adopted in a given situation in order 
to achieve a given end. Our epoch is one in which space takes up the form of 
relations among sites. (Foucault 1967, ^ 5)
In 1967, Foucault stated that the sacred and secular places of the middle-ages 
ordered all things, all people. Everything and everyone had a place. With Galileo 
there came a stress on changing relationships and perceptual ‘extensions’. Places 
such as towns, kingdoms or churches might have looked stable but they were now, 
with the benefit of extended perspectives, on their way to some new purpose.
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Foucault at this point raises the vital question as to how relationships should now 
be ordered and placed to bring about ‘a given end.’
With reference again to music and intersubjectivity, one of the topics of 
the previous chapter, Eddie Prevost suggests that “music is the most gregarious of 
art-forms. Musicians gather, needing each other, to give meaning and direction to 
their activity” (1995,43). Matless goes as far as to suggest that music can inscribe 
an environment with a “moral geography” (Leyshon, Matless and Revill 1998, 
23). Relations are proximate and laterally disposed between families, peers and 
others in the immediate community. Indeed, John Lovering declares: “spatial 
proximity is a prerequisite for all sorts of creative musical activity” (1998, 47). 
This may be viewed as a somewhat localised set o f tactically oriented places 
effecting socio-cultural reinforcement of identity. Equally, it may be a more 
oppositional set of musical forms, articulating alterities by using novel sets of 
musical expression. Here, there is both an intensification of being and also, 
through the making and preservation of a sense o f alterity, a more radical 
experience of collective becoming. They are, after Lefebvre of “punctual” 
concern, (Lefebvre 1991, 88), a community, not a whole society. However - and 
this is important from a dialectical perspective - it is inside these relatively 
intimate places where, by means of the technological, wider society and its 
cultures are also received™
The important term ofplace is then a topos, a situated, physically occupied 
locale of human activity, significance and immediate experience - Foucault’s 
“emplacement’ (1967, |2 ).
For instance, a situated musical performance takes ‘place’ on a concert 
stage in a very special place (Cornwall’s Eden Project or Ronnie Scott’s Jazz 
Club, London) prior to its (perhaps inevitable) technological projection into 
national and international socio-cultural spaces of mediated spectacle and 
discourse. In short, particular bodies and performances are mediated by a body 
politic. This first sphere is of musically inflected places of “lived concern” 
(Lefebvre 1991, 53). They foster individual becoming and collective identity. This 
would include family sing-alongs, bedroom music-making, rehearsal rooms, 
choirs, garage bands, brass bands, festivals, jazz clubs, free music groups like 
AMM, pirate radio, local choirs, amateur musical theatre and community radio.16
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These are not utopias but eutopias. Foucault asserted that utopias have “no 
real place” and are merely “a perfected form of society”; they are “fundamentally 
unreal spaces” (1967, 111). These places express music’s utopia and a 
collectivised resolve to act upon such feelings in a more externalised, concrete 
setting. Foucault himself then offers us a way forward to embrace the larger, all 
encompassing spatial eutopia:
There are also, in every culture, in every civilisation, real places - places that do 
exist [...] which are something like counter-sites, a kind of effectively enacted 
utopia in which the real sites, all the other real sites that can be found within the 
culture, are simultaneously represented, contested and inverted. Places of this 
kind are outside of all places, even though it may be possible to indicate their 
location in reality. (1967, f  12)
Here, Foucault outlines a conceptual public space that produces an assembly of 
diverse activity. He writes: “Because these places are absolutely different from all 
the sites that they reflect and speak about, I shall call them, by way of contrast to 
utopias, heterotopias” (1967, f  12), this equates to the Heterotopia of this chapter.
Foucault argues that heterotopias are likely to be a global phenomenon, 
and identifies six principles that give on to three types of heterotopias. Of interest 
here is Foucault’s third principle where “The heterotopia is capable of juxtaposing
17in a single real place several spaces, several sites” (1967, 120). He discusses 
theatre’s and cinema’s projections of other places, and could easily have added the 
radio play, and music too.18
It can be argued that the musician John Cale’s childhood bedroom 
(discussed in 8.7 below) was a heterotopian place where he could seek refuge 
from his immediate circumstances and, because of the liminality provided by his 
listening-in to the radio, this bedroom gave directly on to the broadcast 
Heterotopia of the BBC.19 Whilst seeing Cale’s early exposure to radio as a 
possible ‘compensation’ it is surely, given his exceptional musicality, also an 
‘elective belonging’ to sate his omnivorous tastes.
Foucault's mirror
In order to develop the idea of heterotopias and Heterotopia further, we need to 
introduce more of Foucault’s theory. Foucault (1967) floated the idea of the
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mirror as a heterotopian space ‘a placeless place’. This gently evokes the idea of 
Otherness where a subject comprehends their own existence as they are 
simultaneously represented/reflected in another space. We also know that the 
larger image of the mirror is able to capture a wider world in which we do not 
live.
What we have with the mirror is, perhaps, a phantasmagoria where 
appearances and representations circulate. This is thereby, potentially, a condition 
of order or compensation, but also scepticism and dialectical negations. In putting 
forward our voice, and our culture’s collective affirmation of the beautiful for 
instance, we, at every phase of socialisation, encounter others doing the same. 
This is the first step towards questioning singular views but, importantly, also 
raises questions about the possibility of representing otherness in any direct, 
unmediated way in a modem world. Encountering reflections and representations 
we become aware of our own mythic fabrications, what Vattimo calls tabulations 
of “critical distance” which are aware of their own mediated, synthetic origins 
(Vattimo 1992, 25). This mirror may not lead to radical, subjective emancipation, 
but in rejecting solipsism, we perhaps realise that universality is, in fact, a 
plurality of ideas and identities that can be usefiilly experienced aesthetically, 
even when in reflective reproduction.
Foucault posits a Heterotopian space as both a no-place and a good place, 
a social ‘mirror’ akin to the eutopian broadcast space of the BBC advocated in this 
study. He argued that:
[In these] quite other sites, these heterotopias, there might be a sort of mixed, 
joint experience, which would be the mirror [...] a utopia, since it is a placeless 
place. In the mirror, I see myself there where I am not, in an unreal, virtual space 
that opens up behind the surface; I am over there, there where I am not, a sort of 
shadow that gives my own visibility to myself. (Foucault 1967)
Foucault argued for the existence of such a ‘mirror’, not just as a utopia but a real 
phenomenon too:
It is also a heterotopia in so far as the mirror does exist in reality, where it exerts 
a sort of counteraction on the position that I occupy [...] I begin again to direct 
my eyes toward myself and to reconstitute myself there where I am. The mirror 
functions as a heterotopia in this respect: it makes this place that I occupy at the 
moment when I look at myself in the glass at once absolutely real, connected with 
all the space that surrounds it, and absolutely unreal. (Foucault 1967,112)
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8.4 Praise & critique of eutopian places
How does all of this relate to real music making and live venues? Places are where 
we live and belong. With the addition of music, places gather us all together at a 
particular time and location. They are a fixed location in possession of aura, 
tradition, community values, even a genius loci. They are sites of agency , co­
existence, and being. Places allow us to see and hear ‘live’ musical activity and 
effect cultural exchange. This is simply expressed by Frith: “Live music is music 
as a social event, an aspect of a social situation - play, display, celebration,
beginning. It is an organic, a living aspect of public life, [...] whatever its technical
20or aesthetic qualities” (2003, 95).
Music locates us spatially, historically, culturally, and socially. It grants us 
a perspective and makes us look back to places of familial comfort, or look 
forward to better ‘times’. The deployment of either spatial or temporal references 
in matters of ‘where one is right now’ is a common conceit. Poets and politicians 
have long exploited notions of better places, better times; for example, consider 
Winston Churchill’s political image of “Broad, sunlit uplands”,21 and more 
personally, our memories of places of one’s childhood. Places one has never been 
to can also loom large in the romantic imagination of musicians and music-lovers: 
consider such distant locales of potential in the musical life of the U.S.A. (New 
Orleans, New York). British Composers and musicians too are capable of 
exploiting, or at least summoning, lost temporal and geographic places nearer to 
home, (consider the broad and specific evocation of places in the music of 
Vaughan Williams, Lennon and McCartney, Ray Davies). Cultural histories can 
add to these evocations of lost places and past times that may serve as paradigms 
for future pride and sense of identity, for example, the late 1970s and 1980s 
Manchester of Joy Division and the Ha9ienda club. Sociologists studying musical 
habits in present-day Manchester have observed that “live performance is 
commonly discussed in connection to space and place, especially [...] with respect 
to the use of Manchester city centre. Live music was nearly always linked in 
respondent’s narratives to a particular venue, such as The Apollo or the Band On
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The Wall. [...] live cultural performances continue to be importantly anchored in 
place” (Savage, Bagnall and Longhurst 2005,169).
Community and local radio stations nearly always situate themselves 
within a geographical locality and region to appear to be relevant and trustworthy, 
whilst at the same time spin ‘golden oldies’ that allows presenters to hit the 
nostalgic nerve of listeners who can instantly recall moments and place of a lost 
youth whenever ‘their song’ is played. “In the first second or two [of an old
77.
record], people know where they are.’ A song arrests us, places us, and when it
23is shared with a wider audience, lets us all reflect on such a common experience.
Yet we must be on our guard. Are we now guilty of fetishising places? Do 
they not exclude as much as they include? Do they actually order and regulate (as 
Foucault would have it) as much as they allow for free expression? Locations can 
sometimes become the norm rather than a site of freedom and critique. They can 
perpetuate notions of reverence, uniqueness and aura at the expense of 
accessibility or experiment. Gemeinschaft may be a place of continuity, but it is 
also a place of ritual and constraint. Places are frequently shot-through with 
established cultural codes that have to be acknowledged. In is his fifth principle, 
pertinent to local places, Foucault wrote that:
Heterotopias always presuppose a system of opening and closing that both isolates 
them and makes them penetrable. In general, the Heterotopia site is not freely 
accessible like a public place [...] to get in one must have a certain permission and 
make certain gestures. (Foucault 1967, [^24)
For Rob Gretton and Joy Division the band he managed, Manchester and the 
North West were special places, honest places, familiar places: they were ‘home’. 
This ‘home turf contains mainstream cultural places such as night clubs and live 
venues. The Russell Club, Hume (the venue for Factory nights featuring Joy 
Division and others) would qualify as one such place, as might the Hacienda club 
in later years. This home turf also provides isolated, more discrete locales - 
pockets of refusal - that are short term, alternative sites. Rob Gretton would, for 
example, let Joy Division retreat to rehearsal Room Number Six - a studio 
antechamber in Manchester. The Monday-night Musician’s Collective and Band 
on the Wall proved to be a useful experimental site for the band.24 Joy Division
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valued place and community, but they also tapped into a wider, alternative 
community of records, films and the music press. Curtis recalled:
The Collective was a really good thing for Joy Division [...] it gave us 
somewhere to play, we met other musicians like A Certain Ratio and The Fall, 
talked and swapped ideas. Also it gave us a chance to experiment in front of 
people. We were allowed to to take risks - The Collective isn’t about music that 
needs to draw an audience. Curtis, in Brian Edge (1988, 18)
Dave Haslam has alluded to the value of what he has termed “Cells”, and 
has stated that ‘”If you are not at home, [i.e. feeling like an uncomfortable 
outsider] look instead to Warhol, the Peel show, not to local bands” (Haslam 
2006). Musical subcultures are nothing if not spectacular. They demand to be 
seen, and urge conformity and embodiment. One way to avoid immediate, 
subcultural pressure is to tune in to a wider world where raw musical sounds are 
as important as haircuts and dress codes. Now we are in a position to turn to 
eutopian broadcast space for an alternative freedom and ordering.
8.5 Eutopian space & spatial conservatism
Whilst Adomo and even Marcuse (contra Benjamin) argued for the aesthetics of 
uniqueness and presence; to some extent, both still underestimated the 
significance of wider reality - real musicians yes, but also real radio stations, real 
debate, real people. Neither trusted technological and institutional mediation. A 
shift then to the emancipatory content of reality with its Marcusian ‘chances’ 
involves shifting from metaphysical thought, utopian strategies and bleak 
interpretations, to more modest instances and moments of positive actions and 
participation in the ordinary; with real people we should be able to encounter 
praxis critical of capitalist domination and ideology. The challenge is to move 
cleanly from subjective ‘insularity’ of cultural diasporas to an enlightened social 
agglomeration.
Through broadcast discourse and ‘framing’, space effects aesthetic and 
subjective defamiliarisation, a productive non-identity in the mirror of Foucault’s 
Heterotopian space. Listeners do not literally populate this space, but are 
disembodied, and only represented by institutional proxy (except when actually
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recording for or performing in institutional places), there is much though that is 
preserved. Much radio output is still live, we still hear a direct (quasi-acousmatic) 
amplification reaching back into discrete domestic and community places.
Is broadcast space then in fact a superior locale? What are the advantages 
and disadvantages of collected, publicly available places? Space facilitates what 
might usefully be termed, after Benedict Anderson, ‘imagined communities’ 
(Anderson 1991) wherein discrete socio-cultural groupings are integrated 
vertically by secular institutions and technologies to constitute a portrait of a 
nation. “A deep, horizontal comradeship” is invoked, even though it is a vertical 
integration of people, with no direct experience of each other (Anderson 1991, 6- 
7). For the way in which this is achieved in a specific instance of radio 
transmission we need only turn to the insightful work of Jody Berland who has 
analysed pan-Canadian radio public service transmissions which bind 
geographically diffuse bodies of North Americans inhabiting many time zones 
into a national unit that falls in step with a singular ‘radio day’ of shared, in-
25common ‘morning’ and ‘evening’ shows. This industrially organised time she 
argues is an overt, easily perceived division of a listener’s day, but that the 
implications of the act as spatial choreography are perhaps less apparent (Berland 
1998, 129). Berland accurately observes how “we subjectify the source of sound, 
hearing it only as a speaking subject” (ibid., 130). Berland creates an accurate 
impression of such a united, spatialised (but geographically dislocated) society 
fuelled by music and whilst hinting at an ideological construction, also suggests 
the formation of a critical sensibility on the part of the listener:
In this musical imagination, everyone is together in the same place. It’s probably 
California [...] Listening to the sounds of these [...] vocabularies can make you 
feel as though you are everywhere, a universal self [...] America [...] Jamaica [...] 
Africa [...] or a particular place [a] suburb [...] wherever it locates you, the music 
reminds you of your place. It speaks to the heart of where you are, and tells you 
something about what it means to live there. And you die listener, might begin to 
hear the ongoing flow of music and noise differently, as something that both 
celebrates and evaporates the colonizing of that place. With this mode of 
listening, space and location become explicit; then space is recognised as a social 
construction, outside of nature and one of its codes. (Berland 1998,130-1)
We should look carefully at space. ‘Space’ is encountered at a societal rather than 
community level. This second eutopian sphere is of a different scale and reach to 
the first. Strictly speaking it is an unbounded, infinite space, not a true, singular
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place (though it may require real buildings for production and transmission). It is a 
conceptual, socially produced structure, ideologically constituted and 
technologically mediated (see Lefebvre 1991, 3). Such a space has been framed 
historically within public service Broadcasting. Musically speaking, spatial 
organisation serves to collect, encourage and amplify the specific, communal, 
topological entities and imaginings of musical place - be they traditional or avant- 
garde. This second sphere is summoned as an inclusivist, pluralist concern, 
reflecting the heterotopian dispersal of local identities and energies.
In this reflecting space, the discursive immediacy, identities and alterities 
of the former are marshalled, mediated and shared for wider epistemological and 
cognitive gains. Here, Crossley’s egological form of the subject’s encounter with 
the Other is effected, through mediated experience. This type of public sphere is 
rendered practical through institutions, technologies and discourses which 
incorporate and magnify to give us a grand spread of heterotopias, perceptible in 
what is, effectively, one mediating node which, says Harvey constitutes the 
coexistence in “an impossible space” of a “large number of fragmentary possible 
worlds, or more simply, incommensurable spaces that are juxtaposed or 
superimposed upon each other” (1990,48).
Space also makes us listen attentively for the strange. Therefore, perhaps 
paradoxically, music and people in distant places can be heard via broadcast space 
in that most intimate of locations: the home. Domestic proximities and familiar 
ground are where we rest to hear the wider world.26
Frith asserts:
Radio was the most significant twentieth-century mass medium. It was radio that 
transformed the use of domestic space, blurring the boundary between the public 
and the private, idealizing the family hearth as the site of ease and entertainment, 
establishing die rhythm of everydayness [...] It was radio that shaped the new 
voice of public intimacy, that created Britain as a mediated collectivity, that gave 
ordinary people a public platform. (2003, 96)
On the matter of hearing alternatives, Frith adds:
Radio is important, not least as a means of access to music otherwise inaccessible, 
whether in the BBC’s systematic policy of musical education or in the furtive 
teenage use of Radio Luxembourg, the American Forces network, and pirate 
stations as windows on another world. (Frith 2003, 96)
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Spatial dangers
Henri Lefebvre’s Marxist perspective allows him to regard space with some 
suspicion, as an arena for politicised deployment of knowledge and for 
“concealing ideology”. He observes that this space, be it state-supported or 
otherwise, is not an “a priori condition of its institutions” but is determined by its
27intended uses, and therein lies its problems (Lefebvre 1991, 85). More 
positively, Lefebvre later suggests that social space gathers and instigates as a site 
of potential and actual ethical consequence: it is “a set of places whence energies 
derive and whither energies are directed” (ibid., 191). These optimistic glosses, 
anticipating the interpretations of this study is, nonetheless confronted with a 
more distinct critique too. A principle concern is the ‘invisibility’ of this second 
nature entity and its instrumental tendency to homogenise and dominate the places 
on which it alights. On a technical note which returns us to the debate of Benjamin 
and Adomo, Lefebvre asserts that in the removal of “place” to “space”, the 
specifics and authenticity of creative works are converted into mere “repeatable”, 
“reproducible” product (ibid., 422).
8.6 A deconstructive move
Standard evaluations of music events might be seen to be built on the following 
premise: local, immediate places of live musical performance are distinguished by 
the physical proximity and presence of real musicians and their rapt audience. The 
relation between performer and listener is distinct, and generates a Benjaminian 
aura of authenticity and uniqueness. The musical performances of a broadcast 
space on the other hand are, for a listener at home, characterised by the physical 
absence of real musicians. The isolated listener cannot see or touch the performer, 
and is simply receiving a generalised public address where no distinct performer- 
listener orientation exists. Performers are effectively, after Barnett “disembodied” 
(2003, 5). This theoretical binary opposition of the contradictory, socio-aesthetic 
values of each locale is one that is found to structure our cultural lives and is one 
to which Adomo subscribed.
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Certainly we all seek an intelligibility, a modelling of the cultural world so 
that we can decide what it all means. A theoretical snap-shot is of course useful as 
far as it goes. Indeed, above we have just counter-posed performative places with 
broadcast space. In doing this we could equally summon the following associated 
ideological binaries:
live/recorded; spontaneous/rehearsed; free agency/social fact; active/passive; 
spectacular/invisible; art/commodity; authentic/fabricated; real/realistic; 
presentational/representational; musica practica/musica symbolica; 
particular/general.
There tends to be an ideological bias in our language. We might automatically 
assume that the local and immediate have more integrity than anything on a 
national stage; that a presentational performance, a face-to-face encounter, is 
better than one mediated through the airwaves. Liveness normally takes 
precedence over representational recording.28 Not only is the featured binary 
pairing one of opposites, it has an implicit hierarchy of prior, superior places and a 
secondary inferior space. This is because the musical space of public broadcasting 
is inferior, being ‘diminished’ by the ‘removal’ of the living performer.
However, can we deconstruct the differential relationship, the binary 
opposition between performative place and broadcast space and invert their 
importance, or, better still, argue for an equal significance which fosters
29interdependence and change? If we just invert the assumed hierarchy of place 
and space, and assume that broadcast space is superior to all things live and local, 
we replace one biased assumption with another. However, we can deconstruct the 
hierarchy legitimately by looking at the moments of dialectical ‘trade’ between 
homegrown stage personality and nationally transmitted star, as local musicians 
leave home to travel to radio station studios in London, and as national 
broadcasters leave the metropolis to visit the regional scene (for example: Radio 1 
Live in Cardiff, October 20-26, 2000). The hierarchy is destabilised in such acts 
and moments as neither place nor space are superior or inferior locales as far as 
musicians, audiences and broadcasters are concerned, as both are equally valued. 
Moreover, the differential relationship of each theoretically incompatible and
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critically evaluated term is evidently a dynamic relationship. Frith usefully 
identifies not a fixed relationship but a freely accepted dialectic:
Radio listening [...] is a constant movement between predictability and surprise. 
On “our” station we expect to hear our kind of music, without ever being quite 
sure what will come next. It’s as if we’re happy to let someone else have the 
burden of choice. And radio is also a way of suggesting a broader taste 
community [...] likes and dislikes are publicly confirmed, and deejays and 
presenters have a particularly important role in treating music as a form of social 
communication. (2003,97)
It is to the movement of the predictable and surprising we now turn. As Bom has 
observed: “Broadcast culture exists in a double relation with wider cultural and 
ideological movements: in a centrepetal motion it draws them in, selectively 
metabolising them in its operations; and in a centrifugal motion it sends them out, 
refracted in its programming” (2004,492).
8.7 Musical eutopias, Cale & the dialectical process
New music comes from ‘nowhere’ but in reality, the traditions of localities and 
regions have long provided the talent for record companies and broadcasters. At 
the same time, musical genres, traditions and individual songs from afar have 
heavily influenced emerging local talent. Whilst records per se have a significant 
role to play, radio stations - both popular and serious - do too. As a child, 
musician John Cale retreated to his bedroom in South Wales and listened to “All 
the music I could find on the Third Programme, Webern, Stockhausen [...] maybe
30 •some Ligeti.” In his autobiography Cale tells us he was also “hearing and 
learning about [Elvis, jazz and classical] on the radio” (Cale and Bockris 1999). 
Cale in fact confessed to Sue Lawley that “I had to get out” (Cale, Desert Island 
Discs, 2004). It seemed that Cale was seeking a cosmopolitanism and a liberty by 
associating himself with the cultural capital offered by the institution of the BBC, 
records and radio. He chose not to associate himself with Welsh culture, nor with 
his father’s English roots. Is this possibly an expression of Blochian 
dissatisfaction and ‘lack’, an abstract utopian desire for something else, locality 
critiqued by the very act of retreating to his own room so to cast abroad for what 
might be more fulfilling?
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Was Cale seeking then, and is he still seeking, to assert status and 
distinction by being a middle class “cultural omnivore”? This is a term adopted 
from Peterson and Kern by sociologists Savage, Bagnall and Longhurst, who state 
that:
[T]he omnivore is able to roam widely across cultural genres and references 
because of the capacities of the media to readily provide diverse cultural cues in 
an easy and accessible form. This mobility also involves spatial mobility, the 
capacity to appreciate cultural forms from different parts of the globe. (2005, 
155)
Cale desperately wanted to be in Warhol’s Factory in New York. He told Lawley 
in c.2004 that it was “comforting to have a place for all those crazy people with 
some really brilliant ideas, a little out of control themselves so they could exist 
and work.” Whilst accepting firm musical encouragement from his mother at the 
piano, there seems to be an activation of his social and aesthetic imaginary which 
sees him want to exercise what Savage, Bagnall and Longhurst (2005), term an
31“elective belonging”. Was Cale seeking respite, escapism or inspiration through 
such a belonging? Might he also have been seeking status and distinction by 
expressing an affinity with remote cultural sources so that he might satisfy his 
omnivorous tastes? The creative potentials of Cale, the rebellious local agent 
communing with the alternative sounds of a state radio broadcast, makes manifest 
a real dialectic that drives cultural novelty; maintains a struggle between localised 
constraint and spatially framed freedoms; the familiar and the Other. In effect, an 
ongoing, Adomian negative dialectic given precedence neither to home nor the 
rest of the world, but to the locale that mediates them both: a eutopian imaginary 
of difference and plurality, utopic play and becoming.
We can accept (with reservations) that public service broadcasts issue from 
modem institutions as spatial reflections of, and responses to, modem life. Space, 
howsoever regulated and occupied, is a modem substrate where we can 
experience defamiliarisation, understand new music or simply observe musical 
commerce at work. With public service broadcasts we can challenge our own 
social, temporal and cultural situations by looking further afield and back into the 
past. Whilst popular music is highly ‘spectacular’, not everyone needs to ‘see’ 
their musical idols on television or video. Radio can remove the need to witness 
and then imitate a dress code or a haircut This is liberating for many. For others,
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space reinforces our own local identities and pride. It puts our musical heroes on a 
bigger stage, and validates who we are, and where we come from. In short, places 
and space have an ongoing relationship. As Harvey observes:
Modernism, seen as a whole, explored the dialectic of place versus space, of 
present versus past, in a variety of ways. While celebrating universality and the 
collapse of spatial barriers, it also explored new meanings for space and place in 
ways that tacitly reinforced local identity. (Harvey 1990,273)
Dialogue and interpenetration have already occurred, and will continue. Space 
mediates the content of places; places require the inspiration derived from the 
formal ordering of the Other. A mutuality which goes beyond structural need to 
simply distinguish one concept from another. Energy for this comes from social 
agents in both place and space. It is not an autonomous process but one that is 
dependent on the cultural politics of place and space and is a continuing historical 
process.
Harvey asks: “If materialized utopias went wrong because of the social 
processes mobilized in their construction, then the focus switches to questions of 
process. Can we think of a utopianism of process rather than of spatial form?” 
(2000, 173). It is to the value of eutopian places, space and process in relation to 
immanent transcendence that we now turn.
Harvey outlines the interelatedness of ‘particularity’ and ‘universality’. He 
argues that the former is real, the later more of an ethical set of values that are 
consciously constructed. He says in relational dialectics there’s a connection 
between the concrete and the reified concept or the ‘universal’, one influences the 
other (2000, 16-7).32 Harvey asks:
How then, can a stronger utopianism be constructed that integrates social process 
and spatial form? Is it possible to formulate a more dialectical form of 
utopianism, construct, even, a utopian dialectics? [...] The task is to pull together 
a spatio-temporal utopianism - a dialectical utopianism - that is rooted in our 
present possibilities at the same time as it points towards different trajectories for 
human uneven geographical developments. (Harvey 2000,196)
In calling for this approach, Harvey (2000) draws attention to the limits of 
Foucault’s account, and touches on the ethical implications of one culture 
encountering another, equitably and neutrally. This latter reservation is taken up 
below with reference to Bom who has similar concerns. Harvey admits to being
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drawn to Foucault’s “multiple utopian schemas”. He also accepts that a 
“simultaneity of spatial play [...] highlights choice, diversity, and differences” 
adding:
[Alternatives might be explored not as mere figments of the imagination but 
through contact with social processes that already exist. It is within these spaces 
that alternatives can take shape [...] and so disrupt the homogeneity to which 
society (and by extension its utopian antidotes) typically clings. (Harvey 2000, 
184)
However, Harvey raises important reservations in respect to Foucault’s 
heterotopian schema. He cites political, discursive and ethical matters which could
33derail any rigorous dialectical progress. If Foucault’s schema is too limiting, 
Bom points to the pitfalls of a more fluid schema. She writes of the power of the 
“pleasure and prestige” of “culturally imagined community” for “producers and 
consumers” the latter:
invited to enter into complicit imaginary identification with the producers. The 
global strategy invokes the pleasure of overcoming boundaries [and] the reflected 
narcissism of seeing self and other as ‘becoming one’; of banishing difference. 
(Bom 1993a, 282-3)
Bom, in sketching a sophisticated model of place and space, cannot help but 
allude to the dominating tendency of erasing Otherness, in an act of eradication 
rather than affinity. She also effectively appraises the construction and 
preservation of difference as an equally suspect socio-cultural approach: “The 
strategy of alterity enjoys the sense of continuing difference” (1993a, 283), which 
she later describes as “at once both utopian and tyrannically omnipotent” (1993a, 
286). Bom argues that if the urge to cultural globalisation is unavoidable, then the 
continuation of the local and diverse must now be a matter of policy, emanating 
from politically aware, reconstructed “social and institutional forms” (1993a, 
288).
8.8 The BBC & Born’s imaginaries
Bom succinctly defines the task of the BBC and any other national institution 
charged with representational and unificatory responsibilities:
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Public service media cannot only be about a proliferation of micro publics, but 
about achieving a unifying sense in which are displayed and in which mutual 
encounters take place between expressions of sometimes incommensurable 
component cultures of the nation. (2004, 515)
Reith had overseen the construction of a national cultural space that drew content 
from the regions in order that they might be acknowledged as components of a 
greater, socio-political whole. A more equitable plurality of diverse musical 
production is apparent in the post-war plurality of the BBC, where regionality is 
given greater credence as a source of diverse musical expressions and allied 
identities.
Bom sees “cultural production” as generating works of labour that are 
“informal and amateur” or “formal and professional” (1993a, 285) but all 
produced with the influence of institutions and ‘the established order’ where these 
works then become texts. Social contexts are matched by continuing subjective 
and discursive actions “involving imaginative and aesthetic construction - 
projected connections both to imagined social communities, and to aesthetic 
genres” (Bom 1993a, 272). In other words, cultural production generates works of 
art, shaped by social facts. These are held by institutional (often ideological) 
discourses, yet still retain an excessive and optimistic dimension that through 
independent agents and a collective imagination can help to see the use value of 
music’s contribution to matters of alterity and power. These aesthetic-discursive 
places are what Bom terms “social and aesthetic imaginaries” - presumably to 
some extent after Benedict Anderson (1991) - strategies of imagining operating 
across communities, both out of and into communities from a national platform. 
The first of these imaginaries - the social - she breaks-down into two: (1) a 
unifying vision of the “communal and consensual” which fosters an eliding of 
difference and which we might dare to equate with a Reithian cultural universality 
and (2) a localised, resistant, often more radical alternative. Each of these two 
social imaginaries is a strategy assisting in the process of subjective and collective 
constitution, relying on the production of, and subsequent affinity with, cultural 
works. Each is predicated on an initial construction of alterity which is either 
resisted or coopted and erased. Bom rightly avers that any “institutional alterity 
does not [necessarily] produce aesthetic difference or political dissent, just as
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inhabiting the institutional mainstream does not completely preclude them” 
(1993a, 285). The emancipatory problems of negation inherent in any subjective, 
collective or institutional construction of difference are identified by Bom. She 
writes of “idealized ultimate reconciliation”, “phantasised pleasures of 
omnipotence” and the act of “bringing everyone under one’s own regime.” Bom 
identifies these “psychic” tendencies with the universalising impulse. On the other 
hand, a localised, psychically configured alterity (socially or aesthetically 
embodied) can equally create and preserve “defensive phantasies of 
fragmentation”, “destruction of the unity” and a denigration of “the ordinary and 
dominant” (1993a, 282-3). (Many of these issues are later developed in Bom and 
Hesmondhalgh, 2000). This study actually seeks to effect an accommodation of 
Bom’s two social imaginary sites, whereby instances of difference in any process 
of subjectification might be seen for what they are, and thereby be mutually 
invigorating and supportive to inculcate what Bom identifies in one of her co- 
esssayists as “aesthetic and political value” - alterity as a marker inculcating 
moves for mutual respect, and representation - not a route to a negation of others 
(Bom 1993a, 283). Bom is in some ways supportive of the potential for, or 
actuality of, contemporary eutopian ambition and potentials of institutions like a 
contemporary BBC. (Cf. Bom 1993a, 285 and more generally Bom, 2004). Her 
belief in a benign “respublica” of cultural pluralities is foreshadowed in her 
Afterword to Bennett et al (1993) where she calls for reconstructed and 
reconstructive institutions that support the local to counter the universal 
imaginary, but not that of a paternalistic BBC, the universal social and aesthetic 
imaginaries of capitalism, nor its converse: endless instances of cultural novelty 
ascribed to ‘marginal’ authentic sites. (Bom 1993a, 288).
In turning to Bom we might discern a distinct manifestation of the musical 
eutopia sought in the present study that informs her all-important social 
imaginary. Prior to Bom’s social imaginary stands her aesthetic imaginary, 
characterised by the presence of musical work and text available in places and 
broadcast space for local and national audiences to ‘encounter’ and make a
* 34musical judgement upon a plurality of musical forms. As a subject’s sensibility 
is triggered by an experience of the aesthetic imaginary, musical alterities - past 
and present, local, national or global are imagined in a more concrete utopian
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form as actual communities. This, within the eutopian space commanded by the 
likes of the BBC, constitutes Bom’s social imaginary. In a national form, a sort of 
Reithian vertical integration of community musics is gathered. Whilst Bom 
clearly states that her understanding of the aesthetic is as a phenomenon coopted 
for socio-political usage, her conceptual model does not preclude its critical 
articulation with the eutopian locale of a ‘here and now’ site presenting and 
representing such encounters. Bom, even as she fights shy of any Kantian 
implications or conclusions seems, in her propositions to be drifting close towards 
a Kantian and Habermasian construction of subjective appreciation and collective, 
common sense discernment and understandings. Bom’s aesthetic and social 
imaginaries might be seen to run parallel to Kant’s epistemological combination 
of the faculties of sense, experience and a priori reasoning, and as such, are 
possibly additional instances of music’s abstract and concrete utopian 
manifestations coming together in eutopian locales for the subject’s sensory 
encounter, imaginative assimilation and cognitive understanding of an objective
35world occupied by others and Otherness.
8.9 In conclusion
Heterotopias are at once places of alternative order and disorder/displacement, 
mainstream acceptance and alternative resistance. Likewise, Heterotopia is both 
mainstream output and alternative space of discovery. What matters is their 
mutual relationship and consequent dynamic. ‘Locality’, ‘community’ and 
‘regionality’ are shown to be immediate sites of musical activity that connote 
exclusivity, peripheral resistance and socio-cultural originality. They are also 
viewed as sites that suggest authenticity, presence and tradition. It is argued that 
their subsequent mediation by radio, television and commercial recording promote 
them to an extensive public sphere where for many, the aura and integrity of the 
music are lost. However, for some, mass mediation arguably effects the 
transcendence of place to effect a benign, cognitively-rich encounter with 
Otherness. This process of mediation promotes, over time, not only renewed local 
resistances and heterotopias, but importantly, fresh stimulation at the performative 
level as other, ‘foreign’ musical heterotopias are broadcast back into a creative
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community in exchange for yet further cooptions into an institutionally framed 
national Heterotopia.
This Heterotopia is a space occupied by difference and the locally 
produced. It makes them available to all through the ether. Its power is linear and 
‘live’. The potentials of both resistant human body and idealistic state institutions 
are preserved to effect a desublimated ‘negative dialectic’ that sustains cultural 
innovation; maintains struggle between order and freedom; the known and new. 
What we have is an ongoing dialectic, a postmodern condition which privileges 
neither place nor space and can thus be said to be a here and now eutopia.
The musical utopias and eutopias posited in this study are surely cultures 
held within a public sphere ordained by the state at the behest of the people. 
Though perhaps not the strictly neutral, ‘other spaces’ of Foucault, they are at the 
same time more than this. Such eutopias are rational, but also imaginative and 
revivifying locales for the population where repositories of the past and new 
activity bring about cultural improvement, expressive liberty and intersubjectivity. 
Here, creativity, taste and independence are collectively constructed and 
intersubj ectively shared - often specifically through musical sounds - at a near- 
presentational, ‘I-Thou’ level, as music shapes as well as simply inhabits places.36
The spatial organisation amplifies static, topological entities, but the 
process can come to a halt if it is devoid of any dynamic. The challenge is to 
respect places and use their energy allied to the ambition of broadcast space to 
produce and maintain innumerable good places where positive values (but not 
moral absolutes) can be expressed and explored. Here, idealism operates with 
reality. ‘Life as it is’ constitutes the thesis, its antithesis is ‘Utopia - an imagined 
perfection’; their synthesis is More’s and our e/utopia - a society of enlightening 
institutions, imaginaries and praxis - a synthesis which, for too long has been 
deferred.
Notes
1. Des Espace Autres published by the French Journal Architectvre/Mouvement/Continuite number 
5 Oct 1984 pp. 46-49, was the basis of a lecture Foucault gave on 14th March 1967. (See 
http://Foucault.info/documents/heterotopia/Foucault.heterotopia.fr.httnl (Accessed Oct 2004).
For the English translation used here see:
http://Foucault.info/documentsdieterotopia/Foucault.heterotopia.en.httnl.
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2. “The BBC is one of the few things in Britain that works” The Guardian, Saturday September 27 
2003,22.
3. Harvey tells us that in The Order o f Things (1966), Foucault first “coined the term ‘heterotopia’ 
to describe the incongruity, the ‘enigmatic multiplicity’ and die fundamental disorder of which 
language was itself so capable” (2000,183).
4. Lyrical fragment from the song Transmission, Joy Division on Factory Records, 1979.
5. Whilst a stimulus to David Harvey, relational notions of places and spaces seem to be somewhat 
poorly regimented in his otherwise exemplary works. In spite of such reservations, inspiration for 
this chapter is taken directly from die work of Michel Foucault (1967), Henri Lefebvre (1991), 
David Harvey (1990, 2000), Georgina Bom (1993a) and others. Discussion of the social 
production of space as proposed by Lefebvre (1991) is ongoing and is further considered by Clive 
Barnett (2003). The Sage journal Space and Culture: International Journal o f social spaces is also 
to be noted. Specific accounts of musical places are to be found in Leyshon, Matless and Revill 
(1998). See also: Manchester: Music & Place, an international conference on music and place, 
held at die Manchester Institute for Popular Culture, Manchester Metropolitan University, June 8 - 
10 2006. Each have looked exhaustively at real, material locations and metaphorical ‘locales’ of 
social construction, contestation and improvement
6. Foucault was interested in the interaction of power relations of social groups, as seen in 
institutions and held in discourses. He saw that a modem world of perils and possibilities 
comprises social constraint that inevitably fosters social resistance. His concept of heterotopia 
allows for a consideration of discrete sites of conformity and alterity, but, importantly their 
combination in a unending dialectical sequence where dualities, be they concepts, antagonisms or 
separate entities are mediated (modified but not fully negated) by each other or by a third, 
mediating term that acts as a site of transition.
7. Jacques Attali argues for new ways of making and listening to music. For him, displaced organs 
or new entities which are foreign to the host can provoke fresh perspectives. This Attali advocates 
through his concept of ‘Composition’ in his final chapter of Noise (1985). He detects “Emerging, 
piecemeal and with the greatest ambiguity, the seeds of a new noise, one exterior to the institutions 
and customary sites of political conflict [...] the essential element in a strategy for the emergence 
of a truly new society [...] opportunities to grasp an aspect of utopia, reality under construction” 
(Attali 1985, 133). Here, the economy and state have no direct role to perform in music-making. It 
is a ‘do-it-yourself mode. Jameson remarks that Attali is looking for ways o f “discovering and 
theorizing the concrete possibilities of social transformation within the new system. His 
utopianism is thus materialistic and immanent” (Jameson in Attali 1985, p. xiii).
8. Bom, after Benedict Anderson’s notion of “Imagined Communities” (Anderson, 1991) gives us 
“musically-imagined communities”: an aesthetic imaginary of musical actions, “a strategy which 
constructs alterity, difference, marginality, the small-scale the ‘local’ the ‘independent’, the avant- 
garde” (Bom 1993a, 282).
9. We might, in passing, consider Raymond Williams’s account of what he identifies as a heuristic 
utopia (in contrast to a systematic, holistic one) that is driven by “individualistic impulse”. He 
added, “It is not based on a new system as a form of critiques of an existing system, or as a whole 
worked-through alternative [...] its purpose, instead is to form desire. It is an imaginative 
encouragement to feel and to relate differently, or to strengthen and confirm existing feelings and 
relations which are not at home in the existing order and cannot be lived through in it. This kind of 
heuristic utopia has much in common with the practical movements of alternative, individual, or 
small-communal lifestyles”. See Williams (1985,13-14).
10. Bom offers us a social/institutional imaginary which she says: “seeks fusion and mergers, 
submersion into the dominant collectivity, which constructs the mainstream, the ‘global’, the 
communal and consensual” (1993a, 282). In a written response to this present discussion Bom has 
advised that her two imaginaires were proposed “as general potentials or conditions; in principle 
they can both be experienced either live or mediated. I develop them as psychoanalytically- 
informed categories that can be derived from many empirical and historical accounts of distinctive 
forms of popular music practice (as in Bennett et al (eds.) 1993)”.
11. Heatherington might dispute this: “Heterotopia are not quite spaces of transition - the chasm 
they represent can never be closed up - but they are spaces of deferral, spaces where ideas and 
practices that represent the good life can come into being, from nowhere, even if they never 
actually achieve what they set out to achieve - social order, or control and freedom” (1997, ix).
12. In Europe, the likes of Karl Marx, J. M. W. Turner, William Blake, William Wordsworth and 
others functioned as socialists and romantics seeking to reinstate the value of locality, community 
and Identity as alternatives were conceived.
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13. In 1911 A German group proposed the setting-up of a “world office” that would “unify all the 
humanitarian tendencies that run in parallel but disorderly directions, and bring about a 
concentration and a promotion of all creative activities” (Tafuri, in Harvey 1990,270).
14. Bey says the TAZ is a critical aside. “The TAZ is like an uprising which does not engage 
directly with the state, a guerrilla operation which liberates an area (of land, of time, of 
imagination) and then dissolves itself before the state can crush it” (2002,117).
15. Consider the mediating status of record players and discs, transistor radios home taping, and 
now MP3 and i-Pod options.
16. One needs to recall the autonomous, free-wheeling activities of the AMM musical collective 
(see Provost 1995). Consider too the ‘Rock in Opposition* festival and organisation based in 
London in the late 1970s (See Cutler 1993 131-135); the socialist ‘Red Wedge’ and die likes of 
Billy Bragg and the ‘Rock Against Racism’ movement, of the same period, (Widgery 1986). 
Political consciousness amongst musicians and audiences is addressed by Steve Redhead (1990).
17. Foucault’s sixth principle is suggestive for this study in that heterotopias can operate as vessels 
of illusion. Foucault writes: “Either their role is to create a space of illusion that exposes every real 
space [...] or else, on the contrary, their role is to create a space that is other, another real space, as 
perfect, as meticulous, as well arranged as ours is messy, ill-constructed and jumbled. This would 
be the heterotopia, not of illusion, but of compensation” (1967, f26). The challenge here is to 
ensure that compensatory music making is only an initial, abstract then concretised utopian urge, 
and not a withdrawal from any subsequent wider engagement and confrontation. In all of these 
musings we detect Foucault’s enduring fascination for the location of inferior discourses and 
isolated discourses where power relations are constituted prior to wider scrutiny. Harvey warns 
that “cultural institutions - museums and heritage centres, arenas for spectacle, exhibitions, and 
festivals - seem to have as the aim the cultivation of nostalgia, the production of sanitized 
collective memories, the nurturing of uncritical aesthetic sensibilities, and the absorption of future 
possibilities into a non-conflictual arena that is eternally present” (Harvey 2000,168).
18. His fourth principle is concerned with time that is ended or perhaps accumulated. This gives on 
to a consideration of the museum and library and reminds us of Derrida’s call (Derrida 2002) for 
the state institutions to make past cultural content available.
19. It is interesting to recall John Cale’s account of his exposure during his (self-confessed) Welsh 
Childhood of constraints to a wider musical world at the hands of BBC radio broadcasters. Desert 
Island Discs, BBC Radio 4,2004.
20. Frith contrasts this with “Canned music [that] has been removed from its social origins. Like 
some alien force it moves relentlessly forward regardless of any human responses to it” (Frith 
2003,95).
21. Churchill’s ‘Battle of Britain’ speech, delivered June 18 1940.
22. A music radio scheduler explaining the targeting of a listenership using knowledge of music 
heard in a formative age range of between 12 and 22, and at its most intense at about 17. “If I play 
any one [of these songs] in a 20 minute sequence. I’m on to a winner” The Archive Hour, BBC 
Radio 4, February 18, 2006. Berland suggests that community radio “forefronts diverse local 
musics and nurtures a sense of difference-within-place.” She argues that it is more contingent than 
public service radio and “refuses to become homogeneous or habitual” (Berland 1998, 140-1). 
This is in contrast to the formulae of local, usually commercial stations.
23. Consider the BBC’s ‘listen again’, i-Player and archival ambitions. Foucault himself identified 
“heterotopias of indefinitely accumulating time, for examples museums and libraries” (Foucault, 
1967).
24. Brian Edge tells us that in “early 1978 Joy Division took good advantage of equipment and 
facilities offered by the Manchester Musician’s Collective, a cooperative set up by Dick Witts of 
The Passage among others, to help local talent flourish outside the constraints of the music 
industry” (1988,18).
25. See particularly Berland (1993, 104-18) and Berland (1998, 129-50). Anderson (1991, 37) 
terms this “simultaneity” which has its origins in the development on the printing press in 
fifteenth-century Europe (Anderson, 1991,37).
26. Consider Raymond Williams’s mobile privatisations (Williams 1974). He offered a subtle 
understanding of subject and society in relation to radio. Comparing the notion of a mass radio 
audience to that of the common situation of domestic, relatively isolated listening he points to 
radio as a technology effecting both “social integration and control” (1974, 23-4), but importantly 
for this study also opportunities for “an at once mobile and home-centred way of living: a form of 
mobile privatisation” whereby Williams implied die social flux of busy external life could be 
represented and apprehended in private (1974,26).
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27. He asks: “Is it conceivable that the exercise of hegemony might leave space untouched? could 
space be nothing more than the passive locus of social relations [...] Hie answer must be no [...] I 
shall demonstrate die active - die operational or instrumental - role of space, as knowledge and 
action, in the existing mode of production” (Lefebvre 1991,11).
28. Derrida has pointed out that there’s a bias in favour of speech over writing. That the self- 
present is more faithful and embodied than the recorded and reproduced which are abstractions and 
pale imitations. Reversing the sequencing (and implied hierarchy) of the dualities above would be 
a start - valuing recorded over the live; the rehearsed over the spontaneous. Deconstructionists will 
at this point also argue there’s also no broadcast space without place, and no place that does not 
contain the bigger spaces of radio. One needs the other to have any content and meaning. The 
family hearth and the teenage bedroom admit sounds from afar. What we are looking at is not the 
theoretical snap shot offered by the binary model, but a process of mutual influence.
29. After Christopher Norris, Deconstruction: Theory and Practice (1991).
30. Desert Island Discs, BBC Radio 4 c.2003.
31. Savage, Bagnall and Longhurst see this as being facilitated by what they identify as the 
mediascape and the technoscape of Appadurai which they outline (2005, 11).
32. Harvey’s Spaces o f Hope (2000) is a play on Raymond Williams’s Resources o f Hope (1989).
33. Harvey is critical of Foucault’s account of dispersed power which is in Foucault perhaps 
insufficiently dialectical in relation to wider forces and is thus frozen. In addition, Harvey points to 
Foucault’s oversight which allows for ideological, dystopian sites to thrive equally well. It 
presumes that connections to the dominant social order are or can be severed, attenuated or, as in 
the prison, totally inverted. The presumption is that power/knowledge is or can be dispersed and 
fragmented into spaces of difference. It presumes that whatever happens in such spaces of 
“Otherness” is of interest and even in some sense “acceptable”, or “appropriate” (Harvey 2000, 
184).
34. Bom points out that with regard to formats and aesthetic standardization, “local sites of 
production and divers aesthetics [are not] synonymous” and that “local production [cannot] 
guarantee diversify” nor that if it did, it would be with reference to “ ‘authentic’, traditional 
aesthetic forms [...] I do not buy into this equation [but] cultural policy can support both of these 
things autonomously, and [...] may well be correlated” (1993a, n.3 288-9).
35. Bom suggests the BBC’s cultural array “enables each genre to comment implicitly on the 
qualities and limits of other genres [reflecting] something of the increasingly complex and chaotic 
nature of modem urban life” (2004,29).
36. See Leyshon, Matless and Revill (1998,16).
PART FOUR | Communication, society & eutopia
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9 Normative ambitions & institutional histories: Public service broadcasting 
& the BBC from Reith to Ravenscroft
9.1 Introduction
Thus far, this study has explored utopian desire and its linguistic articulation in 
relation to music; considered musical experience and music radio in the processes 
of subjectification and intersubjectivity, and developed the conceit of an ethical, 
eutopian space of mediated cultural content.
The fourth part of this study seeks to frame the normative ambitions and 
particular historical realities of British public service broadcasting by way of a 
contextualising intellectual history, present-day academic critique and 
accompanying philosophical gloss. The practice of mediating and delivering 
culture to a nation will be seen to be a potent mix of philosophical, social and 
political agendas. It is a wish to preserve and understand this mix and its eutopian 
aspects that in large part explains the historical-cum-socio-philosophical character 
of this study’s final part.
The present chapter looks at public service ideals and realities, Amoldian 
and Reithian hopes, and the public service agendas of one broadcaster in 
particular, the late John Peel (bom John Ravenscroft). These embodied values are 
examined here with reference to some of the perspectives of Bloch, Gramsci, 
Adomo and other, more contemporary, thinkers to support claims for the efficacy 
of the BBC and its broadcasters.
9.2 Public service broadcasting & the early BBC
In the modem period, states and governments have protected property and 
individual persons in their prosecution of a public and national good. They have 
also facilitated education and inculcated citizenship. Locke (1984) in Two 
Treatises o f Government (1689) saw government arise from agreement to progress 
beyond the ‘state of nature’ whereby the individual willingly ceded the application
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of reason to the community in the form of a collective, more-or-less 
democratically accountable public body and related agencies. The modem state 
thus possesses not an absolute power but a delegated one. It is made incarnate via 
individuals, groups and institutions; it represents our ‘greater selves’. Such self­
less activity is demanded and sanctioned by collective aspiration. Rousseau 
posited the theory of the general will (The Social Contract, 1762a) which 
supposed democratically formulated outcomes that transcended individual aims to 
serve the common good.1 Thus normative public ambition, and more political and 
even commercial realities in respect of mere ‘audiences’, play out in public 
institutions that are for us, but also o f  us.
Since the advent of modem economies, bureaucracies, liberal-democratic 
politics and concomitant national agendas; issues of creativity, leisure, education 
and technical dissemination have increasingly become concerns of national, state- 
monitored bodies. It is the so-called ‘positive function’ of such bodies in 
promoting pleasure and happiness, and the creative aspects of delegated public 
guidance and improvement in particular, assisted indirectly by state laws and taxes 
that concerns us here.
Public service broadcasting does not reach out to a specific individual, and 
neither to an anonymous mass audience. Instead it is offered up to millions of 
individuals (potentially) as what Scannel terms “a for-anyone-as-someone 
structure” (2000, 5), a standardized, communicative framework that “in its 
organization and design, presents itself as useable and useful for anyone” (2000, 
6). For Scannell, such “structures register the play of the social, the dialectic of 
impersonal and personal, collective and individual historical processes” (2000, 
16). Developed, public service broadcasting thus arguably encourages a mediated 
intersubjectivity for mature or maturing individuals within such a structure where 
they express themselves and encounter others.
Early public service broadcasting in Britain was motivated in a different 
way, and sought to educate and raise the cultural lives of others for reasons of 
national unity, public utility, and social control: albeit tempered slightly by a 
heartfelt obligation to ‘improve’. Central to national ‘cultivation’ has been the 
idea of the immature subject and the assumed maturity and even superiority of the 
paternalistic, or sometimes aristocratic cultivating body. Bom writes of political
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and intellectual worry about “the unready state of ordinary people for the 
responsibilities of citizenship” and the need to “create the kind of informed and 
rational citizenry” that would “support the development of an inclusive, 
participatory and enlightened democracy” (2004, 28).
Public-service broadcasting is a compound of a system of control, an attitude of 
mind and an aim, which if successfully achieved results in a service which cannot 
be given by any other means. The system of control is full independence, or the 
maximum degree [...] that Parliament will accord. The attitude of mind is an 
intelligent one capable of attracting to the service the highest quality of character 
and intellect [...] it must not be vitiated by political or commercial considerations. 
Sir Ian Jacob, Director General of the BBC, quoted by Greene (1960, 3)
Bom is however right to characterise the formation of the BBC as one of 
“political intervention” and “political imagination” (2004, 26). And, like many 
academics, she is rightly sensitive to the class-bound impulses of the BBC, then 
and now (see Bom 2004, 5). Scannell and Cardiff argue (after Raymond 
Williams) that “The Victorian reforming ideal of service was animated by a sense 
of moral purpose and of social duty on behalf of the community, aimed 
particularly at those most in need of reforming -  the lower classes” (1991, 9). This 
impulse toward educational and cultural enlightenment, Scannell and Cardiff 
argue, was possessed by the middle class, and informed the ideals of public 
service broadcasting by the BBC from its founding in the 1920s through to the 
1950s. It was first articulated in the writings of Arnold, and was echoed in the 
work and writings of Reith. Thus a means existed, in the BBC, of assuaging moral 
guilt and class tensions - particularly at the time of universal suffrage - when a 
new and ‘immature’ electorate of unknown potentials came into being.
In so doing, a national culture would arise where ‘anyone-as-someone’ 
would begin to experience their own sense of self as part of a larger, cohesive 
citizenry. As Scannell and Cardiff observe: “radio, in an organized social form, 
seemed to be one significant and unprecendented means of helping to shape a 
more unified and egalitarian society” (1991, 13). What resulted was “a shared 
public life [as] radio and, later, television were potent means of manufacturing 
that ‘we-feeling’ ” (1991, 277). The true extent of present-day social (and by 
implication a class) inclusion is contested and constructively reviewed elsewhere 
(Bom 2004 & 2006).
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Arnoldian values & John Reith
In his book, Broadcast Over Britain (Reith, 1924), first Director General of the 
BBC, John Reith, demonstrated a knowledge of the English nineteenth century 
poet, cultural critic and school inspector Matthew Arnold, and his respective book, 
Culture and Anarchy: An essay in political and social criticism of 1867-9 (1993, 
53-211). Arnold’s critique interestingly has much in common with the descriptive 
and normative approaches of the likes of Bloch and Adorno, observing that 
“perfection can never be reached without seeing things as they really are” (1993, 
208). Moreover, Arnold recognised the need for an intellectually revitalised, 
independently minded critique of modem society’s habituated approach to 
education and culture, and a non-patronising attitude of experts to the education of 
the mass: “Plenty of people will try to give the masses, as they call them, an 
intellectual food prepared and adapted in the way they think proper for the action 
condition of the masses” (1993, 79). To effect this, Arnold advocated roles for 
“instrumental statesmen [and] creative statesmen” (1993,208). He wrote:
We have not the notion, so familiar on the Continent and to antiquity, of the 
State, - the nation in its collective and corporate character, entrusted with general 
powers for the general advantage, and controlling individual wills in the name of 
an interest wider than that of individuals. (1993, 83)
Such views instantly turn our gaze towards Reith, and the task entrusted him to
2
head the new, state-constituted BBC. In the 1860s, Arnold witnessed British class 
struggles for power. For him, any revolutionary seizure of state powers by the 
masses would have been unacceptable, but, writing as he was in 1861, a post- 
aristocratic, democratically derived political emancipation was acceptable to him. 
Democratic though he was in this regard, he still advocated the promotion of 
older, aristocratic standards in culture, and sought to hitch cultural affairs to state 
ministration. The responsibility of enculturation should, for Arnold, be taken on at 
a national level. He wrote: “A good thing meant for the many cannot be well be so 
exquisite as the good things for the few; but it can easily, if it comes from a donor 
of great resources and wide power, be incomparably better than what the many 
could, unaided, provide for themselves” (Arnold 1861, 18). He seemed to favour 
the disinterested powers of fine culture and education for all as a means to a
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reasoned and felicitous society, aided, even embodied, by a benign state. “What if 
we tried to rise above the idea of class to the idea of the whole community, the 
State, and to find our centre of light and authority there?” Arnold continued: “We 
want an authority, and we find nothing but jealous classes, checks and a deadlock; 
culture suggests the idea of the State. We find no basis for a firm state-power in 
our ordinary selves; culture suggests one to us in our best se lf ” (1993, 98-9). If 
we are to raise standards, we are to do so through state channels. Arnold here is 
Hegelian, and invites people to look positively at the state when it has everyone’s 
higher interests and aspirations in view. He wrote:
It is not State-action in itself which the middle and lower classes of a nation 
ought to deprecate; it is State-action exercised by a hostile class, and for their 
oppression [...] For the middle or lower classes to obstruct such a State-action, to 
repel its benefits, is to play the game of their enemies, and to prolong for 
themselves a condition of real inferiority. (1861, 19)
Arnold was writing of schooling primarily here, but his principles do anticipate 
Reithian ones, both having an interest in democratic access to the best cultural 
diet, overseen by ‘well-meaning’ state institutions. Reith on the other hand, whilst 
also valuing culture and a state-sanctioned education of society as a route to 
national betterment, seemed less ready to embrace any elite as a sole source of 
improving culture. He wrote:
Like some other interests, the musical profession, and the general musical 
interests of the country, have tended to come under the sway of a limited number 
of individuals who exercise semi-dictatorial powers [...] and in whose hands has 
lain the organization of most of the musical pleasures with which at their 
discretion the countiy, or rather a very limited portion of it, is regaled. (1924, 
102)
Reith did not abandon Arnold’s faith in education however, and avocated a more 
pragmatic, ‘earthed’ approach the social matters:
There are two kinds of idealist: the dreamer who sees the ultimate vision and has 
no conception of how to overcome or circumvent the difficulties [...] and the 
practical idealist who builds up his Utopia on the foundations, and with the 
materials, already at hand [...] the practical idealist [...] looks to education as the 
hope of the nation. (1924,181)
Reith then turned to the new medium of radio broadcasting as an educational, 
democratic vehicle: “Of a sudden, a new concern appears, exploiting music to an
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extent hitherto undreamt of. There is a flutter in the dovecots” (1924, 102). Reith 
also was ready to admit a plurality of music, and refused to be swayed by either 
the serious or populist camps: “As in all our work, it must be remembered that 
every variety of musical taste has to be catered for [selections should be] perfectly 
good [...] quite popular, easily understood and assimilated, or capable of being 
understood and assimilated” (1924, 174-5). In addition, Reith looked ahead to 
when broadcasts might deliver even more:
The time is not far distant when for those to hear who care to listen, voices from 
the ends of the earth shall be brought to all the homes of Britain [...] they may 
hear the messages or the music of the East or the West, or may attend to that sent 
in return [...] in such a realization of world-unity, music will play its exalted part. 
(1924, 221-2)
Ideals & reality: ‘Happier homes, good music and a new national asset *
In 1927, the British Broadcasting Company - an association of radio set 
manufacturers - was keen to assemble audio content for its members’ products. 
The broadcast of their varied, commercially inspired content rapidly became the 
prime concern of a Government anxious to exercise quantitative and qualitative
4
controls on domestic radio transmissions. This wish for control translated itself 
into the ethics and pronouncements of many working within the BBC, and was 
joined (sincerely it can be argued) by high-minded pursuit of the nation’s 
cultivation. This combination of governmental overview, high-mindedness and the 
brute reality of BBC’s near monopoly in radio matters until the 1970s sits at the 
foundation of this particular point.
Near the start of his general managership of the British Broadcasting 
Company in 1924, Reith wrote of the anticipated demands which would be made 
on the new institution:
The responsibility weighs heavily with us; let there be no misunderstanding on 
that score [...] It is a burden such as few have been called upon to carry. Whether 
we are fit or not, is for reasoned judgement only, but at any rate it is relevant and 
advisable that our recognition of the responsibility should be known (Reith 1924, 
34)
It is not difficult to view the ethos of a nascent BBC in the 1920s and that of Reith 
its first Director General coloured by the ancient philosophers, more modem
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thinkers and contemporary cultural figures.5 Reith indeed asked whether radio 
might:
operate as a living force [...] as long ago it operated in the city state? It must 
cover more and more of the field of the social and cultural life; become more and 
more valuable as an index to the community’s outlook and personality. (1949, 
135)
The Liberal enlightenment at work in a modem, public-service state is of a kind 
where the BBC allows a subject to encounter an objective world. Here, 
intimations of a Hegelian ‘ought’ are played against the givens of a Hegelian ‘is’, 
as progress towards human fulfillment ensues. Subject and society become 
something better in the presence of wider perspectives and an improving culture.
Karl Mannheim alluded to such a liberal character as Reith in his 1936 
account of ideology and Utopia:
The fundamental attitude of the liberal is characterised by a positive acceptance 
of culture and the giving of an ethical tone to human affairs. He is most in his 
element in the role of critic rather than that of creative destroyer. He has not 
broken his contract with the present - the here and now. (1960,198)
This process of ‘becoming’, of socialisation and cultivation seeking a given moral 
end favoured by Reith is nothing new. In previous eras, activity and ambition - 
with theological, scientific and philosophical ends in view - was sought through 
faith, secular education, science, civic activity or revolution. In the nineteenth 
century, a combination of Judeo-Christian and enlightenment impulses toward 
change and betterment coloured the thoughts of Marx and other reforming 
thinkers, and was paralleled in biological, ethnographic and ethnological quarters, 
and in urban, non-conformist congregations.6 The likes of Arnold and Reith were, 
it can be argued, products of this rich teleological ideology of active, ‘here and 
now’ faith and reason. We can look to Mannheim to identify the character of 
liberal humanists turning to education as a conduit for self-development and 
emancipation - development that would also be a good ‘end’ for the wider 
community. Mannheim identified a:
middle stratum that was disciplining itself through conscious self-cultivation and 
which regarded ethics and intellectual culture as its principle self-justification 
(against the nobility), and unwittingly shifted the bases of experience from an
7
ecstatic to an educational plane. (1960,205)
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Reith was appointed BBC General Manager at the age of only 34. He later 
confessed that he did not really know what radio was, but that his ‘face’, that of a 
Scottish presbyterian and ex-services officer seemed to fit. Even so, he was 
neither entirely an establishment figure doing the Government’s bidding, nor was 
he a common man. He was surely of Mannheim’s middle rank. What was Reith 
like as an individual, and how did this impact on his administration of the BBC? 
One insight appears in his postwar autobiography where he wrote of the Latin 
inscription inside Broadcasting House, Portland Place, London. The inscription is 
taken from Paul to the Philippians Chapter 4 verse 8 which reads: “In conclusion 
my brothers, fill your minds with those things that are good and those that deserve
g
praise, things that are true, noble, right, pure, lovely and honourable.” Reith wrote 
in his autobiography that:
There was publicity [...] much of it probably sarcastic about the [Broadcasting 
House] dedication Deo Omnipotenti [...] from Philippians iv, 8 in the entrance 
hall. It was Rendall’s composition; the inclusion of my name in the inscription 
was his doing. The sentiment was magnificent; I entirely approved o f it; but was 
not sure if the BBC could live up to i t  (Reith 1949, 159)
Interestingly, the whole tone of the final passages of the 1949 autobiography is a 
humble, almost disillusioned one. Here Reith commented on his lack of any 
certain knowledge in his later years that he might usefully pass on to his children. 
Reith’s BBC directorship had, in contrast, been coloured by his youthful 
certainties: respect for God, Sundays and education that he pursued by exploiting
9the BBC’s monopolistic position to deliver its three key duties. The BBC should 
he argued, inform, educate and entertain - what became the so-called Reithian 
trinity.10 Entertainment for Reith should be British in origin and character, and 
should serve a particular purpose. Entertainment (rather than ‘art’) for its own 
sake was inappropriate, but should be there to sooth tired individuals in their 
leisure hours. The BBC should encourage cultural discrimination and selective, 
active listening.11 This is a complex view of culture on the part of Reith that 
combines Kantian notions of moral agreement with a more mundane deployment 
of it for specific purposes of ‘improvement’ or compensation. In Reith’s case, it 
combines an elevated, ‘aristocratic’ perspective and the certainties and duty of an
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earlier age, with a more middle-ranking, post-First World War commitment to 
national recovery and social responsibility.12
For Reith, radio transcended parochialism and partisanship. It mediated 
town and country, nature and city street, public figures and those at home and was 
“a return of the City-State of old. All that and more” (1949, 100). For him, 
broadcasting could overcome the problem of social fragmentation: “the modem 
problem was [...] not of sub-division but of integration; there was no unity of the 
nervous system of the body politic” (1949,136). On unifying taste Reith wrote:
Integration is a process not of gross summation but of ordering and valuation. 
Broadcasting was not only the collector but die selector of material. Therein lay -
13and always will lie - its supreme responsibility. (1949, 136)
A responsibility aided, he conceded by the uncompromising power of what he 
termed “the brute force of monopoly” (1949,99).14
A later director reiterated the idealistic ambitions of the BBC as laid out by 
Reith. Sir Hugh Greene, who headed the corporation between 1960 and 1969 
wrote:
The true purpose of the BBC [was] concerned with the whole of life. The 
broadcaster opens a window on the world and for many, especially the young, it 
is a window opened for the first time [...] the new age of broadcasting which lies 
before us should not stand in the service of governments, political, political 
parties, big business or sectional interests. (Sir Hugh Greene, part of a US speech, 
1961, cited in Briggs (1995, 325 [WAC file R44/548]) 15
Reith’s (and the BBC’s) role then was always to be at once idealistic and 
discerning, whilst also mindful of social obligation, and all of this to be applied in 
a modem, technologically advancing democracy.16 Reith consciously trod a line 
between establishment principles and a reality of social and technological change. 
Interposed between the implementation of state duty via Government and the 
shifting socio-cultural realities, Reith’s mediating institution exhibited neither fear 
nor favour in its dogged determination to meet the necessity for an independent 
BBC, without which, no one and no institution, governmental or social could hope
17to thrive. Reith’s strict independence and patriotism succeeded in rebuffing
18American culture, but not its business models - which he witnessed firsthand - to 
extend an orderly, middle-class culture of liberal ambition that acknowledged the
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existence of elite tastes cultivated through leisure time, but which also sought to 
improve the tastes and prospects of the lower orders through modem technical
19means.
Briggs reminds us that Reith asked: “What ‘incalculable harm’ might have 
been done, if those in charge of the BBC had been without principles? What 
would have happened had the controllers of the BBC been content with 
mediocrity, with providing a service which was just sufficiently good to avoid 
complaint.”20 This view is articulated in class terms in the next decade when we 
look again to Mannheim:
We owe die possibility of mutual interpenetration and understanding of existent 
currents of thought to the presence of such a relatively unattached middle stratum 
which is open to the constant influx of individuals from the most diverse social 
classes and groups with all possible points of view. (Mannheim 1960, 143-4)
Mannheim’s point is that in the past, social antagonisms tended to be mediated by
,21the bourgeoisie. Back in 1936, independent, “socially unattached intelligentsia - 
more frilly educated individuals not caught up in class particulars (ruling or 
proletarian) were well placed to effect, when together a sensitive, progressive 
synthesis. Reith and Peel (himself from the public school system) typify this 
twentieth-century agent of public service, expertise and respect.
Eutopian administration
Nineteenth century Amoldian paternalism had articulated notions of a public 
good, proposing ‘the best’ for everyone. Implementation of this benign concept 
required three additional conditions that were to emerge at the start of the 
twentieth century. The first of these was broad, cross-party political will; the 
second, a selfless suite of new and reformed institutional platforms and the last,
the technocratic-cum-socio-cultural phenomenon of broadcasting, regarded by the
22Sykes Committee in 1923 as “public property”. Only a new and distinct 
economic and political state polity could effect a broad educational and cultural 
substrate to stimulate the sharing of a common national purpose to tackle national 
reconstruction, economic challenges and, at the same time, transcend divisive 
class conditions. Jenny Owen observes that “by the 1920s, ‘public service’ could 
be understood as an increasingly coherent set of principles. These principles
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embraced a definition of efficiency which stressed the ‘human factor’, a ‘belief in 
people rather than balance sheets’ and a commitment to serve the community” 
(Owen 1996, vii).
The BBC came into being as one institutional response of the British 
national polity amongst many to modem social, economic and cultural conditions 
offering a planned collective socio-cultural space of access implemented by what 
Owen has identified as “technocratic expertise” and an administering, “aristocracy 
of talent”.23 The liberal-democratic state could, and should take part in cultivating 
subjects away from individualistic outlooks and towards a less selfish collective 
ideal that might, at the same time, promote an individual ontogenesis which might 
serve subject, family and national community. An interventionist liberalism might 
not simply continue to espouse an Amoldian sense of public service ideals but, 
with the reform of a mature bureaucratic class, tackle the forces of hitherto 
unbridled capitalism and the partialities of a market-inflected public sphere. 
British government, at the start of the twentieth century had begun to exhibit the 
necessary socio-philosophical outlook amid its political and administrative castes. 
A public conscience, meritocratic policy and inclusivity were being promoted, 
which would be, by the start of WWII, sufficiently mature to ensure that the 
somewhat transitional phase of Reithian paternalism and cultural conservatism
24
could respond more generously and empathetically to popular taste.
Music radio
“Before broadcasting, music did not exist as a unified cultural field.. .what existed 
were particular musics [...] choral societies [...] brass and military bands [...] 
concert publics [...] background music [...] dance” (Scannell and Cardiff 1991, 
182). Scannell and Cardiff tell us “Radio uprooted all these musics from their 
particular social and economic settings and brought them together in a strange 
new abstract unity” (1991, 182). This, from the outset, involved planning and 
execution based on what Scannell views as the “standardization, classification and 
evaluation of the whole field of music” (1991, 182). Bom reminds us that almost 
from the beginning BBC programming was “one of the first sustained experiments 
in the juxtaposition of cultural genres” (2004, 29). Scannell and Cardiff explain 
that “through a policy of mixed programming on a single channel [...] the BBC
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quite unintentionally brought all these musics and their publics into collision with 
each other” and think “a plurality of choices was more likely to produce a 
negative response to one kind of music in order to affirm a preference for another” 
(1991, 207). They add that “there was no universal audience for the universe of 
music on radio. The ideal-typical listener who enjoyed everything from Henry 
Hall to Bach existed only in the corporate mind” (1991, 221). A shift towards an 
acceptance of demarcated class tastes and a simple wish for entertainment ensued 
in the war years and was further expanded by the BBC in the 1960s when it saw 
the need to represent hitherto unrepresented youthful tastes for the popular.
In short, the BBC’s history has never been that of a singular politico- 
cultural project but, as Bom expresses it, one of “ideas and of fashions in ethics 
and aesthetics as they attach to changing technological possibilities.” (2004, 26.) 
Of course, it is this, allied to contesting and serious discourses (with and beyond) 
about the absolute and relative merits of various ‘high and ‘popular’ genres, allied 
to the BBC’s ‘universal’ array of available genres, which infuses the BBC with 
something more than a hegemonic duty. To be sure, it has always had a state- 
dependency, being set about by constitutional matters, funding pressures, 
committees, governors and now trustees, but, as Bom explains, “the BBC is not 
formally a direct instrument of state [it has] a real autonomy, deepened over the 
decades by the growth of a powerful and recalcitrant professionalism” (2004, 31). 
To this, one must add an increasingly informed and articulate nation of individual 
expression, audition and debate.
9.3 Adorno, administration & culture
Where else do we look for an optimistic reading of administered culture and 
cultural agency within public institutions? Let’s turn once again to Adorno. His 
views on culture and administration identified tensions as the content of the 
former was edited and marshaled by the latter. However, as is often the case with 
Adorno, some optimism can be inferred amid his dialectically negative analyses. 
We begin with his suggestion that cultural activity cannot be isolated from wider 
social realities:
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The appeal to the creators of culture to withdraw from the process of 
administration and keep distant from it has a hollow ring. Not only would this 
deprive them of the possibility of earning a living, but also of every effect, every 
contact between work of art and society, something which the work of greatest 
integrity cannot do without, if it is not to perish. (Adorno 200lg, 119)
We then read that for Adorno, institutionalised culture might be critically 
inflected:
In the beginning nothing more can be demanded than a cultural policy [...] a 
policy which does not conceive of the concept of culture as a reified fixed 
configuration of values, but rather a policy which absorbs critical consideration in 
order to develop them further. (200lg, 127-8)
Might Adorno’s words on cultural administration describe the BBC’s sense of 
purpose as a space of integrity and cultural flux, sensitive to comment? If it were 
not a genuine, responsive space, it would be of little value, either to a ruling group 
wanting credibility to sustain their hegemonic reach, or to a diverse public 
wanting a national platform of wide cultural representation. Adorno’s position 
seems to betoken an argument for the BBC as a channel of factual truths and, 
perhaps more beside, in the way of cultural aspiration. In a rare utterance on the 
BBC, we read the following from Adorno in a discussion on exaggeration in 
relation to teaching and propaganda:
The more stringently one holds to the facts - which God knows speak for 
themselves, or against themselves - the better. If you will recall from the war, 
which I of course did not experience in Germany, the authority the BBC, the 
English radio, enjoyed precisely because it did not make propaganda [...] one 
knew that it was telling die truth. (Adomo 1998d, Appendix 1, 306)
Adorno saw an institution’s duty to be, ideally, that o f an administrator of reality, 
but he also knew the task to be a more extensive and insinuating one as cultural 
administrators warmed to their power and responsibilities. Here Adomo identified 
the dialectical modification of ideal social and cultural content by politicised and 
partial bureaucratic systems. What he bemoaned was the synthesis that in its 
populist, homogenised form fails to keep up with his own standards of critical 
insight and judgement Adomo drew attention to the inevitable role of 
administrators in cultural and ethical choreography that are closely bound together 
in public service output:
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Whoever speaks of culture speaks of administration as well [...] The combination 
of so many things lacking a common denominator - such as philosophy and 
religion, science and art, forms of conduct and mores - and finally the inclusion 
of the objective spirit of an age in the single word ‘culture’ betrays from the 
outset the administrative view, the task of which looking down from on high, is to 
assemble, distribute, evaluate and organize. (Adomo 200lg, 107)
Adomo continued with references to the concept of “The Cultural World” that 
may be heard in radio broadcasting itself. Here he stated, is “a province where 
everything possible is encountered, in so far as it corresponds to a more or less 
precise idea of niveau and cultivation - in contrast to the sphere of entertainment” 
(200lg, 107-8). Adomo again alluded to the tension of cultural growth and its 
regulated delivery:
Culture is viewed as the manifestation of pure humanity without regard for its 
functional relationships within society [...] no half-way sensitive person can 
overcome the discomfort conditioned by his consciousness of a culture which is 
indeed administered. (200lg, 107-8)
So, has the BBC overcome the tensions identified by Adomo, and if so how? Is it 
forever bureaucratically hamstrung (and instrumentally tainted) and is culture on 
air in Britain merely an administered one? Does the BBC deliver pure values or 
serve as an administrative arm of capitalism and commodity distribution? It is 
perhaps the moment to delve into the histories of the BBC and its agents.
9.4 “Listen to auntie” - Critiques of the BBC23
Look at its nickname - ‘Auntie’ {Big Buzz respondent no. 119, 2003).
Socio-philosophical contestation over the purpose and accountability of the 
nation’s public service broadcaster surfaced in the post-war era, particularly as the 
commercial ITV channel launched in the 1950s; pirate pop music stations briefly 
applied pressure to staid BBC radio music policy in the 1960s, and independent 
commercial radio came to air in the mid-1970s.26 Additional debate ensued when, 
in 1982 Channel 4 television was launched, and offered a new economic model of 
public service broadcasting. This development, at the start of a long period of 
Conservative governance in Britain, marked the moment at which pure public
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service ethos became subject to a rampant instrumentalism, conceived as a 
freemarket liberation of the entrepreneurial; a pseudo-democratic culture of 
enterprise which, in the corridors of the BBC developed into what is now known 
as Birtism. Under John Birt, old cultural ambition and representational impulses 
geared to a socio-cultural ‘effectiveness’, gave way to a financially driven agenda 
which taxed long-standing internal standards of creativity and, amongst many 
internal changes, saw the abandonment o f the qualitative listener appreciation
27index for the BBC’s radio output. Bom is clear that for her, the replacement of
the corporation’s trust in its staff in the 1980s and 1990s was replaced by an
auditing and structural model that saw a “Birtist management [...] responsible for
eroding the BBC’s creativity” (2004, 5). Curran (1996), whilst noting that in the
mass media generally of the West there were “staff with a commitment to
professional goals” and a high degree of autonomy” there was, (in 1996), a
situation where “more power has been ceded to professional managers concerned
with market performance rather than the pursuit of ideological goals” (1996,122).
Sir Henry Bunbury’s call back in the 1920s for the administration of
public institutions to be one unhindered by political interference at managerial
level - a view supported by Reith - might, under Birt, be seen as one plank of the
public service ethos that had been stripped-out, never to return. However, such
accountability, rather than evacuating any last traces of a public service ethos of
cultural discernment, democratic representation, experiment and technical
standards seems to have seen such an ethos remain deep within the BBC’s 
28corridors and studios.
There are those who would rebut any benign reading of administered 
culture and who would condemn all public communications as bureaucratic,
29
authoritarian acts of socio-cultural imposition. Certainly, arguments counter to 
the propositions of this chapter require some attention. The very process of culture 
for some is one of audition and subsequent regimentation. As Nietzsche wrote in
30Ecce Homo: “Culture begins with obedience”. We should not be surprised by the 
sinister imagery of Nietzsche’s listening subject, and can hear an echo of it in 
Levin’s quotation from Derrida’s Ear o f the Other: “You open wide the portals
31[pavilions] of your ears to admit the state”. This conjures a similar picture of 
listening imposed from above. Levin surely presents us with Derrida’s stark image
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of state intrusion into the life of subjects, but only to stress the equal presence of 
the potentials of such a relationship. Derrida would argue that these alternatives 
would have a deconstructive moment when subject and polity reveal a dynamic 
interdependence that plays out equally between their respective locales, namely 
place and space as addressed deconstructively in Chapter 8. This chapter accepts 
this duality, but sympathises with Levin’s optimistic conviction that, whilst we are 
exposed to both as we listen, possibilities outweigh perils as dialogue and dialectic 
emerge between the universal values of an enlightening state and its rational 
subjects.
There are, of course, some instrumental and hegemonic aspects to the BBC 
that have been clearly identified. Edward Buscombe wrote of the BBC’s 
“historical role, at least as defined by those in control, has been to function as a 
support for those in power”, and it remains “to many people [...] essentially the 
instrument of a single class” (1993, 155, 161). Its commercial origins; 
governmental influence over Charter renewal terms and the propagation of a 
compliant citizenry are features that cannot be ignored. Many, then and now of 
course have argued “that broadcasters were not challenging enough and were 
cowed by Government and vested interests to produce programmes which 
bolstered up the status quo and concealed how a better society could evolve” 
(Annan 1977,15).
Until the early 1970s, many children in British schools and at home were 
told by adults to listen, concentrate and obey. As a faux personal address and 
invitation to concentrate, children were often asked by the radio presenter, “Are 
you sitting comfortably? [pause] then I’ll begin”. What took place as we listened 
attentively to the wider world was private and collective participation, 
subjectification and cultivation. A considered response from any young adult 
reflecting on their several years’ exposure to the BBC in the postwar years might 
be, “I am the BBC!”. They may conclude that they have not only been “informed, 
educated and entertained”, but thoroughly constituted in a socio-cultural and 
political sense as an obedient citizen by a BBC reproducing the hegemonic 
dominance of the nation’s ruling class. The following Big Buzz respondent may 
allow critics of the BBC to dismiss them as expressing a false consciousness as 
they recount the ‘value’ of BBC broadcasting as if  by rote:
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I listen predominantly to Radio 1 and Radio Five Live and they inform me on 
news, weather, sport, popular music, diverse society and different cultures to my 
own from which I learn. {Big Buzz respondent no. 119, 2003)
But what about the following response:
The attitude of the BBC is one of providing a service based on quality and depth 
rather than the dumbing-down of output from other media. They tell it like it is 
rather than what you want to hear. {Big Buzz respondent no. 118,2003)
Consider this response too:
I don’t find any aspect of the BBC stuffy or arrogant, they are producing a wide 
range of programme appealing to a broad church of viewers and listeners. Why 
should they be accountable? [this] would inevitably result in more control from 
the government o f the day. The fact that they have stuck two fingers up to Tony 
Blair and his insane preoccupation with controlling the media only increases their 
world standing in self-control and honest reporting. {Big Buzz respondent no. 118, 
2003)
This last justification for rejecting any additional, government-led, external 
accountability overlooks the contemporary facts of government-approved, market- 
orientated efficiencies o f Directors General like Birt and the politicised nature of 
the then Board o f Governors and today the new BBC Trust. Perhaps then it is an 
expression o f hope for independent and professional self-regulation founded on 
more enduring and profound values; a hope founded on the ethics expounded in 
earlier decades and still present in ordinary debate.
Critics aver that liberal apologists for the BBC perhaps exhibit a number of blind 
spots. Firstly, their own upbringing (and those of a ‘conservative’ majority) can 
colour perceptions. Curran (1996), in looking even-handedly at the mass media as 
either social mirror, ideological and emotional mirror, or one of consensus, warns 
that the liberal perspective is less than critical and too trustworthy (1996, 122-3). 
For him, there is often an assumed “underlying unity of interest in society” and 
that the “media are independent and socially neutral agencies” (1996, 128). Bom 
writes: “The BBC is outmoded, our relations with it as drenched in nostalgia and 
sentimentality as they are with the monarchy or the Church of England” (2004, 7). 
Secondly, in spite o f a wish to be ‘universal’ in terms of equal employment 
opportunities and social and cultural representation, “The BBC’s services have 
marginalized the interests and social expression of many of Britain’s minority
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groups” (Bom  2004, 10). Despite criticisms of the BBC’s public service mission 
and its advocates, one individual agent -  John Peel -  has, within the institution, 
striven hard to  be socio-culturally inclusive in his pursuit o f his BBC rem it It is to 
him we now turn.
9.5 Agency: G ram sci, Bloch, Adorno & Peel
“John Peel shaped me as a person - all I know about credible music is down to 
him [...] My world is a less pleasant place without him.” - Sean Fitzpatrick
“To build a bridge is one of the noblest of man’s endeavours. John built bridges 
between people and music and created joy for so many along the way.” - ‘H’ 
London
“He reached out to people of all colours, regions and ages; clearly a unique man, 
who introduced the world to a diverse, melting pot of music.” — Iketina
These, and m any m ore messages were posted websites in the days following 
Peel’s death (O ctober 25 2004) including the John Peel homepage: BBC.Co.UK, 
accessed in Novem ber 2004. They attest to the disc jockey’s importance to many 
listening subjects who understood his motivations, appreciated the independence 
he exercised and who believed they benefited from his unparalleled breadth of 
musical curiosity.
As B ritish broadcasting history shapes particular subjects (employees and 
listeners) so do individual agents influence in turn, the histoiy of the BBC. The 
BBC is argued to be a m ediator o f humanitarian values amid the imperfections of 
a real world. Universal values are crystalised in the outlooks and careers of 
particular BBC agents, and, because of that, we listeners encounter a testing, 
transforming idealism , encouraging us as rational subjects to become morally a- 
tuned individuals.
There is ample condemnation of the BBC as a paternalistic ‘ideological 
apparatus’ sure o f its m ission, and no more benign than any of its ‘free market’,
32New World or fascist counterparts. Some have detected a reproduction of class 
interest, others a capitulation o f Amoldian values as new technologies and 
changing commercial paradigms appeared. However, what receives relatively 
little attention is the cooption and usage of creative agency manifest within the
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state-institutions and cultural policies o f the modem British polity. A dialectic 
between society, institution and agent surely takes us from the optimism of 
Gramsci and his belief in individual agency, through the dynamic of Adorno’s 
negative dialectics towards the reassuringly British compromise of Anthony 
Giddens and his theory o f structuration where history shapes people as they shape
.  33It.
Gramsci & organic intellectuals
Gramsci’s attention to history, economics, people and institutions allowed him to 
effect the move from a bleak critical theory, to one that presages the ‘process’
34accounts o f W illiams and Habermas, Benhabib, Levitas and Bronner. Gramsci’s 
outlook was his ‘war o f position’: a slow and complex struggle, fuelled by a 
intellectual-moral nexus sensitive to conditions which can operate in the 
interstices o f material and hegemonic givens. Gramsci asked us to attend to 
infrastructure, supportive ideology, and the potential for the democratisation of 
knowledge and action within our existing superstructures, a position which 
somewhat prefigures that o f Habermas. He gave credence to the ability of the 
individual to achieve influence in an institutional setting. His premise was one that 
has resurfaced in the sociological model o f Anthony Giddens and also implicit in 
the thought o f Gamham (1992), Harvey (2000) and Bom (1993a and 2004). 
Curran (1996), whilst critical o f a Gramscian, post-Marxist position for being too 
focused on culture per se, and for the stance offering a “ ‘liberal Marxist’ [...] 
Blank cheque”, does aver that “the Gramscian legacy still has something to offer” 
(1996, 133). In order to breakout o f the fate visited on subjects by any 
Althusserian structure, subjects not only survive social inscription but are able, in 
turn to exercise their resultant character within the workings of those same, 
formative institutions.35
As a good Marxist, Gramsci saw a potential for bourgeois forms and 
activity to serve as a well o f potency and change. Kearney states that:
Gramsci saw a need for socialist, ‘organic intellectuals’ to organise information 
[...] Bourgeois culture Gramsci remained convinced, is capable of occasionally 
expressing progressive forms of moral protest against injustice and inequality and 
this ‘native’ tradition of protest should be fostered by socialism rather than 
summarily dismissed. (Kearney 1986, 171,179)
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Gramsci argued strongly for the transforming powers of individual genius and 
intellectual agents within the superstructure and given historically informed social 
settings. This is a view that encompasses the ideas of informed activity and 
edifying work.
So, how might agency inform any eutopia proposition? Encouraging is 
comment from Jack Zipes who identifies the thread of thought which calls for 
radical agency in the ‘here and now’:
Bloch and Freire’s utopian hope is at the basis of self-transcending action and 
militant optimism that contest consumer capitalism and postmodern nihilism. [...] 
By positing the utopian impulse not as a fixed human essence but as one of 
existential necessity for bringing about social transformation [there emerge] critical 
utopias [that] enable educators to clearly see how the real-possible conditions for 
the utopian function can take root in die concrete materiality of daily struggle. 
(Zipes 1997, 8)
Adorno, commenting positively on free agency in an institutional setting wrote:
The spontaneous consciousness, not yet totally in the grips of reification, is still 
in a position to alter the function of the institution [...] For the present, within 
liberal-democratic order, the individual still has sufficient freedom within the 
institution [and] Whoever makes critically and unflinchingly conscious use of the 
means o f administration and its institutions is still in a position to realize 
something which would be different from merely administrated culture. (200lg, 
131)
Bom provocatively calls for “elected musical experts [...] organic 
intellectuals” to move away from an uncritical populism or consumerism back to 
an engagement with deeper aesthetic concerns (1993a, 280-81).36 However, for 
Bom this must not constitute a return to avant-garde thought whereby musical
products “tyrannise the subject” (1993a, 281). She states it is “time to move
beyond the rigid inhibitions instituted by the various structuralist and
poststructuralist deconstructions o f authorship and to begin tentatively again to 
talk of the author, his /her role, and his/her potential political engagement” 
(1993a, 274). For Bom, the “political position of the author is not foreclosed” and 
that “cultural works are produced [...] through the conditioned interaction of 
originating subjects.” She adds “I am calling [...] for a return of agency in 
theorizing cultural production, and for acknowledgement of the place of
originating creativity or, simply, work” (1993a, 275). For Bom, “The author may
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perhaps be conceived as an individual or collective subject [...] who inhabits or 
supervises a process of production, thereby marking the process aesthetically and 
socially in a pronounced way” (1993a, 275). Bom wishes to insert authorial 
agency as a force impacting on what she terms the imaginary social and aesthetic 
dimensions o f ‘enabling’ production, which constitute, in the cultural object, a 
potential site for Adomian homological readings and an aesthetic ‘use value’ as a 
political point o f subjective and collective departure (1993a, 234-5). Thus we 
have, in popular cultural production, reification but also a residual authorial intent
37and, potentially as a still-possible site of ‘enigmatic’ potential.
Bom (2000), subsequently argues more extensively for the value of social, 
media and cultural theory addressing the sites and moments o f cultural production. 
Bom argues “for the ontological priority o f production of consumption in the 
sociological analysis o f culture” because “the power to represent and to create in 
sociolinguistic terms, to speak, to engage in the struggle for the sign -  is 
foundational for cultural politics, as it is in some versions of cultural theory” 
(2000, 405-6). Attention paid in this way to a privileging of agency and the related 
discourse o f production allows us, in Bom’s view, to “attend to a category of 
specifically media intellectuals whose task it is to mediate the generic dynamics 
that bridge the past, present and future output [...] judging how to progress a set of 
generic possibilites [...] and how to balance the enhancement of the 
entertainment, pleasure and education o f the audience” (2000,406).
The Disc Jockey as agent
The relation between administration and expert is not only a matter of necessity, 
but it is a virtue as well. It opens a perspective for the protection of cultural 
matters from the realm of control by the market, which today unhesitatingly 
mutilates culture. (Adomo 200lg, 129)
As a prelude to a consideration of Radio 1 ’s individual agents, here is a brief 
impression of its musical remit and breadth exhibited across its first three decades.
Just Turn that dial, make the music worthwhile/Radio 1, you stole my gal, but I 
love you just the same/Radio 1, you’re the only one for me.
- Lyrical extract from an impromptu Jimi Hendrix jingle for Radio 1, recorded in 
1967, Rebroadcast, Radio 1, 1994
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The Kershaw programme this week brings you two cracking new sessions: from 
the United States, Little Axe mix-up hip-hop with the blues, and then dump dub 
all over it [and] one of Africa’s greatest voices, Papa Wemba of Zaire follows up 
his recently released Kershaw Sessions album, with a new and exclusive 
recording especially for Radio 1. On the Kershaw programme tonight, ten ‘til 
Midnight, BBC Radio 1.
Andy Kershaw radio trailer for his Radio 1 programme, broadcast c.1995
The dialectic between ideals and realities are seen to be embodied in the history of 
Radio 1. As a daytime and night time operation, it deliberately embraced two 
socio-cultural agendas reflecting the idealism and realities o f the BBC’s position 
as a public service provider, caught between political conditions and a culture 
industry. The transience, artificiality, and particularities of pop presented a 
‘fantasy’ culture for adolescents; after dark, those more serious, non-pop genres 
evolving from Afro-American roots pleased older listeners wanting to hear 
‘authentic’ voices. Unchallenged during the day by any commercial popular music 
station, the new BBC Radio 1 popular music station used its mid-morning 
wavelength linkage in the late 1960s with Radio 2 to secure substantial daytime 
audiences o f older listeners, who, out o f habit were tuned to what was previously 
the BBC’s Light Programme. During the early 1970s, an emergent ‘night-time’ 
Radio 1, was consciously presented as a serious antidote to its daytime profile and 
thus further broadened its listener base. To effect the development, early evening 
programmes promoted studio debate, interviews and aired ‘vox pops’ where 
listeners’ expressions o f affiliation for ‘progressive’ music were frequently heard. 
BBC music radio effectively supported the growth of rock music, in part by 
treating it as an authentic, blues-inspired expression that it viewed as a novel 
pendant to an experimental ‘Western Art Music’ and this, to some degree it still 
does.3* The four new BBC stations between them offered a universalist cultural 
diet which, at individual station level was also deepened with specialist output that 
could usefully ‘entrap’ the unwary as they search for the familiar. This breadth of 
content that not only satisfied existing tastes but also effected a ‘cultural ramping’ 
had previously existed in a narrower form. Ian Trethowan (Director-General 
1977-82), writing in 1970 told us that:
[I]n earlier days, radio was based on ‘mixed programming’ and that this had the 
effect of drawing listeners into new experiences [...] Millions [...] sitting in their 
homes of an evening, would turn to Tommy Handley, and then would by accident 
hear Beethoven. (1970, 5)39
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Trethowan also argued that radio is a serious “cultural medium an art form in 
itself’ that “there is ample evidence to show that the music programme is valued 
by millions, not only as casual refreshment but also as a ladder of music 
experience” (1970, 12). The existence of such a ladder today in a digital, highly
40segregated broadcast environment, even within the BBC, has to be questioned.
There is certainly an argument for viewing state-sponsored disc jockeys as 
‘cultural gatekeepers’ or more accurately ‘gateways’. Perhaps they are indeed 
Gramsci’s “Organic intellectuals”, Said’s “noble intellectuals” or Kellner’s 
“public intellectuals”.41 They might simply be the “bricoleurs” of Levi-Strauss
42there to construct a new explanation of the world.
Peel as disc Jockey
John Peel came to Radio 1 by way of Shrewsbury Public School, National Service 
and pirate radio. On Radio London he developed the habit of giving airtime to 
long, uncommercial album tracks at a period when many pirate shows were in fact 
highly commercialised. His empathy for the popular musical voice and taste for 
the musically adventurous, allied to his ‘establishment’ credentials led to his 
appointment as a Radio 1 disc jockey in 1967. From then on, his reputation grew, 
and his name became synonymous with a serious, public service-orientated 
engagement with new musics. Any reference to ‘ratings by day, reputation by
43night’ automatically implied the work of Peel.
Peel made plain his neo-Reithian views on music in an early interview for 
the Radio 1 Annual (1969). They denote the presence of a thoughtful, serious 
individual, aware of the expectations his particular recruitment to the staff of the 
BBC implied. They contrast sharply with the more ephemeral, fashion-conscious 
portraits o f other disc jockeys on other pages.
I know it sounds corny, but radio should be of the people, for the people, rather 
than dictated by a bunch of civil servants who constantly manage to hem in all 
programmes by such specifications that when I listen to the end result of radio I
consider it an offence. [...] There are I think, some very fine things on, say Radio
3 [...] but, nevertheless, most of the programmes are either geared towards the 
ego of the jockey or else are a constant stream of musical baby food which is so
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bland and superficial that it passes over without touching you at any level. What I 
do is incredibly insignificant, but [I]t’s much better being on the inside trying to 
effect some small change than on the outside shouting in vain. (Peel 1969, 90-1)
Peel’s studio sessions
BBC music sessions intended for broadcast predated the well-known Peel sessions 
and owed their origin to the pressures of so-called ‘needle-time’ that involved 
record companies receiving payment from the BBC for the use of commercial 
releases. This was calculated according to the period of time each recording was 
aired. A BBC practice developed for economic reasons whereby in-house 
musicians would be employed to cover standards and current hits in preference to 
the use o f commercial records. It was only in the 1960s and 1970s that this 
became an opportunity to feature unsigned talent and an economic necessity
44became a cultural virtue. In an interview, Peel argued that “a lot o f the most 
popular things were the sessions. You know, unique things, things you couldn’t 
buy, performances you - everyone - could be at, for nothing” (Stump 1997, 92).45
One, often quoted example of a significant session which went some way 
to establishing the reputation of a band is that o f the Mancunian group Joy 
Division. Their exposure in the late 1970s as a provincial, post-punk act was way 
beyond the local or regional. At the same time they were were on the way to 
record Peel sessions, they played concerts well south of Manchester. Joy 
Division’s debut London show was at The Hope & Anchor, Islington. They also 
played a punk festival in the capital and undertook a small European tour. Most 
importantly for this study, they also took themselves and their music into the 
universal, public spaces crafted by the BBC. Everyone now had a chance to hear 
them.46
Peel could be accused of indulging in a ‘radical chic’, but what so often 
seemed to move him to play a new release or demonstration tape was his 
discernment of human ambition, musical integrity and originality. Musical craft or 
lyrical sophistication were of little concern for him, he would still listen. Peel’s 
ready embrace of new or non-British musical genres, and a peculiar ability to 
recall the intensity of life as experienced by youth, would often leave his more 
conservative listeners behind. His breadth o f selections attests to his sense of 
responsibility to those who would otherwise have no platform. Of course, this
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developed into a persona of ‘authenticity’ to an extent but the cultivation of 
character which happens to promote an inclusivist agenda is not to be sneered at. 
More recently, extending his brief with advertising voiceovers, documentary 
presentations and broadcasting on BBC Radio 4's Home Truths, Peel not only 
revealed his commitment to the business o f mass media communication, but in the 
confessional format o f Home Truths, extended the claim to regard him as a 
persona yes, but as individual o f some continuing empathy and humanity too. 
Scannell o f course (19%) has written productively on the phenomenological 
aspects o f radio presenter character in relation to sincerity and authenticity.
9.6 “Creating a Perfect Day”: The BBC’s Music Live event47
Like music itself, BBC Music Live should touch and involve us all. Of course it 
will celebrate the great names [...] but it is first and foremost a peoples’ festival, 
uniting communities and nations throughout the United Kingdom in a shared 
celebration of music making. Tony Blair, in the Music Live booklet, British 
Broadcasting Corporation (2000a, 11)
In May 2000, the BBC staged and broadcast a five-day national festival o f live 
music. Music o f all genres was played by professionals and amateurs at diverse 
live venues and transmitted to a substantial mass media audience. It was 
simultaneously recorded to serve as an archive “creating [...] a valuable legacy for 
future generations” (British Broadcasting Corporation 2000a, 10). Its aim was “to 
provide a fitting, distinctive and memorable broadcast contribution by the 
Corporation to the Millennium year celebrations [...] an all-embracing festival of 
musical discovery and participation.” Also it was to “celebrate and draw on the 
UK’s great music-making traditions, reaffirming the BBC’s stature and 
commitment as the world’s largest-scale patron of live music of all kinds and a 
leading sponsor o f music education in the UK” (ibid. 2000a, 2).
Part music festival, part corporate justification, the BBC’s Music Live 
event was accompanied by corporate rhetoric and solicited quotation which spoke 
idealistically o f a continuing belief in the value of music making and musical 
discovery as part o f a culturally diverse but singular, mediated society: some 
authentic antithesis perhaps to the culture industry. The notion of the BBC as 
creative ‘patron’ and adept, mass-media organisation permeates the promotional
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booklet. Was Music Live a strategic attempt to reaffirm public sector broadcasting, 
or an opportunity commandeered for the tactical defence o f corporate monopoly
48and state-levied income? What might a positive critique o f such events be?
Here is a description and analysis o f the BBC-hosted musical event which 
whilst purporting to privilege music as a liberating, edifying medium, did seem to 
be somewhat crass politically, and as such after Seaton (2001) reminds us o f the 
need to develop a watching brief in respect o f individual governments, institutions 
and their attitude to culture and broadcasting which might be co-opted for both 
party-political and more insidious ideological influence:
BBC Music Live will reach out via radio, television and online media [...] the 
festival’s inclusive wall-to-wall radio and television coverage will range from 
classical to jazz, country to choral, rock-n-roll to rhythm-n-blues, bhangra to 
baroque, be-bop to hip-hop, rap to reggae, soul to salsa [...] Through BBC 
broadcasting and its many partners, the UK can celebrate diversity of form and 
community - united by a shared passion for music. Music Live booklet, British 
Broadcasting Corporation (2000a, 4)
“Everyone can be heard” trumpets a singled-out phrase in the BBC’s Music Live 
booklet This innocent phrase might be an inspiring call for many musicians and
49listeners. It suggests that the BBC still conceives of itself as the national arena 
for shared musical representation and potential participation. Music Live
culminated with the creation of a ‘Perfect Day’, with some help from Lou Reed’s 
anthem to cocaine and a fair amount of broadcasting technology. Here is neither a 
Reithian inclusivist national imaginary of cultural improvement, nor a more 
pluralistic BBC of Sir Hugh Greene or John Peel. What we might see in fact is 
that under New Labour and Birtist principles: political, commercial and
institutional interests combine and conspire with the complicity of some 
professional performers and sophisticated technical means to maintain extant 
hegemonic relations. Bom avers that “while it espoused values of community and 
social responsibility, New Labour conceived of public institutions only as a 
variant o f business” (Bom 2004, 8). What is witnessed perhaps is less a utopian 
social imaginary than a dystopian, ideological one. Birt declared:
Music is a universal currency [...] it nourishes the soul and stimulates every
emotion. It helps to define our differences and yet it has the power to bring
communities, peoples and nations together, the United kingdom continues to be a
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world leader in so many areas of music making - both culturally and 
commercially. The BBC is proud to be the UK’s foremost patron of live music. 
Music Live booklet, British Broadcasting Corporation. (2000a, 9)
Adorno had offered a cutting critique of the administered festival which may have 
some pretence of radicalism:
Festivals are to be celebrated as they come; [...] Administrative reason which 
takes control of them and rationalizes them banishes festivity from them [...] 
This might well explain to no small degree the loss of inner tension which is to be 
observed today at various points even in progressive cultural productions - to say 
nothing of the less progressive efforts. Whatever raises from within itself a claim 
to being autonomous, critical and antithetical [...] must necessarily come to 
naught; this is particularly true when its impulses are integrated into something 
worked out previously from above. (200lg, 118)
Adomo would certainly have reserved criticism for the BBC’s television and radio 
transmission of the concerts that gave the day substance. For him it would simply 
have forged a ‘false immediacy’ for the millions watching at home. Pop in this 
form continues to foster passive pleasure, regression and diversion - nothing more. 
Social change is again deferred. Any oppositional grit in songs has been co-opted 
for the day.
A positive critique
What might we rescue from the event? There may be no unscripted, visceral 
performances here, but we cannot condemn the whole BBC enterprise by 
critiquing one heavily politicised moment. Has over seventy years of public 
service output from the BBC really been little more than a cynical exercise in 
ideological communication producing a culturally enfeebled nation? Has it not
SOgiven us just a little bit of Arnold’s “sweetness and light”? Or did Birt’s 
managerialist strategy have to be implemented to maintain some independence for 
the BBC at that moment? The BBC’s ‘Perfect Day’ is a vivid instance of musical 
works that can be configured as a singular text that can be at a utopian moment, 
utopian allegory, eutopian effort and/or ideological deceit. Prey to the social 
imaginary of government, corporate institutional agendas and those critical 
theorists still committed to human emancipation through culture; broadcast music 
and its discourses are interpreted, analysed and immanently-critiqued to near
f
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destruction. Institutionalised potentials are for some oxymoronic. Yet Bernstein 
offers one optimistic interpretation o f the institutional impulse in the presence of 
cultural representation stating that: “providing something for everyone, may have 
the unintended consequence of revealing social alternatives” (Bernstein in Adomo 
2001a, 20-1).
What, we must ask, is the alternative to mass-mediated cultural exchange, 
be it self-reflexive or otherwise in its delivery. Unmediated, discrete musical 
encounters away from exposure and sharing o f the mass media fail to unite 
isolated subjects. In any case, how can contemporary cultural expression sidestep 
an inevitable, mass-media gaze or any institutional ‘encouragement’? At the very 
least, can we not insist on the day being a successful aesthetic encounter in the 
long tradition of the BBC’s remit o f imagined nationhood which calls forth a 
immanent critique on the lines set down by Bernstein: “For the sake o f gaining an 
audience and possessing credibility, mass media must reproduce social reality” the 
consequences according to Douglas Kellner, cited Bernstein is that they “deflate 
or undermine the ideological illusions of their own products and however 
unwittingly engage in social critique and ideological subversion” (Bernstein in 
Adomo 2001a, 20).
9.7 Broadcast space, aesthetic experiment & the BBC’s future
Research for this study began in 1998 when debates about broadcasting and public 
service values were largely the preserve o f professionals and academics. As Royal 
Charter renewal approached, a more general debate about the BBC’s future 
funding and core purpose ensued. The following Big Buzz comments give some 
flavour o f public opinion as it stood in 2003, prior to the 2005 national canvassing 
of views in the run-up to charter renewal:
Even though I pay a licence fee, I have no say in what goes on in the BBC, and 
the BBC are not accountable to the general public that pays for them. (B ig Buzz 
respondent no. 119,2003)
It is controlled mainly by middle-class, heterosexual men; it’s unaccountable 
because there are no obvious mechanisms to challenge this. (Big Buzz respondent 
no. 114, 2003)
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Writing in 2009, after the renewal o f the BBC’s charter and licence fee, the 
constitution of the corporation is once again no longer subject to widespread 
popular scrutiny. However, those professionals and academics that continue to 
‘worry’ about the BBC and broadcast principles are now having to register the 
implications o f radical technological change. Digital television and radio stations; 
‘listen-again’ facilities and podcasting technology stand as testament to the growth 
of an increasingly interactive, fragmented listenership accessing digital, 
narrowcast content.51 The granting of a national digital radio licence to Four 
Digital, part o f the other Britain’s other public service broadcaster Channel 4, in 
July 2007, undoubtedly now challenges BBC Radio even as PSB principles are 
given a renewed vote of confidence. What is the future for public service 
broadcasting in the traditional sense of a near-monopolistic, mass-reception 
service? If  there is a broader message beyond the immediate conclusions of this 
thesis, it is that to dismantle, fragment or downgrade - knowingly or otherwise - a 
universal cultural platform such as die BBC would be to the detriment o f us all.
From today, informed discourse in Britain must revolve around the BBC’s 
purpose as a publicly funded national (and international service) in a postmodern, 
deregulated arena of commercial competition and new technological and socio-
52cultural realities. One practitioner-scholar, Breitsameter (2001) has already 
questioned the narrowcast and democratic models offered by new media by asking 
if we all become atomised producers of content, what happens to collective 
reception? Is anyone listening, reflecting and talking in common anymore?
It has been important here to offer an historical and socio-philosophical 
account o f the BBC’s past purpose and effectiveness as it may allow new 
technical options and the demise of popular listenerships to be evaluated in respect 
of preserving longstanding emancipatory activity across the airwaves.53
9.8 Defence of the BBC
Contemporary defence of the BBC as a relatively free public space and site of 
hope, touched by instrumental realities has been articulated by scholars like 
Gamham (1986, 1992, 1995), Scannell (1992) and Bom (2000, 2004, 2006). 
Gamham has pointed to the general attempts of public service institutions to
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construct social relations more on an independent political-cum-ethical footing 
rather than on anything driven by economic or state-agendas (Gamham 1986,245- 
6, 251). It is this analysis that allows us to regard the BBC as an intermediate 
body of a national polity, situated equidistantly between successive governments, 
public and private spheres.
Gamham tells us that the early BBC made “efforts to address their 
listeners as rational political beings rather than consumers”, and further suggests 
that Reith’s ethos descends from the Scottish enlightenment (Gamham 1986,
5 4
245). Gamham (1997) argues that cultural policy-making must not languish 
amongst remote, disinterested ideals. Instead, practitioners and academics should 
tackle the instrumental realities o f sophisticated, technological particulars that are 
likely to degrade those ideals. It is simply naive to expect the BBC to deliver in 
vacuo what nineteenth century poet and educationalist Matthew Arnold’s had 
termed (after Swift) ‘sweetness and light’ by way of Culture:
That pursuit of our total perfection by means of getting to know, on all the 
matters which most concern us, the best which has been though and said in the 
world and, through this knowledge, turning a stream of fresh and free thought 
upon our stock notions and habits which we now follow staunchly but 
mechanically. (Arnold, 1993, 190)
Economics and politics intervene, but that does not mean universal, humanistic 
values consequently evaporate from the minds and actions of socially minded 
public service agents. The BBC is still one such space where we can, with a good 
conscience seek, by listening-in, some self-improvement and join a wider 
collective awareness. BBC historian Jean Seaton, speaking at the Radiodyssey 
conference (2001) told her audience that her appointment as the BBC’s official 
historian was, for her, a call to continue the work of Asa Briggs. Briggs had 
mapped out the complex internal and contextual affairs which had coloured the 
activities o f the BBC and other British broadcasters, but Seaton argued this had 
become an academic activity rendered irrelevant with the triumph of late 
capitalism. Seaton made a passionate plea for everyone present at her conference 
seminar to not rest easy in what appeared to be a Damascene, post-Birtian moment 
for the BBC, but to understand the constant need for us all to remind present and 
future governments of the unique position and role of the BBC in a complex 
modem state.
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Curran (1996), critical of the liberal reading o f the mass media at the same 
time identifies a weakness in what he regards as radical perspectives which see 
dominant interests being too readily served. For him, this is too reductionist, 
overlooking the diverse “field of discourses” comprising countercultural and 
subcultural voice, together with a more ‘decentred’ socio-political reality o f “state 
institutions” with their “contradictory and multicentred character” and on Curran’s 
part their (presumable) reflection of “the complex activity o f economic political 
and cultural realms” more generally (1996, 131-2) when exposed to 
“Countervailing pressures” (1996,148).
Bom has fashioned a sophisticated reading (and model) -  what she herself 
calls a “normative typology” of the BBC’s value and impact with regard to its role 
as cultural producer (2004, 491; 2006, 116). Rather than continue to lay academic 
stress on cultural reception, works and programmes as ‘texts’ or, alternatively, 
become mired in politico-philosophical musings we should look closely at a 
fruitful, Kanitian dialectic of creative output and its imaginative and 
comprehending consumption. Bom thus offers a qualified defence of the 
universalist qualities o f broadcasting per se, and o f the BBC wherein a widespread 
trust can be reinstated and new technological means usefully deployed. Indeed, 
she has mapped out a detailed institutional ‘design’ (2006, 117) which might 
address what she terms “public service communications” as opposed to public 
service broadcasting (2006,102); the potentials o f new digital platforms; enduring 
matters o f “the politics o f difference [...] “Self-representation” and “presence”. It 
is interesting to note that this ‘normative impulse’ is also evident in Curran (1991) 
wherein, a discussion of Habermas and the public sphere is joined by a revised 
public sphere model “designed to promote the expression of diversity” with 
“spaces for the communication of opposed viewpoints, and a common space for 
their mediation” (1991, 142-3). For Bom, a future exists for the BBC as one of 
many media organizations that “in their social make-up and in their output - can 
be understood as the primary ‘theatres’ for contemporary pluralism” (2006, 112, 
114) and that it is “forging the architecture o f a free-to-air public service digital 
media system [in order to] respond to new political forms, to rejuvenate civic 
cultures, to encourage participation and to innovate in content” (2006, 111). 
Importantly, for Bom, there should be a diversity o f programming and 
transmission but “a continuation of mass or ‘universal’ channels” (2006,116).
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For Scannell (1992), broadcasting is a constructive place for everyday discourse 
“a totality, a universe of discourse” because “the public life o f broadcasting is 
accessible to all, it is there to be talked about by all” (1992, 337). Indeed, rather 
than it being a rational, Habermasian sphere of rational communications, it is 
more simply a place of a “reasonable consensus” o f mutuality and “entitlement” 
(1992, 342).
9.9 In conclusion
[Broadcasting] is a crucial means -  perhaps the only means at present -  whereby 
common knowledges and pleasures in a shared public life are maintained as a 
social good for the whole population. As such it should be defended against its 
enemies. Scannell (1992, 346)
In 1927, following the recommendations of the Crawford Committee and 
determined argument from its general manager - John Reith - The British 
Broadcasting Company ceased to be. What had begun as a modest commercial 
company o f radio set manufacturers became, instead a Corporation, a publicly - 
funded service operating under government licence. Have the three generations of 
listeners since that time had our political and cultural lives subjected to a state- 
shadowed, technologically administered dystopia o f the air, or have cultural ideals 
been promoted in the complex realities of a still extant, but mass-mediated public 
sphere?
The BBC is today only one voice amongst many and this might well 
undermine its socio-cultural legitimacy. John Birt (Director-General 1992-2000) 
spoke in a lecture in 1999 about an imminent “Digitopia”. He drew attention to a 
“common collective experience” yet there is, a decade later, a profound 
breakdown of cultural commonality and therefore of socio-cultural consensus. 
Some commenting on Birt and the BBC remit of cultural representation suggested 
that common, simultaneous cultural experience, if  it still existed was no guarantee 
of socio-cultural cohesion, and that if cultural breadth or the cultural high-ground 
was to be surrendered they argued, there were other values and ways of sharing.55
Today, as we all admit the pluralistic and unregulated spaces of the 
Internet into our lives, we simultaneously witness trenchant commercial and
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political criticism of a BBC characterised as a monadic, moribund public 
institution of little value in a globalised world. Should we simply reflect 
somewhat nostalgically on its past achievements and significance or should we, as 
we closely examine its shortcomings, also promote its strengths as an 
enfranchising entity assisting in the collective and individual identity of millions? 
Is it capable o f remaking itself (again), this time to operate in the twenty-first 
century?56
The broadcast model is perhaps a defunct model. However, universals and 
ideals can, and perhaps must continue to receive attention and promotion. This is 
the challenge for the BBC and its agents at the start of a new century. However, 
populist, attention-grabbing activity may disrupt genuine subjectification and 
culturally led intersubjectivity, even as it strives to meet democratic and 
commercial imperatives in a bid to save itself. The challenge for any institution 
attempting to create a musical eutopia is to avoid an imbalance where the 
sensation and ideology of communications ‘deafen’ any rational understanding 
receiving them. Many critical theorists have already attended closely to ‘the 
damaged life’ of non-identity perpetuated rather than liberated by popular cultures 
and the media. This fact must however be accepted as an ‘occupational hazard’ of 
the dialectical process, as a search continues for the continuance of a Hegelian- 
Gramscian ‘ethical state’, or, at the very least, a Durkheimian institutional 
bulwark and a likely site for praxis.
So, what is the considered position of this chapter? The BBC as a public 
service broadcaster has existed and continues to exist with its agents in the ‘here 
and now’ of dynamic cultural, political and economic ecologies. Never an entirely 
perfect embodiment of disinterested, ethical activity, or influence it was, and is 
still, nonetheless a platform of representation and creativity, standards and 
ambition, not least in the field of music. As such, it stands as a manifestation of 
the possible: a provisional, happy space that has touched generations of listeners, 
and is well-regarded by many who, whilst seeing its shortcomings would perhaps 
be unable to formulate a better alternative. Bom rightly observes that the BBC is 
not “a paragon, nor [...] has it covered all bases [...] but that in their scope, they
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are suggestive of the normative functions o f dialgocial flows between socio­
cultural majorities and minorities, or dominant and subordinate groups” (2006, 
116). As one Big Buzz respondent wrote in 2003: “You can’t please all the people 
all the time. Standards have to be set and someone has to do it” (Big Buzz 
respondent no. 39,2003).
Notes
1. In Emile (1762b) Rousseau advocated the gentle guidance o f a child so that she may develop 
morally and politically and eventually become fully civilized.
2. Edgar glosses developments in the social politics o f Western states which is pertinent to Reith’s 
Britain and the new administrative caste o f which he was a part: “under the welfare states and the 
mixed economies o f the Western world, the mass o f die population becomes more affluent, cared 
for and educated. The class distinctions that Marx could observe are further blurred and seemingly 
removed by the rise o f the middle classes (dividing wage-labour) and the so-called managerial 
revolution that places capitalist enterprise under die control o f a non-owning class” (1987,283).
3. Reith (1949, 116). Briggs concludes that: Reith’s: Broadcast Over Britain (1924) was “written 
reluctantly and quickly [and] remains an impressive social document, the best statement o f the 
public service character o f broadcasting before the sittings o f the Crawford Committee in 1925. 
Reith used it to set out his own ideals and objectives for the attention o f ‘the great audience’ ” 
(1961,234).
4. Crisell tells us that: “On 1 January 1927 the British Broadcasting Company became the British 
Broadcasting Corporation, a publicly funded yet quasi-autonomous orgnization whose constitution 
and statutory obligations have remained largely unchanged for seventy years. It was established by 
Royal Charter, with a board of governors and a director-general, Sir John Reith, who was 
answerable to i t  Although the charter determines die corporation’s structure, its activities are 
regulated by a licence and Agreement which is conferred by die government It was, and is obliged 
to inform, educate and to entertain; to report the proceedings o f Parliament; to provide a political 
balance; and in a national emergency broadcast government messages. It may neither editorialize 
nor carry advertising. Its income is guaranteed from broadcast receiving licences and it strives to 
maintain a position o f editorial independence” (1997,22).
5. “Among the works we’ve inherited from the past there are a great many grand old pieces of 
music [...] from which we should not hesitate to choose those suitable and appropriate for the 
society we are organizing. Censors o f at least fifty years of age should be appointed to make die 
selection [...] absolutely unsuitable material must be totally rejected, and substandard pieces 
revised and re-arranged, on the advice of poets and musicians. (Although we shall exploit the 
creative talents o f these people, we shan’t - with rare exceptions - put our trust in their tastes and 
inclinations, instead, we shall interpret the wishes of the lawgiver and arrange to his liking our 
dancing and singing” Plato, ‘The Regulation of Music’ from The Laws (Plato 1970, 290). The 
Laws has been argued to be an exposition on die realistically attainable, unlike his earlier Republic 
(see Plato 1970, Introduction, 27-28). Reith offers us: “It has been our endeavour to give a 
conscious, social purpose to the exploitation o f this medium [...] we have broadcast systematically 
and increasingly good music; we have developed education courses [...] we have broadcast 
common sense Christian ethics which we believe to be a necessary component of citizenship and 
culture [...] We have tried to found a tradition o f public service, and to dedicate the service of 
broadcasting to the service of humanity in its fullest sense. [...] We believe a new national asset 
has been created [it is] o f the moral and not die material order- that which, down die years, brings 
the compound interest o f happier homes, broad culture and truer citizenship” (Reith 1949,116).
6. Witness the likes o f William Paley (,Natural Theology 1802) and The Bridgewater Treatises 
(1833-6), and ethnologist James C Pritchard (The Natural History o f Man 1843), the social welfare 
concerns o f Methodism and Booth’s Salvation Army, not to mention political and other social 
reformers.
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7. Cf. Owen (1996) who rehearses die argument that in Britain, university-educated middle class 
professionals were removed from direct economic and political struggle and could thus remain 
loyal to mutuality, communitarianism and public service by way o f culture and administration. 
State institutions became mediators of partial political interest where compromise for the national 
good was organised and articulated (Owen 1996,145, 149).
8. The Good News Bible translation. This was placed there by Dr Montague Rendall, a BBC 
Governor and former Headmaster of Winchester.
9. On Reith’s views on an independent, monopolistic, BBC; its duty to offer national broadcasting 
of high content under a singular administration; and for parallel thinking on public ownership from 
the likes o f Herbert Morrison and Hugh Dalton, see Briggs (1961, 235-9). Briggs sets out the four 
aspects o f public service important to Reith. (1) ‘not being profit-driven’ (2) affording ‘national 
coverage’, (3) effecting ‘unified [technical] control’ and (4) ‘maintenance o f high standards’ and 
‘die provision o f die best’ (1961,236-8).
10. The ‘Reithian trinity’ derives partly from The Sykes Report o f 1923 and can be traced to US 
pioneer radio listener and industry champion David Samoff: “broadcasting represents a job of 
entertaining, informing and educating the nation, and should therefore be distinctly regarded as a 
public service” cited in (Owen 1996, 84) who detects its widespread acknowledgement in other 
scholarly work. This public responsibility was, in the United States o f Samoff an ethic overlooked 
in favour o f democratic, free-market expression where the ability to be heard was deemed a 
superior principle. This so-called ‘anarchy o f the air’ was the experience deemed to have 
persuaded British officials to reject American commercial models. The Radio Corporation of 
America (RCA) transmitted “Sustaining Programmes”: advert-free content to meet the “public 
interest and convenience or necessity” requirements of the 1934 Communications Act which 
seemed to address public interests (Spinelli 2000,269 and note 1,277).
11. It is widely held that Reith was keen to insert silences between early radio programmes so that 
listeners might contemplate what they had just heard.
12. To reinforce public service he set up advisory committees. The first Musical Advisory 
Committee, formed in July 1925, was chaired by Sir Hugh Allen o f the Royal College o f Music 
(Briggs 1961,244).
13. It would be interesting to compare Reith’s notions of expertise with those of Adorno’s various 
grades o f listener, culminating in the expert Adomo wrote: “Administration which wishes to do its 
part must renounce itself; it needs the ignominious figure o f the expert No city administration, for 
example can decide from which painter it should buy paintings, unless it can rely on people who 
have a serious, objective, and progressive understanding of painting. In establishing the necessity 
of the expert, one immediately exposes himself again to every imaginable reproach - to the 
notorious accusation, for example that the judgement of an expert remains a judgement for experts 
and as such ignores the community from which, according to popular phraseology, public 
institutions receive their mandate, or that the expert - necessarily an administrator himself - makes 
his decision from on high, thus extinguishing spontaneity” (Adomo 200lg, 128).
14. Bom, in alluding to Reith’s own honest assessment of the BBC’s powers argues that: “The 
BBC’s monopoly allowed a kind o f cultural dictatorship, but one that was highly inventive” 
adding: “It was one o f the first sustained experiments in die juxtaposition of cultural genres” 
(2004,29).
15. Whereas Reith led and produced culture, Greene followed and reproduced i t  Smith sees in the 
1960s die “New cultural pluralism o f Greene”. “It had to admit pop music and rock to its 
schedules. Where Reith might have tried to hire staff rock groups, the BBC of the Greene era 
established the compromise of Radio 1. Where Reith tried to fit the range of national tastes into an 
evaluative pyramid o f services - Home, Light, Third - die Greene era developed a policy of 
cultural outreach, it invaded die cultural ghettos in search of talent” (1986,14).
16. Smith identified Reith’s incumbency as that of the “total institution”, he wrote that “Reith 
sought to construct a BBC which itself recruited, trained and employed all those who provided the 
material o f the broadcasts. The BBC [had] 11 house orchestras [...] published [its] own hymn book 
[and had] its own idiom o f pure English” (1986,13).
17. Reith’s position is exemplified by his steering the BBC deftly between Government and 
workers during die General Strike o f 1926. Reith understood that if the BBC were to have a future 
he would have to maintain its independence. This was much to the frustration of both the 
Government and die unions.
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18. “The BBC was run partly according to the principles o f modem 1920’s management which 
Reith had discovered during his years in America, and which a number o f successful British firms 
in the private sector had also espoused - also some, such as the Post Office, in the public sector” 
(Smith 1986, 9).
19. As Marx wrote in the Grundrisse with reference to attaining personal freedom: “free time - 
which is both ideal time and time for higher activity - has naturally transformed its possessor into a 
different subject” - Grundrisse 1859 cited Lukes (1984,161).
20. Reith, Broadcast Over Britain 1924, cited Briggs (1961,234-5).
21. A term Mannheim (1960, 138) borrowed from an Alfred Weber.
22. The Sykes Committee is addressed in Owen (1996, 61). Owen identifies further calls for public 
discourse and interest to be promoted in die pages of the 1936 Ullswater Report and die post-war 
Beveridge Report o f 1951.
23. This modem, bureaucratic and polity development o f which die BBC was a part, is charted in 
some detail by Owen (1996, 32, 60-61) who identifies a public service discourse - important for 
Reith - articulated by the likes of Sir Henry Bunbury, in die corridors o f die Institute o f Public 
Affairs (est. 1922), in the pages of their Journal, Public Administration.
24. Briggs informs us that Reith held no sympathy with die opinion that the broadcaster should 
give customers what they want (1961, 236-8). There was a Reithian fear o f an ‘Americanisation’ 
o f British radio (in all its anarchical commercialism predicated on freedom of trade) and a fear of 
totalitarian co-option o f mass media as witnessed on die Continent At this time, vivid popular 
musics tended to be tempered and moderated by BBC musicians and had to compete with anodine 
imitations or ‘well-labelled’ exemplars of high culture. For a contextualisation o f the popular, see 
Doctor (1999). She has undertaken an exhaustive survey of die BBC’s more progressive attitude to 
contemporary serious composers in the prewar decades.
25. Listen with Mother was a radio programme ‘slot’ dedicated to a pre-school audience. It was 
followed by Watch with Mother at the advent o f regular television output The reference to ‘Auntie 
Beeb' comes from the somewhat affectionate term once applied to the BBC by its public as a 
matriarchal (rather than patriarchal) presence in the nurturing o f the nation.
26. The likes o f die Beveridge Report of 1951 and even the Annan report o f 1977, called for an 
ongoing channel o f diverse political communication rather than popular satisfaction. See Owen 
(1996, 154, 157).
27. This fact supplied by a colleague at the ESRC radio seminar number 3, Music, Youth, ‘Taste ’ 
and Radio Genres held at die LSE, April 14,2000.
28. BBC employees set store by what they perceive to be standards of relative quality in terms of 
both technical competence and content Independent production companies and short-term 
contracts are now breaking-down this sense o f superiority. In interviews with BBC Wales music 
producer Paul Ford in June 2003, explicit reference was made to what he thought die BBC 
guaranteed, namely technical competence and high professional standards. Ford had a significant 
role to play in the organisation delivery of The Big Buzz day.
29. Important are the inevitable bureaucratic tendencies of any large institution engaging with a 
modem society and have been identified as such by Weber and amplified by Adomo: 
“Administration [...] is no longer merely a national or communal institution existing in clear 
separation from the play o f social forces. The tendency of every institution towards expansion - 
both quantitatively and qualitatively - was designated as immanent by Max Weber in ‘The Theory 
of Social and Economic Organisation’ [...] In Weber’s own view, bureaucracies, following their 
own law are destined to expand [...] the immoderate size of even those institutions not concerned 
about profit - such as education and radio - furthers the practices of administration [...] these 
practices are strengthened by technological development; in die case of radio, for example, that 
which is to be communicated is concentrated to the extreme and disseminated as far as possible 
(2001g, 111).
30. Cited Levin (1989, 91). “Derrida attributes these words to Nietzsche in Ear o f the Other".
31. Jacques Derrida, The Ear o f the Other: Otobiography, Transference, Translation, cited in 
Levin (1989, 90).
32. For example, Barnard (1989). A more even critical account of Radio 1 that also provides useful 
historical detail and anecdote is to be found in Chapman (1992,226-78).
33. See Giddens (1993,131-2) and Tucker (1998,65-92).
34. Seyla Benhabib (1986) offers a subtle and complementary account o f the utopian function in a 
postmodern polity recognising and celebrating culturally diversity as a potent site o f social 
solidarity. She sees there being more than just a theoretical, speculative role for subjectively 
conceived utopias and politically driven utopian speculations. She sees the utopian function as one
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of revivifying, critiquing, strengthening and creating community bonds within the broader 
structure o f civil society and its institutions. But for her this is more a community o f diverse 
community need rather than a polity of administered equality.
35. “By reincorporating the ‘subjective’ dimensions o f will, freedom, responsibility and action into 
the historical dialectic, Gramsci endeavoured to counteract the doctrinaire view that histoiy 
unfolds according to ‘objective’ laws” (Kearney 1986, 180-1).
36. In relation to agents o f selection, Bom promotes thought by arguing for continuing aesthetic 
judgement undertaken by “a diverse, plural and volatile set of genre-specific panels, made up o f 
elected musical ‘experts’ (organic intellectuals from those genres; but changing, evolving and 
above all interrelating” (1993a, 280-81).
37. Another defence o f agency comes from Edward Said who saw the intellectual as:
“An individual with a specific public role in society that cannot be reduced simply to being a 
faceless professional [...] die intellectual is an individual endowed with a faculty for representing, 
embodying, articulating a message, a [...] view, an attitude, philosophy or opinion to, as well as for 
a public. [...] someone who cannot easily be co-opted by governments and corporations, and whose 
raison d'etre is to represent all those people and issues. [...] routinely forgotten [...] the intellectual 
does so on the basis o f universal principles” Said, cited McGuigan, (1996,185-6).
38. ‘Western Art Music’ is the category employed by the British Library NSA (National Sound 
Archive) to identify serious music which it contrasts with its ‘Popular music’ category. The NSA 
adopted its cataloguing system from the BBC. The present study sees this as a problematic division 
where the ‘popular’, plural and experimental meet, as in the music of Zappa or Radiohead. In the 
1970s, Derek Jewell gave serious consideration to progressive rock on Radio Three. Today, Radio 
Three programmes like Mixing It (now removed from BBC schedules to be heard on Resonance 
FM in London only) and Late Junction increasingly position rock music in the Western Art Music 
fold. Progressive rock, evolving as popular musicians matured, side-stepped chart-led radio output 
and found favour with the likes o f John Peel’s Top Gear with a pirate-inspired formula o f playing 
album tracks. Peel argued that: “it doesn’t sound radical now, but at the time, people just didn’t do 
it. One talks about the university circuit doing a lot for Progressive rock, but the BBC did a lot too 
- in the sense o f an eighteenth-century patron of the arts” (Paul Stump’s interview with Peel, 
Stump 1997, 92).
39. Briggs notes that in the 1930s at Reith’s BBC: “listeners were not divided naturally into 
‘home’ or ‘light’ and ‘third’, nor did ‘highbrows’ or ‘lowbrows’, it was felt, want necessarily to be 
highbrow or lowbrow all the time. Not only might the habitual listener to light music cultivate an 
interest in ‘serious’ music, but the habitual listener to ‘serious’ music might want occasionally at 
least to listen to light music” (1965,122).
40. Music radio output is today so bespoke, there’s little or no room for accidental exposure. Many 
of my undergraduate broadcast media students, whilst aware o f diverse musical genres are 
somewhat surprised by the actual range o f musics available to them should they venture beyond 
their regular choice o f music radio station.
4 1 .1 am most grateful to Dave Laing for his suggestion in a 2001 conversation that Peel could be 
regarded as one o f Gramsci's organic intellectuals. Douglas Kellner cited in McGuigan (1996) 
outlines his concept o f the public intellectual: “Such an intellectual is not a privileged 
representative o f any group but must engage, instead, in practical matters on the terms of those 
groups whose interests he or she may wish to advance and by deploying to this effect the most 
advanced technologies” (1996 ,189).
42. We might think also o f the likes o f Steve Lamacq, Radio Three, Andy Kershaw, Late Junction 
presenters Verity Sharp and Fiona Talkington and latterly, Radio Six Music and Radio lXtra. 
Some, like BBC jazz programme producer and presenter Steve Shepherd had argued that such 
programming is little more than a high-culture ghetto and that the BBC’s ‘difficult’ content needs 
to be more accessible (W riter’s conversations with Shepherd, 2004-5). Lack of space permits an 
account o f the BBC Orchestras and the BBC Promenade Concerts each Summer. Consider too The 
London Jazz Festival, 2005 sponsored by BBC Radio 3 and the BBC sponsoring on o f the stages 
of the Cambridge Folk Festival.
43. It is interesting to note that Peel was often quick to disparage the work and personality of Tony 
Blackburn and Dave Lee Travis but that they, like he, were astute enough to be aware o f the tasks 
their particular personas was expected to execute. I have been unable to find any overt criticism of 
Peel from fellow broadcasters. Peel’s disparagement is, to an extent amplified by comments from 
John Walters: “I was Peel’s producer from 1969. There was very clearly two Radio l's  - the third 
floor versus the fourth floor, the mainstream playlist Radio 1 - which was Noel Edmonds and the 
welly boots sticker Radio 1, the fun Radio 1 - was on the the fourth floor. Whereas Tommy Vance
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and Peel and the people concerned with live recordings were on the third floor, where it was about 
music” John Walters in Garfield (1998,5).
44. Cf. Ken Gamer who has researched and written a book on the Peel sessions: In Session 
Tonight, (Gamer 1993). The BBC’s Gramophone Department and live entertainment section 
generated an eclectic mix of musical output The former reflecting a larger, more diverse music- 
loving radio audience, the latter a serious, record-buying audience. Educated producers drew-up 
what has been termed ‘spectrum’ and ‘hierarchies’ to understand audiences, Hendy, (LSE ESRC 
Seminar April 14, 2000). As Ken Gamer (LSE ESRC Seminar April 14, 2000) explained to die 
present writer, producers o f night-time Radio 1 and its live sessions from new performers drew on 
a tradition o f live music making and its associated values while those from the Gramophone 
Department helped to shape day-time’s more formatted output. Hence die epithet; ‘ratings by day, 
reputation by night’. Continued support for new talent and the support for live music is evidenced 
by Radio l ’s New Music First policy in the 1990s, die BBC’s nationwide search for young talent 
c.2004 and the 2006 campaign, This is what we do, stressing the BBC’s continuing readiness to 
support and transmit the music o f new, often unsigned bands.
45. Peel’s impact on popular music should not be dismissed lightly. On October 20 2005, one year 
on from death o f Peel, the first ‘John Peel Day’ took place and comprised some 300 shows around 
the world including Zimbabwe, The Netherlands and Japan, i.e. places where Peel had travelled. 
Super Furry Animals’ Gruff Jones said o f Peel’s show that: “songs gatecrash[ed] the radio”. “He 
loved the idea o f his music being heard” said a former BBC colleague; [he was] “a very BBC man, 
steeped in it” Music Biz, BBC World Service programme with Mark Coles, October 20,2005.
46. A John Peel studio session was recorded and later aired in February 1979. Early in the 
Autumn, Joy Division recorded a session for BBC television’s Something Else screened on BBC2. 
They also later recorded a second Peel session. A Peel show session, recorded 31 January 1979 
BBC Studios, Maida Vale, London was broadcast on BBC Radio 1 February 14, 1979 and 
included the song Transmission, later released as a 12-inch Extended-Play release and on two BBC 
albums.
47. ‘Creating a Perfect Day’ - a phrase used in the Music Live, 12pp. colour booklet programme 
published ahead o f die festival (Thursday 25 - Monday 29 May) kindly supplied by the BBC 
Music Live office, June 2000. It alludes to Lou Reed’s song Perfect Day, re-recorded by various 
artists initially for a television promotion (which extolled the BBC’s diverse musical output and 
the relationship o f that output to the licence fee) and subsequently sung live across the UK as a 
“fitting climax to the Festival” (British Broadcasting Corporation 2000a, 8), “broadcasting more 
that 1,000 hours o f continuous music with appeal for all ages and every imaginable musical taste” 
(ibid., 8).
48. The origins o f ‘A Perfect Day’ in a promotional video and charity song o f 1997 are charted by 
Bom (2004, 256-59). It is instructive to compare this ‘project’ with the Department for Education 
and Skills Music Manifesto o f 2004 which sought to promote access to music via a national 
platform o f educators, local authorities (for example The London Borough of Hammersmith and 
Fulham), NGO’s like Music For Youth, commercial interests (for example Roland UK) and 
composer/broadcasters (for example, Howard Goodall). “Music can be magic. It calls for and calls 
forth all human virtues: imagination, discipline, teamwork, determination. It enriches and inspires” 
(www.music manifesto.co.uk, December 2004).
49. Thought o f in a different light, die phrase may have more dystopian overtones, indeed it might 
serve as a chilling, somewhat Orwellian reminder, not of public participation but instead, of public 
subjection to the voices o f dictators; totalitarian domination and surveillance by anyone in 
command o f the necessary technologies. Broadcast technologies throughout the twentieth century 
have been exploited by every power keen to be heard or seen by the populace.
Adolf Hitler wrote in his Manual o f German Radio in 1938 that “Without die loudspeaker 
we would never have conquered Germany” (i.e the use of loudspeakers at rallies and in Germany’s 
Deutchsekleinemfanger radio sets). It is interesting to note that Aristotle in The Politics observed 
the practical difficulty o f speaking to and controlling large state territories. He asked: “who will be 
their [town] crier unless he has die voice o f a Stentor?” [the name o f a herald in the Trojan war] 
(1962,264).
50. Concerts, music festivals and dance music raves function as real (albeit transient and 
economically coloured) instances o f idealistic commonality from the point of view o f performers 
and audiences; instances which may be argued to be ‘utopian’ (abstract and concrete) in character. 
For instance, the organisation and broadcasting o f Live Aid by the BBC in 1985 (in support o f die 
Ethiopian famine appeal) captured a public imagination and raised money. Critics would argue that
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Live Aid  salved Western consciences and simply masked underlying structural problems in world 
food economies.
51. Hie BBC has been charged by Government to effect die so-called digital switch over so that 
the analogue wave lengths o f terrestrial stations might be sold. The ending in 2006 o f die 
BBCTV’s weekly Top o f the Pops music chart television programme (first broadcast in 1964), is to 
be understood against MP3 developments and online access to new music. It is interesting to note 
that whilst MySpace is touted as a ‘free space’ for new talent and diverse audiences it is currently 
owned by Rupert Murdoch’s Media Corporation. Clearly, the advent o f die Internet has proposed a 
new mode o f cultural production and dissemination which can transcend dominant base- 
superstructure constraints so that a monetary economy, class divisions, state control, multi-national 
companies may now dissolve in true utopian fashion. In place of capitalism is emerging a ‘ high- 
tech’ exchange economy operating between producers and listeners. There are of course socio- 
phi losophical implications for this new model of communication. See Spinelli (2000) who argues 
that radio and the Internet are “consumption-based parodies o f what might have been”.
52. In addition to leader comments and letters in die broadsheets, television debates and bespoke 
websites encouraging wide participation were to be seen in the long run up to charter renewal. The 
David Kelly affair intensified discussion and seemed to strengthen popular support for a relatively 
strong, unchanged BBC.
53. Questions about the form and role of public sector broadcasting around the globe have fuelled 
debate since the inception o f regular and diverse radio transmissions in the late 1920s and 1930s. 
Discussions, policy formulation, legislation and disputes continue today in societies where 
questions o f public funds, state ideology and the basic human right o f access to mass- 
communications run alongside the production o f vital musical forms in popular quarters. In 
Britain, discussion today revolves around the BBC’s purpose, continued accountability as a 
publicly funded national (and international service) in a postmodern, deregulated arena of 
commercial competition and new technological potentials. Concerns about ‘dumbing-down’ are 
also expressed but are to be understood as part o f a long-running discussion o f raising and 
reflecting cultural values that has its roots in the 1920s. Should licence fee revenues be increased 
to facilitate BBC enterprise in the field of digital channels and the Internet? Is such ‘public 
subsidy’ an unfair advantage as the commercial sector argues? All such questions are indices o f 
the BBC’s vulnerability but responses from many quarters show a robust belief in the continuance 
of public sector broadcasting.
54. In his argument, Gamham makes reference to two important articles on British inter-war 
broadcasting, namely: D. Cardiff, ‘The serious and the popular: aspects of the evolution o f style in 
the radio talk, 1928-1939’ and Paddy Scannell ‘Broadcasting and the politics of unemployment, 
1930-1935’ both in Media, Culture ami Society, vol. 12, No. 1 1980.
55. Roger Silverstone and Philip Dodd and Birt, The World Tonight BBC Radio 4, July 6 1999. 
Consider the following: “[The BBC] attempts to reflect the diversity of multi-cultural Britain - 
how well it does this, or whether it should do this is another matter” (Big Buzz respondent no. 38, 
2003).
56. Bom rightly avers that the BBC has “repeatedly invented itself’ (2004,69).
247
10 Justness for you: Habermas, the BBC & the public sphere
10.1 Introduction
This chapter is an account of the BBC in relation to Habermasian analysis and a 
normative ambition of mutuality and discursive intent. It also features a return to 
the ideas o f Gramsci and a consideration of the perspectives o f Raymond 
Williams and David Harvey, and a brief return to the thinking of Gamham, Bom 
and Thompson.
The broadcast space as framed by the BBC is here further examined and 
argued to be a portion of a Habermasian public sphere consistent with Habermas’s 
words on the role o f such a space in that it “mediates between society and state” 
(2006, 74). The BBC operates somewhat as a “disorganised public” representing 
diverse democratic wills and Habermas’s demotic “communicative power” yet is, 
at the same time, directed by an “organised public” entity of legislative, 
hierarchical and bureaucratic rule.1 The views, tastes and traditions of everyday
existence are symbolically assembled and encountered in this space of considered
2
judgement. Not just news and views have been shared, but entertainment and the 
arts from home and abroad, past and present, have occupied this particular arm of 
the British ‘public sphere’ wherein aesthetic encounter, imaginative projection and 
empathetic comprehension has taken place for subjects as they grow into 
competent members o f society. Here, we might usefully consider BBC Radio 3’s 
Sounds Interesting with Derek Jewell, and Jazz Today with Charles Fox; BBC 
Radio l ’s, Sounds o f the Seventies and Peel’s Top Gear. In more recent times, the 
impulse to represent and share new musics has been evident in Radio lXtra, and 
Radio 3’s Late Junction, Mixing It and World Music Awards. The discursive and 
discussive instinct being evident in Radio l ’s Roundtable, and latterly the various 
musicological formats typified by Radio 2’s popular music histories and 
programmes on the popular American songbook tradition, written and presented 
by Russell Davies.
Whilst the BBC has increasingly fostered popular representation across its 
history through the work o f its in-house administrative and cultural agents, how 
democratic and emancipatory is the business of British public service
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broadcasting? Has it really led to the formation and maintenance of humanistic 
public opinion? Is the BBC a dystopian facility, elitist utopian vision or eutopia of 
imperfect but progressive socio-cultural processes? Is it a just, institutional site of 
‘useful’ aesthetic encounter, cultural exchange and social discourse, or does it, 
through ideology, bureaucracy and instrumentally only ever exhibit an 
administered, improving art for obedient citizens?
We must not forget the BBC’s reasons for being: The BBC became a 
publicly funded institution in the 1920s. It did so as a consequence of 
governmental initiatives motivated by technological imperatives, political 
philosophy and cultural wariness of U.S. broadcast models.3 Such motivations 
coloured much that happened in British broadcasting in succeeding decades, and 
they are facets that can still impact on contemporary policy and debate. A picture 
of a flawed institution operating within the ‘established order’ but with 
independent agents responsive and accountable as much to a public at large as to 
any internal system of control or external intervention is for those who choose to 
see it, a picture o f a eutopian entity of some democratic legitimacy and potential.
This chapter contends that: (1) The BBC as an institution is a product of 
the hegemonic realities and socio-cultural impulses of the British polity. However 
the BBC is argued to be an intermediary corporation, which is less an Althusserian 
ideological state apparatus than a political subset of the contemporary public 
sphere, never exclusively beholden to one constituency or agenda. (2) Because of 
the BBC’s position, communicative action, communicative reason and a critical 
ideal and their necessary conditions as constituted and prescribed by Habermas 
are actually present in the music radio output of the BBC. (3) As a consequence of 
(1) and (2), the BBC has a continuing social, political and cultural legitimacy, 
especially in its eutopian musical broadcasting touching the real, lifeworld of 
hearing subjects.
10.2 Broadcasting critiqued & redeemed
As modernity advanced in the twentieth century, culture, commerce and 
technology that had previously been features of a vital public sphere situated 
between society’s lifeworlds and its systems of national bureaucratic
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administration now became detrimental forces. Certainly, as we have seen in the 
writings o f earlier critical theorists, the all-pervasive complexity of modem life 
precluded any utopian site of ‘ultimate’ human emancipation. Yet any retreat to 
strict utopian or metaphysical thinking would not just be a waste o f time, it would 
be to obscure the materialism and pragmatics of Engels and Marx, and undermine 
any eutopian praxis - that combination of critical thought and situated social 
action which must operate in all projects - personal or socio-political - and that 
address the founding of a good life. In Habermas’s analyses of the 1970s 
(Habermas, 1975), which can be plausibly applied to a theorisation o f the BBC, 
we read o f a crisis o f freedom for the public sphere that ensued in the mid­
twentieth century as immanent cultural debate became simply cultural 
consumption of things external where quantity, legal contract and managed 
outcomes dominated personal relations and qualitative cultural experience. 
Moreover, political power and ideology invaded this modified public sphere 
formerly devoted to knowledge. As it did so, it eclipsed reason with power, and 
truth with authority. Intersubjectivity was now devolved to more rigid institutional 
and mass media channels exposing people to political power, administration and 
instrumentality. In its contemporary, technocratic guise, increased governmental 
involvement has sought to regulate the ‘excesses’ o f ‘liberal’ public spheres and 
has administered the markets with laws.
Such constraining social and cultural conditions have been recognised by 
late capitalism itself, and has led to what is termed by Habermas a “legitimation 
crisis” whereby institutions (media organisations included) became aware that 
their legitimacy as a mediator o f fine social and cultural values was in crisis as the 
‘reciprocal’, hegemonic contract o f the old state polity was compromised if not 
broken by the bureaucratic colonisation of the lifeworld. Such a breach also lead 
to a “motivational crisis” on the part of society’s members as established trusts 
loyalties and familiarity were lost, or simply rejected by a younger generation.5
It does seem then that a late-twentieth century society and state could only 
ever present us with (for instance) Marcuse’s ‘affirmative’ culture as individuals 
were ‘depoliticised’, with only their more mundane ambitions and pleasures 
exploited and briefly satisfied.
250
It is not just senior critical theorists who are quicker to condemn than 
praise the public service bodies engaged with the modem lifeworld. Many 
ordinary listeners have expressed disenchantment and scepticism in the face of 
such ‘institutionalised’ channels running between lifeworld and system. Consider 
for example, the following ‘class-aware’ questionnaire response to the suggestion 
that the BBC might act as a legitimate cultural representative o f the community:
It is not the community, but some Oxbridge BBC idea of the community talking 
down from on high. There is no such thing as a free space, the BBC operates 
from behind closed doors, who is allowed to pass those doors, and why, is the 
result of an office of hidden agendas - whether those agendas are political, moral 
or economic who knows? {Big Buzz respondent no. 38,2003)
Academic condemnation of the institutional cultivation o f subjects echoing the 
Frankfurt School analysis comes from Lloyd and Thomas (1998). In their account 
of the growth of modem corporate bodies, they identify intermediate cultural 
institutions but refuse to grant them any plaudits as they are, forever, state 
apparatuses.6 They write:
Culture increasingly came to designate and to frame a set of institutions along the 
locus of society’s intersection with the state. These institutions occupy spaces of 
their own; for the veiy formulation of the space or spaces of culture demands its 
actualization in pedagogical institutions whose function it is to transform the 
individual of civil society into the citizen of the modem state [...] culture can 
oppose society only in theory, and at best with an anticipatory and ever-deferred 
utopianism, whereas in practice culture can and does serve the state quite directly 
(Lloyd and Thomas 1998,146)
No doubt, respondent number 38 and Lloyd and Thomas listen to, and most 
probably enjoy public service radio broadcasts. However, they can only regard the 
cultural output as an institutionalized, behavioural tool where any possibility of 
representation, interaction and justness for artists and listeners is forever deferred.
For each o f these observers, intermediate ‘public sphere’ bodies do not 
offer sincere representation, not even any hegemonic trade-off whereby something 
new, authentic and non-instrumental is delivered in exchange for the preservation 
of the socio-political status quo. So must we perhaps conclude at this point that 
the BBC is nothing other than an Althusserian, ideological state apparatus (an 
ISA) giving us aesthetic promise followed by deceit and continued domination? It 
is surely this very ability to be critical and self-reflexive on the part of our sceptics
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and cynics, even in the face of overwhelming cultural ‘domination’ which should 
convince us all - theorists too - of a subject’s rationality, agency and dialectical 
ability to sift, critique and reconfigure. Indeed in his ongoing project o f human 
betterment via extant channels, Habermas sees the advantages o f a mass media 
relationship with society and argues, in relation to events in Eastern Europe that 
the revolution ‘was televised’ (in an allusion to 1960s radicals’ claims that it 
would not be; and that we should all be out o f doors constructing street 
barricades). He concludes:
If I made another attempt to analyse the structural transformation of the public 
sphere, I am not sure what its outcome would be for a theory of democracy - 
maybe one that could give cause for a less pessimistic assessment. (Habermas 
1992e, 455-57)
Not only the instrumentality of radio but the technical limitations of broadcasting 
- its ‘one-way’ character might preclude both ideologically-ffee ‘dialogue’ and 
direct dialogue, but today, participation is afforded through letters, phone-ins,
7
online message boards and email. Moreover, the BBC does have an active policy 
of representation so that at the very least, whilst communication may be a 
succession of statements rather than a more immediate, ‘face-to-face’ exchange, 
people speak (or sing) as others hear and respond. McCarthy frames this as “an 
effective equality o f chances” that are not simply pursuing a linguistic, analytical 
logic but a communicative situation where participants “have the same chance to 
express attitudes, feelings, intentions and the like, and to command, to oppose, to 
permits and to forbid, etc.” (McCarthy in Habermas 1975, xvii). This is not a 
present reality nor an abstract ideal, but a mutually beneficial condition to be 
striven for, it is a communication sustained by Habermas’s Unterstellung - a 
“reciprocal supposition” of respect and equality, present at the point o f mutual 
address (McCarthy in Habermas 1975, xvii). Might we look to a Gramscian quid 
pro quo o f hegemonic relationships for a positive mechanics that might animate a 
communicative ethics?
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103 Gramsci & a social theory of the extant
The idea of a structurally transformed but still dynamic public sphere with 
residual potentials as mooted by Habermas are prefigured in some of Gramsci’s 
ideas. The historian Geoff Eley revitalises Gramsci’s account of hegemony, 
asking that it be disentangled from an automatic association with any ideological 
system alone, and be allied instead with a total mode of social life (1992, 322). 
Rather than linking the term hegemony with any dictatorial, ‘ISA’ activity, 
Gramsci says Eley “expressly links hegemony to a domain of public life (which 
he calls civil society, but which might also be called the ‘public sphere’) that is 
relatively independent o f governmental controls and hence makes its achievement 
a far more contingent process” (1992, 323). Gramsci’s contingent hegemony (a 
balancing act between interests) is achieved through activities that cultivate an 
acceptance o f ‘intelligent’, ethical dominance. It is the contingency of hegemony 
that makes the public sphere such a still vital site for cultural and political
g
discursive contestation. Gramsci’s pragmatic socialism discerned the power and 
the potentials o f hegemonic rule. If  mass media channels could reproduce 
dominant social relations and economic conditions, then they can also (with its 
remit of consensus) proffer a nationwide ‘sociology of knowledge’ leading to 
praxis and the felicitous conditions of the eutopia argued here to obtain 
intermittently in the ethos and output o f the BBC.
In essence, Gramsci turned, not just to culture per se like Adorno or 
Marcuse, but to the cultural superstructure where ideological messages are 
produced, held in place, disregarded and mutated. Gramsci’s wish for a 
democratisation o f articulated knowledge and the founding of a ‘historical-bloc’ 
for ‘dialogue and compromise’ is attainable whenever dominant discourses are 
engaged.
Gramsci’s lessons are straightforward: pay attention to realities and their 
contingent potentials, and believe in the efficacy of ‘organic individuals.’ In 
addition, use reason and debate to extract emancipatory potentials. His is not a 
utopian philosophy, nor one much given to speculation on the power of music. It 
is however his philosophy that seems to provided the very necessary intellectual, 
critical arc into which can be inserted positive accounts o f the BBC. Gramsci’s 
inclusivity, flexibility and theoretical breadth anticipate the more tactical,
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contingent and provisional utopias o f the likes o f Levitas, and refurbishes a tired 
dialectic. As Smith has put it:
We need the established institutions because they either are, or can be rendered 
accountable. Through them, the inhabitants of the society, will have some access 
to die new and still little understood processes by which societies today are 
controlled. (Smith 1986, 21)
The BBC was, and is situated in the public sphere of non-domestic, apolitical, 
non-governmental exchange as a mediating entity touched by all agendas and all 
realities. It is because of this, rather than in spite o f it, that the BBC has flourished 
as a socio-cultural institution both respected and criticised by everyone. What the 
BBC does, as one element of a modem public sphere, is to allow music and 
popular cultures to be articulated through equitable discourses. The linguistic and 
aesthetic work together, the former articulating the possible values of the latter, 
the latter always exceeding and preventing linguistic and conceptual and critical 
closure. As such, the BBC is perhaps the Habermasian “discourse model o f public 
space” to quote Selaya Benhabib (1992, 84). Here, consensus establishes “norms 
of action”; subjects develop, not simply as actors, but as individuals able to reflect 
on the particulars of their own lives. Any “appropriation of cultural tradition 
becomes more dependent upon the creative hermeneutic o f contemporary 
interpreters”, Benhabib (1992, 85). This, for Habermas, is a positive central 
feature o f a modem polity, and constitutes a broad ‘political’ process, unlike 
earlier understandings of more politically-partial public spheres (Benhabib. 1992
9
86-7). In the case of the BBC there is a way in which, as a corporation, it 
continually counters governmental intrusion even as it employs government- 
sanctioned governors, chairs and now a Trust. O f necessity, like any large 
organisation, the BBC is not a fixed entity, but necessarily repositions itself 
structurally and discursively to meet shifting political pressure. In so doing, it 
undoubtedly maintains itself as an establishment conduit, but it also continues to 
act as a responsive and strategic socio-cultural arena that is too complex and lithe 
to be swayed by any singular governmental tactic. The BBC is, in the main, a state 
and society creature, and whilst a parliamentary platform, it is not a governmental 
tool but rather has a sophisticated relationship with the British public and the 
British polity that transcends the particulars o f any government or governmental
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department ambitions. The cynic might say that governments tolerate the BBC to 
demonstrate their resilience in the face of satirical attacks or independent political 
comment and that it is ultimately a prime hegemonic device. In addition, many 
might argue that John Birt injected an external ideological and political agenda 
that pushed the BBC towards a model of accountability which disrupted much of 
its traditional ethical impulse in the 1990s. However, Birt’s internal market 
models that may well have given independent production companies access, did 
antagonise many. The public disquiet surrounding the sacking of Director General 
Greg Dyke is another instance of many ordinary people expressing a proprietorial 
interest in the ‘governance’ of their BBC.10
10.4 Habermas: analyses, critiques & normative propositions
Habermas in his normative mode does not give up on ‘modernity’ and the 
possibility o f emancipated and enlightened subjects in such rigid and 
impoverished conditions. Kearney tells us that:
in response to this stalemate of late capitalism, Habermas proposes a praxeology 
capable of conjugating the radical principles of dialectical materialism with a 
critical theoiy of social evolution. The aim of such a praxeology is to secure an 
open system of communication enabling each subject to become self-reflective. 
(1986,235)
This was a new epistemological and moral philosophy predicated on a system that 
is not fully devoid of cultural and political potentials.
We should turn in detail to Habermasian theory to understand both the 
socio-political context and the dialectical process of broadcasting and meadiated 
listenership. In order to do this we must first briefly set out Habermas’s concepts 
and problematics.
Habermas & language
McCarthy cites part of Habermas’s inaugural June 1965 lecture at The University 
of Frankfurt where he set out his position on human language:
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What raises us out of nature is the only thing whose nature we can know: 
language. Through its structure, autonomy and responsibility are posited for us. 
Our first sentence expresses unequivocally the intention of universal and 
unconstrained consensus. Autonomy and responsibility together (Miindikeit) 
comprise the only idea we possess a priori in the sense of the philosophical 
tradition. (McCarthy, Introduction to Habermas 1991, xvii)
Habermas took what Axel Honneth called the linguistic turn in critical theory: but 
why? Class revolution has not happened, art alone as a tool for change was too 
vapid; social emancipation for Habermas had to begin with individuals engaging 
in ethical discourse.11 This is met by Habermas’s theory of social action and 
labour (in the guise of hermeneutics, history and philosophy) together with his 
model o f communicative action - a mutuality o f discursive intent. Bloch’s 
imagery, Adorno’s rarefied reason and negations, Marcuse’s ineffabilites each had 
to be replaced for Habermas by everyday encounters and talk.
Whilst radio doesn’t reveal any profound Truth, it sets out common 
grounds o f agreement and mutuality in a pluralistic world we hear ourselves; 
hopes coalesce, dialogue and intersubjectivity ensues; we can, in the public 
service sphere hear and discuss music as part of a mediated, communicative 
action.
Public service broadcasting contributes to the formation o f a site for 
Habermas’s ethical discourse by demanding a pragmatic attitude to intersubjective 
address. Such mutual recognition, coupled to a competent and truthful exchange 
of semantic content, is not just a conversation between people or a communicative 
exchange say on air, but the possibility of “the mediation of individuality and 
universality” and a “meta-communication, in which one communicates about 
one’s own and others’ communications” (S. M. Weber 1976, 94-5). This, says 
Weber “recapitulates Hegel’s model o f mutual recognition, each subject both 
experiences the uniqueness of his own experience and translates it into universal 
terms which can be understood by another” (1976, 100). The Hegelian starting 
point of the autonomous subject may be questioned by critical theorists like 
Adorno who prefer to see a prior, ‘decentered’ and socially inflected subject. Too 
much can be made of this. The Hegelian model, which to an extent informs the 
work o f Habermas, is just that: a way o f making plain the complex encounter and 
formation of subjects in the real world. Certainly Habermas demonstrates an 
awareness in his writings of the institutional, bureaucratic trap but does not
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abandon it, acknowledging it as an inevitable component o f a modem society. 
Fmstratingly, Habermasian theory often tends to be about structural relations 
rather than specifics, and offers no picture of any actual lifeworld, any critiques of
named public service institutions which might deliver the praxis and just, fair-
12minded communication his theory conjures-up for his readers. This is not to be 
insensitive to the Habermasian project, but to urge a move away from the dogged 
disinterestedness that befell Adomo in 1969. Habermas does seem to offer a 
Hegelian progression for the individual through a succession of self, group and 
legal/moral development, but Habermas offers a clear move from the ahistoric 
subject with a return to the subject as agent He is surely illustrating Held’s beliefs 
on subjective development where “an essential tenet o f historical materialism [is] 
that history, social reality and nature are all a product o f the constituting labour of 
the human species” (Held 1990,254-55).
Habermas & social life
How do we characterize the social? We first need to define the constituent parts of 
a state. These are its people, lands and polity. O f significance here too is the term 
polity. This, for Aristotle was the most equitable mode of social rule for a state, a 
reasoned and pragmatic compromise between stem oligarchy and unstable, pure 
democracy. The polity is directed at defining and communing with the whole of 
society (private and public) and those who live within the confines o f the state’s 
politico-legal structures overseen by individuals invited to oversee the majority 
with a philosophically informed good grace. Habermas, tends to see the modem 
state as an administrative system concerned a little more with legal and political 
instrumentality than a polity of benevolence whose political and legal impetus 
impinges unhelpfully on the other component of Habermas’s society: the 
lifeworld. The lifeworld is a lived, unreflective condition of ordinary ambition, 
clear meanings and day-to-day pragmatics. In effect, a ‘natural’, second nature 
sphere o f relative integrity for you and I of immediate experience shaped by 
Crossley’s radical ‘I-thou’ intersubjectivities. An untainted public sphere, a 
Gemeinschaft where independent communication might ensue. However every 
modem lifeworld is also addressed, indeed ‘invaded’ by the mass media o f all 
persuasions that are not necessarily motivated by any pure pursuit of public
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discourse. Not only is intersubjectivity from this source o f a different order and 
kind as Crossley’s somewhat reifying ‘egological’, subject-object model, but it is 
a lifeworld exposed to external, Gesellschaft ambition, technologies and power 
glossed and directed by the state, cultural institutions and business. Thus one’s 
lifeworld is at once personal and externally administered. As Habermas has 
expressed it: the lifeworld is “me and us” [which must be] “defended against 
extreme alienation at the hands of the objectivating, the moralizing and the 
aestheticising interventions of expert cultures” (1992b, 18). Is it possible to 
activate such an intersubjectivity through the offices of the BBC but avoid “expert 
cultures”? Is it possible to operate a fair socio-cultural discourse without the 
utopian ambitions of a non aristocratic, non-demotic, generally non-aligned 
group?
In looking for a locational and socio-spatial riposte to a powerful state system, 
Habermas looks to a mediating social institution that can cultivate a cogent 
response. Habermas’s public sphere of the eighteenth century, sitting without the 
state polity, was one such arena which was neither wholly private, nor commercial 
in its constitution, and it is here that civil and commercial interests were aired. 
This public sphere reflected a bourgeois ‘public opinion’ in everyday situations 
where a political, non-aristocratic discussions on morality, ethics and the cultural 
(mediated through conversation and the press, at least in the eighteenth century) 
reflected upon both commercial and public activity, and at the same time, brought 
reason to bear on power relations. It served as a mediating space for the 
subjectification and intersubjective activities of the middle classes, but became 
compromised with the impact of demotic pressures in the nineteenth century and a 
consequent retreat into private, domestic space in the twentieth, intensified by 
newer modes o f systematised and administered mass communication centred on 
the home. It might be that we can see a Reithian BBC consolidating this set of 
circumstances or, alternatively, see the BBC vainly trying to reactivate or re- 
occupy this middle, apolitical ground in this way, by connecting the domestic 
sphere with the stimulation of and discussion about wider, socio-cultural concerns. 
If this latter revitalisation is taking place in a BBC communing with the lifeworld, 
then Habermas’s search for a legally-constituted socio-cultural sphere of some 
account may exist from time-to-time to the extent that it can impact on the state as
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much as the state and its systems can impact on i t  Habermas in fact defines the 
public sphere for us. It is:
[A] realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be 
formed. Access is guaranteed to all citizens. A portion of the public sphere comes 
into being in every conversation in which private individuals assemble to form a 
public body. (2006, 73)
13Leaving his pre-modem, eighteenth-century coffee house model behind, as we 
have seen, Habermas writes that: “Today, newspapers, and magazines, radio and 
television are the media of the public sphere” (2006, 73). This is, of course, 
Reith’s world of ‘music and electricity’; culture and commerce where any benign, 
autonomous public activity is unlikely to remain inviolate for too long. Certainly, 
the Birtist production model at the BBC in the 1990s seemed to represent an 
invasion o f corporate outlooks and instrumental, ‘value for money’ practices 
which nevertheless seemed ideologically indeterminate but very capable of 
bringing to an end the creative atmosphere and ethos of the institution per se.™
Might the pluralism of a less-commercially minded BBC however respond 
to effectively to postmodemity ’ s cultural diversity without recourse to any 
‘cultural logic of late capitalism? (Jameson 1991). In the 1970s, Habermas 
reluctantly accepted the inevitability o f a regulated, somewhat overbearing and 
complex mass media, and saw in this ordering compromise, a drive towards a 
technological rationality of increasing ubiquity which at least could stabilize 
conditions which might commission or preserve a space for the mimetic stimulant 
of radical arts, cognitive insights and what he terms a “moral-practical 
significance” (1975, 78, 118). For Habermas, a mass-media discourse allows us to 
initiate and take part in some working truths and some consensus. He argues that a 
discourse can lead to a rational, collection position wherein “all motives except 
that of the cooperative search for truth are excluded” leading to “a rational will” 
(1975,107-109) where general interests are addressed, and in so doing, particulars 
and sedimented power relations are sidelined in favour o f normative propositions. 
As far as cultural meaning systems are concerned, Habermas cites P. Berger who 
argued that society has a “craving for meaning [...] the ultimate danger [is] the 
danger o f meaninglessness. This danger is the nightmare par excellence, in which 
the individual is submerged is a world o f disorder, senselessness and madness [...]
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to be in society is sane” (1975, 118). Habermas adds that “the fundamental 
function of world-maintaining interpretative systems is the avoidance o f chaos, 
that is the overcoming of contingency” and sees ‘specialist’ institutions able to 
deliver a “meaning-giving function” (ibid.). So, a combination of steadily- 
disseminated culture and a vibrant, discursive engagement with values may well 
operate in the spaces of mass media systems. The possibility o f a dystopian, 
totalitarian dissemination of approved culture needs to be avoided by regularly 
testing governmental and institutional legitimacy and ensuring socio-cultural 
inclusion and representation.
Communicative action
Dews argues that to desublimate reason:
It is not enough for it to be theorised as a potential of social and communicative 
practice. It has to be actually progressively embodied in the activities and 
institutions of society. In other words, reason remains an impotent ideal unless as 
Habermas often says it is met ‘halfway’ by modem forms of life which are 
receptive to, and can foster, its democratic and universalising impulses. (Dews 
1999a, 19)
This is Habermas’s social and communicative action: a kind o f praxis in a 
person’s lifeworld, where debate is predicated on agreed topics, agreed methods 
and agreed practical ends. Habermas, well aware of the pitfalls of technocratic 
agendas, still sees institutions such as broadcasting and the public sphere in 
general as likely conduits for such edifying, progressive debate. As Morris 
observes: there is “a communicative rationality that draws upon the suppressed 
rational potentials o f modernity, and hence offers theory a secure basis from 
which to criticize current conditions” (2001, 12). This Habermasian turn into the 
lifeworld o f immanent critique and transcendence could well lead some to regard 
the theory of the younger Habermas as being one that was somewhat naive and 
optimistic.15 This however is to ignore his achievement in preserving, updating 
and extending critical theory’s project of modernity with an antithetical counter to 
a distorted enlightenment dialectic.16
Careful consideration might lead to the view that Habermas’s 
desublimated critical theory simply skates, in an abstract fashion, over the
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awkward realities of social relations and power relations in his call for equitable 
contact, shared knowledge and universal participation. However, his use o f the 
dialectic is one where we are led by the hand to seek and find, amid ideals and 
reality, particulars and universals; affinity and alterity; and each mediated through 
discourse to give us imperfect, but critically-aware individuals.
Communicative reason & the critical ideal
McCarthy reminds us of Habermas’s “validity claims” (Geltungsanspruche), 
which need to be present in equitable dialogue so that “the utterance is 
understandable; that its prepositional content is true, and that the speaker is 
sincere in uttering it, and that it is right or appropriate for the speaker to be
17performing the speech act” (McCarthy in Habermas 1975, xiii-xiv). This gives 
on to the questions as to whether the BBC has ever truly facilitated such a site of 
communicative ethics - a mutual engagement predicated on experiential and 
rational transcendence of particulars in a search for more universal truths as the 
first stage of change. O f relevance here is Habermas’s “critical ideal” of 
communicative reason; a position of relative detachment and reflection, whereby 
intersubjective judgements, when in an ethical, equitable setting, are adjudged to 
be representative and are permitted to reject divergent views only on rational 
grounds that have some universally benign, collectively valuable moral position 
which defends the unwary against 'insincerity’ or detrimental comment. Such a 
perspective takes us towards a reading of Kant’s a priori epistemology but brings 
to it a more pragmatic, vital and situated form of intersubjective relations. Might 
we not see the organic intellectual, John Peel, embody the linguistic requirements 
of dialogue, mutuality and intersubjectivity within an institutional setting?
Habermas & legal philosophy
Social institutions shaped by the statute book do not simply have to remain remote 
and unresponsive to whom we are. For Habermas, there can be a dynamic relation 
between people’s lifeworlds, their rational faculties and a mutual comprehension 
of others’ needs. What he terms “communicative power” operates in the lifeworld 
and impacts on governmental legislation and institutional administration that in
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turn becomes an embodiment of who we are and where we would like to go. In
fact, in Habermas’s writing on legal philosophy in the 1990s, we see him
construct a legalistic model that has little to do with any natural law concerned
with abstract freedoms, and which, at the same time, sidelines any positivistic
18account o f legal particulars because of their indifference to universal rights. Such 
a proposition could easily be read into the renewal process o f the BBC’s charter in 
2005-6 where the British as ordinary people and citizens were encouraged to 
express views and debate the issues at stake in a number of public meetings. In 
this instance, it was the BBC itself which was the subject o f reasoned public 
debate, but it is also the case that the BBC has an ongoing role as one of 
Habermas’s conduits connecting people in the formation o f a general will which is 
then converted into an administrative, executive power sanctioned by (an 
assumed) frill democratic participation. Whilst not a perfect model, it does 
preserve a balance between stable, comprehensible structures and the more fluid 
substance of the subjective and collective will, a compromise between existing 
states and states imagined.
Certainly, the BBC’s 2006 Royal Charter setting out the conditions for its 
continuance and the accompanying BBC Agreement are documents o f some 
interest in that they not only set out detailed constitution matters but explicitly 
articulate a socio-cultural ambition for universal representation, creativity and the 
more general prerequisite for impartiality and ethical discourse. We should briefly 
note the following phrases and stipulations as indicators o f the normative qualities 
of these two constitutional documents:
In view of the widespread interest which is taken by Our Peoples in broadcasting 
services and of the great value of such services as means of disseminating 
information, education and entertainment, we believe it to be in the interests of 
Our Peoples [...] that there should be an independent corporation which should 
continue to provide broadcasting services. (Opening Charter renewal greeting)
Objectives o f the BBC are set out in Section 3 of The Charter. They are manifold 
but o f relevance is the following objective:
(n) To organise, present, produce provide or subsidise concerts, shows variety 
performances, revues, musical and other productions and performances [...] 
whether live or recorded in connection with the broadcasting and programme 
supply services of the Corporation.
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Section 3 of The Agreement sets out the following regarding programme content: 
“3.1 The Corporation undertakes to provide and keep under review the Home 
Services with a view to the maintenance o f high general standards.” 3.2 requires 
that these Home Services: “(b) stimulate, support and reflect in drama, comedy, 
music and the visual and performing arts, the diversity o f cultural activity in the 
United Kingdom; (c) contain comprehensive, authoritative and impartial coverage 
of news and current affairs [and] support fair and informed debate at local, 
regional and national levels [and] (g) contain programmes which reflect the lives 
and concerns o f both local and national audiences.” As one would expect, the 
need for educational content and high standards for children and young people is 
also expressed in (3.2 (e) and (f) and 5.1 (b) of The Agreement19
Habermas & eutopia
In the pragmatism of the critical theory project of the 1970s and 1980s, Habermas 
sought enlightened, emancipated individuals and social progress through rational 
thought and equitable discourse. He certainly reformulated the utopian impulse to 
be one framed by a clear awareness o f history, societal aims and ambitions, and an 
understanding of unintended ‘dystopian9 trends. Supposedly conflicting terms 
such as technology and humanity, philosophy and materiality, function and value, 
are, in a Habermasian model, reconciled or at least synthesised in the expectation 
of new developments. As S. M. Weber told us:
The crux of Habermas’s resolution of this conflict is a revised notion of interest 
which is both material and ideal. Basing himself primarily on Kant and Fichte, 
Habermas identifies certain interests which are common to the human species as 
such and which form quasi-transcendental frameworks within which knowledge 
is produced in the course of human social evolution. (Weber 1976, 93)
In essence, Habermas seeks an accommodation of everyday feelings, 
concrete particulars, institutional systems and universal thought that operate 
within our individual and collective lifeworld. This is a realism on the part of 
Habermas which advances beyond the restless negativities o f Adorno and the 
ambivalences of Marcuse.
Habermas takes trouble to find eutopian circumstances in which aesthetics 
and humanity might flourish. In Habermasian thought, issues of desire, hope,
263
expression and intersubjective rationality - for so long contested by earlier critical 
theory - seem at last to be brought together as complementary elements of ‘here 
and now.’ Habermas foregrounds language and the will to reach agreement. 
Aesthetic communication, truth, appropriateness and sincerity are claims that can 
be offered, accepted and tested in the sounds and discourse o f public service 
music radio.20 Radio as a technology of the self and of the social provides an 
ontological and socialising realm of personal and collective allegorical 
interpretation. Historical particulars in radio’s music (the nostalgic or novel) can 
lend itself to gentle musings or more determined considerations o f an ethical life 
for those keen to weave new allegories out o f the programming they listen to.
The utopian impulse in Habermas’s reading o f the individual’s lifeworld 
is, at the moment of crisis, one that he surely modifies into a eutopian one, an 
idealist impulse toward change and improvement generated materially from 
within. To an extent it is predicated both on older community models and material 
practices and a Kantian call for a public rationality and ‘agreement’ (Habermas 
1989,117). With this state of affairs in view, Kearney suggests that:
The ultimate task of Habermas’s Critical Theory is therefore to predict and devise 
ways of depoliticising the dessicated public sphere of communication [...] True 
to the basic humanist inspiration of Critical Theory, Habermas holds fast to the 
notion of the human subject - albeit a radically politicised subject - as the 
irreducible source of both theoretical and social transformation. (1986, 237-8)
Habermas’s so-called communicative turn is, in a sense, dependent on an indirect 
return to Gramsci’s agents, and a direct one back to undistorted enlightenment 
potentials. To achieve necessary development, Habermas contends, we, as 
audience, must dare to work, think and act using hermeneutical processes and a 
mutual communication. This we do in large measure within imperfect but at least 
extant institutional channels. In short, individuals must move, communicate and 
act within history. If we use the technological systems positively (which Marx 
predicted capitalism would eventually provide), individuals can exercise a 
rationality to achieve fair intersubjectivity.
What we have in Habermas’s model is also personal growth. This is not 
achieved through the self-contained subject confronting an objective world in an 
already fully conscious, rational way; but a growth of a decentered, already 
socialised self, via a disinterested intersubjectivity through which subjectification
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and maturity take place as a process. Morris (2001) suggests that Adorno’s 
philosophy, whilst seeing us all as historical formations and not autonomous 
beings, had sought to preserve the integrity o f the individual (through what is 
termed Subjektphilosophie), who would only ever exhibit a passing 
intersubjectivity marked by distance and discrete consciousness. Morris refers us 
to Minima Moralia wherein Adorno typically wanted to effect a “nearness by 
distance” (Adorno, 2005,112, 89-90) wherein says Morris:
difference could be maintained, even celebrated, in a process of self-reflective 
contemplation, learning and communication that would not require the kind of 
constitutive identification of traditional conceptions of community. (2001, 7)
It is in this Adomian distance that we find the required rationality and critique, 
untainted by external forces. What ultimately drives this process model and 
protects the subject is, for Habermas, a fundamental human predilection for 
learning. Habermas writes:
It is my conjecture that the fundamental mechanism for social evolution in 
general is to be found in an automatic inability not to learn [...] at the socio­
cultural stage of development. Therein lies, if you will, the rationality of man. 
(1975, 15)
Habermas argues that whatever the economic and political conditions might be, 
human expression, imagination and spontaneity remain. These stand outside 
affirmative culture as an index of our inner-life and our social perspective. 
However, humour, irony and playfulness might be encountered within what Bom 
(2008) suggests was the “expressive palette” of the DJ and their playlist. This, for 
Habermas is sustained by a broad human need to experience not just familial and 
community expressions, but those too from further afield which is possible though 
aesthetic exposure (cf. Habermas 1975, 78). Habermas concludes by arguing that 
society is the site where the randomness and meaninglessness o f contingent reality 
is addressed through the institutions of language and art; the institutions of family 
and community and, importantly for this chapter, the state polity (1975, 118).
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10.5 The BBC: Analyses, critiques & normative perspectives
Efforts to apply Habermasian thoughts from abroad to a peculiarly British 
institution must now make way for thoughts from home. We first turn to 
Raymond Williams and his consideration of the postwar cultural landscape. We 
see in Williams, ambivalence rather than certainty and encouragement. In his 
book Culture and Society (1961), Williams acknowledged the likely impositions 
of a dominant power with access to the media: “Any governing body will seek to 
implant the ‘right’ ideas in the minds o f those whom it governs [...] The whole 
theory o f mass-communication, depends, essentially, on a minority in some way 
exploiting a majority” (1961, 301). However, we are then invited to entertain the 
possibility, not just o f inculcation but of a reasoned, enlightened intent in any such 
situation.
Williams continued:
What of the case where a minority is seeking to educate a majority, for that 
majority’s ultimate good? Such minorities abound, seeking to educate majorities 
in the virtues of capitalism, communism, culture and contraception. Surely here 
mass-communication is necessary and urgent, to bring news of the good life and 
of the ways to get it (1961, 302)
Williams at this date still appeared to be working out his position on the finer 
points of public service broadcasting in Britain. First of all, Williams countered 
criticism of its shortcomings by mooting the alternative: a silenced public service 
conveying nothing to anyone at all. But he also did seem willing to chide the BBC 
for its tone. He wrote: “It is a question of how one tells them, and how one would 
expect to be told oneself [...] telling as an aspect of living, learning as an element 
of experience” (1961, 302). His was a perspective that was neither populist nor 
Leavisite and traditional. To understand this facet of Williams, we must touch 
briefly on the BBC at this time. In the late 1950s, BBC radio had absorbed the 
lessons of broadcasting to entertain during WWII, and would have learned much 
from American Forces Radio. Nevertheless, it would still have had a 
predominantly paternalistic outlook, and would have shown a relative lack of 
interest in American popular culture, most o f which, in the view of Williams
266
would have been a product of the culture industry and would have therefore 
overshadowed any more authentic British forms.
Aware that the BBC was a bulwark and a platform, Williams seemed to 
suggest it adopt a more democratic policy and pitch to achieve a domestic, if  not 
internationally coloured, postwar consensus. Williams referred again to the mode 
of address o f broadcasters, but quickly moved on to sketch out a complex cultural 
diet (presumably of all matters high and low), to which everyone should have 
access:
The answer [...] does not lie in exhortation. It lies, rather, in conceding the 
practice of democracy, which can alone substantiate the theoiy. It lies in terms of 
communication, in adopting a different attitude to transmission, one which will 
ensure that its origins are genuinely multiple, that all the sources have access to 
common channels [...] We need a common culture, not for the sake of an 
abstraction, but because we shall not survive without it [...] A common culture is 
not, at any level, an equal culture. Yet equality of being is always necessary to it, 
or common experience will not be valued. (1961, 304-5)
Williams steps down from his abstracted notion of a society aiming for a common 
good, fuelled by diverse tastes cultures and seems to be writing about what might 
have been the particulars of a postwar, postcolonial Britain that had to admit of 
new communities of people defined by ages and backgrounds. To do otherwise 
would court conflict. Are there indications here o f a nascent multiculturalism 
which was to find favour in liberal quarters in the last quarter of the century which 
here on the part of Williams reads to be something that is as much pragmatic as 
idealistic?
Williams outlined what seemed to be a pluralistic, non-interventionist 
policy on cultural ‘improvement’ that had an Amoldian air about it: “Nobody can 
raise anybody else’s cultural standard. The most that can be done is to transmit the 
skills, which are not personal but general human property, and [...] give open 
access to all that has been made and done” (1961, 306). In his 1961 essay 
‘Communications and Community’, Williams wrote the following, almost as a 
eulogy for the BBC. It reads:
The BBC has been a great and, in spite of eveiything, fortunate exception to the 
normal process of cultural development in modem Britain. It was an exception 
because people thought of it as important for national defence and security, and 
once you touch those things exceptions can be made. But it was right against the
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ordinary trend in all our other institutions over the last hundred years. It was an 
island; and who would have thought ten years ago that it was an island that the 
sea would ever come up over. (Williams 1989,28)
In this essay, Williams pointed to the populist tropes o f British commercial 
television and, in what almost reads like a criticism o f his own complex 
perspectives, wrote that “a deadlock came about, in thinking anyway, between 
people who were critical of paternal systems, certainly o f authoritarian ones, and 
so saw the strength of some of the arguments o f the commercial system” (1989, 
28).
As with Adorno, Williams’s position on media and culture is hard to fix. 
As seen above, as early as 1961, Williams balefully recorded the inundation of the 
BBC “island”. As late as 1974, we read another rather negative account. He began 
positively by arguing that media technologies are both “incentives and responses” 
to social change, but then added that the “centralisation o f political power” (1974, 
20) demanded broadcasting to oversee “centralised entertainment” and the 
“centralised formation of opinions and styles of behaviour” (1974, 11). He added 
that television (and no doubt radio too) “in its character and uses, exploited and 
emphasised elements of a passivity, a cultural and psychological inadequacy” 
(1974,12).
Williams never fully embraced popular culture as enjoyed by younger 
generations, but his theoretical perspective, bleak though it seemed to be in 1974, 
does, some three years later, argue at least for a continuing access to diverse 
cultural forms by way of “a lived hegemony” (pace Gramsci) which he must still 
have seen as a potential in Britain in 1977. It draws on his 1961 essay where he 
argued we must conceive of a “democratic system of communications” (1989, 
28), whereby diversity reigns and what he termed “the false ideology of 
communications” is removed. He trusted neither commerce nor state to deliver it.
Instead, Williams argued for a localised ownership o f communication media
21(1989, 29). Was he in any way touched by the ‘do-it-yourself energies o f Punk 
as a somewhat radical riposte to the domestic socio-political and economic crises 
of the early 1970s? In a renewed mood of optimism Williams wrote:
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A lived hegemony is always a process [...] of experiences, relationships, and 
activities, with specific and changing pressures and limits [...] it does not just 
passively exist as a form of dominance. It has continually to be renewed, 
recreated, defended, and modified. (1977, 112-13)
For Williams, this is where the value o f hegemonic activity resides, its constant, 
dialectical engagement with rival cultural options which it admits to preserve its 
legitimacy as a public platform. He concluded: “We have then to add to the 
concept o f hegemony the concepts o f counter-hegemony and alternative 
hegemony, which are real and persistent elements o f practice” (1977, 112-3). 
Might places o f heterotopian peripheral production and eutopian spaces of 
dissemination usefully combine?
Garnham
A more recent engagement with the imperfections of public service broadcasting 
comes from Garnham whose optimistic account o f public service broadcasting has 
already been outlined in the previous chapter. He seems to be someone looking for 
a productive dialectic amid existing circumstances in matters o f democratic 
expression, moving beyond theory, ambivalent critical flirtation or simple socialist 
aspiration. He writes: “Those on the left who are opposed to market forces in the 
press nonetheless have in general given no more than mealy-mouthed support to 
public-service broadcasting” (1992,363). Garnham then chastises those on the left 
for their idealism and utopianism, falling “back either on idealist formulations of 
free communications with no organizational or material support or on technical 
utopianism that sees the expansion of channels o f communication as inherently 
desirable because pluralistic” (1992, 364).
Garnham then argues that existing, mass mediated communication can 
deal better with the complex, ambivalent facets and decisions o f modem life than 
can a simple democratic framework of majority acceptances and rejections: “The 
sifting o f options necessary for such [complex] decision making can only be done 
by representatives [who] then require space for free thought; they cannot be 
mandated” (Garnham 1992, 366). But Garnham then adds that there still needs to 
be a universalist core of principles against which we might continue to “measure” 
things, “some common normative dimension” (1992, 368-9).
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Richard Collins (1993) reminds us that it was Garnham22 who introduced 
Habermasian thought to the British broadcast debate, which, in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s comprised antithetical market argument and public service positions. 
Collins informs us of a defence of two kinds: (1) the empirical - a defence of PSB 
from historical and extant perspectives which focused on actual public service 
practice and broadcasters’ beliefs and (2) the more idealistic, which concerned 
itself with public service broadcasting in the abstract and as a high calling. As a 
consequence of these two positions, confusion reigned on the part of those seeking 
to defend the likes of the BBC from commercial pressure. The empirical defence 
is implicitly an argument for the status quo, the latter a radical, ‘utopian’ stance, 
unlikely to be mapped onto any policy decisions in the real world (Collins 1993, 
243-4).
In Garnham’s view, the public service sense of public good could be 
argued to have been too class-based and altogether too weak in the face of 
emerging consumerist outlooks in mid-century Britain. However, he is right to 
claim that “this is to miss the point of the enterprise and its continuing importance
23
as both historical example and potential alternative” (Garnham 1995, 245).
David Harvey, Universal values & concrete particulars
How might we begin to make any cohesive sense of the Habermasian model, the 
ambivalences of Williams and the pragmatism of Garnham? Useful insight comes 
from cultural geographer David Harvey whose book Spaces o f Hope (2000) is a 
conscious, spirited continuation of William’s Resources o f Hope, but with a 
distinct air of practical engagement. In a distinct, normative fashion, Harvey 
suggests to us a way in which synchronic particulars intersect with the more 
stable, diachronic ‘universals’ of a public institution that possesses an ongoing 
ethical awareness. He writes: “Dialectics [...] teaches that universality always 
exists in relation to particularity” (2000, 242). Somewhat unfashionably, Harvey 
then adds: “The contemporary radical critique of universalism is sadly misplaced. 
It should focus instead on the specific institutions o f power that translate between 
particularity and universality rather than attack universalisms per se” (ibid.). Even 
as he counsels the caution of a critical theorist, he readily inserts the historical 
subject as an embodiment of the greater good: “Universals cannot and do not
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exist, however, outside of the political persons who hold to them and act upon 
them” (2000, 247).
Harvey rightly identifies the political nature o f much supposed high- 
minded activity, yet his perspective, whilst rightly critical in the face of many 
contemporary contingencies, also carries with it a gentle defence of the institution 
as a dynamic place and space for hope. This perspective is one he frames almost 
as a warning, having presumably studied a number at close quarters:
Mediating institutions, no matter how necessary, cannot afford to ossify, and 
traditional utopianism is often powerfully suggestive as to institutional reforms. 
The dynamic utopian vision that emerges is one of sufficient stability of 
institutional and spatial forms to provide security and continuity, coupled with a 
dynamic negotiation between particularities and universal so as to force 
mediating institutions and spatial structures to be as open as possible. (Harvey 
2000, 242)
This seems to be a prescription in the spirit of Habermas and his hope for a 
dynamic media of good intent and facility. However, Harvey seems to avoid the 
visitation of any universal values upon reality, but instead encourages us to detect 
even the slightest trace of self-less, non-instrumental agendas in the socio-cultural 
streams of the media that could, with careful political and legalistic fostering 
become ‘universal’ principles because of broad agreement as to their goodness. 
Harvey writes:
If we find in them [universals] successful guides to action [...] so they shape our 
world view and become institutionalised as mediating discourses [...] They 
become codified into languages, laws, institutions, and constitutions. Universals 
are socially constructed not given. (2000,247)
Thompson & Born
In order to reconcile universal and particulars, and preserve some of the ideals and 
pragmatic positions of scholars and commentators from Gramsci and Habermas 
and from Harvey to Garnham, we should turn to the normative-cum-pragmatic 
tendencies in the writings of Thompson (1995) and those of anthropologist Bom 
(2004) who both argue for a diverse media ‘ecology’ which can embrace both 
broadcast public service activity and alternate economic and cultural models.
Thompson reflects on a media that “has nourished a sense of 
responsibility, however fragile, for a humanity that is commonly shared and for a
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world that is collectively inhabited” (1995, 264). Where and how might this 
sharing continue occur? Thompson alludes to the agora o f the Greeks, but argues 
for a new conception of public space. He argues normatively for “a renewal of 
public life” via what he calls “the principle o f regulated pluralism [...] the 
establishment o f an institutional framework which would both accommodate and 
secure the existence of a plurality of independent media organizations”. 
Thompson qualifies this by stating “it is a principle which also recognizes that the 
market left to itself will not necessarily secure the conditions of freedom [...] it 
may be necessary to intervene [...] in such a way that diversity and plurality are 
not undermined by the concentration of economic or symbolic power” (1995, 
241).
Bom’s incisive reading of the radical musical institution in Paris, IRC AM 
(Bom 1995) might lead one to expect an equally cutting reading of the BBC. 
Whilst her anthropological training exposes a government-led colouration of 
operations, she is more philosophical about its enduring ethical efficacy and 
promise. She writes:
The BBC’s role can no longer be primarily to represent a unified nation, as Reith 
believed. It is to provide a unifying space in which plurality can be performed, 
one in which the display and interplay of diverse perspectives can animate and 
reshape the imagined community of the nation. It is a space in which plurality not 
only of information and opinion, but of expression, of aesthetic and imaginative 
invention, must have full reign. The BBC’s task, now as always, is to be hopeful. 
The realisation of its vision will be uncertain; but the vision must be inspired. 
(Bom 2004, 517)
Bom (2004) identifies the BBC as a mid-point, politically inflected public sphere 
belonging to neither government, market nor a more neutral sphere of any critical 
ideal. This inspiration is provided by a BBC giving access to a Blochian education 
of hope and desire, articulated through a model of which Habermas would 
approve. Even as an institution inflected by the British polity, it still affords the 
representation and the sharing of many more ‘lateral’, socio-cultural identities 
than Williams ever imagined, and when necessary, still provides a vertical 
national integration uniting communities in a shared social purview of just intent. 
We cannot simply rely on historical evolution and hope. For Habermas, 
Thompson and Bom, there must be a politico-legal dimension to inscribe and
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reinscribe the existence of such a place and space in the face o f an increasing 
administrative momentum and ever more powerful global communication 
industry.
10.6 In conclusion
Could the BBC and its agents really qualify as a contemporary locale o f 
Habermasian rectitude, or is it too compromised by capitalism, politics and 
narrowcast fragmentation? What ultimately are BBC radio’s actual warrants - 
legal and social?
Has the BBC at anytime been both a mirror allowing society to “commune 
with itself’ (James Curran cited McGuigan 1996, 27), a site for self-recognition 
and as a window looking out onto a world of dialectically significant alterity? 
Might public service radio as exemplified by the BBC posit a 
meaningful/significant context for the texts o f musical creativity?
This normative tendency towards the unproblematised utopian ideal raises 
the fundamental issue o f all utopian propositions rooted in an unquestioned 
rightness o f development and fulfilment for humans. (This questioning of the 
normative utopian desire and expectation as a ‘given’ - positing ideal interaction 
and fair outcomes - is returned to this study’s the main conclusion which follows 
this chapter). What the BBC might be said to do is enframe the arts (including 
music) with their semi-formed utopian tendencies and meta-musical discussion in 
a situated eutopian present where all-comers, musicians, presenters and listeners 
can propose or reject utopian conceits. This very dialectical challenge to the 
utopian given serves to revitalise the dialectical process for more solid truths aided 
by a synthesis o f what - with recourse to Freud and Marcuse - could easily be 
termed the pleasure and reality principles of various cultural expressions and 
discussion that sees immediate somatic and future-orientated emotional liberation 
run productively into the glosses of language. Mannheim averred that “the key to 
the intelligibility of utopias is the structural situation of that social stratum which 
at any given time espouses them” (1960, 187). The conclusions we might reach 
then about the class biases of listeners, musicians and broadcasters must therefore 
involve a problematisation of the class-based origins and intended and unintended
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consequences, not only of any utopian imperative, but also any o f eutopian ones 
such as that mooted throughout this study. In addition, this would also raise the 
need to problematise the assumption that the BBC fosters a Habermasian critical 
ideal when the corporation for many represents perhaps at best, only a particular 
metropolitan constituency, and at worst for others a now moribund body unable to 
deliver the rectitude and honesty of interactions between programme makers and 
listeners because of commercial pressures.24
Surely, far from seeing bourgeois elements o f the British establishment 
taking advantage of a nation’s deference as it tunes-in passively to radio and 
television, intermediate institutions are nothing other than a mirror o f a relatively 
classless collective will; it is (and is required to be) an adjunct o f all our 
communities’ ambitions and tastes. If  this analysis o f the character and agenda of 
the British polity and its institutions is accepted, then there is for the moment, in 
response to the Habermasian call for legitimate, democratically approved control, 
a continuing legitimacy for the BBC and its technicians, producers and cultural 
agents. O f course, when a particular kind of politically motivated rule, rather than 
enduring state polity is in question, we should all scrutinise a government’s 
presidence over the enlightening medium that is public broadcasting. Ideals and 
dogged independence alone may not guarantee integrity of public service output. 
Therefore, any chance of subjectification, representation and any consequent 
intersubjective interaction via the airwaves requires politico-legalistic prescription 
guided by ongoing discussions of morality and ethics.
Notes
1. See Scheuerman (1999), 153-177.
2. See Beebee (2002,192-3).
3. One thinks o f the British bureaucrats dismissing the United States model o f commercial radio 
broadcasting which they encountered in the 1920s and characterised as an anarchy of the air. 
Viewed as an index o f ‘free speech’ in the USA, the commercial content and brute triumph of the 
most powerful local and regional transmitters was anathema to those establishing a public service 
model in Britain set about with notions of national bodies and welfare. The story in the US was 
addressed by Michelle Hilmes in a conference paper (2001).
4. It is interesting to reflect on Terry Eagleton who sees the public sphere having special concerns 
at its heart: “not power but reason” and “Truth not authority”. He adds: “It is on this radical 
dissociation o f politics and knowledge that its entire discourse is founded” (Eagleton [1984] cited 
McGuigan 1996,24).
274
5. Habermas has written: “A public sphere that functions politically requires more than the 
institutional guarantees o f the constitutional state; it also needs the supportive spirit o f cultural 
traditions and patterns o f socialisation, o f the political culture, o f a populace accustomed to 
freedom” (1992e, 453). Consider the impact John Birt had upon the creative culture of the BBC 
and, as a consequence, ultimately the quality o f the lifeworld o f audiences. On the “legitimation 
crisis” and on “motivation crisis” whereby ordinary trust in systems is called into question, see 
Habermas (1975).
6. Cf. M iller (1993) generally for the governmental ‘tempering’ o f individuals and Bratich, Packer 
and McCarthy (2003), for a series of accounts of Foucauldian coordination o f subjects and society 
through diverse cultural channels and discourses.
7. For an account o f intimate, private reception and ‘compensatory dialogue’ in the company of a 
live mass medium, namely radio, see John Durham Peters (1999, 214 et seq.). In March 2007, 
BBC Radio 3 reorganised its online message boards. This led to complaints from frustrated 
contributors feeling censored and disenfranchised. Feedback, BBC Radio 4, March 18 2007.
8. As Hall reminded us when opening his 1986 essay on culture and governance with a quotation 
from Gramsci’s prison notebooks, a state’s ‘ethical’ cultivation o f its subjects was motivated by 
the requirement “to raise the great mass [...] to a particular cultural and moral level [...] which 
corresponds to the needs o f the productive forces for development, and hence to the interests o f the 
ruling classes” (1986b, 22).
9. Benhabib tells us that there are three public spaces, the one a competitive space o f interests, 
what she terms “agonistic” and characterises as republican to a large extent, the second she terms 
“legalistic” which is liberal and Kantian in outlook. The third she names “Discursive public space 
which involves a democratic-socialist remodelling o f late-capitalist societies” and is linked to the 
work of Habermas (Benhabib 1992,73,78).
10. See Dyke (2004) and also Barnett and Curry (1994).
11. Held has suggested that Habermas has been involved in an “attempt to develop a theory of 
society with a practical intention: the self-emancipation o f people from domination” (1990,250).
12. A similar criticism has been levelled by Scheuerman (1999,171).
13. Habermas’s ‘classical’ manifestation o f the public sphere, designed by the middling sort and 
bourgeois groups to meditate anarchy and authority to their ends. See generally Habermas (1989).
14. For a defence o f Lord Birt’s eight years as BBC Director General, see Geraldine Bedell’s ‘Peer 
with a plan’ in The Observer, August 21 2005 (accessed via Media Guardian/Guardian Unlimited, 
August 13, 2007). Birt is seen to have defended and revitalised a “complacent institution” 
strengthening its journalistic remit and getting it ready for digital developments.
15. Kearney argues that “A rational society characterised by universal and unrestricted 
communication remains for Habermas a realisable ideal. And such an ideal necessitates that we 
forego both the nostalgic quest for lost traditions (romantic hermeneutics) and the naive belief in a 
spontaneous activism of the present (revolutionary anarchism) in favour o f a critical deciphering 
and reconstruction o f language aimed at an ideal speech situation where each individual may freely 
participate in social interaction” (1986,235-6).
16. The weakness of the Habermasian model o f critical theory is that it lays itself open to die 
cardinal sin o f reification in dealing with concepts (‘lifeworld’, ‘public sphere’).
17. Bums (1977) offers an interesting insight into the persona adopted by BBC broadcasters. See 
also Scanned on radio sincerity (1996, 58-74) and authenticity (1996,93-116). Important questions 
of authenticity undoubtedly surface when the performances of Peel, Tony Blackburn and other 
radio disc Jockeys are considered in the light o f Habermasian requirements. It might be said that 
Blackburn’s dogged presentation o f his ‘entertaining se lf is of such longevity that it has become 
his sincere, mask-free self in some respects. Thoughtful comment on honesty in popular 
performance comes from Bruce Springsteen - someone often credited with an authentic, blue- 
collar essence on stage. In an interview with the Observer Music Magazine, 2004 he commented 
on the work ethic evident in his live performances; he tells the interviewer that it is only an act and 
asks how more honest and sincere could one be with that admission. One should never assume an 
artfulness in any performance invariably invalidates the ‘truth’ o f the content.
18. Some of these premises are touched on in Habermas’s Between facts and norms: Contributions 
to a discourse theory o f law and democracy, trans. W. Rehg (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996). For 
an overview o f Habermas’s legal philosophy see Edgar (2005,243-72).
19. Extracts taken from: www.bbc.co.uk/info/bbccharter and www.bbc.co.uk/agreement. Both 
were accessed in March 2002.
275
20. Andrew Edgar has usefully observed that sincerity “becomes an issue o f self expression and 
formation o f a community identity” and argued that such a individualistic impulse should be 
compared to the more singular “cultural ambition o f Reith”.
21. McGuigan writes: “Hans Magnus Enzenberger’s youthful belief that everyone could and 
should become a cultural producer in relation to die major media o f public communication was 
hopelessly utopian”; yet McGuigan sees in the ensuing decades a ground-swell o f public and 
community arts and recently a strong interest in video, and home music making which attests 
technological competence and individual creative agency (1996,79-80).
22. Gamham, ‘Public service versus the market’ Screen, vol. 5, no. 1 (1983).
23. Collins expresses reservations about the BBC’s emancipatory project. He refers us to Kant’s
essay, ‘What is Enlightenment?’ which refers in turn to a self-inflicted ‘tutelage’ whereby others 
do our thinking and protect us. Collins quotes Kant: “It is so easy not to be of age. If I have a book 
which understands me, a pastor who has a conscience for me, a physician who decides my diet, 
and so forth, I need not trouble myself. I need not think, If I can only pay - others will readily 
undertake the irksome work for me.” He adds that even if  there is an “emancipatory project”, it is 
“on the terms set by the broadcasting elites, rather than on terms set by the community as a whole” 
(1993,255).
24. Consider the upset (summer 2007) over the British mass media’s inept handling o f audience 
phone-ins. BBC Radio 6 Music came in for some of this criticism.
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11 Conclusion: sensibility, imagination & understanding
11.1 Introduction
Yet hath modem cultur enrich’d a wasting soil;
Science comforting man’s animal poverty
and leisuring his toil, hath humanized manners
and social temper, and now above her globe-spredd net,
of speeded intercourse hath outrun all magic,
and disclosing the secrecy of the reticent air
hath woven a seamless web of invisible strands
spiriting the dumb inane with the quick matter of life:
Now music’s prison’d raptur and the drowned voice of
truth mantled in light’s velocity, over land and sea
are omnipresent, speaking aloud to every ear,
into eveiy heart and evety home their unhinder’d message,
the body and soul of Universal Brotherhood.
Robert Bridges from The Testament o f Beauty (1930) Book I 
cited Briggs (1965, x )
Eutopia, *music & electricity *
As we have seen, Thomas More turned to Anemolius, the imaginary poet laureate 
in his book Utopia, to describe his eutopian island of “men, resources and 
excellent laws”. Four and a half centuries later, Asa Briggs, writing his magnum 
opus on the history of UK broadcasting, opened his second volume, The Golden 
Age o f Wireless, with an extract from real life poet laureate, Robert Bridges 
(1844-1930). Bridges’s words afforded Briggs the lyrical imagery of music 
carried out into society by radio wave: that potent combination of “music and 
electricity” that has been equally fascinating for Reith and Adorno. The human, 
material and technological foundations of More’s e/utopia, Bridges’s ‘seamless 
web’ and Reith’s state monopoly making for “Happier homes”, all point to the key 
elements of the present work. More’s Utopia was a literary-cum political allegory 
in the tradition of Plato’s Republic, an ideal, contrasting with reality. Utopia has, 
since More’s day, become an independent political trope and social prospectus 
which either alludes to better times and conditions in the critical spirit of More’s 
book, or is used conversely as a dismissive adjective condemning as naive, any 
such hopes or actions directed towards a more equitable tomorrow. Utopia is thus
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a ‘chronotope’ - a perfect place somewhere, and sometime in the political future. 
Sensitive to modem and postmodern academic readings o f the ideological power 
of culture as a descending set of often technologically rendered social relations, 
this study has tried to preserve a place for the dialectical dimensions o f socialist 
thought, and has proposed the present-day existence of a eutopia, a place of 
process and potential, set about with appropriate resources and socially minded 
agents. Has the cultural landscape of the BBC merely ‘informed, educated and 
entertained’ to create a modem citizen and state subject? If  so, whose values and 
standards served as the model for judgements? Has the BBC simply ‘fed’ a 
passive individual to deliver John Locke’s “virtue, wisdom, breeding and 
learning” (1693), or have a priori Kantian concepts and a Habermasian ethical 
discourse given us something more robust?
What has been addressed in this study has been the likelihood o f a state- 
mediated, musically and technologically grounded search for an improving 
humanity. What has been proposed throughout has been a place and space for 
mindful individuals engaged in a process o f aesthetically and discursively formed 
‘becoming’. Music radio, particularly that of the public service kind, has been 
proposed as a socio-cultural ‘vessel’ mediating between home, public and state 
spheres. Together, the ideals and universality o f the public service project meet a 
never-ending confluence of particular musics, play and desire; hope, thought, 
socio-political contradictions, language and mutuality - in short a musical eutopia. 
A place and space where the experience of music’s abstract utopia has been 
channeled into a more apprehensible, concrete form of cultural and social import, 
susceptible to imaginative value and rational understanding. Individual listeners’ 
desires and imagination join with processes of an aesthetically and discursively 
rendered subjectification and intersubjectivity. Not only is Adorno’s “music in 
radio” then, the possible locale of a somewhat abstract (but ‘useful’) utopian 
sensibility; it is the index of a space of eutopian goodness and potential where art, 
democracy and communicative praxis have a home.
Radio does not proffer any profound Truth, but a common ground of 
mutuality where we ‘triangulate’ ourselves in relation to the desires and ambitions 
of others.1 Radio let us hear ourselves, our community and a modem world of 
others. It is in this space that mediated subjects attend to cultures beyond their
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own. It is as an antithetical encounter with diverse expressions that music in radio 
is presented to ‘common sense’ as a pragmatic community o f experiences wherein
hopes coalesce and dialogue ensues. Here, ontological and ethical questions about
2
subjectification and intersubjectivity emerge.
This study, which at root is a defence of, but not an apologia for, a certain 
kind o f BBC, has sought to articulate this optimistic view o f ‘music in radio’ in 
the following ways:
(1) Cognitive potential and communicative rationality reside in all musical 
experiences. It is, in effect, for musician and audience, a medium of participation: 
a socio-temporal‘ space’ and a Active medium; a site for collective activity and 
utopian allegory. Not only does music proffer escape and compensation, it 
additionally throws into relief, a sense o f subjective and social alienation or non­
identity, lack and broken promises; we encounter the absent presence o f matters 
utopian. However commercial a musical work might be in its production and 
distribution, its immediate sensory pleasures present supplementary acoustic data 
for the body and memory that exceed music’s illusory, ideological tasks, and for 
many, get to the heart of our ‘species being’.
(2) The mundane form of communication that is radio, is rich in subjectifying and 
intersubjective properties as it broadcasts music to subjects ‘listening-in’ to an 
outside world. Whilst we should continue to critique radio’s instrumental 
tendencies, we should also be prepared to defend it as a determining space for the 
aesthetic, discursive and discussive formation of knowledge as a prelude to 
humanitarian praxis. As Silbermann observed:
Radio’s present-day function as entertainer, patron, composer, interpreter, 
musical educator, impresario, programme planner, sound technician, organiser 
and generator of cultural homogeneity and its consequent interfactional 
relationship with both producer and consumer groups is all too frequently 
dismissed as presumptuous or dangerous to culture. (1963,154)
The study’s origins
The subject matter of this study was prompted by the present writer’s sense of his 
own enculturation through music, particularly that heard on BBC radio in the
279
1960s and 1970s. The realisation as a teenager that ‘I was the BBC’ was both a 
chilling and intriguing one and led to a host o f questions about institutions, 
subjectification and general engagement with the objective world. Could music 
ever evade administrative cooption to preserve its immediate and authentic 
qualities, and if  so, how might those autonomous qualities be preserved, even as 
they were experienced and named? Subsequent readings of Norris (1989b) and 
Flynn (1992) during the early stages of research provided a means o f exploring 
the pre-lingual power of music in relation to a philosophically formulated account 
of music’s utopia. In conjunction with these, Bom (1995) provided a successful 
precedent for an examination of state-sanctioned cultural institutions. The 2006 
renewal o f the BBC Royal Charter and long-awaited publication o f Adorno’s 
Current o f Music (2006a) provided an intellectual confluence of contemporary 
socio-political event, and historically situated radio theory that made for an 
appropriate moment to conclude the present study.
The approach
A provisional literature review in the late 1990s flagged-up the diversity of 
sources and approaches, offering insights into music, broadcasting and the 
listening subject. It has been engagements with this slew of academic 
publications, attendance at ESRC seminars on radio matters, and academic 
conferences, plus a shadowing of day-to-day debate on the subject of the BBC and 
new technologies which have fuelled this study’s pan-disciplinarity and synthetic 
ambition. It is hoped however that there is a sufficient marshalling of concepts and 
thinkers from the cognate socio-philosophical traditions of Marxism, critical and 
cultural theory - be they continental or Anglophone - to illuminate the central 
topic, and alert a patient reader to interesting philosophical alignments and further 
topics o f investigation. Similarly, the inclusion of some qualitative data should be 
seen as a continuation of a critical theory which never wholly abandons socio­
political realities, and which can join its socio-philosophical modes o f inquiry to 
substantiate hypotheses.
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Section & chapter summaries
Following the Introduction and Framework, theories & foundations o f PART 
ONE | Preliminaries; PART TWO | Music’s utopia, comprised three chapters 
marking out the relevance of music’s sensory, imaginative and comprehending 
powers in the evolving thought of Bloch, Adorno and Marcuse. 3 ‘Venturing 
BeyondV Bloch & the utopian trope in music considered Bloch’s romantic 
yearnings and socialist inclinations that led him to outline hopes and utopian 
principles for a better tomorrow. As Zipes has observed, Bloch, whilst 
“essentialist” in his modeling of the subject and “teleological” in his expectations 
of change via an historical materialism, did propose an “existentialist” utopian 
impulse driven by sensibility and imagined alternatives, leading to articulated 
changes in “critical utopias” and “the concrete materiality o f daily struggle” 
(1997, 8). Bronner has argued that it is in Bloch’s writings that we see “a new 
philosophy o f history in which transcendence is linked with immanence.” 
However Bloch’s utopian project “is still grounded in the ontological and 
teleological assumptions of an earlier time” (1994, 350). 4 ‘La Promesse du 
Bonheur V Adorno, music & radio showed that for much of his career, Adorno 
seemed to gainsay most of Bloch’s allegorical sites of “secular escatology” and 
redemption as Norris has expressed it (1989a, 17). However, as Norris here also 
rightly avers, this would be to cast Bloch as an uncritical ‘utopian’ and Adorno as 
someone incapable of admitting any utopian conceit into the business o f societal 
ambition for change. Whilst Bronner (1994, 350-1) has suggested that Adorno’s 
negative dialectics wrest the utopian concept away from any abstract teleological 
movement, it fails to afford the conceptual content any likely institutional form. 
Adomo gives us the following: “All music, however individual it may be in 
stylistic terms, possesses an inalienable collective substance: every sound says 
‘we’ ” (2000a, 9). This is surely the intuitive, positive face of Adomo, but like 
Bloch before him and Marcuse in his wake, there’s a reluctance to really ‘depict’ a 
likely eutopian site. The present study has tried to look closely at Adomo, and in 
particular, his modified critiques of music in radio to detect an implicit, more 
positive dialectical position from where a quasi-autonomous music and 
philosophy even in the presence o f commodified recordings and administered 
broadcasting can be found at work. Chapter 5 Technology, art & liberation:
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Marcuse reviewed marshalled a number of positive critiques o f radio technology. 
We also saw Marcuse’s work address the business o f recollection. This also took 
us directly back to somatic affairs, aesthetics and matters o f sensibility. In much 
of his writing we saw concessions in the presence of communication technologies, 
which boded well for a defence of public service broadcasts. We also saw 
perspectives that seemed to promote the value of countercultural activity. 
Marcuse’s position however was in many respects, more guarded than earlier, 
more optimistic advocates of radio as a liberatory aesthetic and communication
3
tool. Whilst supporting the postwar ‘Great Refusal’, Marcuse possessed an 
Adomian reticence, fuelled by doubt about the political sophistication o f popular 
musics, and by the ever-present threat of technological manipulation.
In PART THREE | Musical eutopias, Chapter 6, Meta-musical readings & 
the utopian conceit problematised the mediation of music through language and 
explored matters of musically and technologically mediated subjectification and 
intersubjectivity. The intractable problematic of music’s ineffable artistic 
credentials and emancipatory promises caught in the web of ‘readings’ and 
conceptual appropriation was examined in regard to the presence o f the popular 
lyric and its political appropriation. Recourse to utopian allegory was also 
examined here, and argued to be one way of constantly refreshing interpretation 
and possibilities as an open, discursive trope which respected the widely- 
experienced sublimity of music and the simultaneous Adomian fear o f existential 
cooption and conceptual correspondence. 7 Music, radio & intersubjectivity 
considered music as a participatory medium of cognition, personal development 
(subjectification) and a social mutuality (intersubjectivity). This was done for a 
number of reasons: (1) so that it might shadow a Hegelian dialectical development 
for the subject, attaining a degree o f fulfilment in the public spaces o f the state 
polity, (2) so that Levin’s complex account of the listening subject might be seen 
as a modification of this Hegelian model and a revision of Adorno’s listening 
types,4 (3) so that the pitfalls of ‘false’, egological dealings with others might be 
scrutinised and countered and (4) so that intersubjectivity be extended to reconcile 
instances of direct and mediated address predicated on a communicative ethics 
that involves sensitive cultural encounters which, through discussive activity, 
promote the beginnings of a revised social reality. 8 Performative places &
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broadcast space looked at Foucault’s claim for a heterotopian alternative to 
linguistically prescribed sites of discourse. It offered a development o f his 
particular variant of the utopian which proposed the likes o f the BBC as a 
legitimate Heterotopian site of representation, but also cultural otherness and 
inspiration for those ‘trapped’ in the realities of an unhappy home.
The two chapters of PART FOUR | Communication, society & eutopia, 
immediately preceded this Conclusion and provided a selection o f the BBC’s 
institutional details to set alongside illuminating Gramscian and Habermasian 
accounts o f agency and communicative potentials. In 9 Normative ambitions & 
institutional histories: Public service broadcasting & The BBC from  Reith to 
Ravenscroft an historical mapping, theoretical reading o f Reithian rhetoric, and an 
account o f BBC DJ John Peel joined philosophical elaboration to present 
arguments for positive hermeneutical readings o f music in radio as shaped by the 
BBC. 10 Justness fo r you: Habermas, the BBC & the public sphere showed how 
Habermas affords us the ‘here and now’ facilities for change. Here, utopian 
impulses and a conceptual, regulatory utopian content o f social equity are turned 
into a communicative praxis of eutopian felicity and goodness. Bronner tells us 
that to be effective, Utopia must move beyond any reified, transcendent ‘content 
devoid of form’. It must become a prospective interpretation: “a regulative ideal 
[where] [t]he formal assumptions of a democracy are seen as prerequisites for an 
emancipated order.” Bronner concludes: “Utopia, from this perspective, is 
immanent within ‘justice’ rather than transcendent in its vision of the ‘good’ ” 
(1994,351).5
11.2 Sensibility, imagination & understanding
As outlined in PART ONE, 2.3, The Kantian faculties of sensibility, imagination 
and understanding were alighted upon by Marcuse, keen to explicate the way in 
which one’s own intense cognitive insights in the presence of art’s “sensuous 
immediacy” were dependent on it being grounded in a wider set o f universally 
shared experiences (1972, 95). Thus for Marcuse, the aesthetic might connect 
historical reality with imagined alternatives, sensitive to common human desires 
and values. If such a socio-philosophical and aesthetic theory is to have any real
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currency in the present study, we must effect a move from Kantian, aprioristic 
epistemology and a philosophy of a prior consciousness towards a sociologically 
inflected model o f socialization and a more situated rationality. (It should be noted 
that this adaptation is a fairly open reading of Kantian aesthetics and 
epistemology, inflected by critical theory and is not one that directly attends to his 
analysis o f music). This very move is to be witnessed in the work of the Frankfurt 
School and finds additional efficacy and relevance here by way o f the linguistic 
turn of Habermas. Kant’s epistemological and moral framework still has a 
relevance, but aesthetic judgement has to be modified. Habermas argues that:
What remains for philosophy, and what is within its capabilities, is to mediate 
interpretively between expert knowledge and an everyday practice in need of 
orientation [but in a post-metaphysical climate] it can no longer place the totality 
of different lifeworlds, which appear only in the plural, into a hierarchy of those 
which are of greater or lesser value; it is limited to grasping universal structures 
of lifeworlds in general. (1992b, 17-18)
Habermas is suggesting that social expression, social relations and modes of 
communication are foregrounded in an ‘earthed’ epistemology given extra weight 
by history and circumstance. It then becomes possible for subjects to attend to 
themselves and everyone else too. An intersubjectivity comes into being as the 
hermetic, a priori self is modified by the inevitablity o f contingent objective 
realities. Habermas contends that:
The analysis of the necessary conditions for mutual understanding in general at 
least allows us to develop the idea of an interactive intersubjectivity, which 
makes possible both a mutual and constraint-free understanding among 
individuals [...] This intact intersubjectivity is a glimmer of symmetrical relations 
marked by free, reciprocal recognition. But this idea must not be filled in as the 
totality of a reconciled form of life and projected into the future as a utopia. 
(1992d, 145)
The conclusion of Musical eutopias then returns us to Kant. This however is a 
move away from aesthetic judgement and categorisation towards a more distinct 
comprehension of the processes of socially reality. Moral positions and ‘oughts’ 
which might now inform communicative processes critical diagnoses of ‘what is 
wrong’ are however preserved, and appear not least as Habermas writes o f the 
four (validity) claims of truth, rightness, truthfulness and meaning, central to his 
post-Kantian pragmatics of human communicative relations which, in the final
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analysis, nevertheless are still measured against non-contingent higher values. In 
short, pragmatism should never descend into a contingent ethics but be ever 
mindful o f a higher human morality.
Validity claims have a Janus face. As claims, they transcend any local context; at 
the same time they have to be raised here and now and be de facto recognised [...] 
The transcendent moment of universal validity bursts every provinciality 
asunder; the obligatory moment of accepted validity claims renders them carriers 
of a context-bound everyday practice [...] a moment of unconditionally is built 
into factual processes of mutual understanding. (1987b, 322-323)
The three human faculties of sensibility and imagination attended to here, connect 
subjects to the objective world. Sensibility according to Kant is aesthetic 
receptivity operating using a priori frameworks that receive sense data. The 
imagination is recollective and also creative. It is retrospective and also 
prospective. Finally, we have the Kantian understanding faculty, an every day 
reason that is one of some assessment and judgement using concepts and sensory 
experiences. Music radio stimulates all three: it provides new music, stimulates 
nostalgia, prompts a mimetic empathy, fuels social and aesthetic imaginaries and 
stimulates the understanding of alterity. As Marcuse has expressed it:
Authentic art never merely acts as a mirror of a class or as an ‘automatic’, 
spontaneous outburst of its frustrations and desires. The very ‘sensuous 
immediacy’ which art expresses, presupposes, however surreptitiously (and this 
is something which most of our popular culture has forgotten) a complex, 
disciplined and formal synthesis of experience according to certain universal 
principles which alone can lend to the work more than a purely private 
significance. (Marcuse in Kearney 1984, 79)
Music & sensibility
Music is an acoustic phenomenon made by people for people. Music, however and 
wherever shared, is itself a socio-cultural ‘space’ where we can belong as 
musicians and listeners. Heard in communities and in the mass media, it becomes 
a socio-cultural framework of refusal or conformity. Listening to that music 
shared in public involves a sort of Kantian sensibility or cognition that is more 
than just the passive reception of pleasurable vibrations or sensory, Lockean data. 
It is an immediate experience of ideas and a sort of interpellation o f others; a 
premeditated attentiveness whereby we anticipate (listen out for), hear and register 
sounds. This is a sensibility in the presence of music that informs us that there is
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something or someone other, that is distinct from ourselves. Once this possibility 
has been created, our faculties o f imagination, understanding and reason become 
active. This is particularly so in the presence o f non-lyrical music where music is 
in effect an ‘empty sign’.7 This, in the context o f this study, takes us firstly into the 
realms of Music’s utopia then on to musical eutopias. The immediate phenomenon 
of music stirs our intuitions, invokes the ‘ineffable’ and sublime and then attracts
g
our conceptual faculties. Desires, memories and alternative possibilities are 
stirred and created, as are sublime, supersensible ideas. Their figuration on our 
part, and moreover, their representation in institutional spaces can be viewed as a 
symbolic place of enlightenment or, even better, creative action and rational, 
communicative exchange. This combination o f utopian, intuited desire in the 
presence of the aesthetic and its conceptual education in conjunction with the 
Kantian understanding may represent a sort o f direct, Kantian hypotyposis o f a 
better life. An institution like the BBC might then serve symbolically as another 
Kantian hypotyposis, as an abstract site, or analogue o f ideas beyond phenomenal
9
intuition formed by reason. Thus art provokes sensibility and imagination then 
the public institution brings ideas, the understanding and reason to bear on this 
most enigmatic of cultural forms.10 For Kant, art serves as a sensory and cognitive 
analogy for reasonable ideas and aspirations requiring a sensible form for 
everyone to apprehend and attend to by means o f allegory or simple discussion.11
Music then is art and social fact (Adomo 1997, 304); a socially determined 
cultural object mediated in a modem, technological world for profit. But it is also 
a cultural object disseminated with a socio-cultural and socio-philosophical 
‘purpose’. Art can beget humanistic reason, if  not revolution. Exceeding its social 
facts, music has an insistent, ‘sensuous immediacy’ (Marcuse); a non­
instrumental, a-lingustic, ability to stir and stimulate. Music comes to us via our 
senses, it touched the individual and it touches the collective - as Marcuse says 
above, it has ‘more than a purely private significance’. Music is thus an intense art 
that that can free-up, and activate our sensibility. In the presence of 
aesthetic/acoustic experience, our sensibility draws out an experience of 
alternative realities and possibilities. Our sensibility responds to music, and joins 
with our imagination to effect a number of cognitively shaped responses: (1) a 
dissatisfaction with the extant, present day reality; (2) a negation of the present
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using: (a) Memory of things now past (b); an anticipation of better conditions to 
come; (c) an imagined set o f specific possibilities; (d) creative and allegorical 
responses that re-work, in new aesthetic forms; (e) illusory representations of 
unknowable phenomena and (f) evasive truths.
Thus we have here, in the presence o f music, Marcuse’s 
intensified, somatic reception which gives on to sensibility and imagination which 
respond actively in spatial and temporal ways to sensory stimulation. What we 
have are thoughtful responses to actual experience in the guise of ideas. Such 
ideas as insightful truths (truths unknowable in any other form) lie beyond 
phenomenal experience and are themselves given collective expression as 
additional cultural works or in allegorical form (such as Beethoven’s Ninth 
Symphony or More’s Utopia). They might too, as has been suggested by Edgar,
form the basis for a “Kantian grounding o f alterity - that which exceed [one’s]
12known world.” These ideations promote necessary aesthetic illusions which 
should stimulate and prompt reflection on our reality and chances. The faculty of 
understanding, a set of categories, concepts and judgments is extended and refined 
by the faculty o f reason which orders and connects singular aesthetic experiences 
and consequent ideations which can be promoted and further refined in praxis and 
discourse to admit of Otherness.
So, art provokes humanitarian reason that is set about with a 
synthetic, epistemological process and illusions o f betterment in the form of 
language and praxis. Our own sense of desire may come to be understood, and the 
parallel desires of others comprehended when encountered in spaces charged with 
achieving such comprehensions. Cognitive reception of art in a historically 
situated reality, an ‘established order of things’ is joined by the Kantian categories 
of imagination, understanding and reason.
The essential proposition of this thesis has been that public service radio can 
deliver, as an intermediary institution and representational space, a ‘good’ cultural 
array for every listening subject. A listening subject’s cognitive faculties - their 
sensibility, their imagination (recollective, creative and prospective) and 
understanding - combine in a Kantian way (as reprised by Marcuse) in the 
presence of music in radio as perceptual, conceptual and rational knowledge to
13 •sharpen a picture of the self, and form one of the wider world. To be precise, the
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BBC as a group ‘bearing ideas’14 (alternative, Kantian ‘ideas’ and possibilities) 
affords us Bom’s aesthetic and social realms o f human discovery (1993a) and 
process that has been defended here as a eutopia, a provisional utopia of 
inclusivity and process. The combined cultural array of say Radio lXtra and 
Radio 6 Music, and the popular musicological output o f Radio 3 does, as a 
deliberate consequence o f cultural representation, offer some chances for 
sensibility, imagination and understanding.
Radio, perhaps uniquely, with its substantial investment in music as a draw 
for listenerships, is a space for a subject’s sensibility and im agination to engage 
with socio-aesthetic alterity. Positively framed cultural difference can be projected 
and mimetically shared to invigorate social empathy and equality, rather than 
simply fuelling international hostility or sustaining the global commerce o f late 
capitalism. What Homer in his work on Jameson has called “a collective 
experience that will allow us to once more think the alternative to a global 
capitalist system” (1998,149).
These processes are formed and experienced amid the flux and realities of 
Marcuse’s ‘established order reality’, affording his ‘chances’ and Bronner’s 
immanently situated regulatory insights and actions o f historical transcendence. 
Additionally, as with all utopian conceits and play, it is a site that affords open, 
allegorical readings of broadcast space within the day-to-day talk o f music and 
radio, cultural policy debate and philosophy. In this evolving institutional site, 
Western Marxist and Gramscian wishes for a liberated, enlightened self assisted 
by extant media technology, discourse and agency are fulfilled.15 Indeed, Marxism 
says Lukes is all about a “self-transforming present” not an “ideal future” (1984, 
158).
We must turn to Bronner, whose thoughts on contemporary utopian 
principles are (alongside those of Levitas) some of the most thoroughgoing. 
Bronner writes: “Utopia is [...] asymptotically connected with practice as a 
phenomenological complex of procedural rules for communication” (1994, 351). 
In Bronner’s picturing of Utopia running alongside but never fused with the 
practical, we can perhaps see again the fruitful, eutopian alliance of transcendent 
possibilities and immanent conditions whereby the one attracts the other. It is in 
such an idea that we might begin to see a defence for the socio-cultural spaces of
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radio, and the BBC in particular, as an essential one, and therefore go a step 
beyond die equivocations o f Bloch, Adomo and Marcuse, and into the pragmatic 
but ethical reality o f Habermas’s contemporary order. Bronner adds:
[The utopian] concept retains practical relevance only when impulses towards the 
‘best life’ are symbolically and institutionally mediated and their inherently 
transcendent character is given a degree of determination. Alternatives to existing 
institutions and forms of cultural production are concrete only when intertwined 
with existing interests, some intractable and some open to compromise, which are 
themselves in need of judgment. (Bronner 1994, 351)
This degree of determination is, for Bronner, effectively a design, a manifestation 
of an idea. Bronner uses the metaphor o f the artistic sketch to advocate the 
benefits of provisionality and contingency in life. In fact he suggests that “the best 
life” is a sketch. Neither the drafter and the drawn subject, nor the viewer can 
know of the final outcome, but together they have a shared interest in working 
towards a fuller picture. Here’s Bronner’s metaphor: “Sketches are not paintings 
[...] They are often little more than half-visible outlines o f a seemingly 
indeterminate content [...] Sketches however retain their inner logic. The best 
offer constructive insights [and] give a sense o f direction. The sketch serves as a 
set of coordinates” (1994, 352).
Even now, in the face of asynchronous broadcasting and debate about the 
purpose of public broadcasting, radio technology might well provide conditions to 
both use and transcend the material and social present: capitalism and 
technological relations might still contain the germ of a sketch to transform or 
progress beyond extant social relations and ideological pressures.16
Music fs utopia & imagination
As musician Eddie Prevost stated, “A piece of music is a precept o f a particular 
possible world [...] It is the possible existence of other worlds, even the inkling 
that other worlds can be thought of, that makes possible the break with the 
hegemonic determinism of industrial clock-time” (1995, 35). This may be a 
compensatory ‘recollection’ of an actual anterior personal state (a lost domestic 
world, moment of authenticity, or condition of personal equanimity) recreated by 
the Kantian imagination, or it might be a more anticipatory image of something
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yet to be, ‘seen’ in the mind and felt in the body. Here is our Blochian hunger for 
a past place of security, an abstract utopia - lost, or at least conceived of in body 
and mind with reference to the visceral and psychological. When these felt and 
imagined ‘desires’ are ‘educated’, set about with language, and understood by the 
listening subject as external musical expressions, Kant’s active im agining  of the 
objective world of others, and Bloch’s, socially-directed concrete utopia give on 
to Bom’s imaginaries as outlined in PART THREE, 8.8.
The BBC, understanding & eutopia
When and where conditions are right for this sort o f sensibility and imagination, a 
good deal of thinking and talking can take place and a rational, Kantian 
understanding ensues. New musical forms are heard by older generations, and 
new listeners access archived materials. Yes, there’s a possibility o f discursive 
cooptions, but a discursive and discussive freedom is instigated too, away from 
any mainstream authority, or compromising setting o f power.
Thinking and talking constructs concepts and conceits that seek to make 
sense of actual experience: what is heard and imagined to exist. It is not a 
metaphysical exercise, but one rooted in the lived. It is where an Aristotelian 
noesis, an active thinking occurs. This is a use o f concepts that avoids any 
predetermined finality of Hegel, or the linguistic reification feared by Adomo. 
Thus we have music, and music in radio, which is at once beyond explanation and 
at the same time caught in language with a social task to perform. The Kantian, 
‘purposeful purposelessness’ {Critique o f Judgement Section I, Book I § 10-17 
1952, 483-91) is one where human creative expression, collective representation 
and dialectical encounter with others assists in the cognitive subjectification and 
intersubjective dialogue between mediating broadcasters and listeners. This meets 
Adorno’s demands that art should serve a purpose beyond that o f creating surplus 
and exchange values. Whilst this can be explained with reference to music’s 
utopia, it is better to set it in the ‘established order reality’ of Marcuse, where just 
such a reality offers none of music’s promises, but chances, and their reasoned 
articulation; a set of resources and agents creating broadcast spaces filled with 
processes, both materialistic and philosophical, and an unending set o f dialectical 
transformations.
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Music, sense & reason
This thesis has argued it is credible to view musics as all at once natural and 
immediate bodily expression, cultural repository and intellectual substrate. 
Imparting subjective expression through our voices or by playing a musical 
instrument to effect a lyrical, sonorous or rhythmic music alerts us to the 
physiological and emotive power o f organised sounds. Music as part impulsive 
gesture and part historically and culturally structured form, inserts performers and 
listeners into a familiar ‘place’ o f close, meaningful ‘association’. Such 
conventions, glosses and commodifications can o f course overlay the 
spontaneous, so that it might now be difficult to locate what might be termed 
unmediated, ‘uncodified’, pre-lingual demonstrations o f singular gesture or social 
harmony. Yet whilst music is today integrated into channels o f production and 
dissemination, there are few who would doubt the residual if  ‘ineffable’ potency 
of many musics as a still unadministered human resource. This makes musics a 
target for a critical hermeneutics anxious to highlight or imagine its pre-modem 
credentials and future prospects. How is this shifting, often contested balance 
between the sense and reason of music to be understood?
Norris tells us that: “For Schopenhauer especially, music gave 
access to a realm of primordial experience - the Will in all its ceaseless strivings 
and desires - which the other arts [...] could only express at a certain distance” 
(1989a, 309).
Music can certainly afford Marcuse’s ‘sensuous immediacy’; a true 
engagement with will, instincts and the ecstatic. Conceptual reification and 
ideological choreography can be avoided for a while as we ourselves listen, sing 
and dance.
But Schopenhauer argued we should also seek to transcend the 
Will via reason to reach greater insights. This move from sense to reason can, 
suggests Simon Reynolds in his account of the ecstatic in Rock music, be 
understood as a translation from Barthes’s transient ‘‘jouissance” into his “plaisir” 
- where fleeting feelings of an exposed but ultimately larger self are fixed and 
articulated in a cultural discourse of “secure enjoyment of identity through time” 
(1990, 9). In short, music might be said to move us so that we first o f all feel and
291
then articulate pleasure, loss and hope. In music the past can be recalled, the 
present enjoyed and tomorrow anticipated - and all three discursively addressed. 
Reynolds resists any comprehending account o f music’s aesthetic surplus in 
favour of the somatic and the confounding that is an a-conceptual phenomenon 
that “holds (a) culture together” (1990, 10-11). Yet his call is a belated, forlorn 
call, a call to some degree contradicted by his own act o f writing. Music’s excess 
is its utopia of feeling, subjective impact and  consequent site o f self-reflection and 
reason set within an historical, social context This combination of the sensuous, 
rational and pragmatic allows us to use music as a utopian trope to first of all 
detect then effect an intersubjectivity and praxis. In music per se, there is no ‘as of 
right’ ascent to the Hegelian Absolute, nor any teleological drift to a more 
mundane yet equally benign socialism through simple acoustic exposure. 
Humanistic improvement can only happen in the presence o f music that is felt and 
heard by the listener then coupled with a utopian trope and universal reason.
Eutopia & Kantian principles
Eutopia, for the purposes of this study has been argued to be a ‘good place’. One 
cannot legislate for meaningful art, but one can legislate for its likely conditions of 
generation and dissemination. What do we mean by a good place and space? 
Unlike the utopian place of impossibility, a ‘good’ place is, after Kant, two things:
(1) places and a space of public, common sense order {sensus communis); (2) a 
place o f ‘concepts and principles’, a place o f laudable, absolute worth, use or end 
where we can hear affirmative/ideological culture but also autonomous/free art. 
Caygill usefully explains that for Kant in his Logik o f 1800, principles were points 
of departure and may be physical, ethical or logical. All philosophical principles 
for Kant were so-called acroamata (literally, something heard): discursive, 
temporally situated principles which, says Caygill are “analogies of experience, 
postulates of empirical thought [...] open to constant discursive challenge and are 
legitimated through language” Caygill (1995,46-7; 332-5).
What we have with music and principled discussion is a Kantian-cum- 
Habermasian opening onto a wider world where aesthetic affinities bring into 
focus cultural difference and the comprehension of ‘musics’. Here we have what 
is surely Kant’s “rationally determined faculty o f desire”, that is, a disinterested,
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absolute apperception o f a sensuous kind, a second and higher sensus communis 
which through art, reason and language effects intersubjectivity and a resultant 
subjectification as, without prejudice, we put “ourselves in the position of 
everyone else.”17
In sum: Music proffers agreeableness but also disinterested sensations 
beyond instrumental reason and immediate, personal pleasure and gives on to a 
second sensus communis employing a priori reason to both sense and then 
thought of the other. It thus has, additionally, a critical rationality developed to 
‘oversee’ the senses and imagination. Art’s utopia shows us another place where 
mind and body become reconciled, eutopia shows us where this ‘good’ can be 
delivered, figured or conceived We can turn to Karl Dalhaus who has written of 
Kantian subjectivity running alongside sensus communis:
The driving force behind the idea of ‘music’ (in the singular) - itself a result of 
‘history’ ( in the singular) - was the classical utopia of humanity that, in Kant’s 
Critique o f Judgement [Kritik der Urteilskraft], formed the basis of an esthetics 
in which judgements of taste are ‘subjective’ but nevertheless ‘universal’ to the 
extent that subjectivities strive to converge in a sensus communis, a ‘common 
sense’. If, however, humanity finds expression less in the discovery of a common 
substance than in the principle of respecting [...] untranscendable difference, one 
remains true to the idea of fmusic’ (in the singular) by relinquishing it as a 
concept of substance in order to reinstate it as a regulative principle of mutual 
understanding. (1998,239-44)
113 Utopian & Eutopian problematics
It would be remiss not to raise the problematics associated with utopian striving 
and this study’s eutopian conceit. This is in part achieved with reference to 
Levitas (1990, Chapters 7 and 8). She concedes that one immediate difficulty is 
the absence in current utopian scholarship o f a singular defintion o f Utopia. She 
ascribes this to the interdisciplinary nature o f utopian studies and seeks to answer 
this challenge by asking whether Utopia is a literary concern or a formal proposal 
of some alternative in another guise? Is Utopia she asks, simply a detailed socio­
political description of ideal content, or is it, instead, an abstract philosophical 
function or critical device? The implied answer is one dependent on one’s 
academic interests, political outlook and ambitions. Definitions and deployment of 
the term are always going to be predicated on the sorts o f questions one asks, and
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the solutions chosen in the face of everyday difficulties and inequalities. Whose 
emancipation is being sought? What form would that take? The danger of 
converting a utopian prescription for human happiness into a dystopia or 
Mannheimian ideology is a real one.
In order to get at the root o f the conceit, Levitas identifies desire as a 
motivating emotion allied to all utopian propositions, but cautions us against 
identifying any basic human propensity to imagine and dream something other 
than the facts of reality with any essentialist tendency towards “utopianising” or 
any “ultimate, universal utopia” (1990, 181). She writes:
Utopia is a social construct which arises not from a ‘natural’ impulse subject to 
social mediation, but as a socially constructed response to an equally socially 
constructed gap between needs and wants generated by a particular society and 
the satisfactions available to and distributed by it. (1990 182-3)
Utopian images and critiques are situated, culturally and politically elaborated 
constructs generated and actioned by ourselves as biological entities and agents in 
a modem environment. They are to be analysed as such. Whether Utopia is now, 
only a relativist exercise in intersubjectivity, or a reinvigorated mode o f abstract 
desire free from the need to be attainable from where we are today, there is 
arguably a role for this study’s, elaboration of the eutopian formulation.
Eutopia’s own problematic is one centred on its existence in the socio­
political present as it is thus potentially compromised as it might just as easily 
legitimise as critique the status quo. However, in the case o f a eutopian music 
radio, it may originate from a political and technocratic centre, but it carries 
highly effective utopian texts in the form o f music’s utopia. Moreover, it is an 
inclusive site of dialectical, discursive and epistemological value wherein human 
capacities can be figured and fulfilled. The inclusivity, independent agents and 
conversation of a good place, precludes the domination o f any one faction. In 
aesthetic terms, eutopian public service radio mixes the here and now pleasures of 
popular musics, with higher notions of freedom tempered by reason and empathy 
which allows for a sober consideration of our own frustrations and futures and 
those of a wider world.
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11.4 Omissions
In the preliminary stages o f research, many additional topics and issues hove into 
view as music, broadcasting and the subject were examined. What follows is a 
brief account of some of those subjects and issues consciously omitted.
Television, it might be argued is central to the critical study of 
popular musics because o f its ability to represent the spectacular nature of live 
performance and promotional video. Music television certainly constitutes a good 
deal o f commercial and public service output, and is significant, not least, for 
adolescents sensitive to subcultural dress codes. However, its ocularcentric (rather 
than auditory) concerns; and the fact o f television’s own extensive critical 
literature, has led to its exclusion in this study. Literature and film  can be 
regarded as expressive, rational forms capable o f supporting utopian and eutopian 
interpretation. Indeed, Caryl Flinn (1992) has amply demonstrated this in her 
work. Again, a separate specialist literature and a wish to avoid dilution or 
complexity has led to their general absence here. This thesis recognises the 
likelihood that illegal drug-taking within counter-cultural scenes may induce 
individual apprehension of ‘peaceable spaces’ and may indeed enhance collective 
feelings of well-being. Underground publications and communal living too, may 
be added to the list of eutopian arenas. Such considerations are regarded here as 
reactive socio-cultural factors pendant to the more central concerns of protracted 
musical policy disseminated locally, regionally and nationally over time by 
permanent cultural institutions. Whilst inspirational and colourful components, 
space has dictated that they are not given sustained analysis. Commercial and 
independent sound recording directly supplies content for music radio. Where 
relevant, instances of sound recording are referred to in brief, but a wish to avoid 
an over-complex set of musical media and practices in need o f analysis, sees its 
omission. Overseas public service broadcasters and their interest in popular 
culture are undoubtedly intriguing and deserve close study, (consider state 
broadcasting in Canada, The Netherlands, Italy and Germany), but they are 
omitted here on the grounds of available space. Contemporary Internet and digital 
musical media offer a fascinating suite of issues and debates which are, by no 
means external to many of those in this study. It has largely been left to the reader 
and to other scholars to reflect on the pursuit o f eutopian musical spaces as
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mapped in the present study, and to consider such matters in the context of 
MySpace.com and MP3 music file sharing. Gender issues are not overtly 
addressed in this study, even though it is acknowledged that historically, divergent 
levels of male and female interest and participation in the medium of radio require 
further analysis and explanation.
11.5 Findings & general conclusions
On completion, I have come to appreciate the immense respect and fascination 
afforded music amongst the many sociological and philosophical investigators 
who view organised sounds as both an ideological trap and site o f utopian 
freedom.
It seems that musical works and the textual, discursive readings of these 
works are inseparable. This linkage presents us with an ongoing tension: that 
between music’s ineffability and its representation and examination in language. 
To avoid a romanticised, reverential ‘silence’ in the presence o f music, we must 
continue to talk and write about i t  In respect o f Utopia, I have begun to trace out 
its shift as a literary conceit and transcendent condition in socialist thought, to 
become a simple conceit and ethical spur to benign, day-to-day social 
communication.
We must of course proceed with caution. Bom sensibly suggests that
music:
[0]ffers little resistance to discursive invasion and universalizing ideology. This 
analysis points, then to the omnipresence and centrality of metaphor and 
discourse as mediations of music-as-sound, and the need for attention, to their 
arbitrary and specific cultural character, their role in strategies of authority, 
legitimation and power, as well as for analysis of their intertextual connections 
with other, non musical realms of discourse, other areas of knowledge and 
practice. (1995,20)
Street points us in the direction of Norris who has observed that “theoretical 
reflection [...] forfeits any claim to emancipated knowledge unless it show as 
willingness to acknowledge its own existence as ‘a product o f textual 
understanding’ ” (1998, 71).
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Underpinning the whole o f this study has indeed been the relationship of 
two means o f persuasive expression: music and language. The former has been 
held to be a site of the ineffable, extra-linguistic realm of direct and free creative 
expression. In musical participation, spontaneity occurs and authenticity can be 
sensed, much more so than in linguistic concepts and discourse where inevitably, 
there’s a constraining set o f verbal equivalents tying music down. Prevost writes:
Sound can be laden with layers of meaning. It is a medium of subliminal impact 
as well as overt significance. Herein lies its real power and energy. Any 
appreciation or critique of music is inadequate unless it tackles this issue. (1995, 
40)
However, in his praise o f music’s provisionality and liberatory qualities, Prevost 
sets down the following challenge:
Our frames of reference, the tools we use to see and to get a grip upon the world, 
are themselves, embedded in ways of thinking [...] One of the deep paradoxes 
facing us may be that we need a concept to keep us free from the paralysing 
forces of unquestioned conceptualization. (1995, 5)
Might Utopia continue to exist as a concept that circles and protects the felt and 
imagined goals of musical experiences? And if  so, might music and the concept o f 
the utopian be somewhat protected from ideological incursions in a eutopian 
setting?
11. 6 Why should we turn to public service music radio?
A community is more than a medium. Broadcasting [...] cannot be more 
important than dialogue. (Big Buzz respondent no. 118, 2003)
It’s merely one voice in many. It’s hardly central - no media is! (Big Buzz 
respondent no. 46, 2003)
Even relatively emancipated political institutions do not necessarily generate 
emancipatoiy culture or expressions of subjectivity. An exclusive commitment to 
justice leaves the culture industry, no less than most regressive moves, intact. 
(Bronner 1994, 351)
As we can see, not everyone accepts the likelihood of immanent change. Bernstein 
argues that there is “a naive Lukacsian optimism involved in the belief that mass
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media in reflecting social reality will, in so doing, deflate their own products, and, 
despite themselves, become vehicles for social critique” (Adomo 2001a, 23).
The thesis has certainly considered the arguments that consider broadcast 
culture to be less a eutopian space than an ideological instrument for a ‘well- 
tempered’ citizenry. Certainly, the more certain socio-cultural and educative 
potentials discerned in broadcasting are o f course frequently confounded, diluted 
and inflected by mundane commercial concern and external political ideology. 
Consequently, any eutopian or utopian ‘condition’ may indeed be argued to be 
unattainable if not simply illusory - reflections o f bourgeois-liberal or liberal- 
democratic desire - far short o f any neutrality or political cogency.
Can the BBC provide radical pop and a palatable, non-commodified avant- 
garde? In serving as a patron of the arts driven by a particular set o f ethics I 
believe it may have done so already, though Paddison doubts it is ever possible 
(1996, 104-5). Are we to conclude that state-sponsored cultural production can 
only ever be a fresh supply of product? As Benhabib has argued (1986), no one 
institution in a postmodern society, can lay claim to any singular perspective 
derived from a universal understanding. Thus legitimacy is compromised and the 
place of action shifts from a centre to a periphery. But, if  this action is socially 
valid, why not at least make it subsequently audible for a wider audience as a 
Foucauldian Heterotopia?
Morris remarks:
Since art cannot replace authority or the political, a democratic society composed 
of competing, conflictual interests and diverse identities can best be governed in 
association with an institutional recognition of what is required for an undamaged 
selfhood that respects its aesthetic and non-identical elements and thus group 
identity. (2001,188)
11. 7 Final words
The musical utopias and eutopias posited in this thesis are surely cultural spaces 
within the public sphere ordained by the state at the behest o f the people. They are 
rational but also imaginative and revivifying spaces for the population where
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repositories o f past and new musical activity bring about cultural improvement, 
expressive liberty and intersubjectivity. Bronner suggests that:
The ideology of a given period is [...] never entirely ‘false’ as in ‘false 
consciousness’, since a set of ‘not-yet realized’ utopian possibilities remains 
‘latent’ and waiting for self-conscious appropriation. The new society in short 
will not just ‘objectively’ appear. ‘Subjective’ action is necessaiy to interpret the 
unfulfilled possibilities of the past and reshape the repressed needs of humanity 
as they appear in the manifold set of cultural products through which history is 
understood. (1994, 68)
Some have come directly to the support o f radio technology and public service 
culture that has taken advantage o f the opportunity to address the many.
Frith makes a bold claim for the medium:
I believe that radio was the most significant twentieth-century mass medium. It 
was radio that transformed the use of domestic space, blurring the boundary 
between the public and the private, idealizing the family hearth as the site of ease 
and entertainment, establishing the rhythm of everydayness: die BBC ‘Children’s 
Hour,’ ‘breakfast Time,’ ‘Friday Night is Music Night!’ It was radio that shaped 
the new voice of public intimacy, that created Britain as a mediated collectivity, 
that gave ordinary people a public platform [...] Where radio led television 
simply followed. And it was radio that established the possibility of music as an 
ever-playing soundtrack to our lives. (2003, 96)
Bom has already told us that the BBC is to “provide a unifying space in which 
plurality can be performed” (2004, 517), and calls for renewed trust and belief in 
the professionalism o f an “ethically-imbued corporate being” (2004, 495). She 
concludes by seeing BBC activity that in her view “foments” and “forms” part of 
civil society. It “constructs our vivid social present and our social memory” (2004, 
512-3). One self-completion respondent at The Big Buzz event, 2003, wrote that: 
“If the alternative is US-style corporate stations that respond to (and shape) viewer 
pressure, then I am more than happy to accept the BBC. Frankly the BBC is one 
of the main reasons I do not emigrate” (Big Buzz respondent no. 124,2003).
If we wish to study that heady mix o f culture, power, capitalism and the 
mass media, we can do worse than draw on the post-metaphysical engagements of 
critical theory. If we also adopt a pragmatic view on the chances offered by reality 
and temper visions of Utopia with those o f a ‘eutopia’ then perhaps a continuing, 
humanistic dialectic through music can at least be formed, articulated and acted 
upon. We might at this point turn again to a powerful reading of ideology and
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Utopia from 1936, and recall Mannheim’s ‘Fourth Form of the Utopian mentality: 
The Socialist-Communist Utopia.’ He wrote:
It is not sufficient to have a good intention in the abstract and to postulate in the 
far-off future a realized realm of freedom [...] It is necessary rather to become 
aware of the real conditions (in this case economic and social) under which such 
a wish-fulfilment can at all become operative. The road which leads from the 
present to this distant goal must also be investigated in order to identify those 
forces in the contemporary process whose immanent, dynamic character, under 
our direction, leads step by step towards the realized idea. (1960,217)
It should be noted that Mannheim was a Frankfurt University colleague of 
Horkheimer. Mannheim is important because he extended the reading of ideology 
to embrace the idea that any framework of thought was constrained and tainted by 
its historical and social settings. The challenge for everyone is to think beyond the 
present One way to do this is to access utopian desire but also adopt the negative 
dialectics o f Adomo. Whilst Adorno’s view of culture and society is one of 
regression, that o f Mannheim and Habermas is one o f optimism and ascendancy. 
This range o f thought, when carefully deployed does offer a sensitive means of 
progressive critique.
This study has exposed the proximity, or existence of a eutopia: an actual 
place o f praxis, a provisional, sometime concrete utopia that also encompasses 
dialectical construction o f self and community. Such a good place informs 
personal desire, acknowledges others, and through linguistic and rational address 
provides a dialectic that is future-orientated. In other words, a mediating 
institutional entity for individual and society still able to meet authentic need and 
preserve ethical behaviour akin to the Gemeinschaft of Tonnies. Its significance 
lies also in its power as a referent or group o f referents in contrast to the regulative 
idea of ‘Utopia’ that can be felt and thought but not attained. In focusing on the 
history of the BBC’s early-twentieth century formation, national role, cultural 
agendas and postwar output o f popular musics, Musical eutopias has sought to 
identify and provide a number o f readings o f state-sponsored popular musics that 
can supplement current debates addressing the continuance of public service 
broadcast output in its present form and set out to ‘unpack’ and evaluate the view 
that there is a continuing need for in-common listening by patient listeners as a 
bulwark against narrowcasting, instrumental deregulation and solipsism. 
Ultimately, ‘musical eutopias’ are perhaps more critical conceit than immanent,
300
self-explanatory, a-lingual devices, but for their attachment to the somatic and 
immediate nature o f musical generation do surely play a role in any humanistic 
programme. Levitas had challenged us to defend eutopian possibilities:
If we have no idea how the world might be transformed, how we might get what 
we want, we may cease to be able to imagine alternatives [...] the loss of hope 
will end in the loss of desire; next come senility and death. (Levitas 1984,29)
Here, there seems no alternative to aesthetic and political intersubjectivity. 
However, Levitas later offers us a revised, but still postmodern reading of 
possibilities which retreats to the body and away from places and spaces. She 
withdraws from any utopian programme and even any intermittent dialectical 
schema and reconnects us with human desire. With Foucauldian concerns for the 
body as a site o f resistance, she seems to want to limit and locate opportunities to 
a sort o f critical embodiment, a retreat from any wider cultural or social reality.
If utopian thought of all kinds is expressive of a desire for a better way of being, 
its projection onto the body, rather than the body politic, may be seen as an 
important retreat from hope, at least social hope, to desire. (Levitas 2001, 34)
Whilst this is perhaps a welcome (re)tum to somatic aspiration, it does seem to 
neglect discursive potentials and to some extent, as a discursive ‘ordering’ o f that 
which is felt, seems to argue against itself.
Musical participation and listening mediated by broadcasting may be 
deemed by some (Barnard 1989) to be the construction of an atomised community 
or diaspora of the air. Certainly it can be argued that paternalistic programming 
does not encourage a mature, thinking for ourselves, as Kant and Adorno might 
demand. But for others (Anderson 1991) there is the construction and sustaining 
of such ‘imagined communities’ of listeners wherein traditional ties of belief, 
dynastic rule and even nationhood are either replaced or supplemented by a 
cultural community facilitating some secular understanding o f the contingencies 
and dilemmas of life.
The next record played on air may not be literally ‘especially for you’. It 
could however, conceivably be for ‘us’ all. Consequently, even though the 
broadcast model is, as this is being written, dying if  not yet dead, a majority of us 
may just still be listening-in to hear culture, rational discourse and each other. It is 
the valuing and preservation o f this ‘in-common’ exposure to culture and ‘good
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quality’ programming generally as afforded by the immediate, in-parallel 
broadcast model (at one remove from any commercial considerations), which will 
give depth and credence to the intersubjective and discussive activity of post­
broadcast public spheres comprising podcasts, chat rooms, message boards, email 
and SMS dialogue.
Might the best o f the one-to-many model combine with a new, 
technologically determined democratic turn to effect a good place of sensibility, 
imagination and understanding? To witness this, public service delivery needs to 
be technologically prepared and well-funded. One half of this equation is already 
in place as the BBC responds to external pressures for it to drive digital reception 
amongst audiences. Adequate funding not only requires political determination to 
preserve the licence fee or some twenty-first century modification (perhaps as a 
mixed funding model akin to that o f Channel 4), but moreover a willingness to 
commission popular, high-grade content and promote in-common listening 
contexts as contingent, ‘enlightening’ sites o f cultural rather than commercial 
exchange for subjects and society where inclusive audience engagement and a 
Habermasian public participation, trustworthy guidance and independent scrutiny 
continue to take place. Media technologies of whatever form, origin and 
legitimacy will remain a source of creative potential, dissemination and recall. 
Levin offers us a positive reading o f technological potentials:
The increasing technocratic ‘rationalisation’ of our society, and what Habermas 
calls the ‘systematic colonisation’ of the lifeworld, may be significant factors in 
the deterioration of our ability to listen and hear one another. But I think we 
should also bear in mind that there are other factors, some of them generated by 
technology itself, which work against this tendency, actually increasing and 
refining our communicative possibilities. (1989, 113)
Levin moves us beyond critical theory’s objections to mediation to see technology 
as a McLuhanesque extension o f the human body and mind for musicians, 
programme makers, listeners and not least, thinkers themselves. Broadcast radio’s 
‘music and electricity’, and its places and spaces may no longer hold the 
monopoly on communication, but its lessons as to what is unique about being 
hum an today, namely the desire for free expression, the formation of individual 
identity and the community impulse of mutuality, may already have begun to seep 
into the more rational and ethical circuits o f the cybersphere.
Notes
1. “The goal is not to amve at the Truth with certainly but rather to produce adequate, practical 
knowledges” (Hardt and Weeks 2000,23).
2. For an account o f new media virtualities that touch on these ideas, see Poster (2006).
3. “In reality it is evil which triumphs, and there are only islands o f good where one can find 
refuge for a brief time” (Marcuse 1979,47).
4. Levin writes: “In listening to others, accepting them in their irreducible difference, we help them 
to listen to themselves, to heed the speech o f their own body of experience, and to become, each 
one, the human being he or she most deeply wants to be. Moreover, by listening well to ourselves 
and to others, we can resist false, ideological interpretations of ‘need* and steer public life towards 
the fulfillment o f more authentic needs” (1989, 88).
5. Pierre Levy in an interview with Peter Szendy and Denis Matignon writes: “II y a des utopies 
qui n’obeissent pas a la logique du tout ou rien; [...] II peut y avoir des utopies qui adviennent 
progressivement, des utopies sans adversaires, sans ennemis, sans victimes, voire - et l’on ici au 
noeud du debat - des utopies sans transcendence. Des utopies qui ne sont pas imposees, d&ndees 
part une instance superieure ou exterieur. Des utopies qui emergent de la collectivity human ine” 
[My emphasis in italics] (IRCAM Journal 1993, 65-6).
6. Norris refers us to the active, Kantian imagination “where imagination is conceived as an active, 
form-giving faculty, a power that is to some degree involved in our most elementary acts of 
cognition” (1990a, 216). S. M. Weber defends the aesthetic whilst articulating the role o f concepts 
and communication in Kantian thought She writes: “Kant begins his presentation o f the dialectic 
of aesthetic judgm ent by noting that one feels impelled to dispute about matters o f aesthetic taste 
even though it is impossible to settle the disputes, since to settle such a dispute would involve 
turning the aesthetic into a form of knowledge, in which all particulars may be subsumed under 
concepts. This is another way o f saying, I believe, that aesthetic experience is inseparable from 
talk about the aesthetic object [...] the aesthetic object [...] Kant says [...] generates an infinitude of 
ideas, and it is this [...] which means that it can never be subordinated to a specific concept. Hence 
critical discussion and aesthetics as a philosophical discipline remain subordinate in turn to the 
particular aesthetic object” (1976,98).
7. Music raises the passions, rather than serves as a representational, programmatic form that 
prompts internal, abstract ideas, i.e. music, says Norris “lacked any determinate content” (1990b, 
211).
8. Norris refers us to Lyotard’s account o f the sublime: “For Lyotard [...] die sublime figures as a 
strictly unthinkable category [...] but one which none the less exists (like Kant’s ‘ideas of pure 
reason’) in a realm o f an as-yet unrealised future potential. It is precisely by virtue of this tentative, 
open-ended character that democracy functions -in Lyotard’s view - as a discursive space where 
various narratives, language-games or ruses o f legitimising reason are able to coexist without any 
one-truth-claim assuming ultimate power” [Norris is referring to Lyotard’s ‘The idea of History’ in 
Derek Attridge, Geoff Bennington and Robert Young (eds.), Post-structuralism and the Question 
o f History CUP 1987)] (1990b, 215).
9. Norris tells us about Kant’s view on the French Revolution. He saw a distinction between the 
“ultimate ideals - republican justice, universal peace, the progress o f mankind toward a state of 
enlightened world government - which as yet had no demonstrable grounding [...] For Kant these 
were ideas o f pure reason, and therefore not concepts that could ever be translated into the here- 
and-now o f revolutionary action” (1990a, 217). He continues: “For Kant, as Lyotard reads him, 
‘[T]he progress o f a common being for the better is not to be judged on the basis o f empirical 
intuition, but on die basis o f signs.’ That is to say, events like the French Revolution have a 
capacity to signify those ultimate values o f progress, democracy and freedom despite what must 
appear as a sequence o f disheartening set-backs and failures in the practical realm [...] To interpret 
them as sipns in this specific sense - as what Kant calls ‘ hypotyposes’, or ideas that possess a 
meaning quite apart from from all present or empirical evidence is to place the sublime at the very 
heart of socio-political thinking” (1990a, 219).
10. With regard to the ineffable, Norris traces an understanding o f the Kantian sublime with 
reference to Edmund Burke’s 1757 account o f beauty and the sublime: whereby we observe “The 
highest reach o f die creative imagination, that point where the mind, having failed to objectify its 
sense of wonder in the face o f some overwhelming experience, falls back upon its own inward 
resources and thus gain access - albeit it momentarily - to the realm of ‘supersensible ideas’. 
Hence the increasing tendency o f thinkers after Burke to forms o f sensuous cognition, and opening 
(as Kant was to argue) on to die realm o f ethics or practical reason” (1990a, 210-1).
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11. Kant writes in the Critique o f Judgement. “By an aesthetic idea I mean that representation of 
the imagination which induces much thought, yet witout the possibility o f any definite thought 
[...] (concept) being adequate to it, and which language consequently can never get quite on level 
terms or render completely intelligible [...] an aesthetic idea is die counterpart (pendant) of a 
rational idea” Section I Book II § 49 (1952,528).
12. Andrew Edgar, written comment, February 2007.
13. Cf. Morris: “The mimetic receptivity o f an undamaged identity is the presupposition of the 
fellow feeling, compassion, sympathy, and love toward other people [...] There is no doubt that 
this entails an extraordinary challenge, for it requires individual moral, ethical, and aesthetic self- 
formation (autonomy) and self-actualization (freedom) as well as requiring non-repressive 
collective identities that encapsulate intersubjective/subject-object relations o f engagement 
(political life). It raises a (Hegelian) question o f the proper mediation of individual and the polity” 
(2001,188). Morris convincingly concludes by outlining a fulfillment of utopian aspiration built 
on a linkage o f Adorno’s aesthetic, Marcuse’s new sensibility and Habermas’s communicative 
action (2001,199).
14 See Kracauer’s 1922 essay, ‘The Group as Bearer o f Ideas’ (1995e).
15. Jameson writes: “One wants to insist very strongly on the necessity o f the reinvention o f the 
Utopian vision in any contemporary politics: this lesson, which Marcuse first taught us, is part of 
the legacy o f the sixties which must never be abandoned in any reevaluation of that period and of 
our relationship to i t ” He then cautions: “On the other hand, it also must be acknowledged that 
Utopian visions are not yet themselves a politics” (1991,159).
16. Kellner cited in McGuigan writes; “My argument is that, first broadcasting media like radio 
and television, and now computers, have produced new public spheres and spaces for information, 
debate and participation that contain both the potential to reinvigorate democracy and to increase 
the dissemination o f criticism and progressive ideas” (McGuigan 1996,189).
17. Kant in his Critique o f Aesthetic Judgement wrote: “By the name sensus communis is to be 
understood the idea o f a public sense, i.e., a critical faculty which in its reflective act takes account 
(a priori) o f the mode o f representation o f everyone else, in order, as it were, to weigh its 
judgement with the collective reason o f mankind, and thereby avoid the illusion arising from 
subjective and personal conditions which could readily be taken for objective. [...] This is 
accomplished by weighing the judgement, not so much with actual, as rather with the merely 
possible, judgements o f others, and by putting ourselves in the position o f everyone else [...] The 
following maxims o f common human understanding [...] may [...] serve to elucidate its 
fundamental propositions. They are these: (1) to think for oneself; (2) to think from the standpoint 
of everyone else; (3) always to think consistently. The first is the maxim of unprejudiced thought, 
the second that o f enlarged thought [...] The first is the maxim of a newer-passive reason. [...] This 
[...] still indicates a man o f enlarged mind: if  he detaches himself from the subjective personal 
conditions o f his judgem ent [...] and reflects upon his own judgement from a universal standpoint 
(which he can only determine by shifting his ground to the standpoint o f others)” Critique o f 
Aesthetic Judgement, Section 1 Book II § 40 (1952, 518-19).
Weber explains: Kant’s aesthetic is “defined through negation, in terms o f focus of 
experience which it is not identical to but nevertheless has something in common with. This is how 
it can be seen as linking the senses and reason. The essence of the aesthetic as Kant sees it is a 
paradox - subjective universality or sensus communis. Furthermore, the basic structure o f the 
aesthetic as Kant sees it is reflective: the aesthetic subject’s experience o f the aesthetic object 
includes his reflection upon the state o f his own psyche, and the aesthetic judgement is based on 
die reflective discovery o f his pleasure. At the same time, die aesthetic subject abstracts from his 
own position to put him self in the position o f a generalized other and judge whether that of the 
other would presumably also feel pleasure in the particular object” (1976,97).
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Appendix A: The BBC Radio Wales “Big Buzz” event [BB] & questionnaire, 
2003
Details o f the event come from Paul Ford in an interview recorded June 19, 2003 
11.00am - 12.00pm and from handwritten notes made at an initial meeting. Ford 
was a BBC Strand Producer aka ‘senior producer.’ B. Mus., Leeds University. He 
organised The Big Buzz stage programme.
BB 2003
Dates: Swansea July 5; Cardiff Bay: July 27 
History of BB
Cardiff County Council in 2000 organised a youth event in 2000. BBC Radio 
Wales were invited to do an outside broadcast. Aim: to attract children who would 
bring parents. It showcased modest local performers. In 2001 the team decided to 
“secure some [bigger] acts”. 2002: The band Hear’say performed. At its peak, 
around 7- 8,000 people were in attendance.
The event o f2003 featured:
Marc Almond, dancers and tape. Blazin’ Squad - a ten piece British boy band. 
Fewer hours o f broadcasting this year. Cardiff Council provided the infrastructure 
(security etc.) and guidelines. The BBC determined the use of venue space. There 
were two stages: main stage run by BBC Radio Wales where there was a big turn 
over of acts who did three numbers; and a tent where longer sets - overseen by the 
council - were performed. Other attractions to cultivate ‘a festival vibe’ included 
a Motorcycle stunt man; ‘Sumo’ wrestling; a fun fair and information stands. BB 
had two key aims: attracting a youth audience and involvement with Cardiff area 
community groups one called Promo another called Community Music Wales.
Location details & date:
BBC Wales: The Big Buzz, Oval Basin Cardiff Bay July 27 2003.
“From 10:30am till late and live all day on BBC Radio Wales. Tickets: FREE, so 
bring your friends and family. A spectacular day o f music and events for all the 
family to celebrate Midsummer Day in 21st Century style!” (Big Buzz flyer copy).
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Method:
With the permission of the BBC Wales Big Buzz event organisers (who agreed on 
my behalf to notify Cardiff City Council of this survey), self-completion 
questionnaires were distributed by hand during the hours of 2:30pm and 10:00pm 
to 150 male and female event attendees deemed to be between the ages of 15- 40. 
Individuals and groups were approached and addressed face to face. 
Questionnaires were given to all those who expressed overt interest, or who were 
otherwise likely to be motivated by the prospect of articulating their views on the 
event and on the BBC.
Participants were told o f the questionnaire’s independent status, and 
invited to complete the questionnaire after the event so that thoughtful responses 
reflecting their views on the event and on their relationship and evaluation of the 
BBC might be generated. A stamped and addressed envelope was provided for the 
return o f the questionnaires. A prize in the form of a draw for compact disc tokens 
to the value o f £25 was instituted to encourage completed returns. This was won 
by respondent number 38.
Results:
Responses
Replies received: 28 (18.7% of total distributed)
Male: 18 (64.28% o f returns)
Female: 10 (35.71% of returns)
Results quantifying respondent’s age groups
15-19  (2); 20 - 24 (5); 25 - 29 (3); 30 - 34 (7); 35 - 39 (6); 40 - 44 (3); 45 - 49 
(2).
Length o f stay at The Big Buzz event; 15 mins - 1 hour (2); 1 hour - 2 hours (5) 
More than 2 hours (21).
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Residential data
Cardiff & environs: (18); Other areas of Wales : Pontypool (1); Other UK origin: 
Bristol (1), Poole (2) Hertfordshire (2); Further afield (0); plus “village” (1), 
“city” (3).
Occupations
Student (4); Graduate (1); Consultant (1); P.A. (1); Accountant (2); Service 
controller (1); Marketing (2); IT/online services/technical support (5); HR (1); 
Beauty Therapist (1); Civil engineering/quantity surveying (2); Teacher (1); 
Musician/entertainer/artist (3); Management (2); Mental health worker (1).
* * * * *
Qualitative responses reflecting commonly expressed views
NB: num bers in brackets in every question below are the respondents
questionnaire numbers.
Section 1, Q. 10. Sample responses
(Why do you think BBC Radio Wales stage the Big Buzz event?)
BBC matters/public service matters
“To support BBC and BBC Radio brand within the community as part of 
broadcasting edict” (146).
“Public service” (61).
“I assume the BBC [...] is allocated a certain amount o f money which must be 
used to provide free events for the general public which provides its funding” 
(63).
“To give itself (BBC Radio Wales) an image less associated with highbrow art 
(the BBC in general)” (140).
“Has an obligation to provide ‘community’ events as an objective or condition of 
its service?” (114).
“To bring enjoyment to the community” (4).
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BBC Radio Wales matters
“To raise awareness o f BBC Radio Wales” (146).
“Win back listeners” (146).
“Advertising and announcements provides certain amount of hype for the radio 
station” (63).
“A PR stunt to vainly justify the licence fee, even though they present an almost 
identical diet o f cheap commercial ‘pop’ [...] as the most crass commercial 
stations” (38).
“Compete with other local radio stations who cover other events” (31).
“Because they enjoy it as much as we do !” (145).
Civic matters
“To be part o f the Cardiff Festival” (60).
“Increase the tourism to Cardiff and [...] Bay area” (12).
Welsh aspects
“To bring acts to Wales” (60).
“Provide a showcase for up and coming Welsh acts” (61).
Creative & cultural matters
“To promote local talent on a big stage” (60).
“To be cultural. An event like this always brings people together, creating a 
happier place and happier people. It would have been better to have [had ] more 
[cultural] diversity” (48).
“To be part o f an ailing music industry” (118).
Other
“For the children [...] allowing parents a bit o f a break” (48).
Section 2. Listening Choices
Stations named as ones listened to a t least once a week for music (NB: many 
named several)
BBC: Radio 1 (18); Radio 2 (12); Radio Wales (7); Radio 3 (2); Radio Cymru (1); 
Radio Solent (1); Radio WM (1).
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Commercial stations
Red Dragon FM (8); Vibe 101 (5); Real Radio (4); 2CR FM (2); Virgin (2); 
Classic FM (2); Bridge FM (1); Fox FM (1); XFM (1)
Galaxy FM (1); GWR (1).
Section 3, Q. la).
“The BBC in general is a bit stuffy & arrogant” (It’s too serious & 
unaccountable)
Agree: 7, Disagree: 20 No opinion expressed : 1
Selection o f  responses that agree to be found in Chapter 9 
Selection o f responses that disagree
“Whilst the BBC maybe a little arrogant, it is also the authority (credible source) 
for news etc. Radio 1 is [a ] (?)service promoting new talent as well as established 
acts” (146).
“With the introduction o f new [TV] channels [...] there is a greater choice of 
viewing and an alternative to more traditional programmes [...] However the 
station can sometimes be a bit ‘full of its own self-importance’ and can come 
across as the self-appointed moral guardian” (83).
“It simply isn’t true, take the Glasto [Glastonbury Festival] coverage” (145).
“[The BBC] attempts to reflect the diversity o f multi-cultural Britain - how well it 
does this, or whether it should do this is another matter” (38).
“Whilst it may be valid to accuse the BBC of being somewhat stuffy and 
conservative, this is not surprising in a non-democratic institution. If the 
alternative is US-style corporate stations that respond to (and shape) viewer 
pressure, then I am more than happy to accept the BBC. Frankly the BBC is one 
of the main reasons I do not emigrate” (124).
“I disagree [...] I believe them to work hard at keeping their image up to date with 
the ‘times’ ” (12).
“Disagree. I believe the BBC is excellent at accommodating all age groups and 
not too serious but has quality and not tackiness about it, neither is it arrogant but 
has good standards” (97).
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Section 3, Q. lb). “The BBC in general has a bossy attitude" (it’s too 
paternalistic in tone and outlook) Agree: 10, Disagree: 14, No opinion 
expressed: 4
Selection o f responses that agree
“In some areas [...] people are paternalistic, i.e. Radio Wales (from what I heard at 
the Big Buzz. [...] Less regional outputs do not seem ‘bossy’ ” (48).
“It is still male dominated in terms of management and programming” (61). 
“[Because] o f its established nature it feels it can make or break a band. It’s also 
inflexible with its playlisting” (46).
Selection o f responses that disagree
“In my experience I’ve found it fronted by lovely people who love their work” 
(145).
“I believe them to take all thoughts and ideas into account and to produce a 
programme which reflects this” (12).
Section 3, Q. lc).
“The BBC must see that its programmes stimulate, support and reflect the 
diversity of cultural activity in the UK.” (BBC’s Licence Agreement 
document).
Agree: 25, Reservation expressed: 2, No opinion expressed: 2
Responses that expressed a reservation
“This is evident on Radio 4 but not noticeable on other stations” (56).
“It [the BBC] does reflect diversity o f music and makes it popular, yet it doesn’t 
stimulate diversity o f culture in other areas” (48).
Selection o f responses that agree
“The BBC is a publicly-funded organisation [...] Britain is diverse [...] BBC has a 
duty to reflect this” (60).
“A wide variety of music and topics are broadcasted” (31).
“We pay a licence fee, thus it should reflect what/who we are” (43).
“I agree, [although] this o f course is impossible” (38).
“It is a spokesperson for culture. It has the power to aid or destroy the careers of 
artists” (145).
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“There are many cultures within the UK and this helps us to understand the 
differences between cultures, if we want to !” (39).
“We all pay the licence fee and should feel included. However BBC is British and 
should predominantly reflect English/Irish/Scottish/Welsh culture” (61)
Section 3, Q. Id). “Public service broadcasting is central to how we 
understand each other. They allow our community to talk to itself.” 
Government W hite Paper 2000) Agree: 17, Disagree: 7, No opinion 
expressed: 4
Selection o f responses that agree to be found in Chapter 7 
Selection o f  responses that disagree are to found in Chapter 10 and 
11 Conclusion.
Section 3, Q. le). “The BBC is a ‘free space’ for new musical talent from 
home and abroad that widens my understanding of other people, groups and 
societies.”
Agree: 15, Disagree: 12, No opinion expressed: 1
Selection o f responses that agree
“I agree [...] but only in a limited way. It chooses a few new talents as a token to 
fit into the mainstream it promotes” (48).
“I have learnt much about different cultures using this medium” (12).
Selection o f responses that disagree
“The ‘free space’ is heavily regulated and only reflects the tastes and views of a 
select few” (46).
“More ‘local’ input is required, I think the BBC sometimes just pays lip service to 
various groups” (81).
“Fame Academy is a prime example o f how the BBC is a ‘free space’ [...] 
however, as soon as the final three were announced the support disappeared. The 
BBC needs to put its resources where its programming is going” (60).
“It is largely concerned with mainstream acts, with token space for everything 
else. BBC radio is driven by the ‘playlist’ which amounts to the editing of culture 
by a few individuals” (114).
“It’s not that easy to get a record broadcast on the BBC !” (39).
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Section 3, Q. 2. data
O f the 28 respondents, 12 (42.85%) indicated that BBC radio was one of the three 
most important mass-communication modes by which they were able to develop 
into ‘a culturally-aware, socially-mature individual’. No one at all specified 
commercial radio. O f the 16 who did not specify BBC radio, 7 chose to specify 
BBC television. O f the 28, only 8 (28.57%) chose not to credit the BBC with any 
influence.
Section 3, Q. 3. A pertinent selection of “any further comments on the subject 
of popular music, BBC radio, society, culture and you?”
“I think it is important for people to experience a wide range of music [...] I feel 
that a cross section o f music is important to provide a balanced individual” (35). 
“The way we grow and develop depends very much on [the] society and culture 
we are bom and brought up in until we are old enough to explore ourselves, e.g. 
through radio programmes” (97).
“I would like more broadcasts of minor local gigs. I think this would boost local 
culture and encourage others to be creative” (145).
“Music radio tends to dictate popular music rather than listening to and 
responding” (56).
“You can’t please all o f the people all o f the time” (38).
“I don’t find it [the BBC] relevant to ME. My music is rarely reflected” (46).
Section 1 profile data results
The majority o f replies came from those between 20 and 39 years o f age. A 
significant majority invested 2 or more hours o f their day at the event. The event 
was promoted across Wales by BBC Radio Wales. The majority responding to the 
questionnaire however came from the City o f Cardiff and its environs. There was 
a preponderance of professional occupations amongst the respondents. 
Understanding of the event’s promotional rationale was joined by a degree of 
cynicism and a minor expression of the socio-cultural advantages of such a day.
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Interpretation of Section 2 data
Data showed a familiarity with public service and commercial radio output.
A significant majority of respondents cited BBC Radio 1 and 2 as their regular 
music radio station. Relatively few named BBC Radio Wales.
Interpretation of Section 3 data
la) A significant majority o f respondents defended the BBC in considered 
fashion. Several who disagreed did qualify their responses with some reservations. 
Those who agreed with the sentiment seemed to fall back on a somewhat stock 
sense o f disenfranchisement. lb ) A more even spread of opinion here, seemingly 
informed in many instances by personal experience of a long-standing, considered 
view, lc) A clear sense o f the social and cultural diversity of the UK is evident as 
is the view that reality should be represented by the nation’s major public service 
broadcaster which is expressed in many of the responses. Id) A sophisticated 
expression of the media’s obligations, impact and limits in relation to representing 
and connecting communities is evidenced in responses to this question, le) 
Standard critiques o f the BBC seems to colour this final question about ‘free 
space’ which was posited as a synonym for the eutopian, heterotopian space of the 
present study.
Interpretation of Section 3, Q. 2. data
A range of mediating socio-cultural and technological means of ‘becoming’ were 
selected by respondents showing no strong trends or aversions with perhaps the 
possible exception o f the absence of any recorded acknowledgement of 
commercial radio output.
Interpretation of Section 3, Q. 3. data
A few respondents articulated personal wishes. Others were able to articulate a 
critique of commercial musics or a somewhat conceptual, overview of public 
service broadcasting with reference to its socio-cultural dynamic.
Overall Interpretation & methodological critique
Whilst a cross-section o f respondents were sought, profile date suggests replies 
came from what may be characterised as a relatively homogeneous cohort of
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young and mature professionals with some familiarity with the soliciting of data. 
The response rate of less than 1 in 5 was therefore not unexpected, given that:
(1) those in receipt of the questionnaires were encouraged to complete them 
without assistance to encourage reflectiveness and honesty. Whilst there’s likely 
to be an element o f ‘meeting expectations’ implicit in any inquiry of this nature, a 
sense o f confident objectivity can be detected in replies.
(2) The eliciting of simple profile data was outweighed by a relatively complex 
series o f questions seeking discursive, qualitative data.
(3) People were advised that the questionnaire was estimated to take between 20 
and 30 minutes and may have deterred the participation of many. Additionally, 
given the unsolicited nature o f the approaches at the event, there may have been 
some unconscious bias on the part o f this writer in the approaches made: those 
most likely to comprehend the exercise and furnish a response were perhaps 
spoken to and given questionnaires ahead of those less certain of the inquiry’s 
purpose. This guaranteed a level o f useful, discursive data, but may have 
precluded a significant section of the audience and might be deemed to have 
generated a narrow, self-selected cohort.
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The original questionnaire
[NB: original fields offered adequate space for discursive responses.
Some response fields have been compressed for this appendix version.]
An Independent Questionnaire 
Time of issue:
Dear member of The Big Buzz audience
You are invited to complete this research questionnaire at home after your visit to 
this year’s Big Buzz event in Cardiff Bay. This is an independent study and has no 
formal links with the BBC, BBC Wales or Cardiff City Council. Findings will 
inform my part-time PhD research at Cardiff University.
This should take no more than 20-30 minutes o f your time to complete in full. 
Please take longer if you wish. You can use extra sheets.
ALL COMPLETED QUESTIONNAIRES RECEIVED ON OR BEFORE 
AUGUST 29 2003 WILL BE ENTERED IN A DRAW FOR A £25 CD GIFT 
VOUCHER
DRAW NUMBER: /150
Please send your completed questionnaire to:
Kevin Edge, Cardiff School o f Art & Design UWIC. Llandaff Campus Western 
Avenue CARDIFF CF5 2YB
Thank you in advance.
Kevin Edge kedge@uwic.ac.uk
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The Questions
PLEASE READ M E BEFORE YOU START!
The questions are in three sections. All questions are designed to help me 
understand a little more about music, BBC Radio and YOU the listener. Please 
answer them all with as many full and thoughtful responses as you can.
Section One You & The Big Buzz
1. Name
(optional)
2. Contact phone num ber for prize draw
(optional)
3. W hen were you born? 19_____
4. Are you male o r female?
5. W here do you live? (village, town, district or city )
6. W hat is your occupation?
7. How long did you stay at the Big Buzz day? Please circle one of the 
following:
Less than 15 mins | 15 mins to 1 hour. | between 1-2 hours | more than 2 hours.
8. Which Big Buzz act did you like most & why?
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Because...
9. Which Big Buzz act did you like least & why ?
Because...
10. Why do y o u  think BBC Radio Wales stages The Big Buzz event?
Please give as many likely aims & reasons as you can. (‘phone a friend9 here
if you wish!)
*
*
*
Section Two Your listening choices
1. Please list the names of all the radio stations you listen to at least once a 
week for music. Circle the one you usually stay tuned to longest.
(Do not forget to include all kinds: commercial, local, community, public service, 
satellite, digital, Pirate & Internet radio stations ! )
2. I f  you listen regularly to BBC Radio Wales, why do you tune in and for 
how long?
3. How would you broadly describe the kind of music played on BBC Radio 
Wales?
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Section 3 The BBC In our lives 
This is the last but longest section.
Your responses here will be the most im portant ones for my study.
1. Please say whv you agree or disagree with the following statements:
a)“The BBC in general is a bit stuffy & arrogant" ( it’s too serious & 
unaccountable) I  agree/disagree because...
b) “The BBC in general has a bossy attitude” (it’s too paternalistic in tone & 
outlook)
I  agree/disagree because...
c) “The BBC must see that its programmes stimulate, support and reflect the 
diversity of cultural activity in the UK.” (BBC’s Licence Agreement 
document)
I  agree/disagree because...
d) “Public service broadcasting is central to how we live our lives and how we 
understand each other. They allow our community to talk to itself.” 
(Government White Paper, 2000)
I  agree/disagree because...
e) “The BBC is a ‘free space’ for new musical talent from home & abroad 
that widens my understanding of other people, groups and societies.”
I  agree/disagree because...
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2. How central have the following influences been on your development into a 
CULTURALLY-AWARE, SOCIALLY-MATURE INDIVIDUAL in the past 
5 years ? (Please circle the three most im portant ones FOR YOU in each set) 
SET 1: Family School/College W ork Friends
Travel
Dance/Night Clubs Concerts Theatre Musicals Live Sport
Performing music with others being a DJ
Other (please specify)
SET 2: BBC Television Independent Television MTV 
The Internet Commercial radio Newspapers
Magazines Literature Films/video
Other (please specify)
3. Do you have any further comments to make on the subject of popular 
music, BBC Radio, society, culture & you?
BBC radio 
CDs
Thank you very much for your comments & time.
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Appendix B: Popular musics defined
As with the definition o f all cultural forms, description and ongoing (re)evaluation 
combine. History, social purpose, commercial interest and cultural significance 
certainly inform the aesthetic codings and consequent discourses determining the 
circulation o f modem genres encompassed by the term ‘popular musics’.
The plural term ‘musics’ has been used deliberately in this study in an 
inclusive fashion to allow for a consideration of a broad set of distinctive and 
distinguishing forms emanating from a diverse set o f commercial and non­
commercial; Western and non-Western circumstances. Dalhaus (1998) argued 
conclusively for the plural because for him we have moved on from a singular
humanity and a singular aesthetic musical corpus to ones of alterity and plurality.
In this study, popular musical works are regarded as works and ‘texts’ of 
varied musicological traits and origins (though frequently rhythmic and Afro- 
American) which have emanated from diverse socio-cultural contexts (Western 
and non-Western) in amateur local form, and which have subsequently been 
professionally transformed into cultural commodities with spectacular facets for 
larger and remote audiences distributed with attendant visual and material product 
along mass media channels.
A useful musicological definition of popular forms is given by Frith (1987, 
144-5). Frith writes that “The most important (and remarkable) feature o f western 
popular music in the twentieth century has been its absorption of and into Afro- 
American forms and conventions [...] this means that pop is complex 
‘intentionally’ ” (This is after Andrew Chester’s ‘Second thoughts on a rock 
aesthetic: the Band’ in New Left Review, 62 1970, 78-9). Frith cites Chester’s 
view on the external form of serious, ‘classical’ construction: ‘Theme and 
variations, counterpoint, tonality [...] are all devices that build diachronically and 
synchronically outwards from basic musical atoms, [they remain] discrete and 
unchanged in the complex unity.” In popular forms on the other hand, Chester 
sees ‘T he basic musical units [as] the simple entity is that constituted by the 
parameters of melody, harmony and beat, while complexity is built up by 
modulation of the basic notes, and by inflexion of the basic beat.” Frith then
f
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summarises Chester’s ‘simple dichotomy’ as one of “a tradition of a linear 
musical development and a tradition of piled-up rhythmic interplay” (1987,145).
Jones and Rahn (1981, 38-52) offer, in a consideration of differential 
relations, a number of interesting musicological factors such as aural rather than 
scored transmission, tactile facility rather than theory and praxis with regard to 
instrumental performance; degree of ephemerality and a listener focus on 
identification with performer rather than composer.
Roy Shuker’s definition is perhaps the most comprehensive and useful, 
and takes us alongside Adorno’s autonomous and commodified musics that have 
been fully explored by Paddison (1993,1996).
It seems that a satisfactory definition of popular music must encompass both 
musical and socio-economic characteristics. Essentially, all popular music 
consists of a hybrid of musical traditions, styles and influences, and is also an 
economic product which is invested with ideological significance by many of its 
consumers. At the heart of the majority of various forms of popular musics a 
fundamental tension between the essential creativity of the act of ‘making music’ 
and the commercial nature of the bulk of its production and dissemination. 
Shuker (1998, 226-8)
A sophisticated structuralist definition of popular musics which replies on
their relation to the serious and subsidised comes from Georgina Bom, and is
2
worth quoting at length. It stresses the contemporary nature and ‘otherness’ of the 
category as it stands in non-commercial or commercial relation to those forms 
heard and discussed in establishment discourses.
I use ‘popular music’ to delineate en gros die ‘other’ macrosociological sphere of 
modem and contemporaiy musics, a sphere subsuming all those musics that exist 
largely separate from the institutions of cultural subsidy. This knowingly elides 
commercial popular musics with those that are self-produced and marginal or 
external to commercial circuits [...] both have been, in different ways, ‘other’ to 
musical modernism and postmodernism. In its non-differentiation, then ‘popular 
music’ is a categoiy constructed by the discourses of legitimate music, and it 
threatens to occlude the enormous variation of musical cultures and subcultures. 
However there are undeniable socio-economic differences between the two 
macrospheres. (1995 n. 12, 342)
Musicological and aesthetic analyses have significance for popular music’s 
acceptance and rejection by public sector broadcasters and critical theorists alike, 
particularly in the inter-war period, and is a musicological distinction from which 
grows evaluative condescension. Pervading all definitions and accounts of
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structural and dialectical relationships is indeed die subjective business of 
‘evaluation’ which, driven by social distinction, is often at the heart of so much 
‘objective’ description and interpretation.
Evaluatively, popular musics can, o f course, be good or bad depending on 
one’s tastes and alignment with the people. It is therefore ‘good’ - authentic, 
democratic, subversive and independent, or ‘bad’: base and vulgar. In simple 
terms, popular musics are music of the people. A more critical definition argues 
that popular music is not an immanent, expression of community ‘by the people’, 
but a product, commercially manufactured and distributed fo r  the masses as 
distracting entertainment. This view takes no account of the autonomy of ordinary 
people who copy and otherwise appropriate artificial, formulaic music for their 
own particular ends.
It seems clear that ‘popular musics’ can be generally regarded as musical 
works which either emanate ‘organically’ (as an unproblematic ‘second nature’) 
and with integrity from ‘the people’, as ‘folk’ musics ‘of the people’, ‘by the 
people’, ‘for the people’ which may, or may not, receive (as texts) commercial 
attentions, mediation and quantifiable ‘popular acclaim’ in sales charts; or are, 
alternatively, musics made for the people - a calculated production or a calculated 
cooption o f local ‘ folk’ forms by a ‘culture industry’. Might we add an additional 
popular form form, that brought into being by the ‘cultural subsidy’ of the BBC?
The BBC it can be argued delivers both popular musics o f  the people, 
popular musics fo r  the people but also commissioned sessions from new talent.
Chris Cutler (1993, 4-17) sets down the common means of identifying 
popular music and touches on the importance of folk, art and pop discourses (by 
implication, somewhat taste-inflected) for its constitution. We see such discourses 
operating within the BBC.
When the early BBC and Reith chose to identify and evaluate popular 
musics, particularly those that were American and dance-orientated, they did so 
from an at once parochial and European high-art perspective. Many popular 
musics were dismissed as unsophisticated and ephemeral. Any popular music 
heard on the early BBC was fiercely vetted and frequently neutered. It could not 
be vulgar and hedonistic but had to be decorous, improving and light on the ear. 
When the early BBC discussed and evaluated popular musics from a 
compensatory perspective, it regarded them as commercial and false but also as a
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necessary evil, providing pleasure and relaxation at the end of hard day. Philip 
Rayner (2001) identified what he termed “cultural dissonance” between the 
BBC’s aims for the Light programme (1945 - 55); and actual usage. His surveys 
reveal how it was used in everyday life, pointing to those listeners who felt that 
their experiences were unimportant, or did not fit with the stereotype of family 
listening.
The postwar period as a whole was, for much of the industrialised West, 
one o f significant economic and social recovery, frequently in the politico- 
economic and cultural ambit of a buoyant United States. Wartime American 
Forces radio for example had widened the musical diet o f British audiences, 
whilst domestic broadcasting in Britain became the prime channel for information 
and entertaining family distractions. Wartime faith in the ability and integrity of 
the masses and in their music and humour had seen the BBC seek to reevaluate 
and follow popular taste, admitting more o f it to the microphone.
In a post-colonial Britain of the late 1940s and early 1950s, hesitant 
industrial realignment, maturing welfare state and educational provision 
eventually supported growing consumer affluence and distinctive sub-cultural 
expression in youthful, popular quarters. Much of this creativity was, by the late 
1950s and 1960s driven, or at least allied to civil rights activity and counter- 
cultural alternatives. Consumerism and creative activity centering around 
independence, individual and collective identities. They were coopted by market 
forces, and studied by cultural and social commentators. Eventually, by the late 
1960s, they were being represented, and in some degree produced in the 
increasingly pluralistic and progressive schedules of public sector broadcasting.
Progressive popular musics -  in part promoted by the BBC - grew out of a 
dialectic with a Western and non-Western socio-cultural landscape, with the 
recording industry; Western compositional traditions, musical instrument 
producers, and mass tastes. Peel, as an observer of this pluralistic advance played 
‘authentic’ older recordings, British blues revival material or radical, ‘progressive’ 
compositions. By playing music rejected by mainstream a moment of immanent 
cultural critique of ‘day-time’ output, a wider social critique and an invitation to 
young audiences to hearken and think occurs. Peel’s playlists did contrast sharply 
and deliberately with daytime playlists and, o f course, gave the BBC an
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opportunity to play the quality and quantity game when it came to justifying its 
continued existence.
Radio 1, created at the behest o f Harold Wilson’s Labour Government had 
appeared at a time when education, popular music and Pirate radio occupied 
working group and Cabinet discussion. One suggestion was to introduce BBC 
Radio 1 as a short-term arrangement, prior to the formation of a new radio 
corporation and network which, with some advertising revenue would provide 
both a pop channel and another delivering a University of the Air (See Briggs 
1995, 563). This potential dalliance of pop, pedagogy and commerce never took 
place. W ilson’s socialist government though populist by calculation was perhaps 
hamstrung by old-school paternalism and over-ambition. The BBC was quick to 
defend its new station and its potential to reflect and shape an evolving cultural 
landscape:
The audience for Radio 1 has amply confirmed that there is a demand for pop 
music, as distinct from the more traditional styles of lighter music. Any 
deficiencies which may be alleged against Radio 1 arise from shortage of 
resources and limitations on the use of records, not from any BBC inhibitions. 
(British Broadcasting Corporation 1969, 3)
Notes
1. According to twentieth-century criteria [...] humanity consists less in making the heterogeneous 
more homogeneous than in mutual acceptance [...] If so, the search in musical esthetics (as a 
derivation of the idea of humanity) for an underlying foundation common to the sonic phenomena 
of all ages and continents is less important than an awareness and mutual recognition of utterly 
different principles of formation. Dalhaus adds: The driving force behind the idea of ‘music’ (in 
the singular) - itself a result of ‘history’ (in the singular) - was the classical utopia of humanity 
that, in Kant’s Critique o f Judgment formed the basis of an esthetics in which judgments of taste 
are ‘subjective’ but nevertheless ‘universal’ to the extent that subjectivities strive to converge in a 
sensus communis (Dalhaus 1998,243-4).
2. Bom traces such a distinction to historical conditions: “ ‘Serious’, ‘art’, ‘classical’, ‘modem’, 
‘avant-garde’ she observes are “drawn from the discourse of high music culture [and] refer 
interchangeably to the whole historical body of high-cultural and professional musics of church, 
court and concert. As ‘emic’ concepts the terms are used both descriptively and evaluatively: these 
musics are given high value often by implicit contrast with the ‘other’ of ‘low’ musical cultures - 
folk, popular, and mass commercial musics” Bom (1995, n. 12,342).
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